Matter of Rivera v. New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 142 A.D.3d 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). · Go Syfert
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Matter of Rivera v. New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 142 A.D.3d 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tailored Fund Cap, LLC v. Gem Ventures, Inc. (nysupctnewyork, 2025-06-02)
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tailored Fund Cap, LLC v. Gem Ventures, Inc.
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2025 · confidence medium
Upon certain terms or in certain circumstances, law office failure may constitute a reasonable excuse (Hertz Vehicles, LLC v Mollo, 171 AD3d 651 [1st Dept 2019]; Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kapitus Servicing, Inc. v. Temple Bldrs., LLC
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2025 · confidence medium
NO. 21 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/08/2025 terms or in certain circumstances, law office failure may constitute a reasonable excuse (Hertz Vehicles, LLC v Mollo, 171 AD3d 651 [1st Dept 2019]; Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Navarro v. Joy Constr. Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · confidence medium
Moreover, the assertion by plaintiff's counsel that two of the court's notices were inadvertently routed to counsel's spam folder constitutes an excusable law office failure ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hamilton v. Basketball City N.Y. LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · confidence medium
Given the lack of prejudice to defendants and considering the strong public policy of deciding cases on the merits, the court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the default judgment ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 465 [1st Dept 2016]; Goodwin , 78 AD3d at 551 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Table Run Estates, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
Accordingly, in view of the strong public policy of disposing of cases on their merits, the motion court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendants' motion to vacate the judgment ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 465 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Table Run Estates, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
Accordingly, in view of the strong public policy of disposing of cases on their merits, the motion court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendants' motion to vacate the judgment ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 465 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alliance for Progress, Inc. v. Blondell Realty Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Even if plaintiff is correct that defendant's counsel simply failed to monitor the calendar for this case, we agree with the motion court that defendant established the reasonable excuse of law office failure for its default, especially given the absence of any evidence of wilful or contumacious conduct on its part ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]) and the absence of any prejudice to plaintiff from the vacatur of the default ( see Mutual Mar.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Neely v. Felicetti
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Defendants' explanation that their October 20, 2017 email forwarding plaintiff's summons and complaint to their counsel was not received may explain their failure to timely answer ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hertz Vehicles, LLC v. Mollo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Defendants satisfied the requirements of CPLR 3012(d), which authorizes an extension of time to appear or plead "upon such terms as may be just and upon a showing of reasonable excuse for delay or default." Here, the delay in filing an answer was occasioned by law office failure, which can constitute a reasonable excuse ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Genesis R. v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
The court providently exercised its discretion in vacating DOE's default based on law office failure ( see Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) US Bank National Ass'n v. Richards
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Price v Polisner, 172 AD2d 422, 423 [1st Dept 1991]; Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 142 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2016]; Cheri Rest.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Duverney v. City of New York
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
For example, respondents rely on Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation ( 142 AD3d 463, 464-465 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Notte Restaurant Corp. v. 1626 Second Avenue, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
The motion court providently exercised its discretion in vacating the defaults (Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 142 AD3d 463, 465 [1st Dept 2016]), given that public policy favors the resolution of cases on the merits (id.), that Salsberg provided a reasonable excuse for the defaults (id. at 464), that it has already been determined that issues of fact exist concerning the lease and guaranty at issue in the two actions (see 1626 Second Ave.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Carlos Rivera, Respondent,
v.
New York City Department of Sanitation Et Al., Appellants
1595N 155455/13.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Aug 18, 2016.
142 A.D.3d 463
Sweeny, Acosta, Feinman, Kapnick, Webber.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published

[*464] Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.), entered June 10, 2014, upon respondents’ purported default, granting the petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul respondents’ determination, dated February 14, 2013, which terminated petitioner’s probationary employment as a sanitation worker, and order, same court, Justice and date of entry, which denied respondents’ motion to vacate the default judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion to vacate the default judgment granted, the petition denied, and the proceeding dismissed.

CPLR 5015 (a) (1) requires a movant seeking to vacate a default to move within one year of entry of the default and to show a reasonable excuse for the default as well as a meritorious defense (see Youni Gems Corp. v Bassco Creations Inc., 70 AD3d 454, 455 [1st Dept 2010], lv dismissed 15 NY3d 863 [2010]). Respondents timely moved to vacate the default. It should be noted that petitioner did not oppose the application.

On the merits, respondents cite “law office failure” as a reason for the default. Under certain circumstances, law office failure may provide a reasonable excuse for a default (see e.g. Goodwin v New York City Hous. Auth., 78 AD3d 550, 551 [1st Dept 2010]). At oral argument, respondents essentially conceded that, in this e-filed case, their office failed to regularly check its email and, as a result, was unaware of the motion court’s order that gave rise to the default. Respondents’ excuse was sufficiently particularized and there is no evidence of wilful or contumacious conduct on their part (see Reyes v New York City Hous. Auth., 236 AD2d 277, 279 [1st Dept 1997]).

Additionally, respondents have demonstrated the existence of a meritorious defense. Petitioner was a probationary employee who was arrested and charged with DWI while still on probationary status. His commercial driver’s license, a requirement for a sanitation worker, was suspended and then revoked as a result. Several disciplinary complaints were filed as a result of this incident and he was subsequently terminated.

“A probationary employee may be discharged without a hearing or a statement of reasons, in the absence of a demonstration that [his] termination was made in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law” (Matter of Turner v Horn, 69 AD3d 522, 522 [1st Dept 2010]). The record before us clearly establishes that there were legitimate reasons for terminating petitioner’s[*465] employment, specifically, his arrest and the revocation of his license * (see Matter of Cipolla v Kelly, 26 AD3d 171 [1st Dept 2006]). This is a valid reason for termination even if the charges for which he was arrested were later withdrawn or dismissed (see e.g. Matter of Holder v Sielaff, 184 AD2d 228 [1st Dept 1992]).

Since respondents’ failure to timely file an answer was neither wilful, nor part of a pattern of dilatory behavior, and petitioner points to no evidence that the short (three month) period of default caused him to change his position, and he has demonstrated no other prejudice, and in view of the strong public policy of disposing of cases on their merits, the motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying respondents’ motion to vacate the default (DaimlerChrysler Ins. Co. v Seek, 82 AD3d 581 [1st Dept 2011]).

Concur — Sweeny, J.P., Acosta, Feinman, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.
*

Although petitioner claims that his license has since been restored, this claim is dehors the record and cannot be considered by us (Vick v Albert, 47 AD3d 482, 484 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 707 [2008]).