Doe defendant in New York

2021The court next dismissed plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants, stating that his remaining allegations amounted to no more than "intermittent conduct that is not actionable." This Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the allegations in the complaint, if proven, would constitute "a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint" ( Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 497-98 [1st Dept 2014]).

2021The court next dismissed plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants, stating that his remaining allegations amounted to no more than "intermittent conduct that is not actionable." This Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the allegations in the complaint, if proven, would constitute "a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint" ( Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 497-98 [1st Dept 2014]).

2013The Supreme Court (Aliotta, J.) granted the DOE’s motion in its entirety, concluding that it could not be held liable on a negligent supervision theory because Jonathan was not in its physical custody at the time of his injury, and that it could not be held vicariously liable for Timothy’s alleged negligence because she was an independent service provider ( 29 Misc 3d 579 [2010]).

2013VI In an order dated May 24, 2010, the Supreme Court granted the DOE’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety ( 29 Misc 3d 579 [2010]).

2013Servs., LLC, 99 AD3d 448 , 450 [1st Dept 2012]; Rosado v Phipps Houses Servs., Inc., 93 AD3d 597, 597 [1st Dept 2012]).

2013Servs., LLC, 99 AD3d 448 , 450 [1st Dept 2012]; Rosado v Phipps Houses Servs., Inc., 93 AD3d 597, 597 [1st Dept 2012]).

2026Significantly, the deposition testimony of the school employees, including regarding their failure to prepare an individual safety plan for J.A., failed to eliminate triable issues of fact concerning whether the DOE defendants took adequate steps to supervise the plaintiff and prevent the incidents that led to J.A.'s injuries (<i>see</i> <i>Sclafani v Young Adult Institute, Inc.</i>, 240 AD3d at 818; <i>J.S. v Ramapo</i>, 205 AD3d at 949; <i>Nizen-Jacobellis v Lindenhurst Union Free School District</i>, 191 AD3d at 1008 ).

2026Significantly, the deposition testimony of the school employees, including regarding their failure to prepare an individual safety plan for J.A., failed to eliminate triable issues of fact concerning whether the DOE defendants took adequate steps to supervise the plaintiff and prevent the incidents that led to J.A.'s injuries (<i>see</i> <i>Sclafani v Young Adult Institute, Inc.</i>, 240 AD3d at 818; <i>J.S. v Ramapo</i>, 205 AD3d at 949; <i>Nizen-Jacobellis v Lindenhurst Union Free School District</i>, 191 AD3d at 1008 ).

2026The Adequate Supervision of J.A.</i></p> <p>In examining the question of whether J.A. was adequately supervised, that determination "'depends largely on the circumstances attending the event'" (<i>Sclafani v Young Adult Inst., Inc</i>., 240 AD3d 816 , 817 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting <i>Mei Kay Chan v City of Yonkers</i>, 34 AD3d 540, 541 ).

2026Moreover, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the DOE defendants consequated the students allegedly harassing J.A. in an effort to stop their pattern of harassing and assaultive behavior, other than Cineus stating that she spoke to all of the students in J.A.'s classes and asked them to be kind to one another.</p> <p>Under these circumstances, the DOE defendants failed to establish that any lack of supervision on their part was not a proximate cause of J.A.'s injuries (<i>see</i> <i>RT v Three Village School Central School District</i>, 153 AD3d 747 ).

2026Moreover, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the DOE defendants consequated the students allegedly harassing J.A. in an effort to stop their pattern of harassing and assaultive behavior, other than Cineus stating that she spoke to all of the students in J.A.'s classes and asked them to be kind to one another.</p> <p>Under these circumstances, the DOE defendants failed to establish that any lack of supervision on their part was not a proximate cause of J.A.'s injuries (<i>see</i> <i>RT v Three Village School Central School District</i>, 153 AD3d 747 ).

2026Since the DOE defendants failed to demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them based on lack of notice, this Court need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' submission in opposition (<i>see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.</i>, 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 ).</p> <p><i>2.

2026Instead, the evidence indicates that despite their notice and knowledge, employees of the DOE defendants were indifferent to the harassment that J.A. was enduring, describing the incidents as merely the type that happen constantly at a middle school and testifying that they did not believe J.A.'s safety was at risk.</p> <p>Given that the DOE defendants failed to demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to <span>[*8]</span>judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them based on a showing that they provided J.A. with adequate supervision, this Court need n

2025Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Doe for failure to provide an offering plan and failure to be incorporated “The mootness doctrine precludes courts from considering questions which, although once active, have become academic by the passage of time or by a change in circumstances.” In re Melinda D., 31 A.D.3d 24 (2d Dept. 2006).

