PD-0292-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 12/17/2015 4:35:05 PM Accepted 12/18/2015 8:08:53 AM ABEL ACOSTA IN THE COURT CLERK OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS JENNIFER BANNER WOLFE, § APPELLANT § § V. § PD-0292-15 § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § RESPONDENT § December 18, 2015
§ § §
STATE'S MERIT BRIEF
§ § § SHAREN WILSON Criminal District Attorney Tarrant County, Texas DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant Criminal District Attorney Chief, Post-Conviction TANYA S. DOHONEY Assistant Criminal District Attorney Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center 401 W. Belknap Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201 (817) 884-1687 FAX (817) 884-1672 State Bar No. 02760900 [email protected]
LISA C. MCMINN, State Prosecuting Attorney
SUBJECT INDEX
SUBJECT INDEX ....................................................................................... ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... v STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE ............. 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................... 2 SIGNIFICANT SECONDARY RESOURCES ............................................ 14 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ............................................................ 15 I. A note about Appellant’s first ground for review ........................ 15 II. Applicable legal standards ........................................................... 19
III. The court of appeals correctly upheld the trial court’s reliability ruling .............................................................................. 23 A. Acceptance and Literature factors .......................................... 24
Acceptance—the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained Literature—the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique ii
B. Qualifications and Application factors ..................................... 29
Qualifications—the qualifications of the expert(s) testifying Application—the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied the technique on the occasion in question
1. The pediatric neurologist ........................................................ 29 2. The pediatric opthalmologist ................................................... 30 3. The pediatric child abuse expert ............................................. 30 4. Differential diagnosis methodology ......................................... 33
C. Rate of Error—the potential rate of error of the technique....... 35
D. Other Available Experts—the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique .......................................... 40
E. Clarity—the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court ................ 40 IV. This Court should uphold both lower courts’ rulings ................. 40 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .................................................................. 42 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................ 43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................... 44 APPENDIX A ..............................................................................................A Sandeep Narang, M.D., J.D., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 505 (2011) iii APPENDIX B ..............................................................................................A Sandeep Narang, M.D., J.D., John D. Melville, M.D., Christopher S. Greeley, M.D., James D. Anderst, M.D., Shannon L. Carpenter, M.D., & Betty Spivack, M.D., A Daubert Analysis Of Abusive Head Trauma—Part II: An Examination Of The Differential Diagnosis, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 203 (2013) iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bekendam v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) .................................... 21, 23 Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) .......................................... 20 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) .................................................................passim Ex parte Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) .......................................... 27 Ex parte Robbins, WR-73,484-02, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6751684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ................................................. 22, 22n, 27-28 Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (J. Cochran, dissenting) ................................................................... 22 Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ...................................passim Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) ........................................................................ 19 State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ............................................ 35 Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .............................. 20, 21, 23 Wolfe v. State, 459 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015) ........................passim v RULES Tex. R. Evid. 702 ...............................................................................passim Tex. R. Evid. 705 ...................................................................................... 21 TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 .................................................................................... 43
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Gaurav Bhardwaj et al., A Systematic Review of the Diagnostic Accuracy of Ocular Signs in Pediatric Abusive Head Trauma, 117 OPHTHALMOLOGY 983 (2010) ..................................................... 38 Harvey Brown & Melissa Davis, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses: Fifteen Years Later, 52 HOUSTON LAW REV. [1] (2014)........................................................ 47
A. Elstein & A. Schwartz, Clinical Problem Solving and Diagnostic Decision Making: Selective Review of the Cognitive Literature, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 729 (2002) ........................................................... 23 Clyde Haberman, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Diagnosis That Divides the Medical World, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. [13], 2015, at A1, http://nyti.ms/1MlkQ7g ........................................................... 26
E. Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony About Differential Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under-and Over-Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 391 (2004) .......................................................... 22 vi
J. Kassirer & F. Sonnenberg, The Scientific Basis of Diagnosis, TEXTBOOK OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (W.N. Kelley ed., 1989) ................. 23 Alex V. Levin et al., Clinical Report: The Eye Examination in the Evaluation of Child Abuse, 126 PEDIATRICS 376 (2010) .............................................................. 38
S. Maguire, Which Clinical Features Distinguish Inflicted from Non-Inflicted Brain Injury? A Systematic Review, 94 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 860 (2009) ................................... 36 Jakob Matschke et al., Nonaccidental Head Injury is the Most Common Cause of Subdural Bleeding in Infants <1 Year of Age, 124 PEDIATRICS 1587 (2009) .......................................................... 38n Sandeep Narang, M.D., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 505 (2011) .................................passim Sandeep Narang, M.D., J.D., John D. Melville, M.D., Christopher S. Greeley, M.D., James D. Anderst, M.D., Shannon L. Carpenter, M.D., & Betty Spivack, M.D., A Daubert Analysis Of Abusive Head Trauma—Part II: An Examination Of The Differential Diagnosis, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 203 (2013) .................................passim STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28th ed. 2006) ........................................ 16 vii
IN THE COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
JENNIFER BANNER WOLFE, § APPELLANT § § V. § PD-0292-15 § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § RESPONDENT §
STATE’S MERIT BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
Comes now the State of Texas, by and through her Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney, and respectfully urges this Court to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A bench trial before the Honorable Louis Sturns culminated in Appellant’s injury-to-a-child conviction. (1CR1: 274–76; RR8:4).
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
In February 2015, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published opinion authored by Chief Justice Livingston. Wolfe v. State, 459 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015). Justice Walker filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 214 (J. Walker, dissenting). No one sought rehearing. On September 16, 2015, this Court granted discretionary review on Appellant’s two-ground petition. After one extension, the State timely files her merit brief on or before December 17, 2015.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant raises two grounds regarding the Second Court’s upholding the admission of expert witness testimony. Hence, the issues presented relate to the implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert and its progeny. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (citations omitted). Appellant’s sole point of error before the Fort Worth court focused on the reliability/admission of expert testimony relating to Abusive Head Trauma [AHT]. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d 201. This appeal’s focus on the admission and reliability of expert testimony necessitates a general summary of the evidence.
