v.
State
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-14-00304-CR
HENRY RICHARD BULLOCK, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 177th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1400383
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
This appeal arises from appellant Henry Richard Bullock, Jr.’s1 third-degree felony conviction for theft of a truck. It comes to us on remand from the Court of 2015), rev’d, 509 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We determined that no instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted theft was required in light of appellant’s trial testimony denying any intent to steal the truck. See id. at 429-30. We noted that the vehicle need not be physically moved to constitute theft; further, all other evidence supported a conviction for theft, not attempted theft. See id. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 430.
Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review contending that this court erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of appellant’s request for a lesser-included charge on attempted theft. See Bullock, 509 S.W.3d at 922. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that “there is more than a scintilla of evidence in the record from which a rational fact finder could have found that [appellant] was guilty only of attempted theft of the truck, rather than theft, and thus the court of appeals erred by concluding that the trial court properly declined to give the lesser-included-offense instruction.” Id. at 923. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed this court’s judgment and remanded the case to us to perform a harm analysis. Id.
ANALYSIS
Jury charge error requires reversal when the defendant properly objected to the charge — as appellant did here — and there was “some harm” to his rights. Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Courts have “routinely” found some harm when the trial court’s denial of a requested instruction on a lesser-included offense leaves the jury with the sole option either to convict the defendant of the greater offense or to acquit him. See Saunders v. State, 913 S.W.2d 564, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also O’Brien v. State, 89 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (“a finding of harm is essentially automatic” in such situations because “there is a distinct possibility that the jury, believing the defendant to have committed some crime, but given only the option to convict him of the greater offense, may have chosen to find him guilty of that greater offense, rather than to acquit him altogether, even though it had a reasonable doubt that he really committed the greater offense”). Erroneous omission of a requested lesser-included offense also is harmful when the penalty actually imposed for the greater offense exceeds the potential maximum penalty for the lesser-included offense. Bridges v. State, 389 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Bignall v. State, 899 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.).
Here, the jury was allowed only the option to convict appellant of theft or to acquit; the jury chose to convict and assessed appellant’s punishment at 30 years’ confinement. Had the jury instead been allowed to consider and convict based on the uncharged lesser-included offense of attempted theft, the maximum potential sentence (even as enhanced by appellant’s prior felony convictions) would have been 20 years.[2] Because (1) the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the jury should have received a charge on the lesser-included offense of attempted theft, and (2) appellant would have received a shorter sentence had the jury convicted him of that lesser-included offense, we conclude that appellant was harmed by the failure to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense. See Bridges, 389 S.W.3d at 513; O’Brien, 89 S.W.3d at 756-57; Bignall, 899 S.W.2d at 284.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.
/s/ William J. Boyce Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Jewell. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).