2022Fund , 83 AD3d 446, 446-447 ).

2022As Cardinale effectively concedes in her appellate brief: "proof of [actual] delegations" from the Chancellor to the principal of Cardinale's school would not be relevant in this case because that issue "was never disputed." Indeed, Cardinale acknowledges on appeal that "[t]he issue was never whether the Chancellor and/or [subordinates] had properly delegated [the] authority." Under the circumstances, in the absence of any cognizable basis for relief asserted in the petition ( see CPLR 7511[b]), the court should have granted the DOE's motion pursuant to CPLR 404(a) and 3211(a)(7) to dismiss th

2018The Charter Schools' Challenge to DOE Oversight Three Success Academy charter schools applied and were approved for inclusion in the DOE's consolidated program for the{**32 NY3d at 449} 2015-2016 school year, subject to completion and registration of the DOE contract, as providers of 72 pre-k seats. [FN10] Success Academy failed to sign the contracts but commenced the pre-k programs, despite the DOE's warnings that it could not guarantee payment without a signed contract registered with the State Comptroller, and that Success Academy was operating "at [its] own risk." When the DOE denied reimb

2018Corp ., 134 AD3d 792, 793 ), the complaint fails to state a cause of action sounding in fraud, as the plaintiffs do not allege that the DOE defendants made any false representation of fact to them upon which they relied to their detriment ( see Swartz v Swartz , 145 AD3d 818 ; MacBeth v New York Racing Assn ., 141 AD2d 805, 806 ; Ginsburg Dev.

2018Corp ., 134 AD3d 792, 793 ), the complaint fails to state a cause of action sounding in fraud, as the plaintiffs do not allege that the DOE defendants made any false representation of fact to them upon which they relied to their detriment ( see Swartz v Swartz , 145 AD3d 818 ; MacBeth v New York Racing Assn ., 141 AD2d 805, 806 ; Ginsburg Dev.

2018Cos., LLC v Carbone , 134 AD3d 890, 892 ; Mariano v Fiorvante , 118 AD3d 961 ).

2018Cos., LLC v Carbone , 134 AD3d 890, 892 ; Mariano v Fiorvante , 118 AD3d 961 ).

2018We also agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the subject branch of Child Center's cross motion ( see McDonald v Sunstone Assoc ., 39 AD3d 603, 605 ).

2018Care , 236 AD2d 380, 381 ).

2018The DOE defendants' own submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the DOE took the appropriate measures to evaluate Denice's employment and fitness at the time he was allowed to intern at the school ( see Giangrasso v Association for Help of Retarded Children , 243 AD2d 680 ; Pratt v Ocean Med.

2018The DOE defendants' own submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the DOE took the appropriate measures to evaluate Denice's employment and fitness at the time he was allowed to intern at the school ( see Giangrasso v Association for Help of Retarded Children , 243 AD2d 680 ; Pratt v Ocean Med.

2018However, in an order dated November 15, 2016, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, reinstated the arbitration award, and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court to provide the DOE defendants with the opportunity to serve and file an answer pursuant to CPLR 404(a), in which it may address allegations that, inter alia, "the arbitration award was procured through fraud or misconduct" ( Matter of Clarke v New York City Dept. of Educ ., 144 AD3d 500 ).

2018The timely filing of a notice of claim upon the DOE defendants within 90 days of the accrual date of the causes of action was a prerequisite condition to commencing this plenary action against them ( see Education Law § 3813[2]; General Municipal Law § 50-e; Chtchannikova v City of New York , 138 AD3d 908 ; Quinn v Wallkill Cent.

2018Under these circumstances, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the causes of action sounding in fraud insofar as asserted against the DOE defendants ( see Chtchannikova v City of New York , 138 AD3d 908 ).

2018Corp ., 134 AD3d 792, 793 ), the complaint fails to state a cause of action sounding in fraud, as the plaintiffs do not allege that the DOE defendants made any false representation of fact to them upon which they relied to their detriment ( see Swartz v Swartz , 145 AD3d 818 ; MacBeth v New York Racing Assn ., 141 AD2d 805, 806 ; Ginsburg Dev.

2015Corp., 10 AD3d 340, 341 [1st Dept 2004]; Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261 [1st Dept 2002]).