v.
State
ACCEPTED
03-15-00436-CV 6130524 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/20/2015 10:23:30 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-15-00436-CV
In the Third Court of Appeals FILED IN Austin, Texas 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/20/2015 10:23:30 AM CHARLES O. “CHUCK” GRIGSON, JEFFREY D. KYLE Appellant, Clerk v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS; THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE; THE TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE; and FARMERS GROUP, INC. ET AL., Appellees.
On Appeal from the 261st Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas Cause No. D-1-GV-02-002501 APPELLEES’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FOR LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF MOTION Marcy Hogan Greer Joshua R. Godbey State Bar No. 08417650 State Bar No. 24049996 [email protected] [email protected] ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON & Ryan S. Mindell TOWNSEND LLP State Bar No. 24089707 515 Congress Ave., Suite 2350 [email protected] Austin, Texas 78701 Jennifer S. Jackson Telephone: 512-482-9300 State Bar No. 24060004 Telecopier: 512-482-9303 [email protected] OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL M. Scott Incerto P.O. Box 12548 State Bar No. 10388950 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 [email protected] Telephone: (512) 475-4209 NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP Fax: (512) 477-2348) 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1100 Austin, Texas 78701 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, THE Telephone: 512-474-5201 STATE OF TEXAS, THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT Telecopier: 512-536-4598 OF INSURANCE, AND THE TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES THE FARMERS PARTIES TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellees, the State of Texas, the Texas Department of Insurance and the Texas Commissioner of Insurance (jointly, “the State”) and the Farmers Parties 1 (together with the State, the “Settling Parties”) file this Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction and Request for Expedited Consideration of Motion to show the Court as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On July 15, 2015, Appellant Charles O. “Chuck” Grigson (“Grigson”) filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal in an attempt to perfect an interlocutory appeal from an order that is not appealable. It is clear from the face of the Order of Preliminary Approval that it only preliminarily approves a class-action settlement agreement and authorizes notice to be sent to the approximately 1.8 million class members by September 4, 2015. It does not certify or refuse to certify a class or take any other action that would permit an interlocutory appeal. To the contrary, the Order expressly states that the settlement classes at issue had been previously certified, in a 2003 order that was appealed and affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court and this Court. The district court rejected Grigson’s effort to add
1 Farmers Group, Inc., Fire Underwriters Association, Farmers Underwriters Association, Farmers Insurance Exchange, Fire Insurance Exchange, Texas Farmers Insurance Company, Mid-Century Insurance Company of Texas, Mid-Century Insurance Company, Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Company, Truck Insurance Exchange, and Truck Underwriters Association certification language to the Order, and Grigson’s counsel acknowledged on the record that the Order, which the district court proceeded to enter, would “not have a separate certification or refusal to certify.” 2 There is, in short, no basis for an interlocutory appeal in this case.
Grigson’s baseless “appeal” is merely a pretext for additional delay of the resolution of a case that was first settled more than a decade ago, but as to which the absent class members have still not been provided notice or an opportunity to be heard. Indeed, he has now filed an Emergency Motion to Stay the sending of class notice, asking this Court to prevent the Settling Parties from providing notice to those class members for an additional, indefinite period of time. This is the same delay tactic that Appellant’s counsel used twelve years ago, which has had the effect of keeping the class members from having court-ordered notice of the settlement since 2003. Rather than permitting all class members to have equal access to information about the settlement and an opportunity to be heard, Appellant has thus far manipulated court processes to insulate his sole and absolute control of the litigation challenging the propriety of this settlement. The frivolous appeal filed in this Court is merely the latest effort in a decade-long endeavor to preclude absent class members from receiving notice of the preliminarily approved settlement.
The Settling Parties respectfully request that the Court grant expedited consideration of this request and dismiss the appeal so that the settlement of this case can go forward in compliance with the district court’s order.
