G Cite
cited 9× by 7 distinct cases, 1995–2025 · 7 courts→ Stable ·
…a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.
at p. 894
✓
cited 4× by 3 distinct cases, 2014–2020 · 2 courts↓ Fading ·
…cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.
at p. 894
✓
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986
2006
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 42 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Simon v. New York City Department of Education
In upholding dismissal, the court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Burnam v. Amoco Container Company: “a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see also Pacheco v. Park S. Hotel, LLC, No. 12-CV-9127, 2014 WL 292348 , at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mitchell v. Elmore County Department of Human Resources (MAG+)
Id.; Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding doctrine did not apply to parole board’s decision to change date of plaintiff’s reconsideration for parole because decision was a one-time act with continued consequences); Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding failure to rehire after allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire, cannot resurrect old discriminatory act under continuing violation doctrine, as a potential plaintiff could otherwise circumvent limitations by reapply…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
GORHAM v. HOUSTON HEALTHCARE SYSTEM INC
“A failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
DAZA v. STATE OF INDIANA
July 28, 1995) (quoting Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11 Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis Atchison v. The Board of Regents of University System of Georgia
As our Court has made clear, a failure to rehire can only count as an adverse action when there is a “new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
SER Raven Crest Contracting and Xinergy of W. Va. v. Hon. William S. Thompson, Judge
A simple request for reinstatement “seeks to 19 redress the original termination.” To be clear, under this line of cases the federal courts “expressly recognize 20 discriminatory failure to reinstate as a separately actionable claim.” “Each discrete 18 Id., 565 F.2d at 562 . 19 Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985). 20 Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
SER Raven Crest Contracting and Xinergy of W. Va. v. Hon. William S. Thompson, Judge
This rule emanates from 3 the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that “a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
William McKenna v. City of Philadelphia
Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hugh Kaufman v. Thomas Perez
(2×)
Moreover, an employer’s refusal to reinstate an employee “cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hugh Kaufman v. Thomas Perez
Moreover, an employer’s refusal to reinstate an employee “cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. Miami-Dade County
In support, Defendant cites to Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., in which the Eleventh Circuit held that “a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Washington v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc.
A failure to rehire, however, “subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Arthur Leroy Smith v. BellSouth Telecommunications
BellSouth relies, for instance, on Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894-95 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam), where a plaintiff whose discriminatory discharge claim was time-barred attempted to circumvent the ADEA's time limitations by claiming that the refusal to rehire her was a new act of discrimination.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lauderdale v. Johnston Industries, Inc.
A “simple request for reinstatement seeks to redress the original termination.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cavallaro v. Corning Inc.
Cf. Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894-95 (11th Cir.1985) (defendant’s failure to rehire plaintiff did not make discriminatory discharge claim timely); Daughtry v. King’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 608 F.2d 906, 909 (1st Cir.1979) (defendant’s termination of plaintiffs employment was a “completed, one-time violation,” and its failure to rehire him did not give rise to continuing violation); White v. Zema Systems Corp., 95-CV-7529, 1996 WL 666683 , *3 (N.D.Ill.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Layaou v. Xerox Corp.
Bur nam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894-95 (11th Cir.1985) (defendant’s failure to rehire plaintiff did not make discriminatory-discharge claim timely); Daughtry v. King’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 608 F.2d 906, 909 (1st Cir.1979) (defendant’s termination of plaintiffs employment was a “completed, one-time violation,” and its failure to rehire him did not give rise to continuing violation); White v. Zema Systems Corp., No. 95 C 7529, 1996 WL 666683 *3 (N.D.Ill.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Boisvert v. Sears, Roebuck & C o .
Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985). 7 Sears’s advertising for automotive customer service consultants (Boisvert’s comparable job after reorganization) between March and August 1993 suggests changed circumstances from the time Sears terminated Boisvert’s employment in February 1993 and told her no positions were available.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc.
(2×)
June 8, 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir.1979); Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985); Farnum v. Swiss Bank Corp., 39 Fair Emp.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education
Newton’s charge of discrimination, filed on 3 August 1993, was unquestionably timely. 159 . "[T]he 180 day filing requirement is not jurisdictional and, thus, like a statute of limitations, it is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Richard Kennedy v. Chemical Waste Management, Incorporated
Webb v. Indiana National Bank, 931 F.2d 434, 436-37 (7th Cir.1991); Dugan v. Ball State University, 815 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir.1987); Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
White v. Stackhouse, Inc.
In Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985), the court stated that “a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” Id. (citing Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir.1975)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hargett v. Valley Federal Savings Bank
In Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam), this court held that a plaintiff must allege that the failure to rehire stemmed from a new and discrete act of discrimination, separate from the original charge of discriminatory discharge. 10 Because Hargett alleges the *764 same discriminatory reasons to support his claim of discrimination in rehiring, Hargett fails to demonstrate that the rehire claim is derived from a separate act of discrimination by Valley.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McCourt v. Oneida Coal Co., Inc.
Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Miller v. International Tel. & Tel.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Allen v. Diebold, Inc.
Johnshury Trucking Co., Inc., 595 F.Supp. 1532, 1534 (D.Conn.1984) See also Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (“a potential plaintiff could always circumvent the limitations”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Annear v. State
The State relies on the case of Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985), where the court stated: [A] failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Independent Fire Co. No. 1 v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission
Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Miller v. International Tel. & Tel.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Knowles v. Postmaster General, United States Postal Service
Even if true, this fact alone does not help the plaintiff; it supports the determination that the original failure to place him on the list in 1983 is the true discriminatory act. “[A] failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited "see"
Dennis Grant Poulsen v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.
See Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited "see"
The Kellogg Company, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Jatinder P. Sabhlok, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee
See Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894-95 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (holding that a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act because otherwise a potential plaintiff could always circumvent the limitations by reapplying for employment).
discussed
Cited "see"
Kellogg Co v. Sabhlok
See Burnham v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894-95 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, Nos. 05-2626/2627 The Kellogg Co. v. Sabhlok Page 7 cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act because otherwise a potential plaintiff could always circumvent the limitations by reapplying for employment).
discussed
Cited "see"
Brooks v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626 (d) (1994). “[T]he 180 day filing requirement is not jurisdictional and, thus, like a statute of limitations, it is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11-th Cir. 1985). 13 The court in Jones v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Inc. stated the following regarding the single filing rule in the Title VII context: Pursuant to the “single-filing rule,” “[a]s long as at least one named plaintiff timely filed an EEOC charge, the precondition to a Title VII action is met for all other named plaintiffs and…
cited
Cited "see"
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc.
See Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited "see"
Charles Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hospital, Gadsden County, Florida
See Burnham v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited "see"
Charles ROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GADSDEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant. Gadsden County, Florida, Defendant
(2×)
See Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893 (11th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited "see"
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Insurance Co. of America
See Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985); Gifford v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.1982).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Roman v. A&S Innersprings USA, LLC
Therefore, in such cases, if no conduct has occurred within the [statutory limitation period], the plaintiff will be barred from recovering for the prior actions . . . .’’ Watts v. Chittenden, supra, 301 Conn. 596 ; see also Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (‘‘a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discrimi- natory act’’).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Riddle v. Citigroup
See, e.g., Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (per cu-riam) (“[A] failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Hilton v. BEDFORD PAVING, LLC
See also, Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (“[A] failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NORFOLK POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee
See, e.g., Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.1985) (“failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing ... cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act” but there can be “new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself’); see also Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554, 561-62 (9th Cir.1977) (in which the Ninth Circuit itself distinguished Collins , finding a charge of re *85 fusal to reinstate timely because “new elements of unfairness, not existing at the time of the original violation, attached to denial of re-e…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Betty Jo WEBB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDIANA NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellee
See also Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam), and cases cited there. *437 This is a good though partial argument — partial because it concerns only one of the positions for which the plaintiff applied — but not one that the district judge discussed or that we can evaluate on this record.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Roy v. Amoco Oil Co.
See also Ricks, supra. The Eleventh Circuit was called upon to review the timeliness of an EEOC claim which was alleged to be continuing in nature in Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893 (11th Cir.1985).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
45 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1180, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,100 Mable Y. Burnam
v.
Amoco Container Company
v.
Amoco Container Company
84-8442.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Mar 20, 1985.
755 F.2d 893
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28477
Jay W. Bouldin, Jonesboro, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant., Charles A. Edwards, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee.
Tjoflat, Hill, Anderson.
Cited by 58 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Burnam appeals the dismissal of her action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 1 The district court held that the case was time-barred because Burnam did not file her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice as required by 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1). We affirm.
Burnam was discharged by appellee Amoco Container Company (Amoco) on October 9, 1982, but did not file her charge with the EEOC until June 6, 1983, more than 180 days later. Burnam argues, however, that additional discrimination practiced by Amoco occurred on May 23, 1983, the date on which Burnam applied to be rehired for the same position and on which Amoco refused to do so. She argues that this refusal to rehire constituted a new and continuing violation of the ADEA. We realize that the 180 day filing requirement is not jurisdictional and, thus, like a statute of limitations, it is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1133 n. 11, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982); (EEOC filing requirement under Title VII, like that under ADEA, is not jurisdictional). [2] However, a failure to rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing, absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discriminatory act. Collins v. United Airlines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir.1975) (Title VII). Otherwise, a potential plaintiff could always circumvent the limitations by reapplying for employment. A simple request for reinstatement “seeks to redress the original termination.” Id. at 596; accord National Labor Relations Board v. Auto Ware- [*895] housers, Inc., 571 F.2d 860 (5th Cir.1978) [3] (relating to six month period for filing of unfair labor practice charge). Here, the original termination occurred on October 9, 1982, more than six months prior to the filing of the EEOC charge. Thus, Bur-nam’s claim is time-barred. “Were we to hold otherwise, we would undermine the significance of the Congressionally mandated [180]-day limitation period.” Collins, 514 F.2d at 596.
AFFIRMED. [4]
1
. This appeal was the subject of a prior published opinion of this court. In Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 738 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir.1984), we held that Burnam’s appeal had been timely noticed within the meaning of Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1).
2
. The Supreme Court has indicated that questions concerning the time requirements for filing an EEOC charge under Title VII and the ADEA and for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board call for parallel analysis. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1133 n. 11, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (noting that the ADEA was modeled after Title VII).
3
. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. Id. at 1209.
4
. Burnam also argues that the 180 day period was tolled because she was "medically unable to return to work”' for a long period of time subsequent to her termination. Because Burnam raised this issue for the first time on appeal, we decline to address it.
Amoco’s motion for imposition of sanctions is DENIED.