v.
State
ACCEPTED
12-15-00099-CR TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 8/5/2015 4:25:15 PM CATHY LUSK CLERK
CAUSE NO. 12-15-00099-CR
IN THE COU RT O F APPEA LS FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TYLER, TEXAS TWELFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 8/5/2015 4:25:15 PM AT TYLER CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
DAR RIAN DEW AYN E JO HNS ON, J R., Appellant vs.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On Appeal from Criminal Cause No. 18851 in the 2nd Judicial District Court of Cherokee County, Texas
ANDERS BRIEF
ORAL ARGUM ENT IS NOT REQUESTED
LAW OFFICE OF FORREST K. PHIFER
P.O. Box 829 /S/ Forrest K. Phifer Rusk, Texas 75785-0829 Forrest K. Phifer (903) 721-1842 SBN 15908570 Attorney for App ellant, Court Appointed
NO POINTS OF ERROR PRESENTED
1. The undersigned finds no legally or factually non-frivolous grounds for appeal reasonably calculated to return a judgment of modif ication or reversal. i
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the Justices of this Honorable Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
Darrian DeWayne Johns on, Jr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appellant/Defendant Jeff Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trial Counsel for Appellant Sten Langsjoen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Court Appointed Trial Counsel on Motion to Adjudicate for A ppellant Forrest K. Phifer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Court Appointed Ap pellate Counsel for Appellant The State of Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prosecuting Party Rachel Patton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . District Attorney, Cherokee County, Texas Charles Breaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assistant D istrict A ttorney, Cherokee County, Texas
Respectfully submitted, Forrest K. Phifer BY: /S/ Forrest K. Phifer SBN 15908570 Attorney f or Appellant on Ap peal, Court Appointed ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
NO POINTS OF ERROR PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i CERTIFICATE OF INTERE STED PAR TIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii TABLE OF CON TENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii TABLE OF AUT HORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii CONST ITUTIONA L PROVISION S, Statutes and Code of Criminal Procedure Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii STATEME NT OF THE C ASE
I. NATU RE OF TH E PRO CEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii II. SUMMA RY OF THE FA CTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi ARGUMENT (1988 ); see als o, And ers v C alifornia, 386 US at 744-45.
After a thorough and conscientious review of the record, the undersigned concludes that the appeal of the instant case is wholly frivolous and that there is found no legal or factual non-frivolous grounds for an appeal reasonably calculated to return a judgment of modif ication or reversal. Therefore, the und ersigned must resp ectf ully advise this Court of same and request permission to w ithdraw. Ande rs v Ca lifornia, 386 US at 7 44; Stafford v Sta te, 813 SW2d 503, 511 (Tex Crim App 1991); Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.01.
A. Suff icienc y of the ind ictme nt or misdemeanor information.
On May 28,2013 A ppellant was indicted for the criminal offense of Pos session of a Controlled Substance - Penalty Group 1. (CR vol 1, page 6) Texas Heakth & Safety Code §§ 481.102(3)(D) and 481.115(a) and (b) Appellant, by and through his attorney of record, filed his written waiver of arraignment and agreed to be arraigned at time of trial. (CR vol 1, page 8) The offense, as alleged in the information, constituted a State Jail Felony. Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.115(b). Punishment for a State Jail Felony has been set by our legis lature at confinement in a state jail facility of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, for a term not less than one hundred eighty (180) days, nor more than 2 years. Texas Penal Code § 12.35(a). In addition to confinement, a fine may be imposed in an amount not to exceed $10,000.00. Texa s Pen al Co de § 12.35(b).
The Indictment appear as to be in proper form and alleges s ufficient facts to apprise Appellant of the charges. Further, those charges are stated in substantial conformity with the cited statutes.
Both the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution require that a Defendant be given proper notice before trial of the “nature and cause” of the acc usation against him, and further requires that the notice be provided with sufficient clarity and detail as to enable the d efendant to anticip ate the State’s evidence and prepare a proper defense to it. Eastep v Sta te, 941 SW2nd 130, 132 (Tex Crim Ap p 1997) U nder Article I,§ 10, the requisite notice must come from the face of the charging ins trument. Id Thus, in this case, the Indictment must allege, in plain and intelligible language, all of the facts and circumstances necessary to establish all of the material elements of the offense alleged . Bynum v State , 767 SW2nd 76 9, 779 (Tex Crim Ap p 1989).
