Francis A. Beimert v. Burlington N., Inc., a Corp., 726 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1984). · Go Syfert
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Francis A. Beimert v. Burlington N., Inc., a Corp., 726 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
26 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Helmick v. BNSF Railway Company (ndd, 2024-09-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#7 45 U.S.C. § 4 cited 1× in this case · 28 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Helmick v. BNSF Railway Company
D.N.D. · 2024 · confidence medium
“If the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause, then the violation of the Safety Appliance Act could not have contributed in whole or in part to the injury.” Beimert v. Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lessert v. BNSF Railway Company
D.S.D. · 2020 · confidence medium
However, “[i]f the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole cause, then the [regulatory] violation . . . could not have contributed in whole or in part to the injury.” Beimert v. Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ainsworth v. Rapid City, Pierre & Eastern Railroad, Inc.
D.S.D. · 2020 · confidence medium
To recover for a FSAA violation Mr. Ainsworth must prove: “(1) the statute was violated; and (2) the violation was ‘a causative factor contributing in whole or in part to the accident’ that caused [his] injuries.” Id. (citing Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414-15 (8th Cir. 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc.
1st Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
R.R., 962 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir.1992); Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F.2d 19, 22-23 (3d Cir.1984); Beimert v. Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1984); Puggioni v. Luckenbach S.S.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Magelky v. BNSF Railway Co.
D.N.D. · 2008 · confidence medium
Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Magelky v. BNSF Railway Co.
D.N.D. · 2007 · confidence medium
Beimeri v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Toth v. Grand Trunk Railroad, D/B/A Cn North America
6th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Likewise, other courts have concluded that “[i]f the plaintiffs negligence was the sole cause, then the violation of the Safety Appliance Act could not have contributed in whole or in part to the injury.” Beimert v. Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 2659 , 81 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Drury v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Mo. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Co., 738 F.2d 328, 331 [5] (8th Cir.1984); Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414-15 [3, 6] (8th Cir.1984); see also Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 206-207, note 8 (1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shawnya Jones v. Southern Pacific Railroad
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F.2d 19, 22-23 (3d Cir.1984); Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Southern Pacific R.R.
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F.2d 19, 22-23 (3d Cir. 1984); Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Idris Ibrahim Siddiqi v. Spencer Leak, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections
7th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir.1984) (judge not required to inform counsel of instruction defining “defect” in product liability case); Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.) (no requirement that judge supply written copy of instructions to counsel), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 2659 , 81 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Connie M. Grogg v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., a Corporation Brant Lee Bobbitt Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Of Fort Smith, a Limited Partnership
8th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Beimert v. Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414-15 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 2659 , 81 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Enrique Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company
5th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.) (no liability under FSAA if plaintiff’s negligence is sole cause of injuries), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 2659 , 81 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984). 2 The issue in the present case is whether the district court erred in instructing the jury that it is a violation of the FSAA “for the railroad to operate a car which has a draw bar sufficiently out of line that it *768 does not couple upon impact.” Both parties contend that the cars failed to couple because of drawbar misalignment before the impact.
cited Cited "see" Bernard E. Walden v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, a Corporation
7th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 2659 , 81 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Geiser v. Burlington Northern Railroad
Mo. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.1984) ce rt. denied 467 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 2659 , 81 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984); Miller v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Francis A. BEIMERT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC., a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee
83-1010.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Mar 7, 1984.
726 F.2d 412
Steven D. Meier, St. Paul, Minn., for defendant-appellee., Randolph E. Schum, East Alton, 111., for plaintiff-appellant.
Lay, Henley, Brown.
Cited by 22 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Francis A. Beimert, appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Burlington Northern, Inc. Beimert brought this action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, seeking to recover for injuries he received while attempting to repair a handhold on a rail[*414] road car in the course of his employment with the defendant railroad. On appeal, Beimert argues that the district court erred in the admission of evidence, in its instructions to the jury, in failing to fairly apprise plaintiff, contrary to the requirements of Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.P., as to the charge it would give to the jury, and in allowing defense counsel to make an improper opening statement and to make an improper argument to the jury.

On April 30, 1981, Beimert, while employed as a carman by the defendant, was inspecting railroad cars at Burlington Northern’s railroad yard in Northtown, Minnesota. Beimert noticed that a handhold on a hopper ear had been crushed against the side of the car. Using a “yard bar” that he carried to make minor repairs on the cars he inspected, Beimert attempted to straighten the handhold. He inserted the bar from the top and pulled downward. The bar slipped and struck Beimert on the forehead causing the injury for which he. sued.