The seven-month-old victim suffered serious brain and eye injuries while in Appellant’s care. Emergency medical personnel arrived at Appellant’s behest to her residence where she ran an in-home daycare; they found the infant unconscious, performed CPR, and rushed the little boy to Fort Worth’s Cook Children’s Medical Center. RR4:38, 76. The boy’s parents also arrived, only to learn their infant son needed immediate brain surgery to stop the bleeding in his brain. RR4:62–63. Meanwhile, the caregiver—Appellant—explained to the mother that her little boy had eaten that morning, been crying and, when she set him down, he fell backward. RR4:59–61. Surgery continued for several hours, and the child remained hospitalized for nine days. RR4:64–65.
Backtracking to earlier events, the child’s mother had dropped him off at 7:15 a.m. for daycare. RR4:55–57. Later, Appellant’s morning included an unexpected trip to retrieve her daughter from school for illness-related reasons; all the children went with Appellant on this unexpected trek. RR4:119; RR5:140; RR9:SX34 [non-custodial statement]. When Appellant returned home, she seated the child-victim on the floor and then retrieved another child from her vehicle. She said the little boy fell back onto the interlocking foam pads on the carpeted floor and cried. RR4:119–21, 212; RR5:127, 140; RR9:SX34. Appellant explained that she told the child he needed to sit up, sat him up again, and she stepped away to see a cake at her decorating table. RR4:122; RR5:128–29,140–41 [SX34]. Appellant said that the child fell back again and went silent while she was looking at the cake; after about thirty seconds, Appellant came closer to the boy and realized he was limp. RR4:122; RR5:128–29.
Appellant made a voluntary statement to a child abuse detective; when the officer said he thought her account was inconsistent with the child’s injuries, Appellant spoke with her husband and then supplemented what she had written. RR5:101–02, 145–46; RR6:5–11, 17–20. She added: "When I set [the boy] down, it was possibly hard. I do not remember shaking him. I picked him up, sat him down, and told him he needed to sit. This is a true account in my own words." RR5:145; RR6:9.
Based on his experience working child abuse cases, the detective believed Appellant faced multiple stressors on the day of this little boy’s injuries. RR6:17–18. First, the teething child was fussy. RR5:118,127; RR6:15. Second, the high school sent Appellant’s daughter home before 10:00 a.m. when her attendance would count and, on top of that, Appellant had to pick up her daughter. RR5:127, 140; RR6:15. Third, Appellant’s growing cake-decorating business was busy with orders for Easter celebrations that upcoming weekend. RR4:54; RR5:126–27; RR6:15. The child abuse detective opined that outside stressors could cause someone to lash out at a child.[1] RR5:126; RR6:17–18.
Investigators uncovered other concerns and inconsistencies. Appellant told the paramedics at the scene that the little boy might have choked on food; she said he had been crying, screaming loudly, and “just fell back unconscious.” RR4:15,17,30. This choking history provided to the EMTs, however, did not correspond to his heart rate. RR4:17–18. Later that same day, Appellant confided to a friend that she had sat the child in a chair and, when she returned, found he had inexplicably collapsed. RR4:161–62, 165–66. The inconsistent descriptions caused concern.
Another concern involved Appellant’s being busy and distracted. Additionally, the thriving cake business Appellant looked forward to running in the future ran afoul of the licensing regulations for in-home child care providers. RR4:53, 87–88, 114–16, 120–23, 134–35, 160; RR5:125–27.
1 Another witness corroborated the detective’s opinion regarding Appellant’s state of frustration. The witness, a friend of Appellant’s, explained that Appellant desired to curtail her in-home child-care business at the end of school so she could, instead, focus on cake decorating. RR4:160, 164. In addition to the desire to shift the focus of her employment, Appellant had also verbalized specific frustrations to her friend about this seven-month-old. Appellant described the little boy as a child who cried all the time. RR4:160.
The approaching weekend with the Easter holiday increased the demand for cake orders. RR5:125–27. Appellant admitted to investigators that she had a large number of orders that she still needed to fill. RR5:127.
In addition to the non-medical testimony, the State’s case included three doctors who practice pediatric medicine and treated this little boy. Dr. Richard Roberts, a pediatric neurosurgeon for Cook Children’s Medical Center, first treated the child. RR4:180. The boy presented with “extremis,” bleeding and compression of the brain, which was worrisome for his survival. RR4:192–93. Dr. Roberts performed an emergency craniotomy to evacuate a hematoma and to decrease the pressure in the brain. RR4:200. The child-victim suffered a subdural hematoma [SDH] with an acute component. RR4:196. During surgery, Dr. Roberts also noted an avulsed bridging vein; he believed this very recent injury could only have been caused by a high-energy impact such as a car crash or an extreme fall. RR4:203–04, 214–18, 225–27 [narrowing the time of injury], 277. The doctor’s medical conclusions lacked congruity with Appellant’s explanation of the mechanism of the injury. RR4:216–17, 260–61. Instead, the doctor’s experience informed him that the injuries were consistent with non-accidental trauma cases. RR4:227, 260.