The fact that the incident occurred within the jurisdiction of the Court, comprising Cherokee County, Texas, w as expressly established by the Indictment (CR vol 1, page 6) and Appellant’s written Stipulation (CR vol 1, page 9)
The Motion to Adjudicate was precise in its notice of the violations alleged. (CR vol 1, page 20) B. Any adverse pretrial rulings, including but not limited to rulings on motions to suppress, m otions to quash, and m otions for speedy trial.
The undersigned finds no evidence that Appellant was arraigned p rior to his plea. An attorney representing a Defendant may present a waiver of arraignment, and the clerk of the court may not require the presence of the Defendant as a cond ition of accepting the waiver. To preserve error on appeal, the complaining party must make a timely, specific objec tion, and obtain a ruling on the objection. TRAP 33.1(a); Neal v State, 256 SW3rd 2 64, 279 (Tex C rim App 200 8); In Re A.D.A., 287 SW3rd 382, 387 (Tex App Texark ana 2009). N o objection was made. Furthermore, a plea of TRUE, standing alone, is sufficient to support a revocation of probation. Cole v State, 578 SW2nd 127, 128 (Tex Crim App 1979) Additional, Appellant waived his right by written agreement (CR vol 1, page 9)
C. Compliance with Texas Co de of Criminal Procedure article 26.13 and, if appropria te, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
The Ap pellant properly admonished in writing of his rights at the time of the original plea. (CR vol 1, page 9) At time of the hearing on the motion to adjudicate, the Court again admonished him concerning the revocation. (RR vol 2, page 1, line 1)
D. Whether the issue of competency w as raised prior to sentencing, so as to warrant an inquiry by the court, and whether appellant was mentally competent when the court accepted the plea.
The Court made a specific finding of the competence of Appellant. (CR vol 1, page 9) No other evidence suggests Appellant was not mentally competent at time of the hearing on the Motion to Adjudicate.
E. Whether appellant’s plea was freely and voluntarily made.
The Court made a specific finding that the plea was free and voluntary (CR vol 1, page 9). No other evidence suggests that Appellant’s plea w as not free and voluntary. Appellant was also represented by legal counsel who stated that he had previously counsel with Appellant concerning the plea and its consequences.(RR vol 2, page 4, line 4)
F. Any adverse rulings during the sentencing hearing on objections or motions.
There were no objections during the sentencing hearing.
G. Any failure on the part of a ppellant’s trial counsel to ob ject to fundamental error.
There is no evidence of fundamental error
H. Whether the sentence imposed was within the applicable range of punishment.
Appellant was charged with the criminal offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance - Penalty Group 1. (CR vol 1, page 6); Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.102(3)(D) and 481.115(a) and (b). The offens e, as alleged in the indictment, constituted a State Jail Felony. Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.115(b). Punishment for a State Jail Felony has been set by our legislature at confinem ent in a state jail facility of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, for a term not less than one hundred eighty (180) days, nor more than 2 years. Texas Penal Code § 12.35(a). In addition to confinement, a fine may be imposed in an amount not to exceed $10,000.00. Texa s Pen al Co de § 12.35(b). The Court assessed c onfinement in the State Jail Facility of TDCJ, ID for a period of two (2) years to b e consecutive with its companion case, cause # 19099. (RR vol 2, page 85, ,line 9) (CR 1 page 44) The punishment was within the permissible range.
I. Whether the written judgm ent accurately reflects the sentence that was imposed and w hether any credit was prope rly applied.
The judgment accurately reflects the sentence imposed and the proper credit earned. (CR vol 1,page 44)
J. Whether there is evidence to support a guilty plea in a felony case.
There is sufficient evidence to support a Guilty/True plea. A plea of TRUE, standing alone, is sufficient to support a revoca tion of probation. Cole v State, 578 SW2nd 127, 128 (Tex Crim App 1979) In addition to Appellant’s plea of TRUE, the State opened it case by introducing State’s exhibit 1, a certifica te of the analysis of the blood (concerning the DWI allegation set forth in the violation allegation paragraph 3 of the motion to adjudicate) which had been on file with the Court since the previous November 12 th, without any previous objection to its filing. (RR vol 2, page 7, page 20) H owever, Defense counsel objected at this time stating that they had already pled TRUE to the referenced allegation and that the plea therefore took the issue out of consideration, making the introduction bolstering. (RR vol 2, page 7, line 25). The Court overruled the objection. (RR vol 2, page 8, line 6) “A conviction rendered withou t sufficien t evidence to support a guilty plea constitutes a trial error.” (emphasis added) Menefee v State, 287 SW3rd 9, 14 (Tex Crim App 2009); Tex Code Crim Proc. Art. 1.15.
The State then called its first witness, Alan Schantz, the Appellant’s supervising probation officer. (RR vol 2, page 9, line 8) Schantz testified that his notes did not reflect that the Appellant had any problems understanding the terms of his probation. (RR vol 2, page 10, line 19) Schantz was not allowed to testify as to hearsay evidence concerning allegation of activity in Houston Couny. (RR vol 2, page 12, line 10)
Under cross-examination, Schantz testified that Appellant tested positive for drugs (RR vol 2, page 13, line 19) and that Appellant confessed to Schantz that he had been using drugs (RR vol 2, page 14,line 1) On re-direct, it was confirmed that the drugs for which App ellant tested positive were cocaine and marihuana. (RR vol 2, page 15, line 14)
The State’s second witness was Deputy Justin Link of the Houston County Sheriff’s office. (RR vol 2, page 17, line 6) Link testified that, while on patrol, he stopped the Appellant within Houston County on or about June 2, 2014 for driving erratically (RR vol 2, page 18, line 8) around 7:30 p.m. (RR vol 2, pag e 19, line 18) identifying the driver as the Appellant (RR vol 2, page 23, line 12) Link further testified that when he approached A ppellant he could smell the strong odor of marihuana (RR vol 2, page 24, line 18) and that Ap pellant admitted that he smoked “K2" earlier. (RR vol 2, page 24, line 23) His further testimony indicated that Appellant identified a bottle’s contents as “crack cocaine” (RR vol 2, page 26, line 8) and that the 27 pills contained therein were Xanax pills, for which he did not have a prescription (RR vol 2, page 27, line 1) Link also stated that Appellant confirmed that both the cocaine and the Xanax were for his (Appellant’s) personal use (RR vol 2, page 27, line 2) Officer Link testified that Appellant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance (RR vol 2, page 27, line 22 ) as well as for tamp ering with evidence since Appellant tried to throw the bottle away before he was stopped. (RR vol 2, page 28, line 1) Efforts to identify the contents of the bottle as cocaine by any other method other than Appellant’s statements were ruled inadmissable hearsay (RR vol 2, page 28, line 21) Defense counsel’s objection to Appellant’s statements concerning the bottle and its contents as in violation of Appellant’s Miranda rights were overruled. (RR vol 2, page 38, line 13). A discussion was ha d concerning whether the statements were made during a custodial interrogation and whether once Miranda had been read and the Appellant confirmed his previous statements and continued to answer questions whether that the statements were then made admissible. (RR vol 2, page 36, line 9)
During cross-examination, it was determined that when Officer Link had returned with the bottle which Appellant was seen throwing out of his vehicle, Link asked whether the bottle belonged to Appellant at which time Appellant identified what was inside of it. (RR vol 2, page 31, line 6 and page 35, line 15). “If a statement was admissible as res gestae the fact that it wa s made in resp onse to an inquiry, or while under arrest does not render the testimony inadmissible.” Harryman v State, 522 SW2nd 512, 516 (Tex Crim App 1975 ) Further, after making these statements Appellant was read his Miranda warnings, indicated that he understood them and continued to answer the officer’s questions concerning the narcotics. (RR vol 2, page 31, line 14)
K. Jury Selection.
The case was tried to the Court p ursuant to a waiver at the time of the underlying charge. The hearing on the Motion to Adj udicate w as tried to the Court
L. Examination of the record to de termin e if the appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel.
There is no evidence that counsel was ineffective. The Strickland standard has been adopted in Texas for resolving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel under both the federal and state constitutions. Hernandez v State, 726 SW2d . 53 (Tex Crim App 1986). Measured by subsequent developments, the prejudice prong creates a “but for” reasonableness standa rd, i.e., “but for” counsel’s unprofessionalism, a different result would have occurred. Even if Appellant demonstrates counsels’ unreasonable errors, he must show that they adversely affected the defense. Whether a fundamentally unfair result occurred becomes the focus for appellate review. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 66 8 (1984).
Among counsel's duties is that of making an independent investigation of the facts of his client's case. It is fundamental that an attorney must have a firm command of the facts of the case as w ell as the law before he can render reasonably effective assistance of counsel. A natural consequence of this notion is that counsel also has a responsibility to seek out and interview potential witnesses and failure to do so is to be ineffective, if not incompetent, where the result is that any viab le defense available to the accused is not advanced. Ex Parte Wellborn, 785 SW2d 3 91 (Tex Crim pp 1990 ); Butler v State, 716 SW2d 48, (Tex Crim App 1986)
Moreover, counsel has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. Thus a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceed ings. Id.