BACKGROUND FACTS 3
Twelve years ago, the district court certified settlement classes and preliminarily approved an unprecedented settlement between Plaintiffs-Appellees, the State, and the Defendants-Appellees, the Farmers Parties. The monetary consideration—valued at $117 million—overwhelmingly benefitted millions of Farmers policyholders represented by the Attorney General. Five intervenors objected to the 2003 Settlement Agreement and filed interlocutory appeals as to the class certification decision. They also obtained a stay of the class notice, and as a result, the 1.8 million class members have never received notice of the settlement.
Both the Texas Supreme Court and this Court upheld the certification decision,4 and on remand, the parties adjusted their settlement to account for the
3 These facts are in the personal knowledge of the undersigned, and so, no affidavit in support is needed. TEX. R. APP. P. 10.2.
passage of time and address some concerns raised by the district court and again sought preliminary approval—this time of the Second Amended Settlement Agreement and Stipulation, as supplemented (“Settlement Agreement”). Significantly, the Settlement Agreement did not revise or alter in any way the defined class of beneficiaries of the settlement, and the classes certified in 2003 thus remain unchanged. Compare Ex. 1 at 2-3 ¶ 2, Order of Preliminary Approval (July 6, 2015), with Ex. [2] at 2-3 ¶ 2, Order of Preliminary Approval (June 27, 2003).
Grigson, represented by counsel for an earlier intervenor, Jan Lubin, intervened in this case and objected to the current Settlement Agreement. [5] After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement. In its July 6, 2015, Order of Preliminary Approval (“Preliminary Approval Order”), the district court expressly stated that it had “previously certified” the settlement classes at issue and that its earlier certification decision had “been affirmed in its entirety by the appellate courts of Texas.” Ex. 1 at 2-3 ¶ 2, Preliminary Approval Order (July 6, 2015).
At the conclusion of the preliminary approval hearing, Grigson objected to the Preliminary Approval Order precisely because it did not contain any language about re-certification of the classes; the district court refused to include any such language. Ex. 3, 7/2/2015 Hearing Tr. 122:5-123:12, 133:20-134:18. Grigson’s counsel subsequently acknowledged on the record that the Preliminary Approval Order “will not have a separate certification or refusal to certify.” Id. at 134:14-16. Grigson has nonetheless appealed, claiming that § 51.014(a)(3) provides interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s Preliminary Approval Order.
ARGUMENT
As a general rule, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. There are exceptions to this rule, but they must be specifically authorized by statute. Because interlocutory orders are immediately appealable only in limited situations, statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals are strictly construed. Rig Tools, Inc., No. 06-13-0001-CV, 2013 WL 177419, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. [17], 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); King-A Corp. v. Wehling, No. 13-13-00100-CV, 2013 WL 1092209, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. [14], 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Section 51.014(a)(3) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order that “certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3), but it is a very limited scope of appeal, in light of the “Legislature’s intent that section 51.014 be strictly construed as ‘a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable.’” Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson,
53 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Montgomery County v. Fuqua, 22 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. denied)). Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court has expressly recognized that this appellate jurisdictional grant does not even encompass orders refusing to decertify a class. See Bally, 53 S.W.3d at 355, 358 (“[T]he trial court’s orders overruling Bally’s motions to decertify do not fit within the [] test for interlocutory-appeal jurisdiction.”).
Although the Appellant has invoked Section 51.014(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, that provision does not apply because the district court did not sign an order certifying or refusing to certify a class. To the contrary, the district court certified settlement classes in 2003. Ex. [2], Order of Preliminary Approval (June 27, 2003). That certification decision has been affirmed in its entirety by the Texas Supreme Court and this Court. See Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 420, 427-28 (Tex. 2007) (holding that “the standard class action requirements must be applied generally to the claims asserted by Attorney General, not the Attorney General himself,” and directing court of appeals to address intervenors’ remaining points of error on remand); Lubin v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 03-03-00374-CV, 2009 WL 3682602, at[*26] -32 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. [6], 2009, no pet.) (overruling intervenors’ remaining objections to certification). 6 And the certified classes have not been changed or modified in any respect since affirmed on appeal.
