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U.S. CodeTitle 45Chapter 2— Liability for Injuries to Employees

45 U.S.C. § 53 (2026)

Contributory negligence; diminution of damages

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1928–2026 446citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 446 opinions since 1928, 26 of them in the last five years.

In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.

(Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 66.)
The 20 cases that cite 45 U.S.C. § 53 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSchultz v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 775 N.E.2d 964 (Ill. 2002).
cites § 53 4×cited by 214 cases
The case’s holding
A trial court error in jury instructions is not reversible unless the faulty instruction clearly misleads the jury and results in prejudice to the appellant.
Later courts cite it for
“a reviewing court ordinarily will not reverse a trial court for giving faulty instructions unless they clearly misled the jury and resulted in prejudice to the appellant.” · 45 citing courts
2
GREENNorfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158 (2007).
cites § 53 4×cited by 168 cases
Where it cites § 53
“" 45 U.S.C. § 53 . Both parties agree that at common law the causation standards for negligence and contributory negligence were the same.”
The case’s holding
The elements of a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act are determined by common law principles unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Later courts cite it for
“absent express language to the contrary, the elements of a fela claim are determined by reference to the common law.” · 10 citing courts
3
GREENKernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
cites § 53 6×cited by 437 cases
Where it cites § 53
“' 45 U. S. C. § 53 . Congress has thus for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety obligations upon railroads and has commanded that if a breach of these obligations contributes in part to an employee's death, the railroad must pay damages.”
The case’s holding
An employer is liable under the Jones Act if a breach of statutory duty contributes in whole or in part to an injury or death.
Later courts cite it for
“without regard to whether the injury flowing from the breach was the injury the statute sought to prevent.” · 15 citing courts
4
GREENMichael Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1985).
cites § 53 5×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 53
“45 U.S.C. § 53 . The district court found that there was no relevant OSHA regulation, struck previously admitted testimony concerning the regulation from the record, and refused to give plaintiff’s requested jury instruction on negligence and contributory negligence.”
The case’s holding
Violations of OSHA safety regulations constitute violations of safety statutes that preclude a reduction in damages for contributory negligence under FELA.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislative history of 653(b)(4) shows that the intent of the provision was merely to ensure that osha was not read to create a private right of action for injured workers which would allow them to bypass the otherwise exclusive remedy of worker's compensation.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENNorfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
cites § 53 2×cited by 201 cases
Where it cites § 53
“[6] As required by the FELA, the trial court directed the jury to determine whether negligence by any of the asbestosis claimants contributed to their injuries and to compare any such negligence with that of Norfolk "in terms of percentages.”
The case’s holding
Railroad workers may recover damages for the fear of developing cancer as part of pain and suffering under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Later courts cite it for
“once an employer has been adjudged negligent with respect to a given injury, it accords with the fela's overarching purpose to require the employer to bear the burden of identifying other responsible parties and demonstrating that some of the costs of the injury should be spread to them,” · 10 citing courts
6
GREENUrie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
cites § 53 3×cited by 1,341 cases
Where it cites § 53
“45 U.S.C. §§ 53 , 54, which bar pleadings of, respectively, contributory negligence and assumption of risk "in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.”
The case’s holding
The term injury under the Federal Employers' Liability Act includes occupational diseases resulting from an employer's negligence.
Later courts cite it for
“what constitutes negligence for fela's purposes is a federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state and local laws for other purposes.” · 20 citing courts
7
GREENThomas N. Eckert v. Aliquippa & S. R.R. Co., 828 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1987).
cites § 53 6×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 53
“Eckert alleges that the failure to do so was error because contributory negligence is no defense to an FELA claim when the defendant has violated either “any statute enacted for the safety of employees,” 45 U.S.C. § 53 , or regulations promulgated pursuant to such a statute.”
8
GREENStarling v. Union Pac. R.R., 203 F.R.D. 468 (D. Kan. 2001).
cites § 53 4×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 53
“305 (a)(1) bars defendant from asserting plaintiffs contributory negligence by virtue of 45 U.S.C. § 53 . Plaintiff requests that the court enter summary judgment on the issues of liability and contributory negligence, leaving only the questions of causation and damages for the…”
Later courts cite it for
“to the limited extent that opinions about the cause of an injury are a necessary part of the patient's treatment” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENAnne Payne v. CSX Transp., Inc., 467 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. 2015).
cites § 53 3×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 53
“] 45 U.S.C. § 53 (emphasis added). The same section of FELA includes the additional caveat “[t]hat no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any ease where the violation by such common carrier of any statute…”
The case’s holding
Expert testimony regarding causation is admissible even if the expert cannot establish a specific dose of exposure.
Later courts cite it for
“stated simply, the plaintiff's experts were not required to establish 'a dose exposure above a certain amount' before they could testify about causation.” · 8 citing courts
10
GREENCollins v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 9 A.3d 56 (Md. 2010).
cites § 53 4×cited by 20 cases
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a cautionary instruction regarding the inapplicability of assumption of risk when evidence implicitly raises the defense to the jury.
Later courts cite it for
“warrants a particular instruction on legal principles applicable to that evidence and to the theories of the parties.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENCoats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1995).
cites § 53 3×cited by 91 cases
Where it cites § 53
“See 45 U.S.C. § 53 . There is no exception in the Act for cases in which one or more of the defendants fails to pay its share.”