Dr. Roberts also learned that the victim suffered retinal hemorrhaging [RH] and retinal tears. RR4:218–19, 261–62. The presence of these retinal injuries combined with the neurosurgeon having detected an avulsed bridging vein, swelling of the brain, and a SDH, constituted classic symptoms associated with high-energy force to the head. RR4:218–20, 224. According to Dr. Roberts, the injury-causing mechanism had to include acceleration and deceleration in order to cause a vein avulsion; the mechanism could also include shaking and impact against a padded play surface. RR4:219–32, 248–50, 272–73, 280–81. The doctor contended that the force necessary to cause the boy’s injuries would be of a degree known to be dangerous. RR4:231–32. Toppling backwards while seated on a padded floor was inconsistent with the injuries presented and the infant’s spinal development; more force than reported would give rise to the injuries presented by the child. RR4:211–32, 260–61, 285–86.
The State’s second expert, pediatric ophthalmologist Dr. Ann Rannelle, treated the child-victim, too. RR5:5, 12–13. Dr. Rannelle found the boy’s right eye uninjured, but his left eye revealed multiple intraretinal hemorrhages, a large subretinal hemorrhage, preretinal hemorrhages, and also vitreous hemorrhages, with a small line indicating retinoschisis, as well. RR5:38–39. In essence, the child suffered multilayered, confluent retinal hemorrhaging in every layer of his eye. RR5:46–47. Multilayered RHs are consistent with non-accidental trauma.[2] RR5:47–48.
Yet, this case involved more than “mere” retinal hemorrhaging. The pediatric ophthalmologist’s findings included retinoschisis, a condition encompassing the retina splitting apart. RR5:49. The torn retina causes a blood pocket. RR4:219–20, 224; RR5:39, 49, 51–52. The confluence of these distinct injuries confirmed that a high-energy aspect of the mechanism of injury.[3] RR4:219–20, 224.
In addition to the scientific conclusions drawn about the force required in light of the medical findings, the little boy’s eye injuries were not consistent with Appellant’s explanation but, instead, required an acceleration/deceleration type of force and significant, violent, high-energy trauma. RR5:48–49, 52. The ophthalmologist explained she had treated children who had fallen out of second story windows or shopping carts onto concrete floors and they did not present with the serious eye retinal injuries the child-victim experienced. RR5:52–53. Dr. Rannelle stated that Appellant’s explanation for the boy’s injuries was not possible in light of the severity of the eye injuries. RR5:53. The pediatric ophthalmologist’s findings dovetailed with those of the pediatric neurologist.
Dr. Jayme Coffman rounded-out the State’s expert witness lineup. Dr. Coffman, a board-certified practitioner in both general pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics, is the medical director of the CARE team at Cook Children’s Medical Center. RR6:65–71. She began focusing her medical practice on the various forms of child abuse in approximately 1993. RR6:69–77. Dr. Coffman has testified as an expert in child abuse and the treatment of child abuse repeatedly. RR6:78. Dr. Coffman treated the child in this case after his injuries. RR6:79. Based upon the child-victim’s history and the injuries he suffered, especially the multiple types of injuries witnessed by the treating physicians, Dr. Coffman opined that there had to be impact or a combination of impact and shaking. RR6:95–105. Dr. Coffman did not find the little boy’s injuries consistent with his falling from a seated position. Having listened to the defense expert’s testimony during the instant bench trial, Dr. Coffman also rebutted assertions put forward by the defense expert (who had testified out-of-order).4 RR6:107–10.
In her practice, Dr. Coffman does not rely on what has been called “Shaken Baby Syndrome,” but she bases her child abuse diagnosis on the specific mechanism of injury presented and a differential diagnosis with observation; the differential diagnosis methodology is an all-encompassing process-of-elimination consideration of every possible cause and is generally accepted in the medical community. RR6:81, 83, 89–95, 107–13.
Dr. Coffman stated there is not “unrest” within the pediatric world— including all pediatric disciplines—regarding AHT findings. RR6:108–11. Dr. Coffman acknowledged the existence of divergent opinions in fields not involving pediatric practitioners with live patients; for instance, medical examiners and those in the field of biomechanics have questioned AHT as a diagnosis. RR6:108–11. Dr. Coffman confirmed that pediatrics experts resoundingly support the validity of AHT as a medical diagnosis;
4 For instance, the defense expert opined that retinoschisis can progress from retinal hemorrhages. RR6:127. Dr. Coffman flatly rejected this claim, stating she knew of no evidence-based medical literature supporting this contention and, likewise, she had never seen this clinically. RR6:126-28. Dr. Roberts also rejected alternative causes for retinoschisis. RR4:223-24.
Dr. Coffman noted her familiarity with papers authored by Tuerkheimer, Gabaeff, and others cited by the defense as challenging aspects of AHT methodology. RR6:120- 27. Dr. Coffman dismissed these papers and studies in light of the wealth of evidence-based medical literature to the contrary and her experience. RR6:125.
accordingly, the American Academy of Pediatrics recognizes Abusive Head Trauma as a diagnosis. RR6:113–14. Finally, Dr. Coffman explained that, to make an accurate differential diagnosis in this case, everything must be considered, including conditions that the defense expert dismissed. RR6:127–29.
Summing up, the child’s prognosis is unknown. Post-surgery, the boy initially lost right side movement, but regained it after months of therapy. RR4:68–69, 212. An initial vision loss in his left eye improved after treatment. RR4:70. The child will still have "dead spaces" in his brain and has suffered some loss of brain volume and function. RR4:221–22, 233. Since his brain is still developing, his prognosis is unclear. RR4:233.
Appellant called Dr. Robert Rothfeder, an emergency physician from Utah to rebut the State’s experts. RR5:155. Dr. Rothfeder testified he had spent fifteen years conducting personal research on Shaken Baby Syndrome [SBS], now AHT. RR5:163–173. Dr. Rothfeder contended that the medical community lacks agreement regarding whether the combination of injuries—SDHs, RHs, and swelling of the brain—constitute non-accidental injury previously referred to as SBS. RR5:85, 167–71, 174, 183. The emergency medicine doctor agreed that pediatrics practitioners recognize these theories, but represented that non-pediatric physicians disagree. RR5:174.