Nothing in the district court’s Preliminary Approval Order certifies or refuses to certify a class. The district court does not even address the settlement classes except to the extent of acknowledging its prior certification and the appellate history. Ex. 1 at 2-3 ¶ 2, Preliminary Approval Order (July 6, 2015). Thus, the Preliminary Approval Order is not an order “certifying or refusing to certify a class” from which an interlocutory appeal may be taken.[7] Bally, 53 S.W.3d at 354.
6 In fact, the certification issues are now law of the case, and Grigson has offered no basis for disturbing those findings. See Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. 2012) (Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a decision from a prior appeal is binding in later proceedings involving the same case.). 7 The statute additionally requires that the certification order challenged be based on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(3) (expressly referencing class certification decisions “under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure”). In the proceedings on interlocutory appeal with respect to the class certification decision in 2003 in this case, intervenor Lubin (represented by the same counsel as Grigson is here) argued that this statute applied only to certification decisions made under Rule 42, and not to certification decisions made under the class action provisions of the Texas Insurance Code. See Lubin, 222 S.W.3d at 420-21. The Texas Supreme Court assumed without deciding that “the Legislature intended to allow interlocutory review of Rule 42 classes but not Insurance Code classes” but held that even if that were the case, there was jurisdiction to review the 2003 order because the district court relied on both Rule 42 and the Insurance Code. See id. at 421. The Supreme Court and this Court on remand then proceeded to hold that the settlement classes were properly certified under the Insurance Code. This chain of events exposes another flaw in Appellant’s basis for invoking this jurisdiction. Appellant’s theory appears to be that—notwithstanding the Nor can the putative interlocutory appeal be grounded in any other grant of appellate jurisdiction. There is not a single Texas case where an appellate court has even reviewed—much less reversed—a trial court’s ruling granting preliminary approval of a class action settlement. As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, a class action settlement:
does not gain legal effect until the trial court gives its final approval. the trial court has a duty at the fairness hearing to examine the proposed settlement thoroughly, with input from objectors, and may approve the settlement only if the court determines that it is fair. Until then, the proposed settlement’s terms do not affect the parties or the proceedings, and appellate review is premature. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tex. 2001).
Furthermore, the Settling Parties respectfully submit that it is imperative that this appeal be dismissed as soon as possible. The existence of this frivolous appeal is the basis upon which Grigson seeks to stay the sending of class notice. And any such delay in distributing the notice is highly prejudicial to the Settling Parties, not to mention the absent class members who Grigson and his counsel have managed to keep in the dark about the details of the proposed settlement for more than a lack of any certification language in the Preliminary Approval Order—it should be deemed to somehow have implicitly re-certified the settlement classes. But even if that were correct (and it plainly is not), any such certification order would have been based on the Insurance Code provisions, consistent with the holdings of the Texas Supreme Court and this Court earlier in this case. In other words, the invented “certification” that Appellants ask the Court to infer in this case would, if it existed, have been based on the Insurance Code class action provision, not Rule 42. And under Appellant’s counsel’s own argument before the Texas Supreme Court, such a (hypothetical) order could not be the basis for an appeal under section 51.014(a)(3).
decade. The Settling Parties are actively engaged in preparing the class notice for dissemination to meet the district court’s 60-day notice deadline. That process is complicated, considering that the class notice must be printed and mailed to over 1.8 million class members by September 4. Any further delay in sending the notice is unwarranted because there is no conceivable basis for an interlocutory appeal to this Court. And the other 1.8 million class members are entitled to be informed of the settlement so they can make their own decisions about its benefits. Moreover, delay in sending class notice could result in further delay in conducting the final fairness hearing, thus putting off the Settling Parties’ 12-plus-year effort to distribute the benefits of the settlement to class members.
In sum, this appeal should be dismissed because the limited grant of appellate jurisdiction under § 51.014(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code invoked by Appellant Grigson does not include an order of preliminary approval of a class action settlement. And it should be dismissed on an expedited basis, because further delay is prejudicial to the parties and the absent class members.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For these reasons, the Settling Parties request that the Court: (i) expedite consideration of this request; (ii) grant the Appellees’ Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction; (iii) dismiss this appeal; and (iv) grant such other and further relief to which the Appellees are entitled.
