Murphy Boyd Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
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Murphy Boyd Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1992 · …a change in law while a case is on direct appeal be given affect. at p. 430 ≈ altered
27 citation events across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Total Marine Services, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs (ca5, 1996-07-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Total Marine Services, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs
5th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Congress amended both § 904(a) and § 905(a) in order to reverse the Supreme Court’s decision, 5 Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 429-30 (5th Cir.1985), which Congress characterized “as an unwanted deviation from 56 years of precedent.” West, 765 F.2d at 530 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Vega Mena v. U.S.A
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1985). -21- Clearly, then, the statutory employer immunity provisions of the LHWCA and the PRWCA are different.
cited Cited as authority (rule) David Vega-Mena v. United States
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 429-30 (5th Cir.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Other cases, however, follow Bradley’s rule that “a change in law while a case is on direct appeal be given affect.” See, e.g., Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Other cases, however, follow Bradley's rule that "a change in law while a case is on direct appeal be given affect." See, e.g., Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925 , 104 S.Ct. 2827 , 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984), and provides a special effective date so amendment applies to pending cases, thus WAMTA will not have precedential effect); Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985) (Congress provided that LHWCA amendment to 33 U.S.C. § 905 shall apply to pending cases); S.Rep.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Devargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc.
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925 , 104 S.Ct. 2827 , 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984), and provides a special effective date so amendment applies to pending cases, thus WAMTA will not have precedential effect); Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985) (Congress provided that LHWCA amendment to 33 U.S.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hill
N.D. Fla. · 1987 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Downs v. Director Office of Workers Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, 803 F.2d 193, 198 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Anguilo, 755 F.2d 969, 971 (1st Cir.1985); Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Antonio Nieves and Ellen Schuster Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation. Samuel Cotto v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation. Joseph R. Taylor v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation. George Thomas v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation. Phillip Scotland and Pearline Scotland v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation, Pauliphy Prevost v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation
3rd Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
(BNA) 1488 (1987); Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985) (upholding Congress' retroactive cure of Supreme Court's interpretation of Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act against due process challenge); Long v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 742 F.2d 1173, 1183-84 (9th Cir.1984) (upholding Congress' retroactive cure of Ninth Circuit's interpretation of statutory exemption to Freedom of Information Act against due process challenge); Thomas v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 174 F.2d 711, 713 (3d Cir.1949) (agreeing with Battaglia v. General Motors …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.
3rd Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
(BNA) 1488 (1987); Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985) (upholding Congress’ retroactive cure of Supreme Court’s interpretation of Longshoreman’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act against due process challenge); Long v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 742 F.2d 1173, 1183-84 (9th Cir.1984) (upholding Congress’ retroactive cure of Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of statutory exemption to Freedom of Information Act against due process challenge); Thomas v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 174 F.2d 711, 713 (3d Cir.1949) (agreeing with Battaglia v. Gen…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Downs v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs (2×)
5th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Only after the Ingalls Shipbuilding decision did Downs question the AU’s authority, and he did so only through an improper use of a section 922 proceeding. 11 There of course can be no suggestion of detrimental reliance on the now defunct rule of Ingalls Shipbuilding because of the time sequence involved. 12 Cf Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985) (retroactive application of 1984 amendment to section 905(a) of LHWCA where no “detrimental reliance” on overruled case law).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leonard P. Downs v. Director, Office Of Workers Compensation Programs (2×)
5th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Only after the Ingalls Shipbuilding decision did Downs question the ALJ's authority, and he did so only through an improper use of a section 922 proceeding. 11 There of course can be no suggestion of detrimental reliance on the now defunct rule of Ingalls Shipbuilding because of the time sequence involved. 12 Cf. Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985) (retroactive application of 1984 amendment to section 905(a) of LHWCA where no "detrimental reliance" on overruled case law). 27 Our decision today is also consistent with prior decisions upholding the retroactive applicat…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Moser v. Aminoil, U.S.A., Inc.
W.D. La. · 1985 · confidence medium
Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hartland Dean West v. Kerr-Mcgee Corporation (2×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428, 429-30 (5th Cir.1985); Martin v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 746 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.1984). 15 The bare language of the amendment to Sec. 905(a) could also be interpreted as foreclosing any designation of any contractor as the employer of its subcontractors' employees--even if a borrowed-employee relationship existed--unless the subcontractor failed to secure compensation payments.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Murphy Boyd LOUVIERE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
84-4658.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Mar 18, 1985.
755 F.2d 428
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28341
Beard & Artigue, J. Michael Artigue, Caliste Beard, Jr., Lafayette, La., for plaintiff-appellant., Onebane, Donohoe, Bernard, Torian, Diaz McNamara & Abell, Rebecca F. Do-herty, John Allen Bernard, John A. Jean-sonne, Jr., Lafayette, La., for plaintiff-ap-pellee.
Clark, Gar-Wood, Jolly, Per Curiam.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Murphy Boyd Louviere appeals the grant of summary judgment to defendant Marathon Oil Company. We reverse and remand.

I

Louviere was employed by A.M.F. Scientific Drilling International on a platform owned by Marathon Oil. He was injured while working on a drilling rig owned by Pool Drilling Company. He filed a suit alleging that his injuries were caused by the gross and wanton negligence of both Pool and Marathon. Marathon moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2827, 2835, 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984) established that under sections 4(a), 5(a) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 904(a), 905(a) a general contractor was immune from tort suits brought by a subcontractor’s employees unless the contractor neglected to secure compensation coverage for those employees after the subcontractor failed to do so.

It is undisputed that Louviere’s employer had secured workers’ compensation under the Act. Therefore, the trial judge awarded Marathon summary judgment. .

II

On appeal Louviere asserts that the trial judge’s decision must be reversed because of the subsequent amendments to the Act. Marathon Oil contends that retrospective application of the 1984 amendments would violate due process.

A

Section 905(a) of the Act provides that worker’s compensation shall be the exclusive remedy for an injured employee whose employer has complied with section 904(a)’s requirement that it secure such compensation. The district court correctly applied Washington Area Transit Authority in holding that Marathon was also immune from suit because A.M.F. Scientific Drilling International had secured worker’s compensation for Louviere.

However, the 1984 amendments had the effect of negating the holding of Washington Area Transit Authority. They provided that a contractor shall be considered the employer of a subcontractor’s employees and be entitled to immunity under section 905(a) only if the contractor is compelled by section 904(a) to secure worker’s compensation for those employees be[*430] cause the subcontractor fails to do so. Congress provided that these amendments applied to all pending claims. 33 U.S.C. § 901(a). Therefore, we are required to reverse the grant of summary judgment to Marathon. Martin v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 746 F.2d 231, 232-33 & n. 1 (5th Cir. 1984).

B

Defendant’s contention that application of these amendments to pending cases would violate Marathon’s due process rights by retroactively divesting it of its vested right to a defense under section 905(a) as interpreted by Washington Area Transit Authority or by creating a cause of action on a retrospective basis are without merit.

“It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to inquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if, subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. * * * In such a case the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.” United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 109, 1 Cranch 103, 109, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801). Schooner Peggy requires that a change in law while a case is on direct review be given effect. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1736, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); see Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2017, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974). In Bradley the Court rejected the contention that a change in law can be applied to a pending case only where that is the “clear and stated intention of the legislature.” Id. 94 S.Ct. at 2018. In light of the Court’s refusal to impose this restriction where the intent of the legislature is unclear, we certainly cannot refuse to enforce the specific provision of § 901(a) that these amendments apply to pending cases. See Eiken-berry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 633 (D.C. Cir.1981). Marathon, of course, has no vested right to act negligently; nor is there any suggestion of significant detrimental reliance on the rule of Washington Area Transit Authority.

Ill

The decision of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.