In the Interest of I.C.C.
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
In the Interest of I.C.C., D.C., D.R., R.R., A.R., E.R., J.R., and M.R., Children
On appeal from the 36th District Court of
San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Longoria, and Hinojosa Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant A.R.[1] appeals the termination of her parental rights. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). We affirm.
an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), A.R.’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment.[2] Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel has: (1) notified the A.R. that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided A.R. with a copy of the Anders brief and the motion to withdraw; (3) informed the A.R. of her rights to file a pro se response3 and review the record preparatory to filing that response; and (4) provided the A.R. with electronic access to the appellate record, and the mailing address for the court of appeals. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.
A.R. received electronic access to the appellate record on or about September 12, 2017. A.R.’s counsel requested a thirty-day filing extension for A.R.’s pro se response. We granted the motion on September 13, 2017, with notice sent to A.R. On November 7, 2017, this Court granted A.R. an additional extension of time to file a pro se response, should she choose to do so. The deadline was extended to November 27, 2017. However, a reasonable amount of time has passed since that extension expired, and A.R. has not filed a pro se response with the Court.
III. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). A court of appeals has two options when an Anders brief and a subsequent pro se response are filed. After reviewing the entire record, it may: (1) determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it finds no reversible error; or (2) determine that there are arguable grounds for appeal and remand the case to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If the court finds arguable grounds for appeal, it may not review those grounds until after new counsel has briefed those issues on appeal. Id.
We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See id. at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no reversible error in the record.
IV. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
A.R.’s counsel has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as appellate counsel. However, the Texas Supreme Court recently held that the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24,
27 (Tex. 2016). It was held that (1) the right to appointed counsel under § 107.013(a)(1) of the Family Code includes the exhaustion of appellate remedies through the Texas Supreme Court, (2) counsel's belief that his client has no grounds to seek further review is not alone good cause to permit counsel’s withdrawal, and (3) appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing a petition for review with the Supreme Court comporting with Anders. See Id. Accordingly, counsel’s obligation to A.R. has not yet been discharged. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is therefore DENIED at this time. If A.R., after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Delivered and filed the 4th day of January, 2018.