Date: July 20, 2015 Respectfully submitted, /s/ M. Scott Incerto Marcy Hogan Greer State Bar No. 08417650 [email protected] ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON & TOWNSEND LLP 515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350 Austin, Texas 78701-3562 Telephone: (512) 482-9300 Facsimile: (512) 482-9303
M. Scott Incerto
State Bar No. 10388950 [email protected] NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1100 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: 512-474-5201 Telecopier: 512-536-4598 Darryl W. Anderson State Bar No. 24008694 [email protected] Geraldine W. Young State Bar No. 24084134 [email protected] NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 1301 McKinney, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 77010 3095 Telephone: 713 651 5151 Telecopier: 713 651 5246 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES FIRE UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, FARMERS GROUP, INC., FARMERS UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, TEXAS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS, MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, FARMERS TEXAS COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, AND TRUCK UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION Respectfully submitted, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas CHARLES E. ROY First Assistant Attorney General JAMES E. DAVIS Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation ROBERT O’KEEFE Division Chief Financial Litigation, Tax, and Charitable Trusts Division /s/ Joshua R. Godbey JOSHUA R. GODBEY Assistant Attorney General LEAD ATTORNEY State Bar No. 24049996 Telephone: (512) 475-4209 [email protected] RYAN S. MINDELL Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 24089707 Telephone: (512) 936-1721 [email protected] JENNIFER S. JACKSON Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 24060004 Telephone: (512) 463-9917 [email protected] Financial Litigation, Tax, and Charitable Trusts Division P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Fax: (512) 477-2348) ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, THE STATE OF TEXAS, THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AND THE TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On July 20, 2015, I electronically filed the Appellees’ Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction and Request for Expedited Consideration of Motion with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following (unless otherwise noted below).
Joe K. Longley Michael J. Woods Philip K. Maxwell 8620 N. New Braunfels, Ste. 522 1609 Shoal Creek Blvd. # 100 San Antonio, TX 78217 Austin, TX 78701 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Pro Se Intervenor/Objector Counsel for Appellant Charles O. “Chuck” Grigson Joseph C. Blanks P.O. Box 999 Doucette, TX 75942 [email protected] Counsel for Intervenor Gerald and Lesly Hooks
/s/ M. Scott Incerto M. Scott Incerto
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I certify that, on July 16, 2015, I conferred with Joe K. Longley, counsel for Charles O. “Chuck” Grigson, about the merits of the foregoing motion, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.1(a)(5), and he stated that Grigson is opposed to the motion.
/s/ M. Scott Incerto M. Scott Incerto
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) I certify that the foregoing document contains 2,412 words and complies with the word limit set forth in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i).
/s/ M. Scott Incerto M. Scott Incerto No. 03-15-00436-CV
In the Third Court of Appeals Austin, Texas
CHARLES O. “CHUCK” GRIGSON, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS; THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE; THE TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE; and FARMERS GROUP, INC. ET AL., Appellees.
On Appeal from the 261st Judicial District Court Travis County, Texas Cause No. GV-202501 APPENDIX TO APPELLEES’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FOR LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF MOTION Exhibit 1 July 6, 2015, Order of Preliminary Approval (certified) Exhibit 2 June 27, 2003, Order of Preliminary Approval (certified) Exhibit 3 7/2/2015 Preliminary Approval Hearing Transcript (certified) Exhibit 1 TO APPELLEES’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FOR LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF MOTION
DC BK15188 PG62
• Filed in The District Court of Travis County, Texas
JUL -6 2015 ~ At q·.54 t\. M.