Beimert’s complaint initially contained two counts. The first count was a negligence count under the FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. More particularly, he charged that the defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to provide him with a safe place and methods to work, in failing to furnish him with suitable tools, and in failing to furnish sufficient manpower to perform the task. In the second count, again relying on the FELA, [1] Beimert alleged only a violation of Section 4 of the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 4, which makes it unlawful to use a car that is not provided with secure handholds. [2] Just prior tó trial, however, Beimert obtained a dismissal of the first count, the negligence count, and relied only on the alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act. [3]

At the one day trial, Beimert objected to defendant’s opening statement and later to its argument to the jury to the effect that the sole cause of the accident was Beimert’s negligence. Beimert also objected to the admission of evidence to support the defendant’s contention. The district court properly overruled these objections. If the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole cause, then the violation of the Safety Appliance Act could not have contributed in whole or in part to the injury. Miller v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 386 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. 1964); Johnson v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 242 Minn. 130, 136, 64 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1954).

We are also satisfied that the district court committed no reversible error under Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.P., in apprising Beimert as to its intended instructions to the jury. Further, the court was not required, as Beimert contends it was required, to supply him with a copy of its intended instructions.

Beimert also contends that the district court’s instructions to the jury, including the additional instructions given at the request of the jury, created the impression that, to support liability for violation of the Safety Appliance Act, it was necessary to show that the violation was the sole cause or at least a “proximate” cause of the accident. It is, of course, sufficient, to make a case of liability for violation of the Safety Appliance Act, only to show that the violation is a causative factor contributing in[*415] whole or in part to the accident. [4] The defendant contends, on the other hand, that the charge, taken as a whole, is to the effect that it is sufficient, to make a case of liability, to show that the violation of the Act contributed in whole or in part to the accident.

This case was tried on the theory that if defendant’s violation of the Safety Appliance Act contributed in whole or in part to the accident and injury, defendant was liable to Beimert. The defendant railroad’s defense at trial was that Beimert’s alleged negligence was the sole cause of the accident and injury. As before stated, these trial theories are in accordance with applicable law. We agree that the trial court’s instructions on the law with respect to these issues were not as clear as they might have been. Nevertheless, in view of the trial theories of the parties and the evidence submitted, we conclude that the instructions adequately informed the jury as to the applicable law and do not constitute reversible error. [5]

Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the district court is Affirmed.

1

. The FELA “embraces claims of an employee based on violations of the Safety Appliance Act.” Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I.C. Ry., 395 U.S. 164, 166, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 1708, 23 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).

2

. Section 4 provides: “It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to use any car in interstate commerce that is not provided with secure grab irons or handholds in the ends and sides of each car for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars.”

3

. Beimert’s stated purpose for withdrawing the negligence count under the FELA was to keep the issue of contributory negligence from the jury. For a negligence claim under the FELA, contributory negligence is not a bar but may reduce the damages. The FELA provides, however, that contributory negligence may not reduce damages when the claim is founded on a violation of the Safety Appliance Act. 45 U.S.C. § 53. See Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S.Ct. 226, 94 L.Ed. 236 (1949).

4

. The standard of causation is variously expressed. The employer is liable if the injury results “in whole or in part” from defendant’s violation, Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 338 U.S. 430, 435, 70 S.Ct. 226, 229-230, 94 L.Ed. 236 (1949) or if the violation is “a contributory proximate cause” of injury, Coray v. Southern Pac. Ry., 335 U.S. 520, 523, 69 S.Ct. 275, 276-277, 93 L.Ed. 208 (1949), or if the defect is “a proximate cause of the accident.” Minneapolis, St. P. & Sault Ste. M. Ry. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406, 410, 46 S.Ct. 129, 131, 70 L.Ed. 335 (1926). In Rogers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957) the Court warned against the use of the language of proximate causation for claims based on the FELA.

5

. We note that the defendant railroad contends that the judgment below should be affirmed on the basis that the district court should have granted its motion for a directed verdict. In this connection, defendant contends that there can be no liability for violation of the Safety Appliance Act where, as here, the employee is injured while performing his duty of repairing the defect that constituted the violation of the Act, and an alleged “cause” of the accident is the very existence of such defect. In view of our disposition of this case, we need not decide whether there is such a narrow exception to liability for violation of the Act. Cf. Minneapolis St. P. & Sault Ste. M. Ry. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406, 46 S.Ct. 129, 70 L.Ed. 335 (1926); Illinois Trust Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 319 Mo. 608, 5 S.W.2d 368, cert, denied, 278 U.S. 623, 49 S.Ct. 25, 73 L.Ed. 544 (1928); Martin v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 323 Mo. 450, 19 S.W.2d 470 (1929); Rittenhouse v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 299 Mo. 199, 252 S.W. 945 (1923); Smiley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 359 Mo. 474, 222 S.W.2d 481 (1949).