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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mckinney v. Pategreen1 sentence2007These include the claims that the trending methodology was arbitrary and that use of it was contrary to law. 28 As to the due process claim set out in the petitions, the posture on remand is *967 dictated by the principle that government “must have the opportunity to ‘remedy the procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in the appropriate fora ... [such as] state courts’ before being subjected to a claim alleging a procedural due process violation.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc)); see al | 1 | 1 |
Judicial Complaint, In Re:green1 sentence2007These include the claims that the trending methodology was arbitrary and that use of it was contrary to law. 28 As to the due process claim set out in the petitions, the posture on remand is *967 dictated by the principle that government “must have the opportunity to ‘remedy the procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in the appropriate fora ... [such as] state courts’ before being subjected to a claim alleging a procedural due process violation.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc)); see al | 1 | 1 |
Greenfield Mills, Incorporated v. Macklingreen1 sentence2007These include the claims that the trending methodology was arbitrary and that use of it was contrary to law. 28 As to the due process claim set out in the petitions, the posture on remand is *967 dictated by the principle that government “must have the opportunity to ‘remedy the procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in the appropriate fora ... [such as] state courts’ before being subjected to a claim alleging a procedural due process violation.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc)); see al | 1 | 1 |
Boddie v. Connecticutgreen2 sentences2002See Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances,” but rather it is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands”); see also Boddie, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. 780 (“The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings”). 2002See Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances,” but rather it is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands”); see also Boddie, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. 780 (“The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings”). | 1 | 1 |
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craftgreen2 sentences2002See id. at 81, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (“when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he [or she] has to say,” erroneous deprivations of liberty and property may be avoided); see also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. *542 Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 , 98 S.Ct. 1554 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (“[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he [or she] who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his [or her] allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal”) (citations omitted). 10 The Supreme Court has stressed 2002See id. at 81, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (“when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he [or she] has to say,” erroneous deprivations of liberty and property may be avoided); see also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. *542 Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 , 98 S.Ct. 1554 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (“[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he [or she] who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his [or her] allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal”) (citations omitted). 10 The Supreme Court has stressed | 1 | 1 |
Fuentes v. Shevingreen1 sentence2002See id. at 81, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (“when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he [or she] has to say,” erroneous deprivations of liberty and property may be avoided); see also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. *542 Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 , 98 S.Ct. 1554 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (“[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he [or she] who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his [or her] allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal”) (citations omitted). 10 The Supreme Court has stressed | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2002See Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances,” but rather it is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands”); see also Boddie, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. 780 (“The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings”). 2002See Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances,” but rather it is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands”); see also Boddie, supra, 401 U.S. at 378 , 91 S.Ct. 780 (“The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings”). | 1 | 1 |
Helen Campo v. The New York City Employees' Retirement System and the City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1 |
Kathy Jo Taylor, a Minor, by and Through David S. Walker, Jr., Attorney at Law as Guardian Ad Litem v. James G. Ledbetter, ph.d.green2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs”); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) (“Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely.”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). . 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1 |
Easter House, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation v. Thomas Felder, Florence McGuire and Joan Satoloegreen2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1 |
Ingraham v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1 |
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.green2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs”); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) (“Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely.”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). . 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs”); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) (“Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely.”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matthew Lockary v. Paul Kayfetz Victor Amoroso Mary Lowry Diana Lopez Fransworth Frederick B. McClellan Peter Warshall v. Pacific Legal Foundation
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 1179 . 1998Id. at 1179 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
John W. Vicory v. Robert R. Walton, Sheriff of Butler County and John F. Holcomb, Butler County Prosecutor
green
2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cristall v. Superior Court of California
green
2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sonnenberg v. United States
green
2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Easter House v. Felder
green
2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Western States Petroleum Ass'n v. Sonoma County
green
2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Celotex Corp. v. Grimes
green
2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Vaughn v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ledbetter v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs”); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) (“Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely.”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). . 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs”); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) (“Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely.”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hudson v. Palmer
green
2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Daniels v. Williams
green
2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Parratt v. Taylor
red
2 sentences1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Galloway v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
green
2 sentences1994See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir.1990) (§ 1983 action not foreclosed simply because state provides alternative forum for relief; however, alternative relief may furnish adequate due process, leaving no basis for § 1983 action), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 , 111 S.Ct. 783 , 112 L.Ed.2d 846 (1991); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.1988) (conclusion that “a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting” does not "offend the doctrine of nonexhaustion of state remedies”), cert. denied, 48 1994See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. at 1156 (state may eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether "just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir.1987) ("Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had a right to rely."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1337 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). [17] See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 14 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Chuck Keough v. Tate County Board of Education
green
1 sentence1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Door v. Donaldson, Postmaster General
green
2 sentences1982In Door v. Donaldson, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 188 , 195 F.2d 764 (1952), the court reviewed a procedural due process challenge to proceedings through which the Postmaster General determined that certain mail was obscene. 1982In Door v. Donaldson, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 188 , 195 F.2d 764 (1952), the court reviewed a procedural due process challenge to proceedings through which the Postmaster General determined that certain mail was obscene. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.