CAUSE NO. GV20250 1 Velva L. Price, District Clerk
THE STATE OF TEXAS, THE TEXAS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, and § THE TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF § INSURANCE, § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § § FARMERS GROUP, INC., FARMERS § UN DERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, FIRE § OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, § FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, § FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, TEXAS § FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, § MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY § OF TEXAS, MID-CENTURY INSURANCE § COMPANY, FARMERS TEXAS COUNTY § MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, § TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, and § TRUCK UNDERWRITERS § 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
ORDER OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
This matter came on for hearing on July I and 2, 2015, for preliminary approval o f the Second Amended Settlement Agreement and Stipulation of December 18, 2002, as amended on June 13, 2003, and as further amended on August 29, 20 13, and the Supplement to the Second Amended Settlement Agreement and Stipulation of March 4, 2015 (collectively referred to as " Second Amended Settlement Agreement" or "Settlement Agreement") between the State of Texas, the Texas Department of Insurance, and the Texas Commissioner of lnsurance, on behalf of Texas policyholders of the Defendants in the classes defined below (collectively, the "State")
and Fire Underwriters Association, Fanners Group, lnc. d/b/a Fanners Underwriters Association, llllll llll lllll lllllllllllllllll lllllllllllllll\1111 004103926
DC BK15188 PG63
Farmers Insurance Exchange, Fire Insurance Exchange, Texas Farmers Insurance Company, Mid-Century Insurance Company of Texas, Mid-Century Insurance Company, Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Company, Truck Insurance Exchange, and Truck Underwriters Association (collectively, the "Farmers Parties"). The State and the Farmers Parties have moved jointly, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 42(e) and Texas Insurance Code § 541.266, for an Order of Preliminary Approval ("Order") (I) preliminarily approving the settlement of all claims asserted in the above-captioned cause ("Action"), the terms of which are set forth in the Second Amended Settlement Agreement, which has been filed with the Clerk of the Court, and (2) approving the proposed notice to the Classes.
The Court having read and considered the Second Amended Settlement Agreement and attached exhibits, including the proposed Notice of Proposed Class Settlement, the proposed Claim Form, the proposed form of Final Judgment, exhibits, pleadings and record in this case, the evidence and other materials presented at the hearing, and argument of counsel and applicable authorities, finds that there exists substantial and suf1icient grounds for entering this Order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:
I. The Court, for purposes of this Order, adopts all defined terms as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
2. The Court has previously certified, only for purposes of effectuating the Settlement Agreement, the following Settlement Classes ("Settlement Classes"):
(i) All of the Exchanges' Texas homeowners insurance policyholders (a) whose homeowners insurance policy incepted (including renewals) from December 28, 200 1, through and including December 27, 2002, or (b) who received a notice at any time after November 14, 2001, that their HO-B policy would not be renewed ("Rate Class");
DC BK15188 PG64
(ii) All of the Exchanges' Texas homeowners insurance policyholders who according to Farmers' records were eligible to receive discounts for FPRA, age of home, or territory from November 16, 2000, through and including December 10, 2002 ("Discount Class"); and
(iii) All Texas homeowners or automobile insurance policyholders of the Exchanges or the Automobile Insurance Providers who according to Farmers' records were provided or should have been provided a Credit Usage Notice from October 1, 1999, through February 28, 2003 ("Credit Usage Notice Class")
That certification decision has been affirmed in its entirety by the appellate courts of Texas. Farmers Grp.. Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 420, 427-28 (Tex. 2007) (holding that "the standard class action requirements must be applied generally to the claims asserted by Attorney General, not the Attorney General himself," and directing court of appeals to address intervenors' remaining points of error on remand); Lubin v. Farmers Grp.. Inc., No. 03-03- 00374-CV, 2009 WL 3682602, at[*26] -32 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. [6], 2009, no pet.) (overruling intervenors' other objections to certification).
DC BK15188 PG65 DC BK1 5188 PG66 DC BK15188 PG67 DC BK15188 PG68 DC BK15188 PG69 DC BK15188 PG70 DC BK15188 PG71 DC BK15188 PG72 DC BK15188 PG75 DC BK15188 PG76 DC BK15188 PG77 DC BK15188 PG78 DC BK15188 PG79 DC BK15188 PG80 DC BK15188 PG81 DC BK15188 PG82 DC BK15188 PG86 3049\649.1
Truck Insurance Exchange, and Truck Underwriters Association (collectively, the "Farmers Parties"). The State and the Farmers Parties have moved jointly, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 42(e) and Texas Insurance Code article 21.21 § l8(g), for an Order of Preliminary Approval {the "Order") (1) preliminarily approving the settlement of all claims asserted in the above-captioned cause (the "Action"), the terms of which are set forth in the Settlement Agreement which has been filed with the Clerk of the Court, and (2) approving the proposed notice to the Classes.