The defense expert attempted to discount AHT based upon its purported disuse elsewhere as valid diagnosis. He testified that in many jurisdictions, including Canada and the United Kingdom, expert testimony that draws a conclusion of AHT from the mere presence of the discussed triad of unexplained symptoms is inadmissible. RR5:202–03. However, during the cross-examination of Dr. Rothfeder, the witness backed off from his sweeping statements, acknowledging his comments were limited to a few cases with specific problems. RR5:228–30.
Even based upon the proverbial “cold record,” cross-examination appeared to severely undermine this expert’s credibility. Dr. Rothfeder had no formal pediatric experience, had a limited emergency room practice regarding young patients, and he had not consulted with any of the treating physicians in this case. RR5:23–32. For more than a decade, the physician worked referrals from a law firm that handled car wreck cases. Further, in spite of his limited pediatric experience, Dr. Rothfeder had spent several years in the consulting/testifying business for defense attorneys regarding child abuse, even though he had no peer-review articles on the subject, had not attended specialized seminars on the matter, and could not identify any specific child abuse case he had treated. RR5:158–59, 213–16, 222–26. Dr. Rothfeder also holds a law license, testifies twelve to fifteen times a year as a consultant for defense counsel in child abuse cases, and receives approximately $8000 per case. RR5:158, 214–28.
SIGNIFICANT SECONDARY RESOURCES
The Houston Journal of Health Law and Policy has published two extensive articles comprehensively providing an overview of evidence- based medical literature relating to the validity of abusive head trauma as a medical diagnosis; the primary author of these papers holds dual credentials—medical doctor and attorney. See Sandeep Narang, M.D., J.D., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 505 (2011) [hereinafter A Daubert Analysis—Part I; Appendix A]; Sandeep Narang, M.D., J.D., John
D. Melville, M.D., Christopher S. Greeley, M.D., James D. Anderst, M.D., Shannon L. Carpenter, M.D., & Betty Spivack, M.D., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma—Part II: An Examination of the Differential Diagnosis, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 203 (2013) [hereinafter A Daubert Analysis—Part II; Appendix B].
During the bench trial, the parties discussed A Daubert Analysis— Part I; likewise, both the State and Second Court referred to it on appeal.5 Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d at 212 & n.18–19. In late 2013 after this case was set
5 The parties provided Dr. Narang’s 2011 AHT survey to the trial court during a break, agreeing that the judge should review the document; the original copy, designated State’s Exhibit No. 42, was mistakenly marked up and no new “clean” copy was proffered into evidence. RR6:64-65,115. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d at 212 & n.18.
for submission below, Dr. Narang published his second article to discuss the differential diagnosis aspect of AHT conclusions and to refute challenges premised on alternative diagnoses to AHT. Dr. Narang authored this follow-up survey along with five other physicians. See A Daubert Analysis—Part II. The two law journal articles bookend any analysis of the validity of AHT diagnosis, and the State attached both publications as appendices and borrows liberally from both herein.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Appellant’s two grounds for discretionary review lack merit because the court of appeals properly determined that no abuse of discretion occurred. The appellate ruling correctly determined that the trial judge’s Daubert ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion because the three physicians who provided AHT testimony proffered reliable expert evidence, both in general and as it applied to this case’s specific facts.
I. A note about Appellant’s first ground for review
Appellant’s first allegation complains that the Second Court’s decision too narrowly determined the issue of reliability. Tethering her first discretionary claim to the argument voiced in Justice Walker’s dissent, Appellant insists that the majority opinion merely focused on the general scientific reliability of AHT evidence and failed to consider the evidence’s reliability in light of the victim’s unique medical history.
The State contends that the expert testimony and conclusions which found non-accidental injury and abusive head trauma came to fruition after application of a methodology called differential diagnosis. Medical science defines “differential diagnosis” as “the determination of which two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one from which the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and contrasting of the clinical findings.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28th ed. 2006); A Daubert Analysis—Part II, at 302. Simplistically speaking, this type of analysis relies on process-of-elimination reasoning. Id. at 304. “In differential diagnosis, if there are four possible diagnoses and you eliminate three, logic points to the last illness as the correct diagnosis.” E. Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony About Differential Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under-and Over-Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 391, 392 (2004); A Daubert Analysis—Part II, at 304.
Decades of research reveal that this diagnostic process employs a non-linear, unstructured method of inferential and deductive problem solving. See J. Kassirer & F. Sonnenberg, The Scientific Basis of Diagnosis, TEXTBOOK OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (W.N. Kelley ed., 1989); see also A. Elstein & A. Schwartz, Clinical Problem Solving and Diagnostic Decision Making: Selective Review of the Cognitive Literature, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 729, 730 (2002); A Daubert Analysis—Part II, at 303 & n.629. Dr. Jayme Coffman, the medical director of the CARE Team at Cook Children’s Medical Center in Fort Worth, relied on this differential diagnosis protocol when concluding that this little boy suffered AHT. RR6:80–94, 106–07, 112, 128, 140, 151–55.
In the context of Appellant’s two discretionary review claims and even when considering the difference between the lower court’s majority opinion and the dissent’s rationale, the differential diagnosis methodology renders the difference (and the first ground for review) moot. The State suggests avoiding the dualistic consideration of the two appellate approaches voiced by the competing opinions from the lower court. An either-or approach is not logical since the State’s medical experts relied on the differential diagnosis methodology. This methodology treated the child’s unique medical history as integral to the diagnosis decision. See A Daubert Analysis—Part I, at 571–72.6 By relying on the differential diagnostic method, Dr. Coffman’s conclusions ruled out other possible causes, general ones and those that were specific to this child. RR6:80–94, 106– 07, 112, 128, 140, 151–55. Therefore, whether Appellant’s brief to the court of appeals argued that the complained-of expertise was unreliable in relation to this child-victim’s specific circumstances and medical history does not matter because the expert opinions developed before the trial judge included full consideration of the child’s unique medical history including the fact that the child bore no external signs of injury. RR4:222– 24, 227–38, 248–59, 274–75, 283–85 [Dr. Roberts]; RR5:170–74, 212–54 [Dr. Ranelle]; RR6:30–33, 56–59, 80–94, 105–28, 140, 151–55 [Dr. Coffman].
