8 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. Californiagreen2 sentences2004See also Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause). 2004See also Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause). | 2 | 2 |
Fifth Third Bank Ex Rel. Bozik v. CSX Corp.green1 sentence2004See also Fifth Third Bank v. CSX Corporation, 306 F.Supp.2d 841 (N.D.Ind.2004), finding state tort claim against county for inadequate warning devices at crossing preempted under the rationale of Shanklin . | 1 | 1 |
Smallwood v. IL Central RR Cogreen1 sentence2004See Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 203 F.Supp.2d 686 (S.D.Miss.2002), judgment vacated on other grounds (fraudulent joinder), 342 F.3d 400 (5th Cir.2003), reh'g denied, 352 F.3d 220 (5th Cir.2003), reh'ing en banc granted, opinion vacated, 355 F.3d 357 (5th Cir.2003), finding a state tort claim against the Mississippi Department of Transportation challenging the adequacy of warnings at a crossing preempted under federal law. | 1 | 1 |
Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroadgreen1 sentence2004See Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 203 F.Supp.2d 686 (S.D.Miss.2002), judgment vacated on other grounds (fraudulent joinder), 342 F.3d 400 (5th Cir.2003), reh'g denied, 352 F.3d 220 (5th Cir.2003), reh'ing en banc granted, opinion vacated, 355 F.3d 357 (5th Cir.2003), finding a state tort claim against the Mississippi Department of Transportation challenging the adequacy of warnings at a crossing preempted under federal law. | 1 | 1 |
Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroadgreen1 sentence2004See Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 203 F.Supp.2d 686 (S.D.Miss.2002), judgment vacated on other grounds (fraudulent joinder), 342 F.3d 400 (5th Cir.2003), reh'g denied, 352 F.3d 220 (5th Cir.2003), reh'ing en banc granted, opinion vacated, 355 F.3d 357 (5th Cir.2003), finding a state tort claim against the Mississippi Department of Transportation challenging the adequacy of warnings at a crossing preempted under federal law. | 1 | 1 |
Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroadgreen1 sentence2004See Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 203 F.Supp.2d 686 (S.D.Miss.2002), judgment vacated on other grounds (fraudulent joinder), 342 F.3d 400 (5th Cir.2003), reh'g denied, 352 F.3d 220 (5th Cir.2003), reh'ing en banc granted, opinion vacated, 355 F.3d 357 (5th Cir.2003), finding a state tort claim against the Mississippi Department of Transportation challenging the adequacy of warnings at a crossing preempted under federal law. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Avondale Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2002Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 10 (3d ed. 1991) ("Retroactive application of new legislation is constitutionally permissible only if it does not result in impairment of the obligation of contracts or in divesture of vested rights."); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), and Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause); Anderson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 00-2799, p. 6 (La.10/16/01), 798 So.2 | 1 | 1 |
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.green2 sentences2002Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 10 (3d ed. 1991) ("Retroactive application of new legislation is constitutionally permissible only if it does not result in impairment of the obligation of contracts or in divesture of vested rights."); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), and Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause); Anderson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 00-2799, p. 6 (La.10/16/01), 798 So.2 2002Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 10 (3d ed. 1991) ("Retroactive application of new legislation is constitutionally permissible only if it does not result in impairment of the obligation of contracts or in divesture of vested rights."); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), and Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause); Anderson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 00-2799, p. 6 (La.10/16/01), 798 So.2 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Palestina v. Molero
green
1 sentence2003Examples of cases where the “maritime but local” rule have been applied include Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 , 93 S.Ct. 1590 , 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973), wherein it was decided that states may constitutionally exercise their police power concurrently with the federal government regarding maritime activities; Palestina v. Fernandez, 701 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1983), wherein state law was applied to a case involving a boating accident which occurred on a navigable Louisiana waterway described as a “garden variety state tort claim;” and, Baggett v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 863 (5t | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Examples of cases where the “maritime but local” rule have been applied include Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 , 93 S.Ct. 1590 , 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973), wherein it was decided that states may constitutionally exercise their police power concurrently with the federal government regarding maritime activities; Palestina v. Fernandez, 701 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1983), wherein state law was applied to a case involving a boating accident which occurred on a navigable Louisiana waterway described as a “garden variety state tort claim;” and, Baggett v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 863 (5t 2003Examples of cases where the “maritime but local” rule have been applied include Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 , 93 S.Ct. 1590 , 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973), wherein it was decided that states may constitutionally exercise their police power concurrently with the federal government regarding maritime activities; Palestina v. Fernandez, 701 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1983), wherein state law was applied to a case involving a boating accident which occurred on a navigable Louisiana waterway described as a “garden variety state tort claim;” and, Baggett v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 863 (5t | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Thomas Baggett v. Charlie B. Richardson and James Martin
green
1 sentence2003Examples of cases where the “maritime but local” rule have been applied include Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 , 93 S.Ct. 1590 , 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973), wherein it was decided that states may constitutionally exercise their police power concurrently with the federal government regarding maritime activities; Palestina v. Fernandez, 701 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1983), wherein state law was applied to a case involving a boating accident which occurred on a navigable Louisiana waterway described as a “garden variety state tort claim;” and, Baggett v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 863 (5t | 1 | 2003–2003 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
1 sentence2000Ultimately, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's state tort claim was not preempted by 23 U.S.C. §§ 646.214 (b)(3) and (4) because the facts did "not establish that federal funds participate[d] in the installation of the [warning] devices." Easterwood , at 672, 113 S.Ct. at 1741 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin
green
2 sentences2000Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of "whether §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are applicable to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds." Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 , 120 S.Ct. 1467, 1474 , 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). 2000Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of "whether §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are applicable to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds." Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 , 120 S.Ct. 1467, 1474 , 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
green
2 sentences1995The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 , 79 S.Ct. 773, 780 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). 1995The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 , 79 S.Ct. 773, 780 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences1988The court framed the test for preemption of a state tort claim as whether the tort "confers non-negotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is extricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Id. at 213 , 105 S.Ct. at 1912 . 1988The court framed the test for preemption of a state tort claim as whether the tort "confers non-negotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is extricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Id. at 213 , 105 S.Ct. at 1912 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Murphy Boyd Louviere v. Marathon Oil Company
green
1 sentence1987As explained in Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428 (5th Cir.1985): [Regarding pre-1984 LHWCA] Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson, [ 467 U.S. 925 ], 104 S.Ct. 2827, 2835 , 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984) established that under sections 4(a), 5(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act), 33 U.S.C., Sections 904 (a), 905(a) a general contractor was immune from tort suits brought by a subcontractor's employees unless the contractor neglected to secure compensation coverage for those employees after the subcontractor failed to do so. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1987As explained in Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428 (5th Cir.1985): [Regarding pre-1984 LHWCA] Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson, [ 467 U.S. 925 ], 104 S.Ct. 2827, 2835 , 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984) established that under sections 4(a), 5(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act), 33 U.S.C., Sections 904 (a), 905(a) a general contractor was immune from tort suits brought by a subcontractor's employees unless the contractor neglected to secure compensation coverage for those employees after the subcontractor failed to do so. 1987As explained in Louviere v. Marathon Oil Co., 755 F.2d 428 (5th Cir.1985): [Regarding pre-1984 LHWCA] Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson, [ 467 U.S. 925 ], 104 S.Ct. 2827, 2835 , 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984) established that under sections 4(a), 5(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act), 33 U.S.C., Sections 904 (a), 905(a) a general contractor was immune from tort suits brought by a subcontractor's employees unless the contractor neglected to secure compensation coverage for those employees after the subcontractor failed to do so. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.