The Court having read and considered the Settlement Agreement and attached exhibits, including the proposed Notice of Proposed Class Settlement, the proposed Claim Form, the proposed form of Final Judgment, exhibits, pleadings and record in this case, the evidence and other materials presented at the hearing, and argument of counsel and applicable authorities, finds that there exists substantial and sufficient grounds for entering this Order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED TIIAT:
1. The Court, for purposes of this Order, adopts all defined terms as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
2. Pursuant to Rule 42 and Texas Insurance Code article 21.21 §§ 17 & 18, this Court hereby certifies, only for purposes of effectuating the Settlement Agreem·ent, the following Settlement Classes (the "Settlement Classes"):
(i) All of the Exchanges' Texas homeowners insurance policyholders (a) whose homeowners insurance policy incepted (including renewals) from December 28, 2001 , through and including December 27, 2002, or (b) who received a notice at any time after November 14, 2001, that their HO- B policy would not be renewed (the "Rate Class");
(ii) All of the Exchanges' Texas homeowners insurance policyholders who according to Fanners' records were eligible to receive discounts for FPRA, age of home, or territory from November 16, 2000, through and including December 10, 2002 (the "Discount Class"); and 30491649.1 -2-
----------- - · ~·~ -----· ··- Hearing, the Office of the Attorney General, the Texas Department of Insurance, and the Fanners Parties shall post on their respective Internet web-sites (www.oag.state.tx.us. www.tdi.state.tx.us and www.fanners.com) the Notice and a Summary Notice of Settlement, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B ("Summary Notice").
8. The Court approves the fonn of Notice, the Summary Notice, and the Claim Fonn, and finds that the procedures established for mailing and distributing such notices substantially in the manner and form set forth in paragraph 7 of this Order meet the requirements of Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, article 21.21 § 18 of the Texas Insurance Code, and due process, and constitute the best notice practicable under the circumstances.
9. To effectuate the provision of notice provided in paragraph 7 hereof, the Farmers Parties shall be responsible for the receipt of all responses from the members of the Settlement Classes and, until further order of this Court, shall preserve all entries of appearance, Claim Forms, requests for exclusion, and any and all other written communications from members of the Settlement Classes or any other person in response to the Notice. The costs of notification of the Settlement Classes as provided herein, including printing, mailing, and posting on the Internet of all required notices, shall be borne by the party charged with the responsibility for such actions in paragraph 7 of this Order.
10. Three (3) days before the date fixed by this Court for the Settlement Hearing, the State and the Farmers Parties shall cause to be filed with the Clerk of the Court affidavits or declarations of the person or persons under whose general direction the mailing of the Notice and the distribution of the Summary Notice by posting .on the web-sites identified in paragraph 7 shall have been made, showing that such mamng and publication have been made in accordance with this Order.
J0491 649. 1 11. Each member of the Settlement Classes will be bound by the proposed settlement provided for in the Settlement Agreement, and by the Final Judgment or any other detennination by this Court affecting the Settlement Classes, unless such member shall mail, by first-class U.S. mail, a written request for exclusion from the Settlement Classes, post-marked no later than August 29. 2003, addressed to "Exclusion Requests", c/o Rust Consulting, Inc.; P.O. Box 9348; Minneapolis, MN 55440-9348 . Such request for exclusion must state (a) the name, address and telephone number of the person seeking exclusion; (b) whether such person has a homeowners or automobile insurance policy from the Farmers Parties, or both; (c) the date of inception of such policy(ies) and the most recent date of renewal for such policy(ies), if available; (d) the policy number(s), if available; and (e) that the person malcing the request wishes to be excluded from the Settlement Classes. Because the Settlement Agreement is intended to be a resolution of all Released Claims, any person requesting exclusion must either exclude himself or herself from the Settlement Agreement in its entirety, or submit to the Settlement Agreement in its entirety. A request for exclusion shall not be effective unless it is made in the manner and within the time set forth in this paragraph and in the Notice. If a member of the Settlement Classes requests to be excluded, that person will not receive any benefit from the Retrospective Rate Reductio~ the Individualized Discount Adjustment, or the Credit Usage Notice Adjustment Fund provided for in the Settlement Agreement, in the event the Settlement Agreement is approved by the Court, nor will such person be permitted to participate further in the Action. Any Class Member who does not request exclusion in the manner provided for herein may, but need not, enter an appearance in this Action at his or her own cost through counsel of his or her own choice. If a member of the Settlement Classes does not enter an appearance, that person's interests will be represented by the State in the Action.
