Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jessie Dwight Baker was convicted by a Marion County jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child,1 and the jury assessed punishment of ten years’ incarceration.

Baker’s appellate attorney filed a brief setting out the procedural history of the case, summarizing the evidence elicited during the course of the trial court proceedings, and concluding that the appellate record presents no arguable grounds to be raised on appeal. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California and has provided an evaluation of the record explaining why he believes there are no plausible appellate issues to be advanced. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel also filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw as counsel in this appeal.

Counsel sent a copy of the brief to Baker, provided him with a copy of the record, and advised Baker of his right to review the record and file a pro se response. On January 22, 2018, we notified Baker that his pro se brief was due on February 21, 2018. Baker has filed neither a pro se response nor a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file such a response.

We have reviewed the entire appellate record and have independently determined that no reversible error exists. Yet, in Anders cases, appellate courts “have the authority to reform judgments and affirm as modified in cases where there is non-reversible error.” Ferguson v. State, 435 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. struck) (comprehensively discussing appellate cases that have modified judgments in Anders cases). Here, non-reversible error is found in the trial court’s assessment of attorney fees to cover the costs of Baker’s court-appointed counsel.

The trial court’s judgment ordered Baker to pay $400.00 in attorney fees for court- appointed counsel. Under Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has the authority to order the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney fees only if “the court determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided, including any expenses and costs.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2017). “[T]he defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay are explicit critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering reimbursement of costs and fees” of legal services provided. Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 765–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).

The record contains a separate finding from the trial court that Baker is indigent and did not have the financial resources to pay the fees of his appointed attorney. However, the order to pay attorney fees is still contained in the court’s judgment and in its bill of costs. Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the assessment of attorney fees.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified.^[2]

Josh R. Morriss III Chief Justice Date Submitted: March 22, 2018 Date Decided: March 23, 2018 Do Not Publish