By definition, when a physician conducts the complex inferential and deductive process of differential refinement and reaches an AHT conclusion, this established, reliable, step-by-step evaluation rules out other causes. See generally A Daubert Analysis, Part II, at 302–22. Differential diagnosis is a reliable methodology for applying AHT to 6 The differentials for subdural hematomas and retinal hemorrhages, the two most common injuries involved in AHT, are found in Appendix B and C of A Daubert Analysis—Part I.
specific facts. Id. Therefore, in this case, the prosecution amply bore its burden to show the reliability of the expert testimony and opinions of the pediatric medical team who treated this child-victim—both in general and as they were applied to this child’s specific circumstances.
II. Applicable legal standards
The court of appeals correctly determined that the trial judge, acting as a Daubert/Kuhmo gatekeeper, properly exercised his discretion after hearing a wealth of diverse information. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Together, these two Supreme Court decisions squarely place the admissibility of scientific and other technical or specialized evidence in the discretionary lap of the trial court. In this case, as the interim appellate court found, no abuse of discretion occurred. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d 201.
The threshold determination regarding the admissibility of expert evidence is whether the testimony will be helpful to the finder of fact. In this case, the trial court acted as finder of fact. Although the trial judge’s experience through the years has encompassed much scientific and/or medical testimony, the specifics of pediatric neurology, pediatric ophthalmology, and even pediatric physical abuse would surely assist in this case. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (same trial judge properly applied evidentiary rules to admit DNA evidence in this landmark case).
This Court’s unanimous Tillman decision comprehensibly addressed the admissibility of expert testimony. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A trial judge's decision on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and will not be reversed if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 435; Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 813–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The State’s AHT evidence and her three treating physicians passed the admission hurdle.
Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs the admission of expert testimony. This rule allows testimony from a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify when scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge can assist a factfinder’s understanding of the evidence and determination of facts in issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. To be admissible, a party offering expert scientific evidence must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony “is sufficiently reliable and relevant to help the jury in reaching accurate results.” TEX. R. EVID. 702, 705(c); see Bekendam v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 572. While other factors go into the admissibility of scientific evidence, Appellant only contests the reliability of the State’s AHT evidence in this case. See Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 435. To be considered reliable, evidence based on a scientific theory must satisfy three criteria: (1) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573; TEX. R. EVID. 702.
Judge Hervey’s Tillman decision opined that courts analyze reliability to determine whether the proffered expert evidence is founded on sound scientific methodology in order to weed out “junk science.” Id. at 435–36. The reliability determination hinges on several factors that include the following:
(1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained; (2) the qualifications of the expert(s) testifying; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique;
(6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied the technique on the occasion in question.
Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. These factors should not be considered a “definitive checklist or test” but, instead constitute guidelines for a trial judge’s assessment. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. The Supreme Court mandated that the focus must be on the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions generated. Id. at 594–95 (emphasis added).
The State recognizes that some members of this Court have previously voiced concerns—in a disparate scenario—about the “fundamental disconnect between the worlds of science and of law” when applying legal principals to evolving scientific theories. See Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)7 (J. Cochran, dissenting); see also Ex parte Robbins, WR-73,484-02, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6751684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (habeas relief granted after statutory amendment) (rehearing granted May 13, 2015). In this case, the State seeks to show that the trial court did not abuse his discretion when
7 In a case involving multiple theories of how (or whether) the child was asphyxiated, the medical examiner re-ruled the manner-of-death from homicide to undetermined, leading to appellate action regarding the conviction’s validity. Ex parte Robbins, 2014 WL 6751684, *5.
applying Daubert-related guidelines to discern the reliability of the State’s evidence (the ground for review) and that the science utilized herein remains reliable.
III. The court of appeals correctly upheld the trial court’s reliability ruling[8] Relying on decisions such as Tillman, Beckendam, and other Daubert progeny from this Court, the court of appeals correctly set out the proper analytical constructs to determine that the trial court’s ruling did not fall outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d at 204– 205 (citing Tillman, 354 S.W.3d 425; Beckendam v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)) (additional citations omitted). With their jurisprudential guidelines squarely addressed, the Fort Worth court methodically reviewed the expert testimony in a manner consistent with the Kelly factors. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d at 204–09, 211–14. The majority contrasted the information from the State’s experts with that of the defense expert and the concerns voiced by the dissenting justice. Id. at 209–14.
The Second Court of Appeals properly applied the Rules of Evidence and the law regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. See Beckendam, 441 S.W.3d at 305.
The Fort Worth Court’s ruling reviewed the extensive direct examination and spirited cross-examination of the State’s three pediatric experts, as well as the evidence from the physician who testified for the defense; this record and the subsequent appellate review support upholding the trial judge’s ruling that each of the experts met the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert. RR8:4–5.
In its decision, the lower court set out and applied the well-known Kelly factors. Specific consideration of those guidelines follows. Several of the factors are grouped together based on their subject’s evidentiary overlap.
A. Acceptance and Literature factors:
Acceptance—the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained Literature—the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique Both the acceptance and the literature factors strongly undergird the validity of the Second Court’s decision regarding the reliability of AHT as a scientific theory. As noted by the Fort Worth court, A Daubert Analysis— Part I comprehensively reviewed the “voluminous” peer-reviewed medical literature on the AHT issue. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d at 212 & n.19. The article explains, “there have been at least 8 systematic reviews, over 15 controlled trials, over 50 comparative cohort studies or prospective case series, and numerous well-designed, retrospective case series/reports, comprising thousands of cases, supporting the diagnosis of AHT.” Id. at n. 19.