. .
such objection and shall forever be foreclosed from making any objection to the fairness, adequacy, or reasonableness of the Settlement Agreement and the proposed Final Judgment.
13. If the Court gives final approval to the Settlement Agreement and enters a final judgment, in order to be entitled to participate in the Credit Usage Notice Adjustment Fund portion of the Settlement Agreement, a member of the Credit Usage Notice Class who has not requested exclusion from the Settlement Classes must submit a Claim Form, substantially in the form attached as Exhibit C hereto, to the Farmers Parties at the address set forth in the Notice.
Such Claim Form must be completed and postmarked on or before May 15,2004. Any member of the Credit Usage Notice Class who does not submit a completed Claim Form shall not be entitled to share in the Credit Usage Notice Adjustment Fund but nonetheless shall be bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement and by the Final Judgment and any other Order of this Court approving the Settlement Agreement, including all releases therein, and shall be barred and enjoined in this or any other action from asserting any Released Claims.
14. Members of the Rate and Discount Classes shall automatically receive their share of Settlement Funds upon final approval of the Settlement Agreement and entry of final judgment, unless they file a written request for exclusion from the Settlement Classes as provided in paragraph 11 herein.
15. The Court expressly retains the power to adjourn the Settlement Hearing, without any further notice other than an announcement at the Settlement Hearing of adjournment thereof, and to approve, modify, or disapprove the Settlement Agreement without further notice to members of the Settlement Classes. The Court retains jurisdiction over this Action to consider all further applications arising out of or connected with the proposed settlement herein.
REPORTER'S RECORD
VOLUME 2 OF 2 VOLUMES
TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. D-1-GV-02-002501
STATE OF TEXAS, THE TEXAS ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, ) AND THE TEXAS ) COMMISSIONER OF ) INSURANCE, ) Plaintiffs, ) ) VS. ) ) ) FARMERS GROUP, INC., ) FARMERS UNDERWRITERS ) TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS ASSOCIATION, FIRE ) UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, ) FARMERS INSURANCE ) EXCHANGE, FIRE INSURANCE ) EXCHANGE, TEXAS FARMERS ) INSURANCE COMPANY, ) MID-CENTURY INSURANCE ) COMPANY OF TEXAS, AND ) FARMERS TEXAS COUNTY ) MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ) Defendants. ) 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT -------------------------------------------------
HEARING ON JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SECOND AMENDED
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
-------------------------------------------------- On the 2nd day of July, 2015, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Scott H. Jenkins, Judge presiding, held in Austin, Travis County, Texas;
Proceedings reported by machine shorthand.
A P P E A R A N C E S
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS, THE STATE OF TEXAS, THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AND THE TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE:
JOSHUA GODBEY
SBOT NO. 24049996
RYAN MINDELL
SBOT NO. 24089707
JENNIFER JACKSON
SBOT NO. 24060004
Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 (512) 475-4209
A P P E A R A N C E S
(CONTINUED)
I N D E X
VOLUME 2
HEARING ON JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SECOND AMENDED
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
JULY 2, 2015
DEFENDANT FARMERS' WITNESSES
Direct Cross Vol. RONALD MYHAN By Mr. Incerto 5 2 By Mr. Mindell 51 2 By Mr. Maxwell 56 2 By Mr. Incerto 105 2
Page Vol.