The case’s holding
Under general maritime law, joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for all damages even if the plaintiff is contributorily negligent.
Later courts cite it for
“without a doubt, worker injuries, particularly those involved in repair and maintenance, can have a disruptive impact on maritime commerce by stalling or delaying the primary activity of the vessel.” · 8 citing courts
12
GREENMonessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988).
cites § 53 2×cited by 278 cases
Where it cites § 53
“Congress expressly dispensed with other common-law doctrines of that era, such as the defense of contributory negligence, see 45 U. S. C. § 53 , in order "to provide liberal recovery for injured workers" under the FELA.”
The case’s holding
The Federal Employers Liability Act does not permit the recovery of prejudgment interest.
Later courts cite it for
“prejudgment interest is normally designed to make the plaintiff whole and is part of the actual damages sought to be recovered” · 10 citing courts
13
GREENCharles A. Ries, III v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1992).
cites § 53 3×cited by 83 cases
Where it cites § 53
“45 U.S.C. § 53 (emphasis added). The issue in this case, then, is whether an OSHA regulation is the type of safety statute whose violation would trigger the provisions of the FELA.”
The case’s holding
A violation of an OSHA regulation does not constitute negligence per se and does not bar the consideration of an employee's contributory negligence under the FELA.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well-settled that the fela requires a finding of negligence per se when there has been a violation of a safety statute specifically aimed at the railroad industry.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENRogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
cites § 53 2×cited by 1,708 cases
Where it cites § 53
“2 was as follows: “The Court instructs the jury that under the law applicable to this case it was the duty of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, at all times, while performing his duties as an employee of the defendant. “In this connection, the Court…”
The case’s holding
A jury question exists under FELA if the evidence justifies a reasonable conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury.
Later courts cite it for
“under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.” · 246 citing courts
15
cites § 53 4×cited by 155 cases
Where it cites § 53
“66 , 45 U. S. C. § 53 . [5] The negligence of the petitioner and that of the railroad should have been submitted to the *437 jury, and in the light of this comparison a verdict reached that would do justice to all concerned.”
The case’s holding
The Safety Appliance Acts impose an absolute duty to ensure automatic couplers function on impact, and a violation constitutes a contributory proximate cause of injury.
Later courts cite it for
“if the jury determines that the defendant's breach is a contributory proximate cause of injury, it may find for the plaintiff” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENHilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
cites § 53 2×cited by 213 cases
Where it cites § 53
“320 which adopts comparative negligence as the rule for railroad employees in actions against their employers, extending the same provision as found in the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.S. § 53 , to Kentucky causes of action if not covered by the federal act.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff recovers damages for an injury in direct proportion to the defendant's fault under a pure comparative negligence system.
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of stare decisis does not commit us to the sanctification of ancient fallacy.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENZarow-Smith v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1997).
cites § 53 3×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 53
“” 45 U.S.C. § 53 . The threshold issue thus becomes whether the decedent was “guilty of contributory negligence” because of his cigarette smoking so that it was proper for the jury to apportion damages under 45 U.”
The case’s holding
Cigarette smoking constitutes contributory negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act when supported by expert testimony, allowing for the proper apportionment of damages.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) ... the jury's verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and a new trial must be granted to prevent a miscarriage of justice; (2) ... newly-discovered evidence exists that would likely alter the outcome of the trial ...; (3) ... improper conduct by an attorney or the court unfairly influenced the verdict; ... and (4) ... the jury's verdict was facially inconsistent.” · 4 citing courts
18
GREENThatch v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 362 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977).
cites § 53 6×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 53
“" At the close of the trial the court refused to submit the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury.”
19
GREENStanley F. Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986).
cites § 53 2×cited by 168 cases
Where it cites § 53
“1983); 45 U.S.C. § 53 . The question of how much of the injury is attributable to the employee’s own actions and lack of due care for his own condition is to be decided by the jury if there is any evidence at all of contributory negligence.”
The case’s holding
An employee performing routine assignments in compliance with employer orders and incurring non-extraordinary risks is engaging in an assumption of risk rather than contributory negligence.
Later courts cite it for
“contributory negligence ... is a careless act or omission on the plaintiff's part tending to add new dangers to conditions that the employer negligently created or permitted to exist.” · 7 citing courts
20
GREENHuffman v. Union Pac. R.R., 675 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2012).
cites § 53 2×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 53
“The standard of care for both the employer and employee under FELA is one of ordinary prudence under the circumstances. Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff under FELA must present evidence specifically linking work activities to the particular injury suffered rather than merely showing a general risk of musculoskeletal disorders.
Later courts cite it for
“fela provides the exclusive remedy for a railroad employee engaged in interstate commerce whose injury resulted from the negligence of the railroad.” · 3 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
192819772026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 18 cases in 1992–1993. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
5th Cir.24Ill. App. Ct.207th Cir.19Tex. App.199th Cir.178th Cir.163rd Cir.15SCOTUS15

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 100 courts in all.

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Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments
(Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 66.)
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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