Additionally, the article cites a multitude of “verifiable references” including various international and domestic medical organizations that have publicly acknowledged the validity of AHT as a medical diagnosis including:
The World Health Organization; The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health; The Royal College of Radiologists; The Royal College of Ophthalmologists; The Canadian Paediatric Society; The American Academy of Pediatrics; The American Academy of Ophthalmology; The American Association for Pediatric Ophthalmology and Strabismus; The American College of Radiology; The American Academy of Family Physicians; The American College of Surgeons; The American Association of Neurologic Surgeons; The Pediatric Orthopaedic Society of North America; The American College of Emergency Physicians; and The American Academy of Neurology.
A Daubert Analysis—Part I, at 575–76 (footnotes and citations omitted). This worldwide list of physicians is a veritable Who’s Who of esteemed medical organizations who recognize AHT as a valid scientific medical diagnosis. Id. Footnotes contained within the Part I law review show extensive literature supporting the science behind AHT. Id. (citations omitted but, for convenience, please reference Appendix A).
It is true that some recent literature and media reports have appeared to question the validity of AHT as a valid medical diagnosis; indeed, Appellant cites to some of these articles. (App. Brief at vi–vii). See A Daubert Analysis—Part II, at 205–06. Undersigned counsel even noticed an article in the New York Times the Sunday before this case’s petition was granted. See Clyde Haberman, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Diagnosis That Divides the Medical World, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. [13], 2015, at A1, http://nyti.ms/1MlkQ7g. Nevertheless, Dr. Narang describes the controversy as “inexplicable” to many physicians. A Daubert Analysis— Part II, at 205.
At the onset, two fundamental principles must be clarified and recognized. First, the terms “Abusive Head Trauma” and “Shaken Baby Syndrome” are not interchangeable. SBS is a commonly recognized subset of AHT, and any controversy regarding the reliability of the science primarily focuses on SBS, not AHT. See A Daubert Analysis—Part II, at 205 & n.1. Second, the peer-reviewed medical literature supporting AHT squarely supports this medical diagnosis; the evidence-based medical literature overshadows the vast majority of the papers and media that attempt to question the validity of AHT. See A Daubert Analysis—Part I, at 540–41 (comparing the quality of the supporting treatises versus questioning literature); A Daubert Analysis—Part II, at 207, 210–12 (providing a metric, the Centre for Evidence Based Medicine [CEBM] scale, to evaluate the best available evidence-based medical literature and studies).
To assert the purported unreliability of the State’s experts, Appellant cites to secondary sources that question the legitimacy of the previous child-abuse-related SBS diagnosis. (App. Brief at vi–vii). Appellant also refers to two habeas cases where the expert trial testimony was later deemed inaccurate based upon the expert’s conclusion changing. See Ex parte Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (medical examiner changed cause of death ruling in short fall case involving an infant); Ex parte Robbins, No. WR-73,484-02, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6751684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (rehearing granted) (post-trial, medical examiner changed cause of death from asphyxia by strangulation to undetermined).
Unlike the habeas cases, the instant trial judge heard specific evidence during the bench trial involving the “debate” about the validity of AHT as a diagnosis. Appellant proffered a Utah doctor in an attempt to undermine the validity of the State’s experts’ AHT findings. The State brought forward the three children’s hospital physicians who actually work with pediatric patients, treated this patient, and have experience, training, and expertise in the medical specialty, pediatric child abuse. The prosecutors offered also significant supporting information; one article, already mentioned and appended herein, reveals that recognition of Abusive Head Trauma as a valid diagnosis is based on years of clinical experience, has been an extensively peer-reviewed topic of medical science, and is a diagnosis endorsed by a verifiable list of national and international medical societies. See A Daubert Analysis—Part I. RR6:64–
65 (trial court confirms receipt and reading of this study as suggested by both parties).
The State’s evidence and argument, along with the articles contained in the State’s appendices, reveal the overwhelming validity of the science behind an AHT diagnosis. The Second Court of Appeals decision should stand.
B. Qualifications and Application factors:
Qualifications—the qualifications of the expert(s) testifying Application—the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied the technique on the occasion in question
The qualifications of the State’s three experts, especially double- board-certified Dr. Jayme Coffman, are beyond credible debate. The depth of their qualifications also supports a strong showing for how their knowledge was correctly applied, especially with respect to Dr. Coffman’s differential diagnosis of AHT.
in order to evacuate the hematoma and to decrease the pressure in the brain. RR4:200.
her pediatric subspecialty rotation, and the remainder of her training followed this interest. RR6:67–68. Dr. Coffman’s pediatric internship and residency training occurred at the Texas Tech University Health Science Center in Lubbock. RR6:66. Upon completing her medical school program, she remained in Lubbock to teach while also working in the emergency room for a year; then she went into private practice. RR6:68–
69. For about two years, Dr. Coffman practiced medicine as the sole pediatrician in a small Texas town. RR6:69. Next, Tyler’s Medicaid and Indigent Pediatric Program recruited Dr. Coffman as its medical director. RR6:69–77. After approximately five years with the Tyler program and also as the medical director of the Mother of Frances Hospital pediatric clinic, Dr. Coffman started her own non-profit clinic in Longview, treating indigent pediatric patients. RR6:69.
Dr. Coffman’s pediatric practices in these several forums led her to focus on the various forms of child abuse. RR6:69–70. Dr. Coffman returned to Cook in 1995. She participates in two LISTSERVs that are honorary societies for child abuse physicians. RR6:71–72. These groups involve treating physicians with multiple specialties such as pediatricians, radiologists, neurosurgeons. RR6:72. Dr. Coffman did not think that the groups included any research-oriented physicians or biomechanical engineers. RR6:72.
Dr. Coffman has attended multiple advanced medical conferences on the evaluation of physical abuse and child maltreatment. RR6:73–74. She attended the Shaken Baby Syndrome Conference in 2002, a Pediatric Forensic Conference, and a Crime Against Children Conference. Her annual continuing education focuses on child abuse. RR6:72–73.
This expert child abuse pediatrician has authored seven papers on various child-abuse-related topics, including protocols on how to recognize and evaluate abuse and a book chapter on child fatality primal response. RR6:74–75. Similarly, Dr. Coffman has given countless presentations sharing her expertise with others. RR6:75. In the courts, Dr. Coffman has testified as a child abuse expert repeatedly. RR6:78. She has treated many children who suffered serious physical injury, and she treated the infant in this case after his injuries. RR6:79.
Dr. Coffman’s extensive work in the field of child abuse-related pediatrics has been officially recognized. Child Abuse is a recently recognized subspecialty of pediatric medicine. RR6:70. There are now fellowships and board certification in child abuse. Dr. Coffman’s two board certifications are in general pediatrics (1990) and child abuse pediatrics (2009). RR6:70. She was “grandfathered-in” for the child abuse certification; the board allowed her to take the certification exam without a fellowship out of respect for her child abuse experience since she has spent more than fifty percent of her practice specifically evaluating possible victims of abuse. RR6:70.
227–38, 248–59, 274–75, 283–85 [Dr. Roberts]; RR5:170–74, 212–54 [Dr. Ranelle]; RR6:30–33, 56–59, 80–94, 105–28, 140, 151–55 [Dr. Coffman]. Dr. Coffman’s already-discussed extensive pediatric/child abuse credentials, her dispositive explanation of differential diagnosis methodology, and the lack of substantive diminution of her testimony by the defense expert combine to indicate that the State fulfilled its Daubert burden regarding Dr. Coffman’s application of her AHT expertise to this case, in general and as specifically applied to this child.
The comprehensive studies described in both Daubert Analysis articles likewise reinforce finding that Dr. Coffman properly applied her medical training, knowledge, and experience to arrive at a correct differential AHT diagnosis with respect to the child-victim in this case. The second survey article by Dr. Narang covers the medical utilization and acceptance of the differential diagnosis methodology and additionally refutes typical alternatively posited diagnosis. A Daubert Analysis, Part II.
Finally, the reliability of the AHT science and application is further enhanced on the specific facts of this case which include findings, not only of SDHs, RHs, and swelling of the brain, but also the unique discovery of retinoschisis, along with Appellant’s inconsistent history of falling from a seated position. RR5:219–20; RR6:60. As Dr. Coffman stated, to make an accurate differential diagnosis in this child’s case, everything must be considered, including the unique circumstances presented with this child- victim. RR6:127–29.
Both factors—experts’ qualifications and application via differential diagnosis methodology—promote a strong finding of reliability in this case. Again, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in this AHT case.
C. Rate of Error—the potential rate of error of the technique
The lower court correctly noted that the proponent of scientific evidence is not typically required to establish empirical reliability of an underlying scientific theory. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d at 204–05 (citing State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); TEX. R. EVID. 702). Yet, potential rate of error undergirds the reliability analysis. Kelly, 824 S.W.at 573. The 2011 survey by Dr. Narang, Appendix A, provided the trial judge with the tools to assess reliability on this basis. That wealth of information is further supplemented by the second article’s assessments of alternative diagnoses to AHT and, significantly, the metrics to assay the validity of various studies and publications. See generally Appendix A & B.
Dr. Narang writes that several well-designed prospective studies and retrospective reviews consider the validity and reliability of the statistical evidence on SDHs and AHT. A Daubert Analysis—Part I, at 548. The statistical results run parallel in multiple fields including pathology, radiology, and general pediatrics. Id. The studies produced the same results: the significant statistical association of SDHs with non-accidental trauma over accidental trauma. Dr. Narang’s review of the evidence-based medical literature revealed no published, peer-reviewed clinical studies that conclude differently. Id.
Significantly, recent studies and systemic reviews have calculated the specificity and positive predictive value of severe RHs for abusive head injury. In 2009, publication of a systematic review show the results of all the scientific literature to identify clinical features that distinguished inflicted from non-inflicted brain injury. See S. Maguire, Which Clinical Features Distinguish Inflicted from Non-Inflicted Brain Injury? A Systematic Review,
94 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 860, 860 (2009). The survey reviewed “20 [electronic] databases, websites, references and bibliographies, using over 100 keyword combinations,” and the authors identified over 6000 studies, which were relevant to the topic, reviewing 320 of them. Id. at 861, 864. Secondary to strict inclusion criteria (including only those studies that compared the clinical features of inflicted and non-inflicted brain injury with consecutive case ascertainment), the authors found 14 studies that met those criteria, representing over 1600 children. Id. at 863–64. Cases were included only if strict definitional criteria for “inflicted” brain injury (i.e., those with witnessed abuse, confessions, legal decisions, or outcome confirmation by multi-agency child protection teams) was met. Id. at 861. The authors specifically excluded all studies where the decision of abuse relied solely on clinical features, to eliminate concerns for “selection bias” and “circularity.” Id.
Conducting a multi-level logistic regression analysis, the survey authors concluded that RHs were “strongly associated with inflicted brain injury, with a positive predictive value of 71% and an odds ratio of 3.504.” Id. at 865. Hence, a comprehensive review of all the literature involving RHs shows that they are 3.5 times more likely to occur in inflicted circumstances than non-inflicted ones. The authors concluded, “By producing a multilevel logistic regression of specific clinical features on over 1600 children, we have shown that there is scientific evidence to support the distinction between [inflicted brain injury] and [non-inflicted brain injury] . . . . “ This review is the largest of its kind, and offers for the first time a valid statistical probability of [inflicted brain injury] when certain key features are present (e.g., retinal hemorrhages).” Id.; A Daubert Analysis—Part I, at 556–57.