Defendants Farmers rest................... 107 2 All parties close......................... 107 2 Statements by Mr. Blanks (in lieu of opening statements earlier)............ 108 2 Statements by Mr. Woods................... 109 2 Statements by Ms. Greer................... 110 2 Court's Ruling............................ 116 2 Adjournment............................... 135 2 Court Reporter's Certificate.............. 136 2 MR. INCERTO: I think the end -- THE COURT: Do we need to discuss all these time periods on the record or may I give the court reporter a break now?
MR. LONGLEY: I want to make an objection on the record before we go off the record, Your Honor, regarding the form of the order that you're about to sign. We object to the form.
THE COURT: Then tell me what the defect is in the form of the order.
MR. LONGLEY: The defect is that, number one, we were just handed this order. It was not attached as part of the moving papers. The one that was attached to the moving papers in Paragraph 2 says this Court hereby certifies classes, and this is the first time we've seen an order that does not certify classes.
THE COURT: That's because their position, as you know, all along in this joint motion has been that the class was previously certified -- or the Court gave preliminary approval before, it's come back to the Court and that the class has never been decertified. That's -- has that been your argument?
MS. GREER: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. GODBEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And so what you like about that other order is that it suggests that I have to go back and recertify the class, and that's what you'd like me to put in the order, right?
MR. LONGLEY: Either that or that you refuse to certify a class in this particular order for the reason that you're adopting their view that it's already been certified and you're applying that certification in 2003 to this new 2015 settlement.
THE COURT: No, I understand what they're doing in this order, and I thought about that very thing as I read it, just as you did, and I am going to sign the order as they've presented it.
MR. LONGLEY: And -- THE COURT: But I understand why you don't like that.
MR. LONGLEY: Well, the point -- the reason we don't like it is it's an attempt through collusion to deny these -- let me finish, please.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to morph into argument. I'm only going to talk about the form of the order. And I understand why you don't want me to sign the order, but I don't want to morph into argument now, which it sounds like you want to do, and I understand that, but we're not going to do that.
Is there any other defect in the form of have, I want to know by what time this afternoon you're going to put that in an e-mail to the Court so I can give one last thought to that. I'm not going to rethink my decision, but I am thinking about the form of the order.
MR. LONGLEY: I think I can meet that timetable so long as I get what they're going to send over to me reasonably soon.
THE COURT: Well, that's just nit corrections with dates. I need to know anything in addition to the thing that you said earlier such as, well, this changes what you're saying about the class certification. Yes, yes it does, in some respects, and I'm signing it. If there's anything else like that, I need to know by 3:00, 4:00 at the latest. I would hope by 3:00. I would hope you could go back right now and compare it and tell me anything else that you couldn't -- because I know you've read this thoroughly before.
MR. LONGLEY: I guess what I need to know is the Court is not going to entertain any alternative order to refuse with regard to what we might want to submit?
THE COURT: I'm not going to entertain any substantive differences, that's correct.
MR. LONGLEY: Such as the certification.
THE COURT: That's correct. That's exactly right.
MR. LONGLEY: We're addressing that right now.
THE COURT: Exactly, we are addressing that right now. And I understood that from the briefing you gave me in advance of this hearing that you were each trying to spin my prior comments on the record to be a "oh, we need to recertify this class" from your perspective and "no we don't" from their perspective. I understood that completely.
MR. LONGLEY: And I think I do, too, Your Honor, that this particular settlement that you're approving will not have a separate certification or refusal to certify.
THE COURT: It's going to be the order they've proposed.
MR. LONGLEY: I gotcha. And I can get back to you by 5:00 o'clock today or to e-mail Ms. Daniel.
THE COURT: No.
MR. MAXWELL: 4:00 o'clock, Joe.
THE COURT: No, by 4:00 o'clock.
MR. LONGLEY: 4:00 o'clock. Okay. Sorry.
THE COURT: Okay. Good. All right. Any other questions or statements on the record before I let the court reporter get a well-deserved break?
MR. INCERTO: Nothing further.
MR. GODBEY: Nothing further, Your Honor.
MR. LONGLEY: Nothing further.
MR. BLANKS: Nothing from the Hooks, Your Honor.
MR. WOODS: Nothing.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you all.
(Court adjourned) REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE