A Judge of Compensation Claims lacks authority to reduce agreed-upon attorney fees based on subjective experience or to redirect fees to the claimant on their own motion.
In a workers' compensation appeal, the claimant challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims' order reducing a jointly agreed-upon attorney's fee and requiring the excess to be paid to the claimant. The court reviews the reasonableness of the fee for competent, substantial evidence. The rule is that a judge may not reduce time entries based solely on subjective experience when a sworn affidavit supports the fees, nor may a judge reform party agreements or redirect fees to the claimant on their own motion. Because the record contained no evidence to rebut the counsel's affidavit, the court reverses the order reducing the fee and reforming the stipulation, and remands for further proceedings.
No citing cases on record.
v.
ACR ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., and Berkley Specialty Underwriting Managers, Appellees
In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant, through her counsel, challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order reducing the. jointly, agreed upon amount of the Employer/Carrier-paid attorney’s fee and requiring that the excess amount be remitted to Claimant personally. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We review for competent, substantial evidence the issue of the reasonableness of ah attorney’s fee. See Sanchez v. Woerner Mgmt., Inc., 867 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Neither argument of counsel nor “the JCC’s reductions and deletions .,. based solely on the JCC’s own subjective and personal experience of what he deemed reasonable” are sufficient to rebut a claimant’s counsel’s sworn affidavit. See Minerd v. Walgreens, 962 So.2d 955, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Because the record here contains no evidence to rebut Claimant’s counsel’s sworn affidavit or the representations of the Employer/Carrier’s counsel, the JCC erred in reducing the time entries contained within that affidavit.
In Luces v. Red Ventures, 140 So.3d 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), we explained that “chapter 440 limits the authority of JCCs and does not authorize them to reform the agreements of the parties on their own motion.” Id. at 1000. Further, a JCC is “without authority to redirect the attorney’s fee from counsel to claimant as an exercise of plenary equitable jurisdiction.” Id. Here, the JCC erred in doing so.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the portion of the order reducing the agreed upon attorney’s fee as well as the portion of the order reforming the stipulation, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LEWIS, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ„ CONCUR.