v.
Pampa Independent School District
ACCEPTED
07-14-00014-CV SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 3/26/2015 11:02:26 PM Vivian Long, Clerk
Case No. 07-14-00014-CV FILED IN 7th COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS In The Court of Appeals 3/26/2015 11:02:26 PM For The Seventh Court of Appeals District VIVIAN LONG Amarillo, Texas CLERK
REBECCA TERRELL
CHANDRASHEKHAR THANEDAR, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee
On Appeal From the 223rd District Court, Gray County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 35621
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Rebecca Terrell Chandrashekhar Thanedar 6503 Dancing Ct.
San Antonio, Texas 78244 (956) 445-3107 [email protected] Appellants
Oral Argument Requested
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellants: Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar Counsel for Appellants: Trial and Appellate Counsel Rebecca Terrell Chandrashekhar Thanedar Representing themselves (956) 445-3107 Appellee: Pampa Independent School District Counsel for Appellee: Trial and Appellate Counsel W. Wade Arnold State Bar No. 00783561 Andrea Slater Gulley Underwood, Wilson, Berry, Stein & Johnson, P.C. P. O. Box 9158 Amarillo, TX 79105-9158 (806) 379-0364 Telephone (806) 349-9474 Fax i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel……………………………………………….….....i Table of Contents………………………………………………………………......ii Index of Authorities………………………………………………………………..iv Statement of the Case…………………………………………………………...…ix Statement Regarding Oral Argument……………………………………………..xii Issues Presented………………………………………………………………….xiii Statement of Facts………………………………………………………………….1 Summary of the Argument………………………………………………………..15 Argument……………………………………………………………………….…18 1. Trial court’s failure to hold trial on 7 distinct causes of action violates TOMA and appellants’ absolute Constitutional rights……………………..18
2. Plaintiffs are entitled to Summary Judgment on 7 distinct causes of action and Declaratory Relief under §551.142(a)………………………..21
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to exclusion of evidence of SchoolCenter, BoardBook, or are entitled to continuance…………………………………26 4. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in their favor or their motions for new trial, to modify judgment, and for reconsideration should be granted……..30
5. PISD’s good faith claim is a fraud on the citizens and tax payers and courts requiring sanctions…………………………………………………..45 6. Denial of plaintiffs’ evidence led to rendition of incorrect judgment……...46
7. Attorney fee award to PISD is invalid and is not reasonable. PISD Forfeited and waived attorney fees when it refused to testify…………..…47 ii 8. Judge Lopez was disqualified from conducting trial…………………...…..55 9. Voidance and Special Damages…………………………………………....59 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...........60 Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………………………………………………61 Certificate of Compliance…………………………………………………............63 Certificate of Service………………………………………………………...........64 Appendix…………………………………………………………..………Attached iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Acker v. Texas Water Commission, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990)………………………………………..16-17, 23 Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse, 165 S.W. 3d 21, 24 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.], 2005)……………...29 Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)………………………………………….54 Austin Transportation Study Policy Advisory Committee v. Sierra Club, 843 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992)………………………………...25 B E & K Construction v. NLRB, 536 U.S.516 (2002)…………………………………………………….20, 51 Besing v. Moffitt, 882 S.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Tex. App.-Amarillo,1994)………………………...15 Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.731 (1983)………………………………………………………...51 Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989)…………………………………..27-29, 31 Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982)………………………………………….55 City of Bells v. Greater Texoma Uti!. Auth., 744 S.W.2d 636,640 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987)……………………...…….59 City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000)……………………………………..……49 City of Laredo v. Monsanto, 414 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. 2013)…………………………………………….....54 iv City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W. 2d 762,765 (Tex. 1991)………………………………………….17 Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001)…………………………………………..16 El Apple v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012)…………………………………………..49, 54 Elam v. State, 841 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992)…………………………..58 Ferris v. Texas Board Chiropractic Examiners, 808 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991)……………………....25, 59 Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965)………………………………………….16 Haddix v. American Zurich Ins. Co., 253 S.W.3d 339,345(Tex. App.--Eastland 2008)………………………….15 Hawkins v. Ehler, 100 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003)…………………..16, 49 Horton v. Horton, 965 S.W.2d 78, 85 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998)…………………………15 IKB Indus. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997)……………………………………….…15 Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Tex. 1983)………………………………………38 Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)…………..……………………………..35-37 Kirkpatrick v. Memorial Hosp., 862 S.W.2d 762, 775 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993)……………………………38 v Lovely v. State, 894 S.W.2d 99,103 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1995)…………………………58 Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279-280, Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, En Banc (1993)………………………….19 McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)……………………………..58 McElwee v.McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 185-87 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995)…………..55 Point Isabel ISD v. Hinojosa, 797 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.App-Corpus Christ 1990)……………..……………59 Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995)………………………………...………..24 Smith County v. Thornton, 726 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1986) …………………………………………………17 Stafford v. State, 948 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1997)………………...……..58 Tony Gullo Motors v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310-311 (Tex. 2006)………………………….………….48 Valdez v. Valdez, 930 S.W.2d 725, 732-33 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996)…………..50 Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 255-56 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.])………………....15 Wells v. Hutchinson, 499 F.Supp. 174, 198 (E.D. Tex. 1980)……………………………………60 Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules: Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (CPRC) vi 38.001……………………………………………………………………………..50 38.004……………………………………………………………..………………50 Texas Educ. Code §21.103………………………………………………..………13 Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure (TRAP) Rules 33.1(d)…………………...…15 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (TRCP) Rules 18(b)(a)………………………………………………………………………..…..55 166a………………………………...……………………………………………..19 166a(c)…………………………………………….………………………………24 193.5……………………………………………….……………….………….26-28 193.6……………………………………………………………………….26-29, 31 215(5)………………………………………………………………………….27-28 245……………………………………………………………………………….…9 296……………………………………………………………………………...…15 297……………………………………………………………………………...…15 301……………………………………………………………………………..….19 Texas Rules of Evidence 402…………………………………………………………………………..…32-33 602…………………………………………………………………………..…32-33 802……………………………………………………………………………..32-33 vii Texas Open Meetings Act, Tex. Gov’t Code Ch. 551 551.041………………..……………………………….…….9-10, 14, 18, 21-22, 48 551.043…………………………………………………..9-10, 14, 18, 23, 43, 47-48 551.043(b)(1)……………………………………………….……….………….…17 551.043(b)(3)……………………………………………….……………….….…17 551.045(d)………………………………………………………9, 11, 14, 18, 22, 48 551.051………………………………………………………….9, 14, 18, 20-21, 48 551.056…………………………………………………………………….18, 45-46 551.056(b)….………………………..1-2, 4, 8, 13, 28, 32, 34-35, 39, 42-45, 50, 56 551.056(d)………………………………7, 14, 17, 19, 26, 29, 31, 33, 35, 40-45, 56 551.074…………………………………………………………………..……18, 48 551.074(b)……………………………………………….….9, 11, 14, 18, 22-23, 46 551.101……………………………………………………...9, 11, 14, 18, 22, 46-48 551.101(2)…………………………………………………………………………22 551.141…………………………………………………………………….17, 24-25 551.142………….……………………………………………………………..48-49 551.142(a)………….……………………………………………….9, 14, 18-20, 48 551.142(b)…………………………………………………………….12, 48, 50, 52 Texas Public Information Act Tex. Gov’t Code Ch. 552………………………….3 viii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: This lawsuit is brought pursuant to Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), Texas Government Code, Chapter 551 and was filed on 5/29/2009. Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar (appellants, plaintiffs, or Terrell) sued Pampa Independent School District (PISD) to void PISD’s actions taken in violation of Sections 551.041, 551.043, 551.045, 551.051, 551.056(b) and (d), 551.074, and 551.101 for 22 Meetings from August 13, 2008 to May 19, 2009 and to seek mandamus, declaratory relief, and permanent injunction under Sec. 551.142(a) among other relief against PISD. (Appendices 5 and 6).1, 2
Trial Court: 223rd District Court, Gray County, Texas, Hon. Abe Lopez, assigned Judge. Previously presided by Judges Lee Waters and Phil Vanderpool.
Course of Proceedings: A summary judgment granted to PISD by Judge Lee Waters on 5/14/2010 was reversed by this Court and the case was remanded to trial court. Appendix19. Judge Waters retired during the pendency of the appeal.
1 Clerk’s record and reporter’s record for this the second appeal are denoted as “CR” and “RR” respectively, followed by page number(s). Supplemental clerk and reporter records are identified by the order in which they were filed.
Plaintiffs’ exhibits for final trial on 10/9/2013 are denoted as “PX” followed by the exhibit number. The final trial transcript found in reporter’s record volume 2 filed on 3/24/14 is referred to as “Trial Transcript” followed by page numbers. Please note trial exhibit PX1 (original) was filed on 10/8/14 along with supplemental reporter’s record. PX13 and PX15 were filed by the reporter on 10/9/14. 2 The clerk’s record on appeal from the First Appeal (007-10-00212-CV) is already on file with the Court and is denoted by “CR” followed by notation First Appeal. Plaintiffs request that the clerk’s record on file in First Appeal be considered in this appeal. ix
The new presiding judge of the 223rd court Judge Phil Vanderpool recused himself upon motion to recuse filed by appellants on September 26, 2012. Retired Judge Abe Lopez was assigned to the case on October 15, 2012. A trial was conducted in this case on October 9, 2013 on the issue of PISD’s violation of TOMA §551.056(b) only with respect to 11 meetings from January 15, 2009 to May 19, 2009, but not for 11 meetings from 8/2008 to 12/2008. Judge Lopez refused to conduct a trial on all other causes of action arising out of PISD’s distinct violations of TOMA sections 551.041, 551.043, 551.045, 551.051, 551.074, and 551.101 in this case. PISD’s counsel refused to testify or provide evidence of attorney fees at the trial. The final judgment for PISD was signed by Judge Lopez on October 25, 2013 and he awarded PISD $30,000 in attorney fees and costs by reviewing the file. See Appendix20. Judge Lopez made Findings of Fact (FOF) and Conclusions of Law (COL) upon request by appellants. Appendix21. Appellants timely filed motion for new trial (Appendix1), motion to modify judgment (Appendix2), motion for reconsideration(Appendix3), and request for amended FOF and COL (Appendix4). Trial court took no action on them. On September 26, 2014, Judge Lopez held a hearing on lost or destroyed trial exhibits as ordered by the appeals court.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals: Appellants filed their first appeal on May 24, 2010 in the Seventh Court of Appeals, Amarillo. Trial court’s judgment x was reversed and remanded. Appendix19. A mandamus petition by appellants for post remand discovery and hearing on motions was denied by this Court in September 2013.
On January 17, 2014, appellants filed their second appeal in this case. Appellants filed an amended notice of appeal in this case. Appendix18. On July 18, 2014, the Court abated the appeal and remanded the case to determine whether certain trial exhibits were lost or destroyed and to determine the fault for the destruction or loss. Trial court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stating the exhibits were lost or destroyed, by no fault of appellants. See 2nd supplemental clerk’s record. Duplicates of lost or destroyed exhibits were filed with the appeals court by visiting court reporter in October 2014.
Proceedings before 9th Administrative Judicial Region: Appellants filed a motion to disqualify and recuse Judge Abe Lopez from sitting in the hearing ordered by the court of appeals, which was denied by the 9th regional administrative Judge Kelly Moore in September 2014. xi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
This is the second appeal in this case in the last 6 years. This case has been strung along for years of intentional inaction and obstruction. Appellants believe oral argument would be of benefit to the Court at this stage to clarify these facts and legal arguments.
An oral argument in the first appeal in this case was denied. An oral argument then, would have made it abundantly clear to the Court that PISD neither had the intention, evidence, nor argument concerning whether “printing” notices changed the electronic properties of the PDF documents in question – a matter on which this court remanded the case.
As our brief makes clear, this case involves several matters of first impression in the history of TOMA jurisprudence e.g. document properties of website internet notices concerning §551.056(b) and issues concerning §551.056(d). Appellants’ pro se status should not be a hindrance. xii
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Trial court’s failure to hold trial on seven distinct causes of action violates TOMA and appellants’ absolute constitutional rights.
2. TOMA requires Exact and Literal compliance with its provisions; Further, good faith defense under §551.056(d) requires clear and convincing standard.
3. Trial court erred in refusing to void PISD’s actions and meetings in violation of TOMA. Terrell is entitled to voidance of her termination action done in 3/26/2009 meeting and entitled to mandamus ordering reinstatement of Terrell to her previous position as a teacher and to back wages and benefits
4. All PISD actions taken in meetings held in violation of TOMA’s notice provisions are voidable and plaintiffs are entitled to their voidance. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in their favor on all causes of action.
5. Plaintiffs have proven their good faith under TOMA §551.142.
6. Trial court erred in ruling that front door is bulletin board within the meaning of §551.051 under TOMA. PISD’s posting of board meeting notices on the front door violates TOMA.
7. Trial court erred in refusing to void PISD’s actions for failure to comply for 9 months with internet posting requirement of §551.056(b). 8. Trial court erred in refusing to deny PISD’s claim of “Good Faith” exception under §551.056(d) for 11 Meetings for five months in 2009. PISD’s good faith claim is a fraud on citizens and courts requiring sanctions. 9. PISD’s meeting notices with incomplete description of Place violate notice provisions of TOMA and such meetings and actions therein must be voided. 10. §551.045(d) requires a designated or authorized person to sign and post board meeting notices; alternatively, this violation is a disputed material fact. 11. Trial court erroneously refused to void Terrell’s termination action in 3/26/09 Board meeting in violation of TOMA; whether or not Terrell had individual notice and her attendance at the meeting are irrelevant. xiii
12. The trial court erred in denying requested relief when undisputed evidence shows PISD illegally closed the 3/26/2009 meeting to public and violated §551.074(b) by deliberating Terrell’s employment contract outside of meeting.
13. Trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ second motion for summary judgment, MSJ, and motions for new trial or grant continuance, to modify judgment, for reconsideration, and denying request for amended and additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Further, trial court erred when it denied hearing on the newly discovered evidence. Trial court erred when it denied post-remand discovery and denied plaintiffs’ certain trial exhibits, such denial causing rendition of incorrect judgment.
14. Terrell is the substantially prevailing party and should be awarded litigation costs, fees, and special damages.
15. This Court should award Terrell special damages and impose sanctions on PISD due to PISD’s systematic and conscious violations of TOMA and to ensure voluntary and willing compliance with TOMA by government bodies.
16. Award of attorney fees of $30,000 to PISD is invalid and unreasonable, further PISD forfeited and waived attorney fees. 17. Assigned trial judge Lopez was disqualified from conducting trial in this case.
18. Plaintiffs are interested persons under TOMA
19. Evidence concerning SchoolCenter, BoardBook, and Lee Carter must be excluded, or continuance granted. Further, bare assertions, hearsay and irrelevant evidence must be barred. Trial court erred in considering such evidence.
20. PISD’s missing link issue is irrelevant because PISD untimely created internet notices in May 2009; and copying or transferring the link onto new website was not a technical problem and was not beyond the control of PISD for 5 months
21. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on 7 distinct causes of action, and declaratory relief under section 551.142(a). xiv TO THE HONORABLE SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
This appeal raises important issues for this Court and Texas citizens. This Court will decide whether Texas Open Meetings Act still is worth the exact and literal compliance standard citizens and taxpayers of Texas demanded a long time ago. Citizens will decide whether they should and can rely on TOMA and can take its promise of sunshine law seriously and will courts even rule on the violations. Will citizens be heard against government bodies and their lawyers? Texas Open Meetings Act may yet prove to be a sunshine law.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are admitted, undisputed, or supported by record.
Undisputed facts concerning untimely “created dates” of PISD’s website internet notices for 22 Meetings
at any other time or made any license fee payment to BoardBook. PISD does not have a purchase order for or contract with, or paid any consideration to BoardBook for its service from 8/13/2008 to 5/19/2009. PISD did not supplement, amend responses to written discovery concerning purchase orders and payments to BoardBook. Appendices8-11. Further PISD refused and failed to provide documents concerning payments to BoardBook to the Texas Attorney General under a Texas Public Information Act, Gov’t Code Ch.552 Request by plaintiffs. CR388 (First Appeal).
agreement in 30 days if money is not received when due. BoardBook does not store or archive notices 30 days after termination. Appendix22.
9. Jameson was aware of the link to notices not being on the new website. Appendix16. Jameson did not think link to BoardBook was necessary and needed to go on the new website. In a maintenance update the link was dropped by Jameson on 1/15/2009. Appendix11-Interrogatory5. On 5/19/2009, Jameson added the link to notices when she found out that the link to notices was required. Appendix16. PISD’s new website was up and running during 1/15/2009 to 5/19/2009. Appendix 16.
10. PISD’s internet notices did not appear on BoardBook’s website without a link to them on PISD website. PISD’s notices were not available for public viewing on Yahoo or Google search.
11. PISD did not timely post notices of meetings on its own website for 22 Meetings.
13. PISD did not know or provide the exact dates when its old website was discontinued and the new website went live and when the link to BoardBook was discontinued. BoardBook is an agent of PISD (Appendix22).
17. SchoolCenter’s failure to transfer link did not force or require PISD to create untimely internet notices in BoardBook weeks and months after the 22 meetings took place as noted by this Court. Appendix19. SchoolCenter had no role in PISD’s creation of new untimely internet notices in the month of May 2009 for 22 meetings which were posted on 5/19/2009. See Appendices 7, 14; PX1.
2009 when he was PISD’s webmaster using Adobe Go Live software. Appendix 1. PISD admitted that the internet notice of 1/15/2009 board meeting did not appear on its or BoardBook’s website for public viewing. The link to website notices was dropped from PISD’s website before 1/15/2009 board meeting. PISD claims good faith defense for 11 meetings from 1/2009 to 5/19/2009. Appendix11- Interrogatories 5, 7.
new website is not beyond the control of PISD for 5 months from 1/15/2009 to 5/19/2009. PISD does not meet requirements of §551.056(d).
23. PISD did not verify even once whether the internet notices of meetings were actually appearing and visible to public for viewing on its website for 11 meetings in question from 1/15/2009 to May 19, 2009. Transcript pg.178. PISD’s website was up and running properly during entirety of this time. No communication occurred between Jameson and Linder concerning TOMA notices of board meetings appearing on its website from January 2009 until after Thanedar informed Linder on 5/15/2009 that internet notices did not appear on PISD’s website. Appendix11-Interrogatory7; Appendix16.
26. PISD presented no evidence at trial 1) when a “link” to internet notices actually existed on its website and the date on which it was dropped, and that 2) SchoolCenter was responsible for transferring said link to a new website.
Conclusions of Law on 7 Causes. Appendix21. Physical posting of notices for 3/26/2009 meeting and other 21 meetings was not the subject of trial. PISD did not comply with any of Gov’t Code Chapter 551’s notice provisions for 22 board meetings in question. PISD was not the substantially prevailing party under TOMA.
30. Plaintiffs did not announce ready and requested continuance of the trial date due to the death of Thanedar’s mother. Transcript pg.[6]. Trial court failed to rule on admissibility of PX1, and denied PX13 (Audio Tapes-CDs), PX12, PX14, PX19, PX21, and PX25. Trial court did not provide a reasonable notice or 45-day notice (TRCP 245) for the trial in this case on remand from the appeals court. Plaintiffs’ filings were not voluminous either in trial court or appeals court. Further they were neither unreasonable nor improper. PISD did not respond to plaintiffs’ filings and no attorney fees were incurred by PISD on them. Trial court held no hearings on plaintiffs’ motions or filings. Undisputed facts in plaintiffs’ claim under §551.051 (Bulletin Board)
31. PISD admits that it posted board meeting notices on the front door of its administrative building for the time period in question from 8/13/2008 to 5/19/2009 (22 Meetings). Public citizens were required to stand outside the central office building to read the public meeting notices. PISD does not dispute that there was an unused glass enclosed bulletin board inside its administrative office building in the lobby area during 22 Meetings and that PISD relocated a glass enclosed bulletin board outside its administrative office building on 6/5/2009. Appendix9 (Admissions 5,7,8).
Undisputed facts in plaintiffs’ claim under §551.041 (Place)
32. PISD admits that for both paper and internet notices it did not specify or include the name of the city. Appendix9 (Admission15). PISD’s notices merely state “Pampa High School” or “Pampa Junior High School” without the address. See CR70-71, CR75, CR89-90, CR129-130, CR147-148, CR156, CR167-168, CR170 (First Appeal). PISD service boundaries defined by Texas Education Agency cover portions of Gray and Roberts Counties. Undisputed facts in plaintiffs’ claim under §551.043 (72 Hours)
33. The physical notice for 3/26/2009 meeting was not posted for 72 hours in a bulletin board inside the central administrative office. CR60-66(Second Appeal).
The physical notice for 5/19/2009 meeting was not posted for 72 hours in a bulletin board. CR60-66(Second Appeal). Linder confirmed to plaintiff Thanedar that there was an error in posting this notice because the meeting date changed to 5/19/2009 and that Linder posted a corrected notice for a board meeting on 5/19/09 on the front door on 5/18/2009 because of the change. CR60-66(Second Appeal). Undisputed facts in plaintiffs’ claim under §551.101 (closed meeting) 34. The presiding officer of the Board did not identify the section or sections under TOMA that authorized closing of the 3/26/2009 board meeting to public. See PX14; PX13 (Audio CDs); Appendix9(Admission14). Undisputed facts in plaintiffs’ claim under §551.074(b) (deliberations)
35. The audio recording of the closed meeting on 3/26/2009 shows discussion among Superintendent Haenisch and Board members on Terrell’s termination. Terrell had specifically requested the action be deliberated in open meeting per §551.074(b). PX13 (Audio CDs)(Tape 2 at Counter 43:45). Undisputed facts in plaintiffs’ claim under §551.045(d) (designated person)
36. PISD’s Board did not designate or authorize Karen Linder to sign meeting notices or post board meeting notices on the Board’s behalf. CR609, CR832; CR821-823 (First Appeal). Appendix10 (Req. for Production 28). Linder signed and posted board meeting notices without authorization from the Board of Trustees. Board retained authority with respect to calling, signing, and posting notices of board meetings. CR821-823; CR832; CR834-836(FirstAppeal). Undisputed facts about attorney fees
37. PISD counsel refused and failed to testify at trial on PISD’s attorney fees concerning the amount and its reasonableness. PISD made no valid application for attorney fees under §551.142(b) at trial. Trial court asked PISD’s attorney Mr. Arnold whether he wanted to testify and present evidence concerning PISD’s request for attorney fees. PISD’s counsel refused to do so, instead asked trial Judge Lopez to take notice of the file. Transcript page 238. PISD did not present evidence concerning existence of PISD’s attorney fees, hours, hourly rate, tasks performed and by whom, difficulty level, and reasonableness of court’s award of attorney fees of $30,000.
Undisputed facts about Bad Faith
38. At trial, PISD presented no evidence of plaintiffs’ bad faith in bringing the lawsuit. PISD’s actions did not have reasonable basis under TOMA. TOMA requires reasonable attorney fees to be proven at trial, and does not permit judicial notice of file. PISD did not present factual evidence of voluminous pleadings and motions in district court or appellate court or time spent by PISD defending against them or the suit. Appellants were meritorious and prevailed in the first appeal with Seventh COA awarding costs to appellants. Appendix19. Judge Lopez does not have power to grant appellate attorney fees.
Undisputed facts about Plaintiffs’ Good Faith
39. Plaintiffs presented evidence of their good faith at trial. PISD admits that plaintiffs’ report to PISD of non-appearance of website notices was the sole reason why PISD fixed its non-compliance with §551.056(b) for 11 meetings after 5 month long of non-compliance. Appendix11-Interrogatory7.
Plaintiffs’ employment, Standing, Back-Wages
40. Appellants are citizens and taxpayers of Texas for more than 15 years (4 years in Pampa beginning 2008), and are interested persons under TOMA and pay sales taxes and other taxes that fund PISD and other school districts in Texas. PX15, PX21; Appendices5,6. TOMA does not require plaintiffs to reside within PISD’s boundaries. PISD, a school district created by the State of Texas, is a government body subject to TOMA. Terrell was a first year beginning teacher at Pampa High School and taught U.S. History, World History, and World Geography. Terrell’s probationary contract (PX6) does not automatically expire by its own terms under the Education Code. The Education Code §21.103 requires that a probationary contract must be terminated in 45 days before the last day of instruction or the contract automatically renews. Terrell’s probationary contract was terminated by PISD in a Board meeting on 3/26/2009. Terrell was not given and did not have actual notice of termination of contract, nor was Terrell’s contract placed on the notice/agenda of the 3/26/2009 meeting. The legal notice of 3/26/2009 board meeting required under TOMA was not in a bulletin board or on a front door for 72 hours prior to said meeting. Terrell’s termination was not placed on the agenda of the meeting.
41. Document properties of a PDF document show various aspects of the electronic document viz. when it was created (created date), when it was last modified (modified date). Plaintiff Thanedar testified as an expert witness at trial in this case. Transcript pgs.75-86.
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial on 10/9/2013 made mockery of Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA). Plaintiffs’ seven distinct causes of action under TOMA sections 551.041, 551.043, 551.051, 551.45(d), 551.74(b), 551.101 and 551.142(a) were not tried or ruled on. Trial judge Abe Lopez blamed this Court for it. Plaintiffs’ are absolutely entitled under law and Texas and U.S. Constitutions to declaratory rulings, mandamus, and injunctive relief on the above claims. Judge Lopez was disqualified to hold trial. PISD produced no legal evidence concerning its claim of good faith under §551.056(d). Further forgetting to transfer or verifying transfer of a link is not a technical problem and never beyond the control of PISD, a government body, especially over 5 months. PISD lied to this Court about “created dates” of internet notices and the “link.”
PISD is solely responsible for compliance with TOMA. Any outside vendors are agents of PISD. PISD showed intentional ignorance concerning the untimely internet notices posted after 5 months, got caught, and made things up. PISD’s good faith claim is a fraud on Texas citizens and courts. Attorney fee award to PISD is unlawful and unreasonable. Each cause of action by plaintiffs is dispositive of the whole case requiring reversal of trial court’s judgment and entitling plaintiffs judgment in her favor. This Court should reverse trial court’s judgment and render judgment for plaintiffs and grant their prayer.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A case is “tried” when a court holds an evidentiary hearing on a cause of action upon conflicting evidence. Besing v. Moffitt, 882 S.W.2d 79,81-82 (Tex. App.-Amarillo,1994, no writ); Haddix, infra at 345. In cases tried without a jury, findings of fact delineate facts that support the judgment and the legal reasoning underlying the judgment. In such cases, findings of fact and conclusions of law are mandatory under TRCP Rule 296 and 297.
On appeal, findings of fact are reviewed for sufficiency of the evidence and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Haddix v. American Zurich Ins. Co., 253 S.W.3d 339,345(Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.); IKB Indus. v. Pro-Line Corp.,938 S.W.2d 440,442 (Tex. 1997).
A request for additional findings is similar to an objection. Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 255-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], pet. denied). Thus a request for additional findings of fact has significance unrelated to the trial court actually filing additional findings of fact. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial can be raised for the first time in appellant’s brief. There is no need to file a post-judgment motion raising it. TEX. R. APP. 33.1(d).
A no evidence point is sustained if the record discloses the following: (1) there is complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla of evidence; or (4) the evidence conclusively established the opposite of a vital fact. See Hawkins v. Ehler, 100 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Horton v. Horton, 965 S.W.2d 78, 85 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
An assertion that the evidence is "insufficient" to support a fact finding means that the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).
When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, the appellate court considers all the evidence and determines whether the evidence supporting a finding is so weak as to be clearly wrong and unjust or whether the evidence is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). Appellate court is required to consider all of the evidence in the case in making this determination. Hawkins, Id.
Exact and Literal Compliance Required under TOMA:
TOMA’s provisions are mandatory. Acker, Infra; Smith County, Infra. TOMA violations are not trivial or de minimis. The Texas Supreme Court has required Exact and Literal Compliance by governmental bodies, especially, with respect to the notice provisions of TOMA. Acker v. Texas Water Commission, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990) (“The explicit command of the statute is for openness at every stage of the deliberations. Accordingly, we have demanded exact and literal compliance with the terms of this statute.[citing] Smith County v. Thornton, 726 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. 1986)”); City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1991). Thus, “substantial compliance” is not valid law in Texas. A governmental body’s actions taken in violation of TOMA are voidable. §551.141. TOMA is not a scheme to provide due process to individuals. It is not a legislative scheme for service of process; it has no due process implications. Acker, Id.; City of San Antonio, Id.
Burden of Proof: Plain language of TOMA makes it clear that the burden of proof of “good faith” under §551.056(d) is on the government body and that it must be “continuous” for each meeting. §551.056(d); §551.043 (b)(1) and (b)(3).
IV. ARGUMENT
Appellants repeat preceding paragraphs as if set forth verbatim herein. [1]. Trial court’s failure to hold trial on 7 distinct causes of action violates TOMA and appellants’ absolute Constitutional rights By a slight of hand, the trial court rigged this case and denied trial on plaintiffs’ distinct causes of action under TOMA Sections 551.041, 551.043, 551.045, 551.051, 551.074, 551.101, and 551.142(a)(7 Causes).3 Appendices 5,6, Transcript pages 11-12. Judge Lopez had an independent duty to try and rule on said causes of action under TOMA and the Texas and U.S. Constitutions, but failed to do so. Plaintiffs’ absolute constitutional rights of due process in this matter cannot be denied or waived, and plaintiffs did not waive their constitutional rights. Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279-280, Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, En Banc (1993).
Further, plaintiffs filed timely objections and motions and brought trial court’s failure to try 7 Causes to its attention. Appendices1,2,3,4. Judge Lopez’s general observations and comments are not rulings. Further, the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding 7 Causes and did not rule on plaintiffs’ request for amended or additional findings of Fact and conclusions of law in this regard. Appendix4.
The trial court stated that the appeals court remanded the case to hold trial only in the matter of §551.056(d). Transcript Pgs.11-12. This is plainly false and an abdication of Judge Lopez’s independent duty to rule. The appeals court did not rule on or limit the causes of action on which trial could be held. Appendix19. Trial court was required to hold trial on all of them and specifically rule on them. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require that the trial court’s judgment shall conform to pleadings. TRCP 301. TOMA §551.142(a) entitles plaintiffs to declaratory ruling and relief on every one of plaintiffs’ 7 untried causes of action. Plaintiffs objected and asked the Judge Lopez to grant new trial on 7 causes of action. Appendices 1,2,3,4. Trial court was required under TRCP 166a to either grant plaintiffs’ second summary judgment motion on said 7 Causes or try them and rule on each one of them.
The Court’s failure and refusal to try the 7 Causes violates plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under Texas Constitution Article 1 Sections 3, 13, 19, and 27, and the 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and is clear misconduct on Judge Lopez’s part.
In the words of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor “this right to petition is one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” BE&K Construction, Infra. Appellants’ are absolutely entitled to trial on every single one of their 7 untried remaining causes of action under TOMA and have all of their complaints redressed and ruled on. Plaintiffs request that this Court uphold this right and vacate final judgment and grant new trial on all causes of action.
2. Plaintiffs are entitled to Summary Judgment on 7 distinct causes of action and Declaratory Relief under §551.142(a)
Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory, injunctive, mandamus relief under TOMA whether or not any other relief is granted and whether or not PISD's actions in violation of TOMA are voided.
A. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration that PISD violated TOMA §551.051.
PISD admits that it posted TOMA notices on the front door for 22 Meetings when there was an unused bulletin board inside the building. Statement of Fact (SOF) 31. §551.051 mandates the location for notices. Here it is clear common sense that “front door” is not “bulletin board” inside the building under §551.051.
This violation is particularly offensive and vile as it forces the “undesirable” citizens to stand outside the entrance of the building in rain, snow, cold, hot weather and in poor lighting conditions and humiliate themselves standing in the way of the incoming and outgoing traffic. This is abuse of citizens. These notices on the front door cannot be read from inside and certainly are neither safe, nor convenient, thus do not meet the requirements of “convenient,” “accessible” “inside the building” and “bulletin board” and under §551.051 under Exact and Literal compliance standard. Forcing citizens to stand outside the building to read notices is an unwelcome mat to poor citizens and minorities all around the “Carver Center” to prevent them from entering the building. Only PISD would have the gall in this day and age to engage in this insensitive divisive tactic against its own taxpaying citizens. Why should or would taxpayers stand outside the building that they paid for to read TOMA notices? What is next - notices on windows, plants, and restroom doors? This Court should prevent this abomination of §551.051 and declare that notices on front doors violate §551.051.
B. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration that PISD violated §551.041 when PISD failed to give notice of "place."
PISD admits the facts in SOF32. PISD failed to notify the reader of the “place” under §551.041 for 22 meetings under the exact and literal compliance standard. PISD forced citizens to guess about “place” with details missing from notice e.g. street address, location, and other details. Thus plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration that PISD violated §551.041.
C. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration by the court that PISD violated §551.045(d).
PISD admits that Board never authorized nor designated Karen Linder under TOMA to sign notices of meetings on behalf of the Board. SOF36. The language of §551.045(d) is clear that it applies to all notices not just emergency notices and it requires an authorized or designated person to post notices of meetings. §551.045(d). Thus plaintiffs are entitled to declaration that PISD violated §551.045(d).
D. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration that PISD violated TOMA §551.101 by improperly closing its March 26, 2009 meeting and further violated 551.074(b)
It is not disputed that defendant's president, Mr. Charles Smith did not identify the section or sections of TOMA that authorized closing the 3/26/09 board meeting to the public under TOMA before closing the meeting. SOF34. PISD thus did not comply with the §551.101(2). Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to declaration that PISD unlawfully closed meeting on March 26, 2009 in violation of §551.101. Plaintiffs are entitled to all legal and equitable relief and that 3/26/09 closed meeting and actions taken in it be declared unlawful and contents of the closed meeting be made public and allowed to be freely copied and distributed. PISD deliberated on Terrell's contract termination in the closed meeting on 3/26/09 when Terrell had specifically requested the action be deliberated in open meeting per §551.074(b). SOF35. Plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration that PISD violated §551.074(b).
E. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration by the court that PISD violated §551.043 concerning the 3/26/09 and 5/19/09 Board Meetings
Plaintiffs’ rely on SOF33. It is undisputed that the notice of 3/26/09 Board meeting was not seen posted in the bulletin board in PISD’s Central Office nor on its front door at 5 P.M. and after 6 P.M. on 3/23/09 i.e. notice was posted less than the prescribed 72 hours in violation of §551.043.4 PISD’s (Linder) vague claims and surmise do not specifically dispute plaintiffs’ sworn assertions e.g. a revised notice for 3/26/2009 meeting was taped to the front door of central office building on 3/24/09, less than 72 hours before the start of the meeting.
Similarly, the notice for 5/19/09 meeting was posted for less than 72 hours because the meeting date changed from 5/8/09 to 5/19/2009 causing the revised notice to be reposted. Because PISD posted (paper) notices of 3/26/09 and 5/19/09 Board meetings for less than the prescribed 72 hours, PISD violated §551.043.
TOMA violations Are Distinct: The statutory language of TOMA is clear that the above notice provisions are distinct, and failure to comply with any one of the notice provisions renders the action(s) in violation of TOMA and thus voidable. §551.141.
No developed record: Because there was no trial on 7 Causes, no trial record exists, thus Plaintiffs rely on the facts and arguments in their Second No- evidence and Traditional Summary Judgment motion herein. Appendix12.
A party moving for summary judgment must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); TRCP 166a(c). Here. The facts are undisputed in the untried 7 Causes. Thus based on the exact and literal compliance standard, plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
F. The sky is not falling if illegal actions are voided
PISD has repeatedly tried scare tactics by using the bogeyman of voidance. All actions in violation of TOMA must be voided given PISD’s defiance, conscious indifference, obstruction of discovery, and systematic longstanding violations of TOMA’s notice requirements. PISD can ratify the voided actions in a legally held board meeting under TOMA. So far PISD has refused to ratify its actions as was properly done in ATSPAC v. Sierra Club, 843 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992), preferring instead to scare the courts.
G. Terrell is entitled to back wages and voidance of her illegal termination:
Terrell was not terminated in a legally convened meeting under TOMA, thus the termination action is voidable. §551.141. Given PISD’s outrageous misconduct and systematic violations of TOMA, and Terrell’s termination action should be voided. Voidance of Terrell’s termination in 3/26/2009 meeting means Terrell lawfully continues to be an employee and is owed back wages. Courts have upheld voidance of action involving employment termination, reinstatement upon voidance, and granting back wages and benefits. See Ferris v. Texas Board Chiropractic Examiners, 808 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Tex.App—Austin 1991) (ordering back wages and benefits of $26,000 until the time Ms. Ferris was terminated in a legally convened meeting under TOMA). Like Ferris, Terrell continues to be lawfully employed by defendant. Back wages and benefits are thus due Terrell, currently at about $262,000 for 5 years until Terrell is terminated lawfully in a subsequent legally held meeting under TOMA. Ferris, Id. Further Terrell’s illegal termination cannot be ratified retroactively because Education Code requires a 45 day notice to Terrell before the last day of instruction (10 days for 2012-2013 and after), failing which Terrell’s contract is automatically renewed and becomes, as here, a continuing contract after 3 years. See Education Code§21.103.
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to exclusion of evidence on SchoolCenter, BoardBook, or are entitled to continuance
Exclusion of Evidence: TRCP 193.5 mandates that a party must amend or supplement the party’s response to written discovery when the part learns that its response was incomplete or incorrect when made, or is no longer complete and correct. TRCP 193.5(a). The party must amend, correct or supplement written discovery concerning identification of persons with knowledge of relevant facts and any other information sought by the written discovery reasonably promptly. Less than 30 days before trial is not reasonably promptly. TRCP 193.5(b). A party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response in a timely manner may not introduce in evidence the material or information that was not timely disclosed, TRCP 193.6.
Evidence concerning SchoolCenter must be excluded: PISD concealed the identity and the central role of the third party vendor, SchoolCenter, in PISD’s §551.056(d) defense until the trial and disclosed the information during the trial on 10/9/2013. In its discovery responses PISD represented that only Jameson and Linder had knowledge of the “link” problem and Jameson caused the link to be severed in a maintenance update. Appendix11. In a flip flop, PISD identifies a new culprit, SchoolCenter, and blames it for not transferring the link. PISD failed to identify, provide information on SchoolCenter in the written discovery, and further failed to amend, supplement, or correct written discovery concerning SchoolCenter. Appendices 8,9,10,11. SOF16. Plaintiffs’ are entitled to exclude any information concerning SchoolCenter from evidence under TRCP 193.6 because PISD failed to comply with TRCP 193.5. Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989). Any information given by Jameson or other witnesses concerning SchoolCenter must be excluded. Trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motions to exclude in this regard. Transcript pgs 214-220.
PISD lied to this Court throughout the First Appeal process in its briefs by concealing the identity of SchoolCenter and its alleged central role in this case causing obstruction of justice. Now after 6 years, there are more lies. All information concerning SchoolCenter must be excluded from evidence as a sanction on PISD for failure to comply with TRCP 193.5. Boothe v. Hausler, Id. The sanction for failure to comply with this rule is exclusion of the evidence affected by the violation. TRCP 215(5); TRCP 193.6; PISD failed to establish before the trial court that good cause existed for allowing SchoolCenter related evidence. Boothe v. Hausler, at 789.
At trial, PISD claimed to have purchased BoardBook program, paid license fees and renewal fees to BoardBook for its service to post website notices since 2007. But during discovery process PISD refused and failed to provide full and complete discovery and produce documents concerning payment of license fees and renewal fees to BoardBook. PISD refused and failed to supplement answers to written discovery in this regard. SOF6. All evidence concerning existence of BoardBook service should have been excluded and struck from evidence at trial. See TRCP 215(5).; TRCP 193.6; Boothe v. Hausler at 789. The Court erred when it refused and failed to do so in response to motions from plaintiffs. CR111.
PISD concealed the above information from plaintiffs and the Attorney General of Texas, obstructing justice. SOF6. Plaintiffs were severely compromised in their ability to show that non-compliance with §551.056(b) was actually due to the fact PISD did not have BoardBook service during 8/13/2008 to 5/2009 or that PISD actually obtained it in May 2009 when and untimely created and posted prior meeting notices to conceal violation of §551.056(b). Texas law is clear - without proof of payment of consideration, PISD did not have a contract with BoardBook or SchoolCenter. Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse, 165 S.W. 3d 21, 24 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.], 2005 no pet.) (without consideration, there is no contract).
For violation of TRCP 193.5, information concerning existence of BoardBook service in this case must be excluded from evidence. TRCP 193.6; See Boothe v. Hausler at 789.
Similarly, because PISD concealed the identity of SchoolCenter until the trial and SchoolCenter’s alleged failure in transporting “link” to PISD website notices, plaintiffs were severely harmed and compromised in examining evidence and questioning witnesses, and would have subpoenaed SchoolCenter at trial for testimony had PISD timely supplemented and amended written discovery.
In both instances, the issues were dispositive and not cumulative because they related to the controlling and central issue of PISD’s good faith under §551.056(d) and why the link to website notices was missing for at least 5 months in 2009. Boothe v. Hausler, at 789. The trial court should have excluded evidence concerning SchoolCenter and BoardBook, alternatively should have granted continuance of the trial as requested by plaintiffs to conduct further discovery. TRCP 193.6(c). Transcript pgs,214-220.
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in their favor or their motions for new trial, to modify judgment, and for reconsideration should be granted
A. PISD lied to this Court that printing changes “created dates” of internet notices in the first appeal
PISD lied to this Court in the first appeal that “created date” means the date the “particular notice was printed for delivery to appellants.” Appendix19. Based on this misrepresentation, this Court remanded this case. It has been six long years of lies from PISD. In the trial of this case, PISD admitted that the above contention was not true, but “oops” it was only a speculation.
“I was just trying to give some reasons why that might have happened.” Linder testimony, Transcript pg, 201.
Such misconduct mocks this Court, TOMA, and the discovery process. Nothing PISD says after this can be credible in the slightest. PISD must be sanctioned for this lie and judgment entered for plaintiffs.
B. PISD lied to this Court again about SchoolCenter and concealed SchoolCenter’s identity and central role in the first appeal PISD lied to this Court again when it concealed the identity and the role of SchoolCenter, a vendor, from this Court in its brief in the First Appeal. In the brief before this Court, PISD blamed Jameson. See PISD’s brief in the First Appeal (07- 10-00212-CV). Appendix11-Interrogatory5. But now PISD blames SchoolCenter for losing the “link.” Even a soap opera cannot be this phony and ridiculous. Both Jameson and SchoolCenter are agents of PISD. It has been six long years of lies from PISD. PISD must be sanctioned for this concealment and lie from this Court and judgment entered for plaintiffs.
C. SchoolCenter, BoardBook evidence must be excluded, PISD’s good faith defense thus fails
Plaintiffs rely on and repeat Argument 3 as if fully set forth herein. As explained above, evidence and information concerning SchoolCenter and BoardBook must be excluded and barred from evidence because PISD failed to timely amend, supplement, or correct written discovery concerning them. TRCP 193.6; Boothe, Id. At trial, PISD flip-flopped and blamed SchoolCenter for the missing link to notices. However both SchoolCenter and BoardBook being vendors employed by PISD are PISD’s agents. The only evidence presented for PISD’s good faith claim related to SchoolCenter’s role. Because all evidence or information concerning SchoolCenter must be excluded, PISD’s good faith claim must be rejected. Similarly, any portion of good faith claim that relies on BoardBook and Lee Carter must also fail because such information or evidence must be excluded and is barred. TRCP 193.6, Boothe, Id. PISD’s good faith defense under §551.056(d) fails.
D. Hearsay and Irrelevant evidence of Linder and Jameson must be barred
PISD has the burden to prove good faith under §551.056(d). Texas Rules of Evidence (TRE) bars evidence that is irrelevant and is not personal knowledge of the witness. TRE 402, 602, 802. Linder and Jameson’s testimony on good faith defense under §551.056(d) was complete hearsay. PISD presented no documentary evidence concerning SchoolCenter, BoardBook, called no expert witnesses in support of its claim of good faith either on document properties e.g. “created dates” of internet notices or the missing link issue. No one from SchoolCenter or BoardBook testified in support of PISD’s good faith.
Linder made it clear that she has no personal knowledge regarding the claim of missing link. Transcript pg.191. Further, her entire testimony about good faith defense was nothing more than her general opinions and beliefs concerning her work in BoardBook software which is irrelevant under TOMA because §551.056(b) or any other section of TOMA does not require work in BoardBook. TOMA requires concurrent internet notices to be posted on government body’s website. §551.056(b). Linder admitted that she never clicked on the link on PISD’s website to verify that internet notices appeared for public viewing (Transcript pgs. 176-178) and does not know anything about created dates or Adobe PDF, she does not even know the name of SchoolCenter. Thus Linder’s entire testimony concerning her bare assertions about her “work” in BoardBook must be struck and excluded from evidence as irrelevant, hearsay, and hearsay within hearsay. TRE 402, 602, 802. Jameson’s testimony about what SchoolCenter did or did not do concerning the link is classic hearsay. TRE 402, 602, 802. Transcript pgs.126-157; Appendix15. Her testimony was a sham and a cover-up to shield her when she removed the link because she thought it was not needed. Appendix16. She could not even recall the name of the person she supposedly worked with on the new website project that supposed to have transferred PISD’s “thousands” of links. Transcript pg.133. Jameson admitted she has no knowledge or expertise in website operations. Transcript pg.129. Under TRE, her testimony is full of bare assertions on what SchoolCenter did or did not do, or failed to do is classic hearsay, lacks personal knowledge, thus must be struck and excluded from evidence. Her testimony concerning what Lee Carter, the webmaster, did or did not do must also be struck as hearsay and excluded. TRE 402, 602, 802.
At best, Linder and Jameson’s testimonies about BoardBook and SchoolCenter’s role are bare assertions, too weak, no more than speculation, surmise, hearsay and less than a scintilla of evidence, therefore are not legal evidence concerning good faith. Kindred, infra at 63. Linder and Jameson’s bare assertions often contradicting overwhelming evidence to the contrary5 are not legal evidence. Kindred, infra at 63 and further they do not meet clear and convincing standard this government entity, PISD, must meet to establish its good faith under §551.056(d).
Evidence by Linder, Jameson, and Haenisch on good faith was bare assertions, hearsay, incompetent, speculative, and immaterial as to whether PISD exercised good faith concerning its non-compliance with §551.056(b). Thus the evidence they presented was no more than scintilla, surmise, and speculation which is not legal evidence.
When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence at all.
Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc. 650 S.W.2d 61,63 (Tex. 1983).
Karen Linder’s testimony was a sham because she admitted that her sworn answers to plaintiffs’ interrogatories were nothing but speculation and she did not have knowledge about technical matters in question. PISD’s Linder falsely represented to the appeals court that printing PDF notices changed the created dates of website notices. Appendix19. PISD now states at trial that it was just speculation on their part. SOF5. Karen Linder’s assertion that she “worked in
5 Jameson admits that she thought the link was not needed on the new website. Appendix16. She removed the link in a maintenance update. Appendix11-Interrogatories 5,7.
BoardBook” on her computer was no more than bare opinion as PISD presented no evidence that it actually had BoardBook service during the period in question i.e. 1/2009 to 5/18/2009 or at any time from 8/13/2008 to 5/19/2009.
Thus Linder’s and Jameson’s testimonies on good faith issue are no legal evidence and must be disregarded as no material fact question was raised or answered by their testimonies and because the Court was barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence they offered (hearsay, bare opinion, and speculation) to prove a vital fact of good faith under TOMA. Kindred, Id. PISD’s good faith claim must fail.
E. Plaintiffs were entitled to hearing on newly discovered evidence
Trial court erred in denying a hearing on newly discovered evidence and motion for new trial. Plaintiffs demonstrate the existence of factors6 in Jackson and Kirkpatrick for grant of new trial in this regard. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Tex. 1983); Kirkpatrick v. Memorial Hosp., 862 S.W.2d 762, 775 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied). The weight and importance of the newly discovered evidence here and its bearing with respect to evidence received at trial
6 The factors are: (i) the evidence came to light since the time of trial or so late in the trial that it was impossible to present the evidence before the trial closed; (ii) it was not because of a lack of due diligence that the information did not come sooner; (iii) the new evidence is not merely cumulative to that already given and does not tend only to impeach the adversary's testimony; and (iv) the evidence is so material that it would probably produce a different result if the court granted a new trial. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Tex. 1983).
is conclusive and is so material that it will probably produce a different result in this case:
1. PISD did not have good faith because it removed the link from its website itself before the creation of new website by SchoolCenter and SchoolCenter had no role to play in the removal or reestablishing the link. SOF18.
2. PISD’s Jameson’s testimony at trial was misleading and false. The newly discovered evidence would show that PISD was aware of the removal of link and willfully violated §551.056(b).
The appendices 2 through 5 to motion for new trial (Appendix 1) are PISD’s website archive pages and view source information of PISD’s website as of the dates noted i.e. 1/26/2009 and 2/5/2009. View source pages identify the software that generated PISD’s website pages viz. “Adobe GoLive” software for the OLD website and “SchoolCenter” version 8.0 used for the NEW website.
The newly discovered evidence shows that a. PISD concealed the fact that the link to internet notices did not exist on the OLD website which was managed by PISD itself. The appendices 2 and 3 of Motion for new trial (Appendix 1) show that PISD managed its website itself through January 26, 2009. PISD has admitted that the TOMA internet notice did not appear on its website for its January 15, 2009 meeting because the link was removed. The missing link problem started with the January 15, 2009 meeting notice when PISD managed the website. There was no link to be transferred to the new website which went live after 1/26/2009.
b. PISD’s OLD website was managed by its webmaster Lee Carter at least through January 26, 2009. Motion for new trial’s appendix 2 (bottom left corner) and appendix 3 (page 2 of the appendix) clearly identify Lee Carter as PISD’s webmaster and show that Lee Carter as an employee had PISD’s business email address. PISD used Adobe GoLive software at least up to January 26, 2009 and maintained its own website well after the time it admitted that January 15, 2009 meeting notice did not appear on its website because link was removed when PISD managed its website itself. The newly discovered evidence shows that SchoolCenter was not at “fault” as falsely alleged by PISD because as admitted by PISD the link did not exist on its website on or before 1/15/2009 causing non- appearance of the internet notice for 1/15/2009 board meeting. PISD removed the link in 1/2009 because it thought it was not “necessary.” Appendix 16.
c. Thus it is obvious PISD’s Suzie Jameson fabricated a story and gave false testimony (Appendix 1) blaming SchoolCenter when PISD itself removed the link in January 2009 or before, on its own watch, before the new website was allegedly created by SchoolCenter in February 2009 (Motion for New trial -appendices 4-5). The problem of admitted non-compliance on January 15, 2009 existed before SchoolCenter allegedly created the new website which was in February 2009.
d. PISD concealed Lee Carter’s (PISD’s Technology Director) role in maintaining and generating PISD’s website during the time period it claims good faith under §551.056(d). Lee Carter’s name was not disclosed during the discovery process in violation of discovery rules as a person who had knowledge or any role in this concerning this lawsuit. Appendices 8-11. Lee Carter’s name appears as webmaster on PISD’s website on January 26, 2009 well after PISD admitted that January 15, 2009 meeting notice did not appear on its website due to alleged link problem. Motion for new trial-appendices 2-3.
PISD failed to timely disclose and supplement, amend, or correct its responses to written discovery, concerning the identity and role of SchoolCenter and Lee Carter until the trial, the above evidence could not be obtained before trial and is not cumulative. SchoolCenter and Lee Carter’s roles are material in PISD’s good faith defense in §551.056(d). .
Plaintiff Thanedar testified as expert in technology matters pertinent to this lawsuit. The above evidence however is obvious to an average person. Plaintiffs affirm that “Adobe GoLive” was a software product of Adobe Systems Inc. and is an HTML editor used to maintain and manage websites by its customers. The word “Generator” in appendix 3 of motion for new trial means what it says i.e. PISD generated its website using Adobe GoLive.
Refusal to receive newly discovered evidence and refusal to grant new trial would be manifest abuse of discretion and permanent loss of plaintiffs’ substantive rights. A new trial is thus required under law on the good faith claim by PISD and an evidentiary hearing was required by trial court to receive evidence in the above matters which will affirm that PISD’s good faith claim was made in bad faith and is a fraud. This Court should grant new trial in this case.
F. Missing link to notices is irrelevant because internet notices for 22 Meetings were untimely created in May 2009 for posting on website weeks and months after meetings took place
The “missing link” to internet notices is a smokescreen and is not relevant. The undisputed fact is that PISD untimely created internet notices in May 2009, weeks and months after the 22 Meetings took place and then posted them untimely on its website all at once on 5/19/2009. Created date of an Adobe PDF document means what it says i.e. the date when the PDF document was created. Transcript pgs.75-86. This is not disputed by PISD. PISD did not produce timely created internet notices for 22 Meetings at trial, there is no evidence that they were timely created. Whether or not the link was missing, PISD never timely created internet notices for each of the 22 Meetings 72 hours before each meeting started. Because PISD did not create timely internet notices and untimely posted them, PISD’s good faith claim fails.
Because PISD did not care to check for each meeting notice whether its notices actually appeared on its website or not, it does not show good faith under §551.056(d) and its good faith claim must be rejected.
G. PISD did not care or attempt to check if the internet notices actually appeared on its website for public viewing for each of the 22 Meetings in 72 hours before each meeting
TOMA requires that the internet notices must be concurrently posted on the Government body’s website 72 hours before the start of a meeting. §551.056(b). The evidence is undisputed that PISD did not attempt to or care to check that internet notices were actually appearing on its website and were available for public viewing for any of the 22 Meetings in question. Transcript pgs. 176-178. An average person would exercise such care to comply with law. A government body should be held to even higher standard. PISD fails even the lower average person standard. Thus PISD did not make a good faith attempt under 551.056(d)7 to verify its compliance with §551.056(b). If PISD had done so, it would have immediately known and found out that notices were not appearing on its website and PISD would have presumably fixed its non-compliance with TOMA.
The language of TOMA is plain and clear that compliance with TOMA must be done in the prescribed 72 hours before a meetings starts and must be continuous. §551.043. This requires that a government body must check for each meeting that the internet notice actually appears on its website for public viewing. PISD’s intentional ignorance defeated the purpose of TOMA’s prescribed 72 hour- requirement. §551.043; §551.056(b).
PISD’s intentional ignorance and conscious indifference is not good faith because it did not even once attempt or care to verify that notices actually appeared on its website from 1/2009 to 5/19/2009 in compliance with §551.056(b). It must be noted that for meeting notices from 1/2009 to 5/19/2009 for which PISD claims good faith, there is no evidence that its website was not up and was not working normally. Haenisch testified the new website had no disruptions. Transcript pg.117. Thousands of other links were working perfectly. Transcript pg.135. PISD showed intentional ignorance and cover-up to hide its violations of §551.056(b).
If this Court does not reverse trial court’s judgment, every government body intentionally or not, will “ignore” to exercise sufficient care to comply with TOMA for months or years and still claim good faith and will be granted exception under §551.056(d), making a laughing stock out of Texas Open Meetings Act.
H. “Oops we forgot,” mistake, negligence, or incompetence is not a technical problem
There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that forgetting to transfer a link to new website is a “technical”8 problem. §551.056(d). Here, PISD claims that SchoolCenter made a mistake and did not transfer the link to notices to new website. Transcript pg.149-150. Jameson testified that the problem was that of a “missing link.” Transcript pg.149. Even if true, forgetting or making a mistake is not a technical problem. There is no evidence that there was anything wrong with the link itself. PISD presented no evidence that mistake is a technical problem. To the contrary, Jameson herself testified that adding a link on the new website is not difficult. Transcript pg.150. Jameson further testified the problem with the link was just a “plain and simple oversight.” Jameson refused to even call the oversight a “technical” problem even when prodded by plaintiffs. Transcript pg.150. Thus oversight, negligence or “Oops we forgot” is not a technical problem under TOMA.
I. “Oops we forgot” to transfer a link is not “beyond the control” of PISD Even if forgetting to copy or transfer link is a technical problem, there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that transferring a link to new website was “beyond the control” of PISD for 5 long months from 1/2009 to 5/19/2009. §551.056(d). Jameson testified that failure to transfer the link in question was a “plain and simple oversight” and that it was not difficult. Transcript pgs.149-150.
Earthquake, snow, rain, hacking and virus attacks are beyond the control of a government body while these events last. Forgetting to verify mandatory compliance with TOMA for 5 months is most certainly not “beyond the control” of a school district. To suggest otherwise is an insult and fraud on citizens and taxpayers of Texas. There is conclusive overwhelming evidence that the link problem in question would have been fixed had PISD checked its new website just once in 5 months as to whether legally required internet notices were actually appearing on its new website, but PISD did not do so. SOF21 and 23. All PISD needed to do was to get off the chair and check that the link was transferred and further check that the legal meeting notices were actually appearing on its website for public viewing. PISD has admitted that it never showed interest and due care to comply with §551.056(b). SOF21, 23, Transcript pg.146. PISD’s missing link was neither a technical problem nor beyond its control. PISD’s good faith defense fails.
Here, PISD decided it was not going to comply with TOMA 551.056(b), but got caught. There is overwhelming evidence that PISD showed conscious indifference at best, or bad faith and fraudulent misconduct concerning its legal duty to comply with TOMA Sec. 551.056(b).
Jameson’s sham testimony Jameson gave false testimony concerning SchoolCenter at trial to avoid blame on herself. PISD had admitted that Jameson performed duties with respect to “establishing BoardBook link” on PISD’s new website and not SchoolCenter. Appendix 16. Jameson’s May 19, 2009 E mail to Linder (Appendix 16) clearly states (Emphasis provided):
I apologize for not having that link on the site. I have added it on the School Board page. There were lots of things that were on the old site that I did not realize needed to go on the new one.
It is abundantly clear from the above email that PISD and Jameson knew about the “link” but did not think it was “needed” on the new website. In written discovery PISD blamed Jameson for “severing” the link in a “maintenance update.” Appendix11-Interrogatories 5, 7. Jameson’s new testimony at trial is diametrically contradictory with PISD’s written discover. Both are not credible. As a result, Jameson dropped the “link” to BoardBook on PISD’s new website in January 2009. This can only be described as a mistake, error or negligence, or lack of due care and diligence, or properly as willful disregard for compliance with TOMA for 5 months. There was no “severance” of the link, no “maintenance update” that “severed” the link, or “inadvertent” mistake here as Jameson clearly knew about the link and PISD and Jameson decided it was not needed on the new website and therefore Jameson did not establish it on the new website. Appendix16. As a matter of law, negligence or lack of due care and diligence by a person is not a “technical” problem as the word technical is commonly understood, and certainly not “beyond the control” of PISD. All PISD had to do was to check its own website to verify that Board meeting notices were “appearing” on its website, as a reasonable person would have done. PISD failed to exercise this reasonable care for 5 months and at least 11 Meetings. PISD fails reasonable care standard, which is never beyond PISD’s control. 5. PISD’s good faith claim is a fraud on the citizens and tax payers and courts requiring sanctions
PISD has obstructed discovery from the beginning concerning BoardBook and SchoolCenter. PISD lied to the Texas Attorney General and to this Court and simply refused to provide documents concerning BoardBook and SchoolCenter to plaintiffs calling them “beyond the scope of TRCP.” SOF They knew they could get away with it. SOF6.
The alleged problem of “link” was only fixed when plaintiff Thanedar reported nonappearance of notices on 5/15/2009 to PISD in good faith. Appendix 11-Interrogatory 7. Without plaintiffs’ report in good faith, PISD could have continued for several more months, or years, or even indefinitely without complying with Sec. 551.056.
Post-remand discovery
Trial court erred in denying post-remand discovery on good faith. Post- remand discovery was consistent with the opinion and mandate of this Court. This is especially important for TOMA because post-remand discovery would have discovered that PISD’s contention that printing changes “created dates” of PDF documents was a fraud on this Court and citizens. Denying post-remand discovery only shielded PISD and its obstruction of justice.
6. Denial of plaintiffs’ evidence led to rendition of incorrect judgment: The Court failed to rule on admissibility of plaintiffs’ exhibit PX1 in the one day trial excluding it from evidence. PX1 contains 22 board meeting website notices at issue in this lawsuit and their electronic document properties on Compact Disc. Plaintiffs rely on facts and argument in Argument 8 below regarding PX1. There was no objection by defendant. This exhibit was admitted and authenticated by Judge Waters before and was reviewed by this Court in the first appeal and the untimely “created dates” were central in determining PISD’s good faith. The CD in question is in the record and the record thereon has been reviewed on appeal by the appeals court. The Court clearly abused its discretion when it refused to rule on admissibility of PX1 and thereby ignored the electronic properties of internet notices leading to incorrect judgment. As PX1 and its electronic properties are central to violation of TOMA Sec. 551.056 and all other causes of action in plaintiffs’ live pleadings. Denial of PX1 caused rendition of incorrect judgment as the untimely created dates of internet notices would have shown that PISD created the internet notices weeks after the 22 meetings took place and untimely posted them on 5/19/2009. This would show that PISD’s missing link good faith defense was a fraud because the internet notices were not even created concurrently and timely. Trial court erred in not ruling on PX1. It should have been admitted.
Further, trial court erred in denying admission of PX13 which is audio tapes of 3/26/2009 meeting that shows violation of 551.101, and 551.074(b) which are causes of action in this lawsuit and directly relevant, resulting in court’s failing to rule on the above claims. PX13 should have been admitted.
Trial court erred in denying admission of PX12(notices of meetings) which concerned violation of 551.043, PX14 (excerpt of transcript 3/26/2009 meeting), concerned violation of 551.101, PX19(back pay benefits) and PX25(salary schedules) concerned claim of back pay and special damages, and PX21(sales tax receipts) concerned the issue of standing), all central and relevant to TOMA issues. Denial of this evidence resulted in rendition of incorrect judgment on these issues. The above exhibits should have been admitted into evidence.
Trial court’s judgment should be reversed and judgment entered for plaintiffs. Minimally, plaintiffs’ motions for new trial, to modify judgment, for reconsideration, and the request for amended and additional FOF and COL should be granted on all causes of action.
7. Attorney fee award to PISD is invalid and is not reasonable. PISD forfeited and waived attorney fees when it refused to testify
The trial court committed clear error in granting $30,000 in attorney fees to PISD by taking “judicial notice of the file” under TOMA. Appendices20, 21.
Texas law has not allowed recovery of attorney fees unless allowed by statute or contract. “Absent a contract or statute, trial courts do not have inherent authority to require a losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees.” Tony Gullo Motors v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310-311 (Tex. 2006). Nothing in TOMA or its pertinent case authority authorizes or empowers any court to take judicial notice of attorney fees and to award them without receiving evidence with respect to the attorney fees and their reasonableness. TOMA §551.142.
Plaintiffs challenge both the imposition and award of the attorney fees to PISD on the grounds that 1) PISD is not the substantially prevailing party, 2) the award of attorney fees is neither legally valid, nor proper, unjust, nor justified in this case, and 3) the attorney fee award is not reasonable, manifestly too large and further, PISD forfeited and waived any attorney fees by refusing to testify.
PISD is not the substantially prevailing party: PISD is not the substantially prevailing party under TOMA§551.142(b) and cannot be awarded attorney fees. This is because trial court shockingly refused and failed to try 7 Causes out of eight independent and distinct causes of action or main issues under TOMA sections 551.041, 551.043, 551.045(d), 551.051, 551.074, 551.101, and 551.142(a) and further failed to rule and make finding of fact or conclusions of law with respect to each of the above 7 above causes of action. Appendices 20,21.9 Thus PISD did not prevail on 7 out 8 separate and distinct causes of action or main issues and is not a substantially prevailing party. Hawkins v. Ehler, Infra at 544. Award of attorney fees to PISD is invalid and unreasonable
Under TOMA only reasonable attorney fees can be granted if certain conditions are met. §551.142(2). The reasonableness of attorneys' fees is question of fact that must be proven at the trial. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 367 (Tex. 2000). Thus PISD was required to testify concerning its attorney fees.
PISD forfeited and waived attorney fees by refusing to testify and prove them
PISD refused and failed to testify on its attorney fees and refused and failed to prove them at trial even after Judge Lopez prompted PISD’s counsel to do so. 9 Plaintiffs objected to this misconduct and brought this to trial court’s attention during trial and in motions. Appendices1,2,3,4. With 7 out of 8 causes of action never taken to trial and never decided, Judge Lopez’s judgment is not final judgment in spite of the words used in it. Because this was a deliberate conduct on Judge Lopez’s part, no implied findings can be made or presumed here. Appellants ask this Court to rule on all causes of action in this appeal.
Transcript Page 238. Thus there is no valid application for attorney fees here. Further, it must be concluded that PISD forfeited and waived any claim to attorney fees by refusing and failing to prove and testify on its attorney fees. Thus there is no evidence or insufficient evidence in the record for the Court to award attorney fees to PISD of any amount. Court’s award of $30,000 has no basis in law under TOMA or evidence because there is no evidence or insufficient evidence of tasks completed, hours worked, level of difficulty, identity of attorneys, reasonable hourly rates of attorneys on the case and other necessary information on which attorney fees must be based on. See El Apple v. Olivas, Infra.
No “Judicial Notice of file” for attorney fees under TOMA: The plain and clear language of §551.142(b) does not permit trial judge to impose attorney fees by taking “judicial notice.” It is clearly ascertainable that the award of attorney fees in this case does not arise under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (CPRC) §38.001, thus this Court does not have power to take judicial notice of attorney fees under CPRC§38.004. See Valdez v. Valdez, 930 S.W.2d 725, 732-
33 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (holding §38.004 only applies to claims under §38.001).
Plaintiffs have proven their good faith in this case:
Attorney fees award here is legally improper because plaintiffs have undisputedly proven their good faith at the trial as their report of the violation of Sec. 551.056(b) was the only reason said violation was finally corrected by PISD after 5 months of admitted10 non-compliance with TOMA from 1/2009 to 5/19/2009. Appendix11 (Interrogatory7). Further plaintiffs prevailed on first appeal in this case, this Court reversing trial court’s judgment and remanding the case which proves conclusively that this lawsuit was in fact brought in good faith. See §551.142(b). PISD did not claim nor produced any evidence or insufficient evidence of bad faith on appellants’ part at trial.
“Voluminous filings” is not bad faith and Plaintiffs cannot be penalized by imposing attorney fees for them
As explained in this brief, There is no factual evidence or legal basis whatsoever for Judge Lopez’s erroneous FOF20 and COL4. Appellants do not show bad faith because of “voluminous” filings. Even assuming filings are voluminous, appellants cannot be penalized for them as there is no evidence that any filing was improper or unreasonable. Further, this argument is bogus and irrational because there is no evidence whatsoever that PISD ever incurred attorney fees due to filing responses, and Judge Lopez never held hearings and never ruled on them. There is no cost or harm here to PISD.
Appellants have constitutional right to sue in court and file motions which is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of
10 The document properties of PISD’s website notices prove that internet notices for 11 notices from 8/2008 to 12/2008 were also created in May 2009 and posted for public viewing on 5/19/2009 after plaintiffs brought the non-compliance with 551.056(b) to PISD’s attention.
grievances. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has noted “this right to petition is one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” Justice O’Connor further observed that the First Amendment petition clause says nothing about success in petitioning. Thus there is absolutely nothing wrong in filing motions and requesting relief that Judge Lopez rule on such motions. Thus appellants cannot be penalized for filing motions, voluminous or not, in this lawsuit to redress grievances. See BE&K Construction v. NLRB, 536 U.S.516 (2002); Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.731 (1983). Thus, “filings”, even if “voluminous,” are not “bad faith” under TOMA and plaintiffs cannot be punished with attorney fees for them.
Further Judge Lopez sitting by assignment has no personal knowledge of all of the proceedings in this case, being the third judge in this case after Judge Waters and Judge Vanderpool.
PISD does not meet prerequisites for attorney fees: PISD never claimed the element of bad faith on plaintiffs’ part which is a prerequisite for attorney fees under TOMA §551.142(b), and further, notably, never presented any evidence at the trial on the issue. PISD did not plead for attorney fees in its original answer-its amended answer must be struck because it lacks a certificate of service and was not served on plaintiffs. See CR285 which is not a certificate of service for the amended answer but a duplicate of CR281(response to previous motion). Because PISD failed to claim bad faith and failed to present evidence on it, failed to plead for attorney fees, it waived attorney fees and the issue of bad faith, thus cannot recover attorney fees under §551.142(b) in this case. Nothing under law or TOMA jurisprudence gives trial court the authority or power to advocate for PISD which failed to meet prerequisites to attorney fees. The award to PISD must be vacated and denied.
Attorney fees for appellate filings must be vacated and denied: Judge Lopez apparently granted attorney fees because plaintiffs made voluminous appellate filings-though he failed to segregate the amount. Appendices20,21. The trial court has no power whatsoever to impose attorney fees for any proceedings or filings in the appellate courts, with or without evidence being received. In fact, plaintiffs prevailed in the first appeal and this Court ordered that defendant pay costs to Terrell for the appeal. Thus no attorney fees are due to PISD in the first appeal. PISD made no argument nor presented any evidence concerning this issue at trial and did not testify about its time and attorney fees incurred in this regard. Thus there is no basis in law or fact for an award of attorney fees for plaintiffs’ filings in appeals court.
Has TOMA’s “Sunshine” gone away?
Further plaintiffs do not have the ability to pay any attorney fees, thus award is not reasonable under TOMA’s lofty purpose of “sunshine law.” TOMA was heralded as the “Sunshine Law” to protect Texas citizens after the shockingly corrupt scandals of Sharpstown. The deliberate arbitrary award indicates that Judge Lopez wielded TOMA as a sword to silence appellants and any future citizens that dare to question a government body. This will have a chilling effect on citizens and taxpayers who report violations of TOMA and seek redress.
Statutory attorney fees are not a “Bonanza” Chief Justice Nathan Hecht has made it clear that an award of statutory attorney fees, as here, is not a “Bonanza,” but its amount and reasonableness is a question of fact and must be proven by a party at trial on factors such as reasonable rate, contract, billing records, fees paid by client, tasks performed, and hours worked. See El Apple v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012) citing the eight- factor test in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997); City of Laredo v. Monsanto, 414 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. 2013). Here, the arbitrary and capricious award of statutory attorney fees of $30,000 to PISD by Judge Lopez without absolutely any substantiation as to the reasonableness is so grossly in defiance of the overwhelming weight of law and the Texas Supreme Court opinions that its only purpose was to intimidate pro se plaintiffs, obstruct, and prevent these pro se citizens from appealing this case and airing PISD’s dirty laundry.
Violation of constitutional right of due process: An attorney fees award based on no evidence or insufficient evidence of existence and reasonableness of attorney fees viz. identity of attorneys, hours worked, tasks performed, quality and difficulty of work, hourly rate and other factors laid out by the Supreme Court in El Apple violates plaintiffs’ constitutional rights of due process and equal protection under Texas Constitution and 14th Amendment to the Unites States Constitution. The award is arbitrary, capricious, manifestly too large and unreasonable imposition of attorney fees that has no support in law.
The judgment and the award of attorney fees of $30,000 and costs should be vacated and denied.
8. Judge Lopez was disqualified from conducting trial
Disqualification[11] can be raised at any time and for the first time on appeal, as here, and even in a motion for rehearing. See Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982).
Judge Lopez was disqualified from sitting in this case and was disqualified from conducting the final trial on 10/9/2013. The standard of review for the Court in this matter is de novo. See McElwee v.McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 185-87 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.]1995, writ denied).
Judge Lopez conducted a meaningless trial on 10/9/2013 and rigged it in favor of defendant:
Judge Lopez repeatedly failed to rule on trial exhibit PX1 during the trial inspite of numerous requests by plaintiffs in the one day trial. Transcript pages34, 37, 44, 74, and 204. Defendant never made an objection to PX1. Judge Lopez’s misconduct in failing to rule on PX1 has caused serious and permanent harm to plaintiffs in this case. This was an exhibit which was reviewed by the 7th court of appeals in the first appeal and formed the basis of the opinion and the reason for remand in the first appeal by the court of appeals.[12] Appendix19. Thus PX1 was a critical exhibit at the trial and should have been admitted by trial court. Judge Lopez’s failure to rule on admissibility of PX1 was deliberate and a gross disregard of his judicial duty resulting in a deliberate damage done to plaintiffs’ case and obstruction of appeal.
The outcome was that the trial was a charade and was infected with chaos and confusion, and plaintiffs were prevented from properly and effectively presenting their case at trial concerning the deliberate violations of electronic website internet notices of PISD’s meeting notices and concerning untimeliness of website notices of 22 Meetings under TOMA §551.056(b) and PISD’s lack of good faith under TOMA Sec. 551.056(d).
12 This Court has confirmed that PISD indeed was untimely in creating and posting internet notices in violation of TOMA §551.056(b) for 22 meetings in 2008-2009. These 22 electronic notices and their electronic properties are contained in PX1. Appendix19.
PX1 was the cornerstone and basis of not only proving the untimeliness of the website notices but proving that PISD’s claim of good faith defense was fraudulent because the internet notices of 22 notices were created in May 2009 and posted to website for public viewing on 5/19/2005 after plaintiffs informed PISD of its non-compliance with §551.056(b). Judge Lopez’s refusal to even rule on admissibility of trial exhibit PX1 was purposeful, calculated, and inexcusable abdication of duty that derailed the entire case of plaintiffs. Further his refusal to rule on PX1 damaged appellants’ case as they were prevented and unable to present their case properly without the critical exhibit PX1 which was central to the trial in showing that PISD did not have a good faith defense and that such defense was fraudulent i.e. the create dates of the internet notices on PX1 showed that the notices were created untimely in violation of TOMA weeks after the meetings in question took place.
Failure to conduct trial or rule on 7 Causes: Plaintiffs rely on Argument 1 which is set forth verbatim herein. Judge Lopez deliberately improperly failed to try plaintiffs’ 7 Causes of action under TOMA and abdicated his independent duty to try and rule on 7 Causes. Such misconduct brings disrepute to justice system and violated plaintiffs’ absolute due process constitutional rights. Neither the district court nor the appeals court has the power to order that plaintiffs’ causes of action cannot be tried.
What kind of judge returns evidence filed in the court?
Trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing ordered by this Court on lost or destroyed exhibits on 9/26/2014 to determine fault in the matter. Plaintiffs submitted documentary evidence to Judge Lopez in the hearing.[13] However, Judge Lopez ordered court reporter to return the evidence to plaintiffs after receiving it in open court. The visiting court reporter mailed the evidence to plaintiffs. Appendix17.
What kind of judge returns evidence presented in an evidentiary hearing ordered by this Court? But Judge Lopez did. Such misconduct shows that Judge Lopez lacks judicial temperament, carried animus and bias against plaintiffs, and advocated for defendant, and was unfit to preside at the trial in this case. His conduct and its severity were not known until after trial on 10/9/2013.
Bias that denies due process In McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) the Court of Criminal Appeals held that in criminal cases bias might be grounds for legal disqualification if that bias was “shown to be of such a nature and to such an extent as to deny a defendant due process of law.”
Due process is recognized in civil as well as the criminal context. Following McClenan ruling in 1983, various Texas appeals courts have recognized McClenan and applied the “bias that denies due process” as bias that materially implicates “personal interest,” therefore meeting constitutional grounds for disqualification under Texas Constitution. See Elam v. State, 841 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. App.-- Austin 1992, no pet.) (recognizing McClenan); Lovely v. State, 894 S.W.2d 99,103 (Tex. App. --Beaumont 1995, pet. ref’d) (same); Stafford v. State, 948 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1997, pet. ref’d) (same).
Thus when a judge’s bias is of such nature and extent that it denies a party due process of law, as here, the judge must be disqualified under Texas constitutional grounds.
Here, Judge Lopez’s bias and conduct was unprecedented and shocking as he deliberately set out to harm pro se plaintiffs and conduct a sham trial. Such conduct lowers citizens’ regard and confidence in the integrity of judges and the justice system. The due process violations outlined in this motion require Judge Lopez’s disqualification from the trial on 10/9/2013.
Judge Lopez was not neutral, but was advocate for PISD and casting himself in adversarial role against plaintiffs causing damage to plaintiffs’ case –depriving them of causes of action and in ensuring their loss at trial. Judge Lopez was disqualified from conducting trial in this case.
9. Voidance and Special damages: PISD’s actions in 22 Meetings held in violation of TOMA should be voided. Courts have repeatedly voided actions in violation of TOMA. Ferris v. Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners, Supra; City of Bells v. Greater Texoma Uti!. Auth., 744 S.W.2d 636,640 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); Point Isabel ISD v. Hinojosa, 797 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.App-Corpus Christ 1990, writ denied). PISD’s willful defiance, misconduct, and a systematic pattern and practice of TOMA violations require that special damages and sanctions be imposed on PISD.
Courts have imposed special damages, as requested here, for conscious indifference and failure to comply with the Open Meetings Act, as in this case on defendant’s part. See Wells v. Hutchinson, 499 F.Supp. 174, 198 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Special damages in the amount to be determined by the Court should be granted to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will produce details of hours and money spent at Court’s direction in this regard.
V. CONCLUSION
A famous U.S. President once asked his opponents “do you think we are stupid?” Citizens ask the same question to PISD. Defendant expects these pro se citizens will be long gone and forgotten. Defendant is mistaken. Appellants think Texas citizens and tax payers will be interested in this case and will insist that their government bodies function in exact and literal compliance with TOMA and that their complaints will be heard.
This court should not let citizens stand outside a school building in humiliation just to read meeting notices in rain, snow, heat, and in poor lighting. This Court should enforce exact and literal compliance standard or declare it dead.
The sky will not fall if PISD ratifies its actions in violation of Open Meetings Act inspite of what PISD claims. This Court should reverse trial court’s judgment and enter judgment for plaintiffs on all causes of action.
VI. PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, appellants Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar respectfully request that the Court
REVERSE the trial court’s judgment in total, vacate the award of attorney fees and costs to PISD and further deny attorney fees and costs to PISD; and
RENDER judgment for appellants; and GRANT declaratory and injunctive relief on all claims of violation of TOMA whether or not any other relief is granted; DECLARE the 22 Meetings and the actions taken in these meetings void; and DECLARE the March 26, 2009 board meeting and the action taken in this meeting non renewing and terminating Terrell’s employment contract void; and ISSUE mandamus to reinstate Terrell as a teacher with full back pay and duties, pay, benefits, and privileges appurtenant thereto and prohibit PISD from preventing Terrell from resuming her duties as teacher at Pampa Independent School District; and GRANT appellants’ second no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment on all causes of action; and DECLARE the closed meeting of March 26, 2009 and any actions taken in it void, and grant the relief of making the certified agenda and/or tape recording of this closed meeting fully available to public inspection and copying and make its contents public; and ISSUE a permanent injunction against appellee PISD to prevent future violations of TOMA; and IMPOSE appropriate sanctions on defendant PISD; and DECLARE that appellants have substantially prevailed in the lawsuit; and AWARD appellants costs of litigation, attorney fees, damages, special damages including opportunity cost of appellants’ time and effort, in an amount to be determined by the Court; and that Judge Lopez was disqualified from sitting in the case and from conducting final trial on 10/9/2013.
Minimally, this Court should REVERSE the trial court’s judgment in total, and REMAND for a new trial on all causes of action to a different judge, ORDER discovery on remand on all causes of action with specific instructions to make SchoolCenter, BoardBook, and any other vendors or persons involved in this matter, PISD current or former employees, and related personnel to this lawsuit available for deposition at PISD’s expense, and further discovery as deemed necessary by plaintiffs at PISD’s expense, and vacate and deny the award of attorney fees and costs in the amount of $30,000 to PISD granted by the district court, and further DECLARE that appellants and indeed all Texas citizens are interested persons in PISD and all public school districts under TOMA. In doing so, appellants would further ask that the Court AWARD appellants the costs of this appeal and costs incurred in the district court.
Appellants request the Court GRANT declaratory and injunctive relief in all causes of action whether or not any other relief is granted. Appellants further pray for all other and further relief to which they may justly be entitled to receive.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Rebecca Terrell Rebecca Terrell /s/ Chandrashekhar Thanedar
Chandrashekhar Thanedar Appellants
Certificate of Compliance I certify that the foregoing brief complies with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 and the word count of the brief is 14,699 words exclusive of the exempted portions in Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 as counted by the MS Word program used to prepare the brief.
/s/ Rebecca Terrell Rebecca Terrell Certificate of Service Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.5, I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellants’ Brief has been e-served via the Court’s EFSP upon the lead counsel on March 26, 2015 as follows:
W. Wade Arnold
State Bar No. 00783561 Underwood Law Firm P. O. Box 9158 Amarillo, TX 79105-9158 (806) 379-0364 Telephone (806) 349-9474 Fax Counsel for Appellee PISD /s/ Rebecca Terrell Rebecca Terrell Chandrashekhar Thanedar
APPENDIX
1. Motion for New Trial
2. Motion for Modify Judgment
3. Motion for Reconsideration
4. Request for Additional or Amended FOF and COL
5. Plaintiffs’ Original Petition
6. Plaintiffs’ Second and First Supplemental Petitions
7. Created Dates of PISD’s Untimely Posted Internet Notices (PX2) 8. Defendant’s Answers to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories (PX8) 9. Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admissions (PX9) 10. Defendant’s Answers to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Request for Production (PX10) 11. Defendant’s Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs’ First Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission (PX11) 12. Plaintiffs’ Second No-Evidence and Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment 13. Notices for 3/26/09 meeting - physical and internet notices (PX3, PX5) 14. Notice for 3/26/09 meeting-document properties of the internet notice (PX4) 15. Suzie Jameson testimony - excerpts 16. Suzie Jameson e-mail (PX32) 17. Letter returning evidence on Judge Lopez’s Order 18. Amended Notice of Appeal 19. 7th Court of Appeals Opinion in the First Appeal 20. Judge Lopez - 223rd Court Final Judgment 21. Judge Lopez - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 22. BoardBook Draft Agreement (PX31) 23. Texas Open Meetings Act, Gov’t Code Ch. 551 - selected provisions Appendix 1 Motion for New Trial ,. ___ 332 c:_ PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL § -leo ~r- (") c: -II"T;
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MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE ABE LOPEZ:
Plaintiffs hereby file their Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rules 320-324, and Rule
329b of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and would respectfully show the Court as follows:
1. Plaintiffs rely on the following Appendices which are adopted and incorporated by reference as if set forth verbatim herein.
Appendix 1 Suzie Jameson testimony. Attached Appendix 2 OLD website archive page on January 26,2009. Attached Appendix 3 View source of OLD website archive page on January 26, 2009 Attached Appendix 4 NEW website archive page on February 5, 2009. Attached Appendix 5 View source of NEW website archive page on February 5, 2009.Attached Appendix 6 Plaintiffs' Affidavit. Attached.
Plaintiffs' trial exhibits are denoted as PX followed by the exhibit number.
2. On October 9, 2013, the Court held trial only on plaintiffs' cause of action in Texas
Open Meetings Act (TOMA), Texas Gov't Code §551.056 (b) and (d) and declined to hold trial on other six causes of action in TOMA Sections 551.041, 551.043, 551.045, 551.051, 551.074, 551.101. See original petition and two supplemental petitions filed in this case. The Court signed judgment on 10/25/2013 and awarded costs and attorney fees of $30,000 by taking • 333
• 337
• 343
• 346
• 353 • 354
REPORTER'S RECORD AP P E ARANCE S VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUME 2 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 35,621 2 3 3 MS. REBECCA TERRELL and REBECCA TERRELL and IN THE 223rd DISTRICT HR. CHANDRASHEKHAR THANEDAR 4 CHANDRASHEKHAR THANEDAR, 4 6503 DANCING COURT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78244 5 Plaintiffs, 5 vs. COURT, IN AND FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFFS. [6] 6 PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL -AND- 7I DISTRICT, 7 HR. WADE ARNOLD and Defendants. GRAY COUNTY, TEXAS MS. ANDREA GULLEY 8 8 UNDERWOOD LAW FIRM P.O. BOX 9158 91 ******************************************************** 9 AMARILLO, TEXAS 79105-9158 (806) 379-0364 10 EXCERPT TESTIMONY OF SUZIE JAMESON 10 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT.
11 ******************************************************** 11 12 12 13 On the 9th day of October, 2013, the following 13 356 3 4
CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX EXHIBIT INPEX 2 2 October 9, 2013 PAGE EXHIBIT NO. IDENTIFICATION OFFERED ADMITTED 3 3
4 Appearances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Called for hearing ................................ 5 I 4 NONE OFFERED OR ADMITTED IN THIS VOLUME.
5 5
61 WITNESSES: 6
7 I SUZIE JAI1ESON 7
8 Direct Examination by Hr. Thanedar ...... 5 8
9 I End of requested excerpt .......................... 33 9 Court Reporter's Certificate ...................... 34 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 357
KAREN MORRIS, CSR - 806-282-9932 KAREN MORRIS, CSR - 806-282-9932 5 6
EXCERPT PROCEEDINGS: A. I was the director of technology. 2 October 9. 2013 2 Q, Would that also include director of instruction 3 (All sides present, in open court:) 3 and technology? 4 THE COURT: Who's your next witness, Hr. 4 A. Yes, sir. 51 Thanadar? 5 Q. Was this a demotion for you? HR. THANEDAR: Yes. We would like to call 6 A, No, sir. I Hs. Jameson, please. 7 Q, How long were you director of technology at HR. ARNOLD: Suzie Jameson. 8 I Pampa ISO? THE COURT: Just over here, Ms. Jameson. 9 A. Five years and two months. I You may be seated. 10 Q. So it would be from about 2008 to 2013? THE WITNESS: Thank you. Yes, sir. 11 A. Yes, sir. From April of 2008 unt 11 Hay 31st of SUZIE JAMESON. 121 2013. I having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 13 Q. And as director of technology, did you ever 358 7 8
Q. Okay. So how long was it, from 2008 through systems, and a master's degree in educational I what period of time? 2 I technology. A. During the whole time I was responsible for the 3 Q. Does that include website management? website, and then there were a couple of times in the 4 A. No. I've never had a class on website past year that the Boardbook website would be down, and 5 I management. I would post the meeting notices directly to the news 6 Q. All ready. Now, were you ever involved in and event portion of the Pampa ISD's website. 7 in Boardbook -- Boardbook service in any way? Q. So when was that, is my question. 8 A. No, sir. A. I'm not I'm not sure exactly the dates, but 9 Q. And you are familiar when I say Boardbook what I -- I know that we had an occasion -- I believe it was 10 that product is? in April of this current year that that Boardbook 11 A. Yes, sir. I have been on that site and looked website was going to be down for ~aintenance, and so I I 12 at board notices and minutes from board meetings, but 13 posted that notice. 13 have never actually logged on. It is a public site. 359 9 10
A. Yes, sir. website that says -- I don't know -- board meetings or 2 a. Did you have any Boardbook training at all? 2 board information. I'm not sure what it says, but when 3 A. No, sir. 3 a person clicks on it, it takes them to the Boardbook 4 a. Did you -- do you know how the Pampa ISD's 4 website which is a public site, and allows them to look 5 I website notices were posted on to-- on to either Pampa 5 at prior meetings and upcoming meetings, and the !SO's website or Boardbook's website for a public 6 notifications for those. viewing? Do you have understanding of that process? 7 a. Was the -- was that click that you do on, was A. I have understanding based on what I have been 8 it meeting information by any change? told. do not have personal knowledge of that. 9 A. I'm sorry? a. And you have not really -- and you testified 10 a. Meeting information? that you haven't really been involved in that process. 11 A. Upcoming meetings. Notice of the meetings, Correct? 12 yes. A. I'm sorry. What? 13 a. And were you responsible for maintaining that 360 11 12
A. -- is when I took over. We began the process name. of finding a company that could maintain our website, 21 Q. It was -- it was a sales person you said? because my predecessor was very skilled in creating and~ 3 A. I believe so, yes. maintaining websites, and spent a lot of time doing 4 Q. And who was the technology person at that. 1 do not have the skills that he had. 5 SchoolCenter? Q. And what was the name of that company? 6 A. I don't know. A. We -- we went through a formal bid process, and 7 Q. But you -- but you were the liaison with we finally settled on a company called SchoolCenter. 8 SchoolCenter? Q. SchoolCenter? Is that a company located in 9 A. Pardon me? in which city? 10 Q. You were the 1 i ai son with the School Center? A. I am not sure which city the -- the company is 11 A. Yes, I was. located in. They -- they submitted a formal bid, along 12 Q. You don't recall the name of the techno- -- with many other companies. 13 technology person that created a new website for you? 361 13 14 them? respect to the variety of different websites that are 2 A. I don't remember exactly. I -- most of my 2 I accessed through the Pampa ISD's website? 3 I conversations were with Angela. 3 A. Thousands. 4 Q. But she's not a technology person. Correct? 4 Q. Did you give them a list? 5 A. She's not a programmer. 5 A. Did I give them a list? 6 Q. Now, for SchoolCenter correct me if I'm 6 Q. Yes. I 7 wrong, was interested with the responsibility of 7 A. No. They had access to the previous website. 8 changing the website of Pampa ISO. Correct? 8 Q. So they downloaded -- apparently, they -- they 9 A. Yes. I 9 worked with the access to your system, collected the 10 Q. Did you submit to them specifications of data, 10 information and created a new website. Right? 11 how to change the system from old to new, that type of 11 A. Yes. [12] technical details as the technology director? Did you 12 Q. Okay. Did you -- you said they created a new 13 pass on that information to them? 13 I website in January of 2009? 362 15 16 new website? Do you know? A. I coordinated the work among the campuses and A. Yes. There was -- there was some data 2 the departments making -- they were supposed to make validation process. The different campuses looked at 3 sure that their data was there correctly. their -- their sites, and made sure that their documents 4 Q. Did you work with Karen Linder the -- on and the principal's message and that type of thing was 5 anything that she was doing? posted correctly. 6 A. No, I did not. Q. And you are aware of a data validation process 7 Q. Were you aware that there was a link to the where the conversion checks with the old data and 8 board meeting notices? creates an error report if there's any, for example, 9 A. No, I was not errors? 10 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't hear -- I A. That is true in a data base conversion type 11 didn't get the question. situation; however, we're not talking about that kind of 12 MR. THANEDAR: I'm sorry. conversion. We're talking about more of a literal text 13 Q, (BY MR. THANEDAR) Were you aware that there was 363 17 18 website, then she contacted me. with it? 21 Q, And that was the first time you were aware that 2 A. I don't recall what type of conversation Karen there was in existence a link of any kind on the old 3 and I had, but when it was brought to my attention we website. Correct? 4 rectified the situation. A. Of that type, yes, sir. 5 Q, You contacted the School Center. Correct? Q, You have really no personal knowledge of that 6 A. Yes. link, do you, the link of -- link that connects a -- a 7 Q, And did you send them an e-mail of some sort? public citizen to a board meeting notice for Pampa ISO? 8 A. I don't recall if I sent them an e-mai 1. A. I do now. 9 Probably just to give them the link -- that would be Q, But not at that time? 10 easier than a telephone conversation, to provide the A. Not at that time. 11 direct link, but I don't recall exactly how I -- how I Q, I understand. I'm only talking about the time 12 let them know. period. 13 Q, So the people who actually fixed the problem 364 19 20 know -- Q, -- for the Court, please? 2 A. Right. 2 A. (Reading) Also, I apologize for not having the 3 Q, -- how to fix that problem. Correct? 3 link on the site. I've added it to the school board's 4 A. Right. 4 page. There were lots of things on -- that were on the 5 Q. Do you know who you talked to at SchoolCenter, 5 old site that I didn't realize needed to go on the new 6lin fixing that link? 6 one. [7] A. No, do not. I don't recall if I e-mailed or 7 Q. Now, earlier you testified that you did not 8 I called. And don't -- if I sent an e-mail, I sent it 8 know anything about the link, did you? I 9 to Angela; but I don't recall exactly what that 9
A.
Q, Pardon me?
Earlier you testified, Ms. Jameson, that it was 10 communication was.
11 Q, I have an e-mail here from you marked PX-32 11 not you that fixed the link; isn't that correct? 12 that I would like to show you, Ms. Jameson. 12 A. That's what I said. 13 MR. ARNOLD: May I see it? 13 Q, Now, that doesn't -- you didn't -- you don't 365 21 22
Q, Now, would you tell me when you said here in Q. Do you know how they fixed it, in technology this e-mail, there were lots of things that were on the 2 I terms? old site that I did not realize needed to go on the new 3 A. Yes, sir. When you put a link on a website, one. You are really referring to the link to the board 4 you put text in whatever you want the link to say. You meeting notices, aren't you -- 5 know, board postings, or board agenda, or whatever it A. I'm -- 6 says, and then you create a hyperlink, using hypertext Q. -- as one item? 7 transfer protocol to point that particular bit of text A. As one item, yes. 8 to the other website that actually contains the document Q. Can you tell me what are the lots of things 9 or the information. that you're referring to that were on the old site that 10 So we did not create the document or the you did not realize needed to go on the next one -- on 11 information there on our page, we created a convenient the new one? 12 way to jump to that information that was already created A. Can I tell you what they are? 13 somewhere on the Internet. 366 23 24 not realize needed to go on the new one. Why did you Q, Well, didn't you -- didn't you just state that think that there was no need for this particular link to 2 there were thousands of links on your website? go onto the new one? 3 A. Yes. There are thousands of links on our A. I didn't specifically think there wasn't a need 4 website. for the link. I did not realize it was one of the 5 Q, And how would you know something was needed or things that had gotten left off. 6 was not needed if, in deed, it was not needed? Q. Well , I was just asking you, i f you recall. 7 A. I -- I don't suppose I would know for certain Why did you think it was not needed on the new website, 8 if one of those links was needed or not needed. My by your own e-mail here? Had -- was -- if you -- if you 9 wording here to me says that I did not realize it was have a reason for it? 10 left off and was needed or necessary for the new site. MR. ARNOLD: Objection, Your Honor. She 11 Q. And that understanding of yours was based on just testified that's not what she meant by that. She 12 what information, that links would not be needed? meant that these things were left off, not that they 13 If they existed before, what would be the 367 25 26
THE COURT: Sustained. signed the contract. 2 Q, (BY MR. THANEDAR) Do you recall, Ms. Jameson, 2 Q. Ms. Linder is the superintendent's secretary. I 3 that you tried -- whether you wrote any other e-mails to 3 I Correct? 4 Karen Linder about this problem? 4 A. That's correct. 5 A. I don't recall. 5 Q, And she's in charge of posting notices for the 6 Q, Did you talk to her? 61 board meetings. Is that correct? 7 A. I don't recall. 7 A. Yes, sir. Q. Did she ever tell you that this particular link Did Mr. Haenisch talk to you about this I 8 Q. 8
9 I problem? 9 needs to be transferred over to the new website in the 10 A. I don't recall that either. 10 form of an e-mail; a telephone conversation? 11 Q. You didn't call him and inform him in any way 11 A. Only the one that's on this piece of paper, the 12 that there was a problem regarded fit -- through 12 Hay 15th. 13 SchoolCenter? 13 Q, So she sent you an e-mail after, I, meaning Hr. 368 27 28
Danny Seabourn. He was on the contract and the choosing working with them? I of SchoolCenter. Other people in the technology 2 HR. ARNOLD: Objection; relevance, Your department. 31 Honor. a. At that time, though, Carol Fields was the 4 THE COURT: Sustained. director of finance, wasn't she? That was not Danny 5 HR. THANEDAR: Well, the relevance, Your Seabourn, was it? 6 Honor, is the fact that Carol Fields was the director of A. You're right. That was Carol Fields. She had 7 finance, and she would have to pay SchoolCenter, and knowledge of it. 8 that was -- you know, if you know. That was the basis a. What was the tit 1e of Danny Sea bourn. at that 9 for asking the question. time? I'm talking about 2008. Let's say the first 10 THE COURT: You don't have to answer the quarter of 2009. 11 question. I've sustained the objection. A. I'm not sure what his title was at that time. 12 Q. HR. THANEDAR: All right. a. What is Danny Seabourn's title now, today? 13 Q, (BY HR. THANEDAR) Hs. Jameson, has this 369 29 30 this was a problem that was -- was it your understanding THE COURT: Sustained. that this was a problem of just negligence? What type 2 Q. (BY HR. THANEDAR) Did you ever write an of problem would you call it, as a technology person? 3 investigative report on this issue? A. It was an oversight. 4 A. Pardon me? Q. It was an oversight, plain and simple 5 Q. Did you write any investigative report on this oversight. Correct? 6 issue? A. Pardon me? 7 A. No, sir, I did not. Q. It was a plain and simple oversight. Correct? 8 Q. Did anybody ask you about it? A. That's correct. 9 A. Other than this communication right here, no, Q. As a technology person you would call that. 10 sir. Now, the fact of putting the old link on 11 Q. No one at Pampa ISO was interested in asking the new one, what kind of technical difficulty is that? 12 you why were the board meeting notices not posted for A. When they put the link -- 13 five months? 370 31 32 notices actually appeared on the website of Boardbook, Q. (BY HR. THANEDAR) Well ·· well, my question or do you know, personally, that they did? 2 really was, how do you know at that time, meaning before A. I had access to the old server, which housed 3 January, 2009, that they were actually there? the old 4 I -- I understand that you said after the Q. Well, I'm only talking about at that time. I'm 5 problem occurred you went back and saw it, but did you not 6 personally ever check by clicking on meeting information HR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, I'm going to ask 7 tab that you were actually -- were able to view the that she be allowed to finish her answer, first. 8 meeting notices before January, 2009 on the Boardbook HR. THANEDAR: Well, I'm just kind of 9 website? Q. (BY HR. THANEDAR) I knew what the issue was 10 A. No, sir. I never clicked that link. I never that you're •• you may be referring to what you know 11 had cause to do so. now. I'm just asking ·• 12 Q. Right. That-- that was my question. I mean, A. No, I'm not referring to what I know now. I'm 13 the reason for explaining was that I was not asking you 371 33 34
Q, Did you ask? THE STATE OF TEXAS.) A. No, sir. 2 I COUNTY OF GRAY HR. THANEDAR: That's all I have. I pass 3 I, KAREN MORRIS, CSR, Official Court Reporter I the witness. 4 in and for the 223rd District Court of Gray County, HR. ARNOLD: No questions, Your Honor. 5 State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and (End of requested excerpt transcript.) 6 foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of 7 all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested 8 in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in 9 this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the 10 above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred 11 in open court or in chambers and were reported by me. [12] I further certify that this Reporter's Record 13 of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the 372 f.l! • i:;j· f. .J • Page • Safety • Tools • ·:f;• ij
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IUiihii • 378 Appendix 2 Motion for Modify Judgment
379 \
CAUSE NO. 35621
REBECCA TERRELL and § IN THE 223R0 DISTRICT <";gURT r--..:;, CHANDRASHEKHARTHANEDAR § -< = ,__.
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MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE ABE LOPEZ:
Plaintiffs hereby file their motion to modify judgment pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure 329b, and ask that Court modify judgment signed on 10/25/2013 accordingly, and in support, would respectfully show the Court as follows:
1. Plaintiffs refer to their motion for new trial including all its appendices 1 through 6, timely filed on November 21, 2013 which is adopted and incorporated as if set forth verbatim herein. Plaintiffs have attached their affidavit hereto concerning this motion as appendix 6.
Judgment is incorrect in stating that plaintiffs announced ready. Plaintiffs requested continuance of trial only which was denied. The judgment should be corrected in this regard.
2. Court erred and clearly abused its discretion in granting award of attorney fees of $30,000 to PISD and costs. The judgment should be modified and the award of attorney fees and costs should be vacated and denied. Plaintiffs challenge the award of the attorney fees on the grounds that the award is 1) not reasonable, manifestly too large, and 2) neither legally valid, nor proper, nor justified in this case.
.. f 389 Appendix 3 Motion for Reconsideration From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806) 669-8053 Page 2 of 8 02105/2014 10:08 CAUSE NO. 35621 ,_-. :~ :....)_,.. _, _!;.-
:"'··' 1 REBECCA TERRELL and § IN THE 223RD DISTRICT CODRTL'o •· :]
CHANDRASHEKHARTHANEDAR § i ;1
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Plaintiffs, § § V. § IN AND FOR § PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL § DISTRICT, § § GRAY COUNTY, TEXAS Defendant §
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE ABE LOPEZ:
We request the court to reconsider its denials of our motion for new trial and our motion to modify judgment. The Motion for New Trial (filed 11121113) and the Motion to Modify Judgment (filed 11/22/13) are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference as if set forth verbatim herein. We further request that the court reconsider its refusal to hold hearing on the newly discovered evidence as presented in the motion for new trial. We request that the court grant new trial on all causes of action and issues including imposition of attorney fees and costs.
The court's plenary power has not expired and is still in force 30 days after said motions were denied by operation of law. See Tex. R. Civ. Pro. 329b. We further request that the court provide and explain its reasons as to why it denied said motions so its decisions can be fully understood by parties so as to allow a meaningful appeal of this court's decisions and actions before the 7th court of appeals.
1. Violation of Plaintiffs' Federal and Texas Constitutional Rights: The record shows that this court, without any basis in fact or law, wrongly declared at trial that the appeals court only wanted trial on Sec. 551.056 of Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA). This court then From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806) 669-805 3 Page 3 of 8 0210512014 10:08 denied and failed to hold trial on plaintiffs' other causes of action i.e. TOMA sections 551.041, 551.051, 551.043, 551.045, 551.074, and 551.101. It is abundantly clear that the 7th court of appeals made no such ruling in its opinion on the first appeal in this case. This was pointed out to this court and plaintiffs have objected to the court's arbitrary declaration and refusal to hold trial on the above causes. This improper denial and failure violates plaintiffs' civil rights, fundamental rights, and federal Constitutional due process and equal rights under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and violation of our rights under Texas Constitution Article
1 Sections 3, 13, 19, and 27. This court closed it doors to plaintiffs by refusing to hold trial on plaintiffs' complaints under TOMA sections 551.041, 551.051, 551.043, 551.045, 551.074, and 551.101 in violation of our constitutional rights. No objection to such plain blatant error and constitutional violation need be made, nor required. Such refusal and denial lowers the regard of Texas and United States Citizens towards the judges and the justice system. We as citizens and tax payers are greatly troubled that after 5 long years of being gamed, drawn out, punished, and impoverished, we got deprived of our constitutional and fundamental rights. What is the point in filing complaints if courts will ignore the citizens? We request the court to grant new trial on all matters and hear the newly discovered evidence presented in the motion for new trial.
The record of the trial shows that this court refused and failed to rule on plaintiffs' certain trial exhibits during trial (e.g. plaintiffs' trial exhibit 1 concerning internet notices of meetings and their electronic properties) stating that court will rule on them later at some other time.
Plaintiffs repeatedly objected and offered proof. This court attempted to rule, deny, and return the trial exhibits to plaintiffs outside of trial, after the trial was over and after the court had rendered judgment. We are greatly troubled by these actions of the court which were highly damaging and prejudicial to plaintiffs. Such actions lower citizens' regard for the judiciary.
Court's refusal to rule on plaintiffs' certain trial exhibits during trial of this case infected the trial with chaos and confusion, greatly harming plaintiffs' case because plaintiffs were prevented from properly and effectively presenting their case. Court's actions above were arbitrary without any basis in law, biased for the defendant and violated our constitutional due process and equal protection rights under Texas Constitution (Art.l, Sees. [3], 13, 19,27) and the U.S. Constitution.
The court wrongly permitted testimony over our repeated objections on a "third party vendor" which defendant claimed as allegedly causing legal violation of TOMA Sec. 551.056.
As we have contended, such new evidence must be excluded because defendant PISD deliberately refused to provide discovery and deliberately refused and failed to supplement discovery with respect to the purported "third party vendor." As explained previously, we are entitled to discovery and supplementation according to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TRCP Rule 193.5, 193.6. This court should have excluded the testimony and should have granted new trial to obtain discovery concerning the "third party vendor." Court's failure to do so was highly prejudicial and damaging to plaintiffs as we were prevented from effectively examining the witnesses and were prevented from presenting our side effectively. The court's failure to exclude evidence or allow discovery on the new evidence made the trial a trial by surprise and ambush violating our rights of equal rights and due process under Texas Constitution (Art. 1, Sees. [3],13,19,27) and 14th Amend. to U.S. Constitution. This is the reason why the case was remanded in the first place by the 7th Court.
As explained in our motion to modifY judgment and motion for new trial above, it is clear that the Texas Open Meetings Act does not authorize this court to take ''judicial notice" of defendant's attorney fees without receiving evidence as to the amount or reasonableness and further that court's award of fees is improper under TOMA. TOMA Sec. 551.142. There is
absolutely no evidence in the record as to the reasonableness of the $30,000 the court granted PISD in attorney fees or the hours worked, tasks performed, and rates per hour, and by whom.
Court's award of attorney fees of $30,000 under TOMA1 is arbitrary, capricious, punitive, and legally improper. Court's award violates plaintiffs' due process rights and equal rights under the Texas Constitution Article 1 Sections 3, 13, 19, and 27 and the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution as we are entitled to the due process and equal rights of contesting the reasonableness of attorney fees awarded to defendant by examining and questioning defendant's attorney and any records proving the existence and reasonableness of the $30,000 award. We object to the attorney fee award because it has no basis in law, because it arbitrary, and because it is punitive in nature. Attorney fees are not mandatory, but if awarded under TOMA, TOMA only permits "reasonable" attorney fees and the reasonableness must be proven at trial. See TOMA Sec. 551.142. The language of TOMA is plain and clear that it does not authorize this court to award punitive attorney fees and does not permit a judge to be an advocate for defendant and for defendant's attorney fees. Here, this court granted attorney fees under TOMA, and not under the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code (TCPRC), thus TCPRC Sec. 38 does not apply here. Further, defendant waived and forfeited its claim to attorney fees when it expressly declined to testifY concerning its request for attorney fees. Defendant's subsequent correspondence with us makes it clear that its only interest was to stop the appeal currently before the 7th COA. This court should grant this motion and reverse its judgment with respect to the award of attorney fees to PISD, and grant new trial on the issue of attorney fees. The record PISD's alleges its claim for attorney fees under TOMA Sec. 551.142. The award of attorneys' fees in this case does not arise under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (CPRC) section 38.001, thus this Court does not have power to take judicial notice of attorney fees under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.004. See Valdez v. Valdez, 930 S.W.2d 725, 732-33 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (holding section 38.004 only applies to claims under section 38.001).
is clear PISD attorneys maintained a very low amount of activity and work in this case and the award of $30,000 is grossly unreasonable. PISD must be required under law, and TOMA requires that PISD prove its attorney fees at trial. Defendant refused to do so. Further judicial efficiency requires that award of attorney fees be delayed until appellate process is concluded.
The court failed to provide detailed reasons as to why it found that we acted in bad faith when defendant presented no evidence or testimony at trial to show whether we brought the suit in bad faith. Court's detailed reasoning in this regard would assist the court of appeals and parties in arguing the reasons in a meaningful way before the 7th court of appeals. Defendant presented no evidence of bad faith or lack of good faith on our part in bringing this suit. The only evidence presented at the trial in this regard by us clearly showed that defendant's 5 month long legal violations of TOMA Sec. 551.056(b) got corrected only because of our report to defendant in that regard on May 15, 2009. How is this lack of good faith? This court held only one day hearing (final trial) in this case and lacks any personal knowledge of prior proceedings.
Under TOMA, evidence and testimony at trial on "bad faith" or lack of good faith on our part in bringing suit and reasonableness and existence of the amount of attorney fees was absolutely necessary so plaintiffs would have the chance to examine, question, and challenge such testimony and evidence. This court cannot just assume or advocate for defendant concerning award of attorney fees or a lack of good faith. TOMA Sec. 551.142. Court's finding ofbad faith in bringing this suit and award of attorney fees is not only arbitrary, capricious and without basis in law or evidence, but it is biased for defendant and punishes and victimizes plaintiffs by further depriving us of due process and equal rights under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Texas Constitution Article 1 Sections 3, 13, 19, and 27. There is no support in law or evidence for court's finding of"bad faith" in bringing this suit and for the attorney fee award to From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806) 669-8053 Page 7 of 8 02105/2014 10:08 PISD and court actions deprive us of our good name and livelihood violating our fundamental and constitutional rights as stated above. Court should grant new trial on the issue of award of attorney fees to defendant and on the issue of its bad faith finding.
How Texas citizens and taxpayers like us are treated by this court will be of interest to
Texas citizens and will be watched for years to come. This court's decisions will have chilling effect on Texas citizens' participation in their government if not modified by this court and if new trial is not granted. TOMA should be more than lofty words. We hope and urge the court to uphold the lofty purpose of open and transparent government under Texas Open Meetings Act, and grant this motion and motions for new trial and to modifY judgment, grant hearing on the newly discovered evidence presented in motion for new trial, grant new trial on the attorney fees requiring PISD to prove its attorney fees, and on all causes of action as requested.
Prayer
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant this motion for reconsideration, grant our motion for new trial, grant our motion to modifY judgment, grant new trial on the issue of imposition of attorney fees, stay imposition and execution of attorney fees and costs until the appellate process is concluded, grant new trial on all causes of action, and modifY judgment as requested.
Plaintiffs further request that court grant all other relief requested by plaintiffs in their motion for new trial and motion to modifY judgment, and vacate the award of costs and attorney fees in the amount of $30,000 to defendant PISD, deny PISD's request for attorney fees and costs, and make additional or amended findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested.
Plaintiffs further request that Court grant all other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which they may justly be entitled to receive.
From: R TerreH Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806) 669-8053 Page 8 of 8 02105/2014 10:08 Date: February 5, 2014 Respectfully submitted, ~~ Rebecca Terrell Appendix 4 Request for Additional or Amended FOF and COL From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806i 669-8053 Page 2 of 1012/0212013 4:18
CAUSE NO. 35621
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL OR AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE ABE LOPEZ:
Pursuant to Rule 298 ofTexas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs in the above styled and numbered cause file this Request for Additional or Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in support respectfully show the following:
The original findings of fact and conclusions oflaw made by the Court were filed in this case on November 20, 2013. This request for additional or amended findings of fact and conclusions of law is timely filed per TRCP Rule 298. Pursuant to TRCP Rule 298, plaintiffs now request the following additional or amended findings of fact and conclusions oflaw be filed.
Plaintiffs affirm that to the extent any Finding of Fact reflects a legal conclusion, it shall be to that extent deemed a Conclusion of Law, and vice versa.
ADDITIONAL OR AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On October 9, 2013, at the trial in this case Court directed defendant Pampa
Independent School District's (defendant or PISD) attorneys to testifY in the matter of defendant's claim for attorney fees as to the amount and reasonableness of attorney fees.
From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271·6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 iS06) 669-8053 Page 3 of 1012102/2013 4:18 Defendant's attorney Mr. Arnold declined and failed to do so and asked the Court to take judicial notice of the file and award attorney fees to ·defendant.
2. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence of defendant's claim for attorney fees for $30,000 or for any amount, its appropriateness, or its reasonableness.
3. Plaintiffs' reported defendant's non-compliance with Texas Open Meetings Act
(TOMA) Sec. 551.056(b) to defendant on May 15, 2009 and their report was the only reason said non-compliance was corrected after 5 months of non-compliance with TOMA by defendant.
Plaintiffs' good faith was not disputed by defendant at trial. Defendant did not offer evidence of lack of good faith. There is no evidence that plaintiffs' brought this action in bad faith. To the contrary, plaintiffs prevailed on appeal in this lawsuit and the appeals court ordered defendant to pay costs in this case to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' case clearly has merit. As a result of this lawsuit, defendant made several changes and reformed its practices to ensure compliance with TOMA.
The record in this case shows that defendant mostly did not file responses to plaintiffs' motions or filings. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that plaintiffs made voluminous filings or that they were not necessary to prosecute the case. Thus, there is no evidence of time spent by PISD on responding to plaintiffs motions either before trial court or appellate court. The Court finds that appeals court rejected PISD's filings and such filings often lacked compliance with appellate rules e.g. citation to record or legal authorities. There have been three judges who have presided over this case and this Court held no proceedings before the trial on October 9, 2013.
4. Court declined to rule on admissibility of plaintiffs' trial exhibits PX 1 (CD of electronic notices and document properties of 22 meetings at issue in this trial), 19, 20, 23, and 25 during the trial. Court rules that said trial exhibits PX 1, 19, 20, 23, and 25 are now admitted.
From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806i 669-8053 Page 4 of 1012/0212013 4:18 5. PISD admitted at trial that internet notice for its 1115/2009 board meeting did not appear on its website. However, there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant employed SchoolCenter to create a new website and or to transfer link to its internet notices to a new website before said meeting on 1115/2009.
6. Defendant's claim that it employed SchoolCenter to create a new website, to transfer link to notices was made for the first time at trial. Defendant did not disclose this information during discovery process to plaintiffs, nor did it timely correct or supplement its discovery responses in this regard before trial under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
7. Defendant maintained and managed its own website and posted website internet notices under TOMA Sec. 551.056(b) through at least January 15, 2009. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that a link to BoardBook existed on defendant's website on or before January 15, 2009 or that internet notices under Sec. 551.056(b) appeared on defendant's website before defendant employed a third party vendor- SchoolCenter. Because PISD admitted that the internet notice for 1115/2009 did not appear on its website, Court finds that the link to internet notices did not exist on PISD's website before PISD allegedly employed SchoolCenter to create a new website.
8. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant had BoardBook service to post internet notices under TOMA sec. 551.056(b) or payments to BoardBook for its service.
There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant executed a contract with BoardBook or that such contract was ever renewed, especially before or during the time period for which defendant claims good faith exception under Sec. 551.056(d).
9. Defendant claimed at trial that it contracted a third party vendor SchoolCenter to create a new website and transfer link to internet notices. There is no evidence or insufficient From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 i806J 669-8053 Page 5 of 101210212013 4:18 evidence that defendant contracted a third party vendor School Center to create a new website for defendant or transfer or maintain a link to internet notices to the new website before the time period for which defendant claims good faith exception under Sec. 551.056(d).
10. Defendant admitted that it did not comply with Sec.551.056(b) for 11 board meetings held from January 15, 2009 through May 19, 2009.
11. Defendant maintained and managed its website through January 15, 2009 board meeting, however it did not comply with Sec.551.056(b) for the January 15, 2009 board meeting.
Further, there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant's new website was created 72 hours before defendant's January 15, 2009 board meeting. Further there is no evidence that SchoolCenter was employed to create new website before the January 15, 2009 board meeting.
12. Plaintiffs (plaintiff Thanedar) reported to defendant on May 15, 2009 that defendant's internet board meeting notices did not appear on its website. Defendant fixed its non-compliance with TOMA due to plaintiffs' said report of non-compliance.
13. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant verified or checked that its internet board meeting notices actually appeared on its website during the period from January 2009 through May 15, 2009.
14. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant verified that it actually complied with TOMA Sec. 551.056(b) during the 5 month period for which it claims good faith exception under Sec. 551.056(d) until plaintiffs reported non-compliance on 5/15/2009.
15. Lee Carter was PISD's webmaster and managed and maintained defendant's website in the month January 2009 and was responsible for maintaining the link to PISD's internet notices on its website during January 2009 or concerning the internet notice of the 1115/2009 board meeting.
From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (S061 669-8053 Page 6 of 10 12/0212013 4:18 16. Defendant concealed and failed to disclose the identity and the central role of SchoolCenter to Texas Attorney General and plaintiffs in response to plaintiffs' Open Records Request or Public Infonnation Request per Gov't Code Ch. 552. Defendant further concealed and failed to disclose documents to plaintiffs concerning license fee payments to BoardBook and SchoolCenter for the purpose of their Open records Request or during discovery process.
17. Court finds that there is no material question of fact remaining concerning plaintiffs'
causes of action in TOMA Sections 551.041, 551.043, 551.045(d), 551.051, 551.101, and 551.074(b ). Court declined to try plaintiffs' said causes of action at the trial of this case and no evidence or insufficient evidence was pennitted or presented concerning said causes of action.
18. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant's internet notices independently appeared on Google or BoardBook. Court finds such infonnation or evidence legally irrelevant, speculative and that it does not comply with TOMA.
19. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that PISD "released" or checked internet notices in BoardBook during Jan. 2009 through May 19, 2009 regarding any or all its board meetings. Such infonnation even if true is legally irrelevant, speculative and immaterial.
20. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant ever checked or verified that the link to internet notices was transferred over to its new website during January 2009 to May 15, 2009 or that defendant required the third party vendor SchoolCenter to timely transfer said link to internet notices to its new website.
21. Plaintiff Terrell's employment contract was tenninated by defendant in the Board meeting held on 3/26/2009. Voidance of defendant's action terminating Terrell's employment requires reinstatement of Terrell and payment of back wages and benefits until she is legally terminated under the Ed. Code in compliance with TOMA in a legally convened Board meeting.
From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806) 669-8053 Page 7 of 10 12/0212013 4:1 S
ADDITIONAL OR AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendant did not meet the prerequisites for attorney fees and costs award under
Texas Open Meetings Act.
2. Defendant's claim for attorney fees does not arise from Sec. 38.001 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code (CPRC). Further, Ch. 38 of the CPRC does not apply to this case.
3. The Court does not have the power or discretion to take judicial notice of the file in this case under TOMAto award attorney fees without receiving evidence concerning attorney fees and its reasonableness. The Court does not have the power or discretion to award attorney fees incurred or claimed by PISD for appeals in this case.
4. Plaintiffs affirmatively established good faith under TOMA and brought the action in good faith. Defendant did not dispute plaintiffs' good faith assertion nor introduced any evidence to the contrary. There is no evidence of lack of good faith on 1he part of plaintiffs in bringing this action.
5. PISD's claim for attorney fees is denied due to lack of evidence and because PISD forfeited its claim due to its refusal to testifY and because it is legally improper.
6. Defendant had the burden ofproofunder Texas Open Meetings Act Sec. 551.056(d) to prove good faith as to its admitted non-compliance with Sec. 551.056(b) for defendant's 11 board meetings held during the time period January 2009 to May 19, 2009.
7. There is no evidence or insufficient evidence that defendant's non-compliance with
TOMA Sec. 551.056(b) was done in good faith. Defendant failed to meet its burden of proof of good faith under Sec. 551.056(d).
8. Defendant obstructed discovery in this lawsuit by concealing and failing to disclose the identity and role of School Center and further concealed and failed to disclose other discovery From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806) 669-8053 Page 8 of 10 1210212013 4:1 S and license fee payments to BoardBook and SchoolCenter. Defendant's obstruction of justice is sanctionable. All evidence concerning SchoolCenter and BoardBook must be and is excluded from trial ofthe case and is disregarded. Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989).
9. Court rules for plaintiffs on all counts and grants all relief requested. Court orders that plaintiff Terrell is reinstated to her previous position as a teacher at PISD and awards back pay and benefits. Terrell's termination in the 3/26/2009 board meeting is voided.
10. Court concludes that plaintiffs' claims must be decided based on the Exact and Literal compliance standard applied to TOMA cases by the Texas Supreme Court. The Court rules in favor of plaintiffs on all of their causes of action in this case whether or not tried before the court on October 9, 2013.
11. Defendant's claim that its internet notices independently appeared on BoardBook's website or on "Google," whether true or not, does not comply with TOMA Sec. 551.056(b).
12. Defendant's claim that it worked in BoardBook or checked its work in BoardBook is irrelevant and does not comply with TOMA Sec. 551.056(b) and does not meet the burden of good faith because PISD failed to check its own website for compliance with Sec. 551.056(b) during the entire time period of 5 months in 2009 for which it claims good faith.
13. Plaintiffs are interested persons under TOMA. Plaintiffs have a particularized injury caused by defendant by its action taken under TOMA terminating Terrell's contract. Plaintiffs have requested relief of reinstatement of Terrell to her teaching position at defendant and stated that Terrell will resume her teaching position upon reinstatement. Thus plaintiffs have standing to maintain this lawsuit and have had standing for the duration of the lawsuit. This court has jurisdiction through out the duration ofthis lawsuit. TOMA does not require a plaintiff to be a taxpayer ofthe government entity sued under TOMA. Further TOMA neither requires a litigant
to live within the boundaries of the government body nor does it require for a litigant to prove interest over and above that of general public. Plaintiffs have shown that they are interested in defendant government body and its functioning. Plaintiffs lived in Pampa within the boundaries of defendant when the alleged violations of TOMA occurred and injury of termination to plaintiff Terrell occurred in the school year 2008-2009 by PISD's action taken under TOMA.
14. TOMA is not a scheme for providing individual notice, nor does it have any due process implication. Thus whether or not plaintiffs attended the 3/26/2009 board meeting or had actual notice of it or of Terrell's termination in said meeting is irrelevant under TOMA.
15. Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to prove that continuance of the trial was justified and should be granted. Plaintiffs' motions to reset trial date, compel discovery, to exclude evidence, and for post-remand discovery are justified and should be granted.
16. Defendant's failure to competently oversee transfer of link is not a technical problem under TOMA and was not beyond the control of defendant for 5 months from January 2009 to May 19, 2009. A good faith attempt to post internet notice under TOMA 551.056 must involve verification as to whether such notice actually appears on government body's website. PISD did not do so even once in 5 months. PISD fails the reasonable person standard of due diligence.
PISD did not attempt to post TOMA internet notices in good faith. Had defendant checked its website for internet notices even once during said 5 months as was its practice in 2008, it would have promptly discovered non-compliance with TOMA Sec. 551.056(b ). The Court finds that lack of due care and oversight or negligence or incompetence, as here, is not a technical problem and that it is not beyond PISD's control. The Court finds that PISD exhibited conscious indifference to the required compliance with TOMA Sec.551.056(b) and with respect to other violations of TOMA asserted by plaintiffs. The Court concludes that given the extended long From: R Terrell Fax: (512) 271-6840 To: Sandra Burkett Fax: +1 (806) 669-8053 Page 10of 1012102/2013 4:18 time period involved in non-compliance with TOMA i.e. 5 months, any problem in this matter was not technical in nature, nor was it beyond the control of PISD. Court finds that the non- compliance with TOMA for 11 board meetings from 112009 thru 5/19/2009 was in bad faith.
Plaintiffs request that Court file the above additional and amended findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case and declare that to the extent any Finding of Fact reflects a legal conclusion, it shall be to that extent deemed a Conclusion of Law, and vice versa.
Respectfully submitted, Appendix 5 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition
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APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE Of A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORPER WITHOUT NOTICE AND TEMPORARY INJVNCTIONS WITH SUPPQBTING DQCUMENJATION AND AFFJDAVIT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF TilE COURT:
NOW COME Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar, hereinafter called Plaintiffs, complaining of and about Pampa Independent School District, hereinafter called Defendant, and for cause of action shows unto the court the following:
DISCOVERY CONTRQL PLAN
1. Discovery in this case is intended to be conducted under Level 2 of Rule 190 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
PABTIES AND SERVICE
2. Plaintiffs, Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar, are individuals whose address is 1000 N. Wells St. Pampa, Texas 79065. See the attached Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order.
3. Defendant Pampa Independent School District is a governmental entity created by the State of Texas located in Pampa, Gray County, Texas and was established for the purpose of '
• • providing public schooling and education for the eligible members of the geographical jurisdiction, and may be served with process by serving its Superintendent of said School District, Barry Haenisch, at 321 W. Albert, Pampa, Texas 79065. Service of said Defendant as described above can be effected by personal delivery.
STA@ING
4. Plaintiffs, as members of public, taxpayers, citizens, or individuals resident within
Pampa Independent School District are interested persons and have standing to bring forth this action as allowed under Tex. Govt. Code §551.142. Standing under the Texas Open Meetings Act (the Act) is to be interpreted broadly. See Buries v. Yarbrough, 157 S.W.3d at 880 (Tex.
App.·Houston [14 Dist.] 2005 org. proceeding [man. denied]); Hays County Water Planning P'ship v. Hays County, 41 S.W. 3d at 177~78 (quoting Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc., 934 S.W.
2d at 163). A person need not prove an interest different from the general public, "because the interest protected by the Open Meetings Act is the interest of the general public." See Hays County Water Planning P'ship, 41 S.W.3d at 177~78 (quoting Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc., 934 S.W. 2d at 163).
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
S, The subject matter in controversy is within the jurisdictional limits of this court.
6. Plaintiff Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar are residents of Pampa, Gray
Cowtty, Texas.
7. This court has jurisdiction over the parties. Defendant Pampa Independent School
District is a political subdivision of the State of Texas located within the geographical confines of Gray County, Texas. The Cowt has the power to grant relief requested and no administrative • exhaustion is required on the part of plaintiffs under the Texas Open Meetings Act Tex. Govt. Code Chapter 551. See Tex. Govt. Code §551.141 and §551.142.
8. Venue for this suit is proper in Gray County, Texas.
FACTS
9. Defendant Pampa Independent School District tapes notices of board meetings to the front door of the administration building at "321 ·W. Albert." The notices do not mention the name of the city in which the meetings are held. The front door as a place to post notices is neither secure, nor convenient, nor appropriate, nor in compliance with the Act The place of the notice of meeting i.e. taping the notices to the front door is in violation of the Open Meetings Act. The Open Meetings Act expressly states where the notice of a meeting shall be posted and the place varies depending on the governing body posting the notice. The place of posting for a School District is mandated to be a "Bulletin Board."
The Tex. Gov't Code §551.051: S~hool District: Plaee of Posting Notice specifically states:
"A school district shall post notice of each meeting ·on a bulletin board at a place convenient to the public in the central administrative office of the district." Tex. Gov't Code §551.051 As Defendant tapes the notices to the front door of its administration building and does not post notices on a bulletin board as mandated by the Act. defendant is in violation of the Act.
10. Further, Defendant is in violation of the time requirement of the Open Meetings Act Tex. Oov't Code §551.043(a). It is not accessible at night and there is no lighting whatsoever for public to read the notices at night time. The place is not convenient and not appropriate as defendant posts other notices on the ftont door of the administration building e.g. Pest Control Notices, Enrollment in Kindergarten Classes, etc., obscuring a statutory notice of the board
Terrell v. Pampa ISO Page 3 of16 meeting under the Act.
• • The notices have fallen off from the front glass door at the defendant's administration building at 321 W. Albert in Pampa and are not accessible and not available for public reading for the prescribed continuous 72 hour period. Notice must be posted for a minimum length oftime before each meeting. Section 55 1.043(a) states:
The notice of a meeting of a governmental body must be posted in a place readily accessible to the general public at all times for at least 72 hours before the scheduled time of the meeting, except as provided by Sections 551.044-551.046. AB explained above, defendant is in violation of Tex. Gov't Code Section 551.043(a).
11. (a) Defendant did not post notices of meetings on its internet website for any of its meetings for the prescribed time period before the meetings specifically including the following meetings of the Board of Trustees of Pampa Independent School District:
2008-2009 Sehool Year- Pampa Independent Sehool District May 19, 2009 Board Meeting May 7, 2009 Board Meeting April 23, 2009 Board Meeting April 21, 2009 Board Meeting April 16, 2009 Board Meeting April2, 2009 Board Meeting March 26, 2009 Board Meeting March 12, 2009 Board Meeting Feb. 19,2009 Board Meeting Feb. 5, 2009 Board Meeting Jan. 15,2009 Board Meeting Dec. [18], 2008 Board Meeting Dec. 4, 2008 Board Meeting Nov. [20], 2008 Board Meeting Nov. [6], 2008 Board Meeting Oct. 23, 2008 Board Meeting Oct. 9, 2008 Board Meeting Oct. 2, 2008 Board Meeting Sept. [18], 2008 Board Meeting Sept. 4, 2008 Board Meeting Aug. 21, 2008 Board Meeting Aug. 13,2008 Board Meeting See EUibit 1.
Terrell v. Pampa ISO Page 4 of 16 • • (b) Defendant engaged in conscious attempt to obstruct justice in flagrant disregard of law by posting notices of the above meetings on its website on May 19,2009, weeks and months after the meetings in gyestion took place, and only after several requests for records were made under the Public Information Act Tex. Gov't Code Ch. 552 by Plaintiffs. This contrivance and manipulation shows conscious guilt and willful conduct to disregard law. See Exhibits 1 ~thru 6.
(c) The above website notices were posted on May 19, 2009 on the Defendant's internet website in the ''Board.Book" nestled deep in the website so as to be less obvious and less conspicuous to public. On May 19, 2009, Defendant's Board was reorganized after a new board member was elected and sworn in on that date.
(d) Defendant bas in fact admitted that it did not post any internet website notices of meetings for the school year 2008..2009 with respect to the meetings referred above as of May 15, 2009. The internet website notices posted for the said meetings on May 19, 2009 do not have the name of the designated person under the Act posting it and/or such person's signature or certificates of compliance with the Act, and dates and times of postings. See Exhibits 1 - 6. Such postings of notices are in violation of the Act, Tex. Gov't Code §551.043(b) and §551.056.
12. Defendant taped a notice of meeting on its building's front door on Friday, May 15, 2009 for a board meeting on May 18, 2009 and removed that taped notice on Monday, May 18, 2009 and re~posted and re-taped a new notice to the front door on Monday, May 18, 2009 for a board meeting on May 19, 2009. Plaintiff ThaDeda:r confirmed this with Defendant's personnel and obtained a copy of the notice of this meeting on May 18, 2009. The May 19, 2009 board meeting was illegally convened in violation of the notice provisions of the Open Meetings Act, Tex. Gov't Code subchapter C, Tex. Gov't Code §551.041, §551.043, and §551.056.
• • 13. On May 26, 2009, two months after the Board Meeting held on March 26, 2009, Defendant Pampa Independent School District's superintendent Mr. Barry Haenisch by certified letter submitted to plaintiff Terrell another "version" of the "original notice." This '•second" version of the "original notice" mailed to Temll is signed by Ms. Karen Linder and falsely dated March 20,2009. See Exhibit 3. It is undisputed that defendant's central office building (and the entire school district) was closed from March 14, 2009 through March 22, 2009 for "Spring Break." This notice dated March 20, 2009 is false, was never posted, nor distributed to public and was recreated only to obstruct justice and misrepresent compliance with the Act. Such obstruction ofjustice should not be countenanced by this Court.
14. In fact, the original posting of notice for the March 26, 2009 was taped to Defendant's front office door on March 24, 2009 (after the March 23, 2009 taped notice fell or was removed from the door per defendant's personnel.) This notice dated March 23, 2009 for the March 26, 2009 board meeting was in fact distributed to public and Plaintiffs on March 26, 2009 during the said board meeting. Plaintiffs verified with defendant's personnel that no notice was posted or remain posted on the front door on March 23, 2009 and obtained a copy of the notice of the March 26, 2009 meeting on March 24,2009. There was no internet website posting done by the Defendant for the March 26, 2009 for the prescribed time period under the Act. The March 26, 2009 meeting was illegally convened and this meeting and all actions taken in it are in violation of the Open Meetings Act Subchapter C, Tex. Gov't Code §551.041; §551.043, and §551.056.
15. Defendant does not maintain or could not locate the signed originals of the notices and/or minutes of the board meetings from November 2008 through April 2009 as inspected pursuant to a Public Information Request by Plaintiff Thanedar. Defendant admitted that the
Terrell v. Pampa lSD Page 6 of 16
• • original signed minutes for the March 12, 2009 meeting did not exist. Upon inspection, several other documents/minutes also appeared to be copies and not originals. .
16. Defendant's notices of board meetings taped to the front door of the administrative building are signed by Ms. Karen Linder who is a secretary to Mr. Barry Haenisch, Superintendent of Defendant Pampa Independent School District. These postings are in violation of the Act as follows:
1. The postings of the notices specifically including' notice for the March 26, 2009 meeting do not contain certificates of compliance by a "designated or authorized" person that the .Postings are in compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Open Meetings Act.
2. The Open Meetings Act has several notice provisions which must be complied with and it is self-evident that a designated or an authorized person must provide a certificate that the notice posted is in fact in compliance with the Open Meetings Act. This court should take judicial notice of how governmental bodies and school districts properly post notices on their internet website where designated personnel post and certify compliance with the Open Meetings Act.
3. Defendant's taped front door notices are signed by Ms. Karen Linder who is not designated nor authorized by the Defendant's policies legally approved by its Board of Trustees to post public notices of meetings under the Act. It is undisputed that as a secretary to the Superintendent of Defendant, Ms. Karen Linder has neither the authority under law, district by-laws or approved policies, nor any apparent or implied authority to post statutory notices on
Terrell v. Pampa lSD Page 7 of 16 • • behalf of a government body namely, Defendant. Indeed, Ms. Karen Linder does not even claim to have any authority to post legal notices, nor certify compliance under the Act, nor sign the notices on behalf of the Board of Trustees. In fact, Ms. Linder makes no certifications whatsoever in the notices she signed including the notice posted for the March 26, 2009 board meeting.
4, No notices of board meetings are signed by the President of the Board of Trustees or the Superintendent of Defendant Pampa Independent School District. This is in violation of the Act as the "school district" must post a notice of a meeting in compliance with the Act Tex. Gov't Code subchapter C, Tex. Gov't Code §551.041, §551.043, and §55 1.056.
17. Defendant is in violation of the additional posting requirements of the Open Meetings Act Tex. Oov't Code §551.056 which requires that governmental bodies such as defendant must post notices of meetings on their internet websites concUl'l'eD.tly for the prescribed minimum 72 hours before meetings. This requirement is in addition to other postings required by the Act. The Open Meetings Act defines "notice" as follows: "A governmental body shall give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the governmental bOdy." Defendant is in violation of Tex. Gov't Code §551.041. Further. Defendant is in violation of the time; requirement of the Open Meetings Act Tex. Oov't Code §551.043(b).
18. Posting notice is mandatory and actions taken at a meeting for which notice was posted incorrectly will be voidable. Sierra Club v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm 'n, 746 S. W.2d at 301 (Tex. App. -Austin 1988, writ denied). ..
• -
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS TO DECLARE MEETINGS AND ACTIONS VOID
UNDER TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT (TEX. GOV'T CODE, Ch. 551) • 19. Plaintiffs incorporate within this claim all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1· 18,Supra.
20. Defendant is a government body which is subject to the provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act. Since the Board of Trustees for the Defendant Pampa Independent School district is a body corpomte, members cannot perfonn any valid act except as a body at meetings properly convened and conducted. See Toyah lSD v. Pecos-Barstow lSD. 466 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971), no writ; see also Buchele v. Woods, 528 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler, 1975, no writ).
21. Pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code §551.141 an action taken by a government body in violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act is voidable. Governmental actions taken in violation of the notice requirements of the Act are voidable. Swate v. Medina Cmty. Hospital, 966 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet denied); Tex. Gov't Code §551.141. Governmental actions in violation of the Open Meetings Act have been judicially declared to ~ void. See e.g. Point /sabelLS.D. v. Hinojosa. 191 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex. App. -Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied). By Defendant's violation of the notice provisions of the Open Meetings Act as explained above, the respective illegally convened Board Meetings (see paragraph 11 above and Exhibit I) and all actions taken therein are both illegal and therefore void. Plaintiffs request that all meetings, and thus actions in question, as noted above in paragraph 11 including the meeting held on 3126/09 be declared void.
22. In this case, the Pampa Independent School District woefully failed to comply with the statutory notice provisions of the Open Meetings Act as shown above and shown conscious guilt in its transparent attempts to misrepresent compliance and grossly obstruct justice. Terrell v. Pampa lSD Page9of16 • • Defendant has repeatedly demonstrated flagrant disregard for the public's right to know what their government is doing and for public's right to expect honest, voluntary, and full compliance with law. Citizens do not have to file lawsuits to expect and enforce honest compliance with the law from their government.
23. It is plaintiffs' position that the board meeting of March 26, 2009 was not properly convened and was in violation of the notice provisions of the Open Meetings Act as explained above , and therefore, illegal. Plaintiffs request that the said meeting and all actions taken in the meeting specifically the action terminating Rebecca Terrell's probationary contract be declared void by this Court. This court should not countenance the improper conduct and flagrant disregard for law shown by the defendant (e.g. having three different fals versions of the notice of the board meeting held on March 26, 2009) and this court should consider such improper conduct in declaring the above referenced actions and meeting void and in further granting it\junctive and mandamus relief to plaintiffs, specifically including reinstatement of Rebecca Terrell's employment contract and duties, responsibilities, and privileges appurtenant therein and granting special damages.
24. It is plaintiffs' position that the board meetings outlined in paragraph ll above were not properly convened and were in violation of the Open Meetings Act's notice provisions. Plaintiffs request that the said meetings and all actions taken in the said meetings be declared void by this CoW't. This court should not countenance the improper conduct and flagrant disregard for law shown by the defendant and this court should consider such improper conduct in declaring the above referenced actions and meetings void and in further granting injunctive and mandamus relief to plaintiffs.
• • 25. By this action, as provided by the Open Meetings Act, plaintiffs also seeks to recover from Defendant all of their reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in bringing this action.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR MANDAMUS
26. Plaintiffs incorporate within this claim all of the alleptions set forth in paragraphs 1- 2S,supra.
27. Defendant's violation of the Open Meetings Act caused plaintiffs' substantial injury for which plaintiffs sue for equitable relief of writ of mandamus in the fonn of voiding all meetings outlined in paragraph 11 above including the meeting of March 26, 2009 and actions taken therein and reinstatement of Rebecca Terrell's employment contract as a classroom teacher and all rights, duties, privileges appurtenant thereto and injunctive relief to prevent further such occurrences and violations of the Act.
APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
WITHOUT NOTICE AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
28. Plaintiffs incorporate within this claim all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1- 27, supra.
29. Plaintiffs are seeking temporary injunctive relief from the actions of Defendant.
30. Plaintiffs request the Court to temporarily restrain Defendant Pampa Independent School District without notice and, after notice is given to Defendant and after hearing is held, to temporarily erijoin Defendant Pampa Independent School District from tampering. deleting, modifying, correcting or changing in any way the Notices. Agendas, Minutes, and/or record of Board Meetings in paper or electronic form or as posted on the defendant's website as ..BoardBook.. or under any other name or form with respect to the meetings in question and subject matter of this lawsuit.
• • 31. Plaintiffs request the Court to temporarily restrain Defendant Pampa Independent School District without notice and, after notice is given to Defendant and after hearing is held, to temporarily enjoin Defendant Pampa Independent School District from proceeding with the tennination of Rebecca Terrell's employment contract and from terminating her duties, rights, and privileges as a classroom teacher.
32. The granting of the tempoi'aty injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs will allow Plaintiffs to preserve the issues at hand until a final determination by the Court regarding the alleged violations of the Texas Open Meetinas Act can be made.
33. Additionally, the granting of the temporary injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs will only require Defendant Pampa Independent School District to comply with and abide by the Open Meetings Act and the employment contract with Rebecca Terrell until a final detennination is made by the Court. The Defendant governmental entity Pampa Independent School District incy.rs no additional cost and bears no additional dutv but to comply with law or the existing contractual obligations. Plaintiffs have made sufficient showing of violations and a pattern of obstruction of justice and willful non compliance with the Open Meetings Act on the part of Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiffs pmy that the Court, in its discretion, should not require cash bond in this matter on the part of plaintiffs, or alternatively, if the court requires a bond, require the bond of a nominal amount.
34. Furthennore, the granting of temporary injunctive relief will prevent Defendant from taking action that will cause further immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs and all other citizens and taxpayers of the Pampa Independent School District. Defendant's modifying, altering or changing in any way the paper or electronic record and documents, whether posted on the Defendant's website or not, will make it impossible for the Plaintiffs to present their case to
TerreJJ v. Pampa lSD Page 12 of 16 • • 44. Plaintiffs pray that the court require defendant to abide by all laws, rules, regulations, and policies that are required of the defendant and its board members, officers, agents, servants, and employees.
45. Plaintiffs request that the court set a date and time for a hearing on plaintiffs' claim to declare the meetings outlined in No. 11 above of this petition and actions taken therein void, Plaintiffs' claim for a mandamus, Plaintiffs' claim for damages and special damages, Plaintiffs' application for temporary and permanent injunctions and issue notice of this hearing to defendant.
46. After holding a hearing, the court should declare the meetings outlined in No. 11 above (specifically including the meeting held on March 26, 2009) void and declare the actions taken in the said meetings (including the termination of Rebecca Terrell's employment contract on March 26, 2009) void and issue a writ of mandamus ordering the reinstatement of Rebecca Terrell's employment contract which would have renewed automatically by operation of law (Texas Education Code Sec. 21.103 (a) and (b)). Further, the Court should issue permanent injunctions against Defendant to prevent future violations of law, specifically the Open Meetings Act.
47. Considering the systematic willful violations of the Open Meeting Law and the scant and perfunctory deliberation on Terrell's employment contract in the open meeting on March 26, 2009 (Terrell had requested that all deliberations be conducted in the open meeting under the authority of Tex. Gov't Code §551.074(b)), it is clear that defendant further deliberated on matters relating to Terrell's employment in the closed meeting in violation of the Act. Plaintiffs pray that the Court order Defendant to produce and disclose to plaintiffs the certified agenda of the closed meeting or the executive session of the board meeting held on March 26, 2009;
TerreJ1 v. Pampa lSD Page 15 of 16 • • alternatively, Plaintiffs pray that the Cow1 conduct an in camera inspection of the Certified Agenda to verify whether Defendant complies with relevant provisions relating to Certified Agenda and whether a violation occurred of the said provisions. See Tex. Oov't Code §55 1.1 04. The court has power to order Defendant to disclose the certified agenda of the closed meeting or the executive session of any Board Meeting pursuant to Tex. Oov't Code §551.1 04
48. As allowed under Tex. Oov't Code Ch. 551 Subchapter G, plaintiffs pray that the court assess costs of litigation, any fees and expenses, and any reasonable attomey fees incurred by plaintiffs and grant such relief to Plaintiffs.
49. Further, considering the flagrant and willful violations of the Open Meetings Act, Plaintiffs respectfully request special damages including costs, fees and expenses, and reasonable attorney fees under the Open Meetings Act.
Dated: May 29, 2009 Respectfully submitted, STATE OF TEXAS § • § § GRAY COUNTY §
AP'FJDAVII IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION
FOR A TEMPORARY BESTRAINING QRDER
BEFORE ME, the Wldersigned authority, on May 28, 2009 personally appeared Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar, and after being duly swom by me, stated under oath the following:
"Our names are Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar. We are over the age of majority. We are mentally, physically and otherwise competent to make this sworn declaration. We are not legally disqualified from making this affidavit" ·
"We have personal knowledge of the facts alleged herein and in the Plaintiffs' Original Petition and Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order Without Notice and Temporary Injunctions with Supporting Documentation and Affidavit ("Petition") and it is true and correct except where otherwise stated. We aftinn that the attached exhibits to the Petition are true and correct copies of the record. We are concerned residents, taxpayers, and citizens of Pampa in the Pampa Independent School District."
• ~'.•·
L 1.
• CoDatroc&ion Update: Pampa HiJb School Identify futuro agenda items • V. REPORTS A. Bufldiaaa. Orouadl, aud Facllitiel Report B. Career and 1aCbDo1osY ad coJie&e aedit opportuniU. for PJSD atudeDts. c. Pa:&ooael Maaqement a.port D. Food Services Report B. Wind Energy Report
VI. PERSONNEL
A. ~t ofprofellioaal employee
B. Approval. !IIDC'NI1 of 11'Jtm. C0DU1Ct employees C. Appmval aDd reoewal of probatioDal')' contract employees D. Apploval of 1arminltiC81 of pobatioaary COiltrlld employees. E. Approval of I10Jlool'elleWal of term con1raet employees.
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P}It MPA • • Pampa Independent School Dlstr1ct ~pa &.cte.,endent school oimeSchoot Board Page2of2
• Commui'Hty/Civlc: Member· St. Vincent De Paul Cethollc Church. CASA of the Hgh Plalna. Pampa Rot.y Club, Kntghtt of COlumbus, Boy Scouta, end UNied Way.
• ,. - "
Pampa Independent School Distric.bool Board Page 1 of2 I', ! This is Google's cache of http://www.pampai$CI.natladucati~tslscdirec:tory/defauJt.php? 1 sectiondetailid=2&PHPSESSID=706c58S5e7ea40287031c6a16a751989. It Is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on May 16, 1 2009 06:59:06 GMT. The current .,.. could have changed in the meantime. learn rnore i These search terms are highlighted: pampe 1M school bollrd The8e terms only appear In links pointing to this Text-ooly version ' 1 page: website -- . ·--.. -·-·--·---.........,_ ... _................ .. ---~·--- ~pal6dependentSchool
• • Place 7. Term: Sfl007- !512010, E-Mail • Lived In Pampa einoe 1987 • Graduate of Roswell High School, 1980;
Page 2 of2 .. . ' "'
Pampa Independent School District .hool Board Page I of2 321 W.Alh~en f Pampa.TX7906.~ I Phaaet~ I Fu:IJOH65'·0506 SINGLE CD ROM THAT IS LABELED "PAMPA ISD NOTICES- EXHIBIT #1" AND IS AN ATTACHMENT OF THE DOCUMENT:
PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WITHOUT
NOTICE AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION WITH SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTATION AND AFFIDAVIT
FILE DATE: MAY29,2009
Appendix 6 Plaintiffs’ Second and First Supplemental Petitions
• 195
..
EXHIBIT 2
EXHIBIT C-3
PAMPAINDEPENDENTSCHOOLDISTRICT
STATEMENTOF REVENUES, EXPENDITURES, AND CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE GOVERNMENTAL FUNDS FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2009 Data 10 60 Total Control General Capital Other Governmental Codes Fund Projects Funds Funds
REVENUES:
5700 Total Local and Intermediate Sources $ 12,380,539 $ 537,197 $ 4,569,830 $ 17,487,566 5800 State Program Revenues 12,566,427 634,624 13,201,051 5900 Federal Program Revenues 161,888 3,322,080 3,483,968 5020 Total Revenues 25,108,854 537,197 8,526,534 34,172,585 EXPENDITURES:
Current:
0011 Instruction 13,316,351 1,634,216 14,950,567 0012 Instructional Resources and Media Services 333,126 16,638 349,764 0013 Curriculum and Instructional Staff Development 467,711 345,061 812,772 0021 Instructional Leadership 208,181 97,444 305,625 0023 School Leadership 1,431,156 22,983 1,454,139 0031 Guidance, Counseling and Evaluation Services 868,754 22,617 891,371 0032 Social Work Services 26,343 31,795 58,138 0033 Health Services 247,298 58,034 305,332 0034 Student (Pupil) Transportation 561,188 561,188 0035 Food Services 1,524,430 1,524,430 0036 Extracurricular Activities 1,156,845 42,274 1,199,119 0041 General Administration 1,098,809 3,967 1,102,776 0051 Facilities Maintenance and Operations 2,431,265 25,223 2,456,488 0052 Security and Monitoring Services 105,573 105,573 0053 Data Processing Services 359,654 81,965 441,619 0061 Community Services 94,730 146,953 241,683 Debt Service:
0071 Debt Service- Principal on Long Term Debt 67,061 433,704 500,765 0072 Debt Service - Interest on Long Term Debt 4,972 2,595,163 2,600,135 0073 Debt Service- Bond Issuance Cost and Fees 800 800 Capital Outlay:
0081 Facilities Acquisition and Construction 1,063,604 17,343,989 549,169 18,956,762 Intergovernmental:
0093 Payments to Fiscal Agent/Member Districts of SSA 666,032 666,032 0099 Other Intergovernmental Charges 304,389 304,389 6030 Total Expenditures 24,147,010 17,343,989 8,298,468 49,789,467 1100 Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues Over (Under) 961,844 (16,806,792) 228,066 ( 15,616,882) Expenditures OTHER FINANCING SOURCES (USES):
7912 Sale of Real and Personal Property 25,960 25,960 7913 Capital Leases 164,638 164,638 7915 Transfers In 101,851 101,851 8911 Transfers Out (Use) (2,812) (99,039) (101,851) 7080 Total Other Financing Sources (Uses) 187,786 2,812 190,598 1200 Net Change in Fund Balances 1,149,630 (16,806,792) 230,878 (15,426,284) 0100 Fund Balance - September 1 (Beginning) 8,586,536 41,635,879 2,714,786 52,937,201
3000 Fund Balance - August 31 (Ending) $ 9,736,166 $ 24,829,087 $ 2,945,664 $ 37,510,917
EXHIBITC-5
PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
STATEMENTOF REVENUES, EXPENDITURES, AND CHANGES TN FUND BALANCE BUDGETANDACTUAL-GENERALFUND FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2009 Data Actual Amounts Variance With Control (GAAP BASIS) Final Budget Budgeted Amounts Positive or Codes Original Final (Negative)
REVENUES:
5700 Total Local and Intennediate Sources $ 10,722,600 $ 12,408,857 $ 12,380,539 $ (28,318) 5800 State Program Revenues 13,015,358 12,543,630 12,566,427 22,797 5900 Federal Program Revenues 158,000 158,000 161,888 3,888 5020 Total Revenues 23,895,958 25,110,487 25,108,854 (1,633) EXPENDITURES:
Current:
0011 Instruction 13,732,490 13,915,302 13,316,351 598,951 0012 Instructional Resources and Media Services 343,163 344,363 333,126 11,237 0013 Curriculum and Instructional Staff Development 474,652 564,451 467,711 96,740 0021 Instructional Leadership 234,333 214,626 208,181 6,445 0023 School Leadership 1,467,158 1,436,018 1,431,156 4,862 0031 Guidance, Counseling and Evaluation Services 998,961 920,365 868,754 51,611 0032 Social Work Services 26,910 30,710 26,343 4,367 0033 Health Services 255,642 255,642 247,298 8,344 0034 Student (Pupil) Transportation 692,055 778,755 561,188 217,567 0036 Extracurricular Activities 1,091,911 1,182,614 1,156,845 25,769 0041 General Administration 1,059,979 1,140,152 1,098,809 41,343 0051 Facilities Maintenance and Operations 2,583,513 2,689,231 2,431,265 257,966 0052 Security and Monitoring Services 53,174 100,471 105,573 (5,102) 0053 Data Processing Services 317,653 366,891 359,654 7,237 0061 Community Services 100,694 100,694 94,730 5,964 Debt Service:
0071 Debt Service- Principal on Long Tenn Debt 68,674 68,674 67,061 1,613 0072 Debt Service - Interest on Long Tenn Debt 4,972 (4,972) Capital Outlay:
0081 Facilities Acquisition and Construction 242,334 1,333,609 1,063,604 270,005 Intergovernmental:
0099 Other Intergovernmental Charges 313,000 304,400 304,389 II 6030 Total Expenditures 24,056,296 25,746,968 24,147,010 1,599,958 1100 Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues Over (Under) (160,338) (636,481) 961,844 1,598,325 Expenditures OTHER FINANCING SOURCES (USES):
7912 Sale of Real and Personal Property 25,000 25,960 960 7913 Capital Leases 164,638 164,638 164,638 7915 Transfers In 500 543 (543) 8911 Transfers Out (Use) (4,800) (2,900) (2,812) 88 7080 Total Other Financing Sources (Uses) 160,338 187,281 187,786 505 1200 Net Change in Fund Balances (449,200) 1,149,630 1,598,830 0100 Fund Balance - September 1 (Beginning) 8,586,536 8,586,536 8,586,536
3000 Fund Balance - August 31 (Ending) $ 8,586,536 $ 8,137,336 $ 9,736,166 $ 1,598,830
EXHIBIT K-1 Cont'd) PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT SCHEDULE OF EXPENDITURES OF FEDERAL AWARDS FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2009 (I) (2) (3) (4) FEDERAL GRANTOR/ Federal Pass-Through PASS-THROUGH GRANTOR/ CFDA Entity Identifying Federal PROGRAM or CLUSTER TITLE Number Number Expenditures U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Passed Through State DeQartment of Education ESEA. Title L Part A- Improving Basic Programs 84.010A 09-610101090904 $ 761.590 IDEA- Part B, Formula 84.027 09-6600010909046600 587,834 SSA- IDEA- Part B, Formula 84.027 09-6600010909046600 634,024 Total CFDA Number 84.027 1,221,858 Career and Technical- Basic Grant 84.048 09-420006090904 40,056 IDEA -Part B. Preschool 84.173 09-6610010909046610 31.323 SSA- IDEA- Part B. Preschool 84.173 09-6610010909046610 32,008 Total CFDA Number 84.173 63,331 ESEA Title IV- Safe and Drug-Free Schools 84.186A 09-691 00 1090904 10,530 ESEA. Title X. Part C -Homeless Children 84.196 09-090904 15,651 Title II, Part D -Enhancing Ed. Through Technology 84.318X 09-630001090904 7,178 Title Ill, Part A - English Language Acquisition 84.365A 09-6 71 00 1090904 34,631 ESEA. Title II. Part A. Teacher/Principal Training 84.367A 09-694501090904 200.205 ESL Summer School Program 84.369A XX-XXXXXXX 2.206 Total Passed Through State Department of Education $ 2,357,236
TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION $ 2,357,236 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Passed Through State DeQartment of Education Head Start 93.600 09-090904 $ 106,010 Total Passed Through State Department of Education $ 106,010
TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES $ 106,010 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Passed Through the State DeQartment of Agriculture School Breakfast Program* 10.553 09-090904 $ 175,115 National School Lunch Program- Cash Assistance* 10.555 09-090904 633.118 National School Lunch Prog.- Non-Cash Assistance* 10.555 09-090904 50.601 Total CFDA Number 10.555 683,719 Total Passed Through the State Department of Agriculture $ 858,834
TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE $ 858,834
TOTAL EXPENDITURES OF FEDERAL AWARDS $ 3,322,080 *Clustered Programs as required by Compliance Supplement March, 2009 Note A- $36,471 of indirect costs are not considered federal financial assistance for inclusion in the Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards. These revenues are reported in the Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balances- Govenmental Funds in the General Fund column.
Note B- According to the Texas Education Agency's Financial Accountability System Resource Guide, (FASRAG), funds received from the School Health and Related Services (SHARS) programs represent reimbursements to the District for school health based services which are not provided to special education students enrolled in the Medicaid Program, and consequently these revenues in the amount of $125,417 are not to be considered federal financial assistance for inclusion in the Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards. These revenues are reported on the Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance- Governmental Funds in the General
.
"'
.
2011-2012 HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS 1--" 0 ~, v. § IN AND FOR I-" c: - r ;.: r-- § ~~-,
-i iTl --.- PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL § -~ ~·-~ =:3 ,) ~-< 0 :--·i ,. ' - ..J DISTRICT, § :· ~ r I r ~·1 -1:
§ GRAY COUNTY, TEXAS ...>~ » _r Defendant § c.D (/)
169 J continuing), and that this Court should grant special damages calculated by the number of hours spent by plaintiffs on this case multiplied by a reasonable rate per hour to be fixed by the Court, and that plaintiffs be declared as the substantially prevailing party and be granted costs, expenses, and attorney fees, damages, back pay and benefits for Terrell with reinstatement as teacher, special damages, and fees, and that the Court enter a permanent injunction against PISD to prevent future violations of TOMA. Plaintiffs further request that the Court grant all other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which they may justly be entitled to receive.
Respectfully submitted,
172 ...)
PAMPA lSD PROPOSED TEACHER HIRING SCHEDULE 2008-2009
YREXP 187 DAY
08/31/08 BACHELOR'S DEGREE MASTER'S DEGREE 34,500 +750 34,800 +750 35,400 +750 35,600 +750 35,800 +750 36,000 +750 36,500 +750 37,100 +750 37,700 +750 38,400 +750 39,100 +750 39,900 +750 40,630 +750 41,350 +750 42,070 +750 42,840 +750 43,560 +750 44,280 +750 44,950 +750 45,690 +750 46,360 +750 46,980 +750 47,410 +750 47,990 +750 48,530 +750 48,890 +750 49,040 +750 49,170 +750 49,320 +750 49,480 +750 49,630 +750 173 \..., ~
Teacher Salary Schedule Pampa ISO
2009-10 2009-10 Years of Continuing Years Adopted Experience Teacher Exp New Hire 8-31-09 Schedule 8-31-09 Schedule
2011-2012 HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS
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~ Appendix 7 Created Dates of PISD’s Untimely Posted Internet Notices (PX2)
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Cause No. 35621 (/) > c::::i )> z C-.J -<
223 rct District Court, Gray County (/ --t 0 :::0 ;.....> C> -q Terrell v. PISD - );:> 0 c_ :~~: I rn -I rn c:: :::n -< 0 ::d 3 :;-., Summary of Document Properties CJ fT1 c..o --{ fl!
v x ofDefendant's Website Notices c: U1 > (/) for 22 Meetings -l -< ..z::
1. Web notices for Board meetings on 8/13/08, 8/21/08, 9/4/08, 9/18/08, 1Oi21 S 10/9/08, and 10/23/08 were created on 5/11/09 and posted on PISD's webs·1 ·1e on 5/19/09; and
2. Web notice for Board meeting on 11/6/08 was created on 515109 and posttd on PISD's website on 5119109; and 3. Web notices for Board meetings on 11/20/08 and 12/4/08 were cr-::.ated-~n 517109 and posted on PISD's website on 5119109; and
4. Web notices for Board meetings on 12/18/08, 1/15/09, 2/15/09, 2/19/09, 3/12/09, 3/26/09, 4/2/09, 4/16/09, 4/21/09, and 4/23/09 were created on 5/8/09 and posted on PISD's website on 5/19/09; and
5. Web notice for Board meeting on 517109 was created on 5/12/09 and posted on PISD's website on 5/19/09; and 6. Web notice for Board meeting for 5/19/09 was created on 5/18/09 and postc:d on PISD's website on 5/19/09." · · "The "Modified" dates for the above notices are identical to the "Created" dates."
Appendix 8 Defendant’s Answers to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories (PX8) .... r ::< Cl -l PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL § CJ P1 (0 rr1 DISTRICT § 1.1 >< c. l>
c..n U) § -I U1 Defendant § GRAY COUNTY, T.EJCA.t
DEFENlJAl'll'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO: Plaintiffs, Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekbar Thanedar, 1000 North Wells St., Pampa, Texas 79065.
COJY.IES NOW Defendan~ PA1\1PA INDEPENDEl\TT SCHOOL DISTRICT, (hereinafter "Defendant") in the above-styled and numbered cause, and, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, makes the follo\Ving Answers to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Request for Production to Defendant.
Respectfully submitted.
W. Wade A.mold
State Bar No. 00783561 Andrea Slater Gulley State Bar No. 24045994 UNTIERWOOD, 'WILSON. BERRY.
STEIN &JOHNSON, P.C.
P .0. Box 9158 A.rnarillo, Texas 79105-9158 806-376-5613 - FAX: 806-349-9471 n _, } PX By.µ) ~VJ W. Wade.Arnold IO ATTOR..NEYS FOR DEFENDANT Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Interrogatories, . EXHIBIT Requests for Admissions and Request for Production-Page 1 #491701 c --------- . . i . -...
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Defendant § GRAY COUNTY, TEXAS; 0'1 );>
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DEFENDA.l\1T'S SUPPLE1\1ENTAL Al"\1SWERS TO PLAlNTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO: Plaintiffs, Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar, 1000 North Wells St., Pampa, Texas 79065.
COMES NOW Defendant, PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, (hereinafter "Defendant'') in the above-styled and numbered cause, and, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, makes the following Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories, Requests for Production and Requests for Admission to Defendant.
Respectfully submitted, W. Wade Arnold
State Bar No. 00783561 Andrea Slater Gulley State Bar No. 24045994 UNDERWOOD, WILSON, BERRY, STEIN & JOHNSON, P.C.
P.O. Box 9158 Anlarillo, Texas 79105-9158 806-3 76-5613 - FAX: 806-349-9471
By: v. W. Wade.Amold
~ ATTORNEYSFORDEFENDANT PX Defendant's Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs' First Jntcrragatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission EXHIBIT II #494359 D
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of April, 2010 a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was delivered via certified mail to and properly addressed as follows:
Rebecca Teirell Chandrashekbar Thanedar 1000 N. Wells Street Pampa, Texas 79065.
• 218 that will show that PISD did not have BoardBook service for the period from January 15, 2009 to May 19, 2009 - period of 5 months for which it claims it had BoardBook service and for which it claims "good faith" exception under §551.056(d) for "non-appearance" of its internet notices. PISD admits the "non-appearance" of notices for said 5 months and blames the "link" to BoardBook service for not working. CR807, CR814-816. CR766-767. 2 It further admits that the untimely notices appeared on BoardBook's website on 5/19/2009 for the previous 5 months.
CR816. But PISD refuses to produce documents that show that it paid license fees or renewal fees to BoardBook for 1/2009 to 5/19/2009 or for the relevant years 2008 and 2009 for
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Curiously, there is no evidence that "created" dates in the document properties of PISD's internet website notices are in actuality dates on which PISD "printed" notices for plaintiffs. In fact the record shows the opposite - PISD did not print PISD's [untimely] website internet notices for plaintiffs. Exhibit 7-pgs 3-6. The copies plaintiffs obtained from Linder were paper copies of signed originals made on PISD' s office copier in the presence of plaintiff Thanedar and had nothing to do with printing website notices which are unsigned and undated. [7] Exhibit 7-pgs 3-6; Exhibits 8, 10. Thus PISD's argument is frivolous.
The "created" date appearing in the "document properties" of PISD's own internet notices posted and appearing on the BoardBook website effective 5/19/2009 means what it states in the document properties - 1) the document is in Adobe PDF format and 2) it was produced ("created") in that format at the stated date and time. See Exhibit 19. Similarly, "Modified" means what it states - the date and time on which the said document was "modified" or changed. Created date and Modified date are standard properties in Adobe's PDF format and are automatically generated information in Adobe PDF. Exhibits 7, 19. In fact PISD does not
meaning). The meaning of words "Bulletin Board" has been well established for more than 150 years as a board for posting notices at a school.
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unlawful actions in meetings held in compliance with TOMA.
Courts have also imposed special damages, as requested here, for conscious indifference and failure to comply with the Open Meetings Act, as here. See Wells v. Hutchinson, 499 F.Supp. 174, 198 (E.D. Tex. 1980). As demonstrated in the record and in this motion, PISD has engaged in frivolous arguments, subterfuge, and obstruction of justice: 1) claiming good faith defense concerning BoardBook service while refusing to produce evidence that PISD ever paid consideration to BoardBook i.e. license fees, maintenance/support fees as required by BoardBook (Exhibit 14) for the period it claims good faith defense. For lack of proof of consideration, the alleged 2007 contract (Exhibit 14) with BoardBook is invalid. There is simply no evidence whatsoever that PISD even had BoardBook service from 8/13/2008 through 5/19/2009; 2) arguing before appeals court that printing notices for plaintiffs "changed" the create dates of its internet website notices, and then refusing and failing to provide evidence of it.
Making this worse, PISD even admitted that plaintiffs printed the internet notices themselves from PISD's public website. CR804.
PISD's defiant willful longstanding violations ofTOMA require voidance to demonstrate to government entities that TOMA will be upheld and honored by Texas courts. Special damages in the amount to be determined by the court should be granted to plaintiffs for prosecuting this unduly protracted litigation pro se expending substantial money, energy, effort, ..
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Appendix 13 Notices for 3/26/09 Meeting - Physical and Internet Notices (PX3, PX5)
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