Counsel’s actions demonstrated knowledge of the facts of the case. He presented objections, with the Court susta ining most of them. (RR vol 2, page 7, line 25- bolstering/Denied; page 12, 10-hearsay/Sustained; page 12, line 25-hearsay/Sustained; page 28, line 22-hearsay/Sustained; page 36, line 9-Miranda/Denied.
Insofar as the bolstering objection, the State opened its case by introducing State’s exhibit 1, a certifica te of the analysis of the b lood (conc erning the DWI allegation set forth in the violation allegation paragraph 3 of the motion to adjudicate) which had been on file with the Court since the previous November 12 th, without any previous objection to its filing. (RR vol 2, page 7, page 20) However, Defense counsel objected at this time stating that they had already pled TRUE to the referenced allegation and that the plea therefore took the issue out of consideration, making the introduction bolstering. (RR vol 2, page 7, line 25). The Court overruled the objection. (RR vol 2, page 8, line 6) “A conviction rendered withou t sufficien t evidence to support a guilty plea constitutes a trial error.” (emphasis added) Menefee v State, 287 SW3rd 9, 14 (Tex Crim App 2009); Tex Code Crim Proc. Art. 1.15.
Insofar as the Miranda objection, Officer Link’s testimony indicated that Appellant identified a bottle’s contents as “crack cocaine” (RR vol 2, page 26, line 8) and that the 27 pills contained therein were Xanax pills, for which he did not have a prescription (RR vol 2, page 27, line 1) Link also stated that Appellant confirmed that both the cocaine and the Xanax were for his (Ap pellant’s) personal use (RR vol 2, page 27, line 2) Officer Link testified that Appellant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance (RR vol 2, page 27, line 22 ) as well as for tamp ering with evidence since Appellant tried to throw the bottle away before he was stopped. (RR vol 2, page 28, line 1) Efforts to identify the contents of the bottle as cocaine by any other method other than A ppellant’s statements were ruled inadmissable hearsay (RR vol 2, page 28, line 21) Defense counsel’s objection to Appellant’s statements concerning the bottle and its contents as in violation of App ellant’s Miranda rights were overruled. (RR vol 2, page 38, line 13). A discussion was had concerning whether the statements were made during a custodial interrogation and whether once Miranda had been read and the App ellant confirmed his previous statements and continued to answer questions whether that the statements were then made admissible. (RR vol 2, page 36, line 9)
During cross-examination, it was determined that when Officer Link had returned with the bottle which Appellant was seen throwing out of his vehicle, Link asked whether the bottle belonged to Appellant at which time Appellant identified what was inside of it. (RR vol 2, page 31, line 6 and page 35, line 15). “If a statement was admissible as res gestae the fact that it wa s made in resp onse to an inquiry, or while under arrest does not render the testimony inadmissible.” Harryman v State, 522 SW2nd 512, 516 (T ex Crim App 19 75) Further, after making these statements Appellant was read his Miranda warnings, indicated that he understood them and continued to answer the officer’s questions concerning the narcotics. (RR vol 2, page 31, line 14)
The record also reflected that he and his client spoke in depth about the procedural aspects of the case as well. (RR vol 2, page 4,line 4) Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully prays that this Court GRANTS Counsel’s Motion To Withdraw, notifies Appellant of this action and grant Appellant an opportunity to either hire legal counsel or file a response or brief pro se. In the event Appellant desires to f ile a response or brief pro se, Counsel would urge to Court to grant Appellant sufficient reasonable time for research and preparation of same.
Respectfully submitted, LAW OFFICE OF FORREST K. PHIFER Forrest K. Phifer P.O. Box 829 SBN 15908570 Rusk, Texas 75785-0829 (903) 721-1842 By: /S/ Forrest K. Phifer
Certificate of Compliance with TRAP 9.4(i)(3)
I, the undersigned certify that this brief contains 8,975 words.
BY: /S/ Forrest K. Phifer
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby c ertifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on the prosecuting attorney, Cherokee County, Cherokee County Courthouse, 135 South Main Street, Rusk, Cherokee County, Texas 75785 in accordance with the applicable Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure on August 5, 2015.
By: /S/ Forrest K. Phifer
APPENDIX