Pair the findings of the Maguire et al. with a systematic review published in 2010 focusing on the diagnostic accuracy of RHs in AHT. See Gaurav Bhardwaj et al., A Systematic Review of the Diagnostic Accuracy of Ocular Signs in Pediatric Abusive Head Trauma, 117 OPHTHALMOLOGY 983, 987 tbl.[1] (2010) (the authors identified 971 articles, choosing fifty-five which met their criteria, then qualitatively narrowing their focus to twenty studies). The Bhardwaj review found that the specificity of intraocular hemorrhages for AHT was 94 percent in high quality “Level II” context. Id. at 991; see also Alex V. Levin et al., Clinical Report: The Eye Examination in the Evaluation of Child Abuse, 126 PEDIATRICS 376, 376–77 (2010) (discussing use of intraocular hemorrhage diagnoses in assessing AHT). See generally A Daubert Analysis—Part I, at 539–561 (describing other statistical evidence derived from well-designed comparative studies includes studies from pediatrics, pathology, and radiology disciplines9).
Dovetailing with these comprehensive surveys, Dr. Coffman testified that SDH are statistically more common in abuse than accident. RR6:110–
11. Likewise, the extensive retinal hemorrhages seen in this child-victim are also seen statistically more often with abuse than accidental causes. RR6:110–11. These statistical findings are held across multiple disciplines, according to Dr. Coffman. RR6:111. Although not necessary, the numbers also support the lower courts’ rulings.
D. Other Available Experts—the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique
The State did not call outside experts to evaluate Dr. Coffman’s differential diagnosis methodology or the other two treating pediatric specialists. Based upon the myriad publications cited in both Daubert Analysis articles, many physicians are available. See generally Appendix A & B.
The State contends that Appellant’s medical expert provided a dubious critique; indeed, had the gate-keeping function been applied to the defense expert, his testimony would likely be excluded.
E. Clarity—the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court
As noted earlier, Dr. Coffman had testified multiple times in cases involving child victims, as had the defense expert. RR5:158, 214–28; RR6:78. The experienced trial judge has successfully contended with scientific evidence in the past, even of a novel nature. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d 568. Nothing in the record indicates any problem with explaining the science or its application in this case.
IV. This Court should uphold both lower courts’ rulings The Daubert/Kelly reliability factors and considerations all weigh heavily in favor of holding the State’s AHT theory of prosecution reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. AHT has long been recognized as a clinically valid medical diagnosis; it should continue to be so recognized. See A Daubert Analysis—Part I, at 505.
Daubert’s flexible guidelines for the admission of expert scientific testimony do not undermine the two prior court rulings in this case, nor do they impede cases presenting even stronger competing theories. An article relied upon Justice Walker in her dissent recognizes this premise. The article focused on trial judges’ gatekeeping function regarding expert witness testimony. Wolfe, 459 S.W.3d at 216 (citing Harvey Brown & Melissa Davis, EIGHT GATES FOR EXPERT WITNESSES: FIFTEEN YEARS LATER,
52 Houston Law Rev. [1] (2014)). That article does not discuss AHT; however, it mentions SBS in a footnote. The footnote recognizes that there can be competing schools of thought within a discipline, even with both sides passing muster under Daubert. Brown & Davis, 52 Houston Law Rev. at 236, n.1439. The footnote’s proposition rings true in light of the Supreme Court’s express language about focusing on principles and methodology, not conclusions. Daubert, at 594–95.
While there may be a legitimate battle regarding the reliability of SBS, the same is not true regarding the differential AHT diagnosis in this case. Again, in light of the voluminous high-caliber evidence-based diagnostic literature supporting AHT as a valid diagnosis, the science is trustworthy; the previous rulings on this issue should be upheld. See generally Appendix A & B. Additionally, Cook Children’s Medical Centerl fortunately employs a uniquely-qualified, board-certified, child abuse pediatrician who thoroughly understands the ADT science, as well as its application within the context of a differential diagnosis methodology. See A Daubert Analysis—Part II, at 302–21. Dr. Coffman applied the best available scientific knowledge, utilizing the respected differential diagnosis methodology which, in doing so, ruled out this child’s unique circumstances. The Court should uphold the Court of Appeals ruling affirming this conviction.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Applying the proper standards of review, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas should be affirmed, upholding the trial court’s ruling, as well.
Respectfully submitted, SHAREN WILSON Criminal District Attorney Tarrant County, Texas DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant Criminal District Attorney Chief, Post-Conviction /s/ Tanya S. Dohoney TANYA S. DOHONEY Assistant Criminal District Attorney Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center 401 W. Belknap Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201 (817) 884-1687 FAX (817) 884-1672 State Bar No. 02760900 [email protected]
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) (conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point text and 12- point footnotes); this document also complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (i) (less than 10,100 words, excluding TEX.
R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) exemptions, as computed by Microsoft Word computer software).
/s/ Tanya S. Dohoney TANYA S. DOHONEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true copy of the State's petition for discretionary review has been e- served to opposing counsel, the Hon. David Pearson, 222 W. Exchange Ave., Ste. 103, Fort Worth, Texas, 76164, at [email protected], on this, the 17th day of December, 2015.
/s/ Tanya S. Dohoney TANYA S. DOHONEY
H:\DOHONEY.D11\BRIEFS\101115 wolfe AHT expert testimony merit CCA.docx
APPENDIX A
Sandeep Narang, M.D., J.D.
A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome