continuing course of conduct doctrine in Connecticut

2003Vincent's Medical Center , 252 Conn. 363 , 369-70 , 746 A.2d 753 (2000). "[T]he application of the continuing course of conduct doctrine [is] conspicuously fact-bound." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital , 252 Conn. 193 , 210 , CT Page 2578-cj 746 A.2d 730 (2000). "[N]o ongoing relationship is required for the continuing course of conduct doctrine to apply . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hernandez v. Cirmo , 67 Conn. App. 565 , 573 , 787 A.2d 657 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 931 , 793 A.2d 1084 (2002).

2003Id. , 364-65. "[A] precondition for the operation of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is that the defendant must have committed an initial wrong upon the plaintiff." Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital , supra , 252 Conn. 204 .

2024For instance, we have recognized the continuing course of conduct doctrine in claims of medical malpractice. . . . [It] has also been applied to other claims of professional negligence in this state.’’ (Citations omitted.) Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575 , 583–84, 22 A.3d 1214 (2011); see also id., 596 (holding that continuing course of conduct doctrine applies to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).

2024For instance, we have recognized the continuing course of conduct doctrine in claims of medical malpractice. . . . [It] has also been applied to other claims of professional negligence in this state.’’ (Citations omitted.) Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575 , 583–84, 22 A.3d 1214 (2011); see also id., 596 (holding that continuing course of conduct doctrine applies to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).

2019However, the continuing course of conduct doctrine recognizes that the "act" or "omission" that commences the limitation period may not be discrete and attributable to a fixed point in time. "[T]he doctrine is generally applicable under circumstances *541 where [i]t may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a particular negligent act or omission that caused injury or where the negligence consists of a series of acts or omissions and it is appropriate to allow the course of [action] to terminate before allowing the repose section of the [limitation period] to run ...." (Internal quotation

2019However, the continuing course of conduct doctrine recognizes that the "act" or "omission" that commences the limitation period may not be discrete and attributable to a fixed point in time. "[T]he doctrine is generally applicable under circumstances *541 where [i]t may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a particular negligent act or omission that caused injury or where the negligence consists of a series of acts or omissions and it is appropriate to allow the course of [action] to terminate before allowing the repose section of the [limitation period] to run ...." (Internal quotation

2024For example, in Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., [ 94 Conn. App. 593, 607 , 894 A.2d 335 (2006), aff’d, 284 Conn. 193 , 931 A.2d 916 (2007), this court] deemed it just to reach the merits of a plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine, despite the plaintiff’s failure to plead the doctrine prop- erly pursuant to . . . § 10-57, when the plaintiff asserted the doctrine’s applicability for the first time Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Bucci v. Bridgeport in a pleading filed in opposition to the defendan

2024For example, in Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., [ 94 Conn. App. 593, 607 , 894 A.2d 335 (2006), aff’d, 284 Conn. 193 , 931 A.2d 916 (2007), this court] deemed it just to reach the merits of a plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine, despite the plaintiff’s failure to plead the doctrine prop- erly pursuant to . . . § 10-57, when the plaintiff asserted the doctrine’s applicability for the first time Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Bucci v. Bridgeport in a pleading filed in opposition to the defendan

2024For example, in Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., [ 94 Conn. App. 593, 607 , 894 A.2d 335 (2006), aff’d, 284 Conn. 193 , 931 A.2d 916 (2007), this court] deemed it just to reach the merits of a plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine, despite the plaintiff’s failure to plead the doctrine prop- erly pursuant to . . . § 10-57, when the plaintiff asserted the doctrine’s applicability for the first time Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Bucci v. Bridgeport in a pleading filed in opposition to the defendan

2024For example, in Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., [ 94 Conn. App. 593, 607 , 894 A.2d 335 (2006), aff’d, 284 Conn. 193 , 931 A.2d 916 (2007), this court] deemed it just to reach the merits of a plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine, despite the plaintiff’s failure to plead the doctrine prop- erly pursuant to . . . § 10-57, when the plaintiff asserted the doctrine’s applicability for the first time Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Bucci v. Bridgeport in a pleading filed in opposition to the defendan

2012We further have stated expressly that *613 “the continuing course of conduct doctrine has no application after the plaintiff has discovered the harm.” Id., 406 , citing Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn. App. 311, 327-32 , 757 A.2d 608 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947 , 762 A.2d 903 (2000), and Rivera v. Fairbank Management Properties, Inc., 45 Conn. Sup. 154, 160 , 703 A.2d 808 (1997).

2012We further have stated expressly that *613 “the continuing course of conduct doctrine has no application after the plaintiff has discovered the harm.” Id., 406 , citing Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn. App. 311, 327-32 , 757 A.2d 608 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947 , 762 A.2d 903 (2000), and Rivera v. Fairbank Management Properties, Inc., 45 Conn. Sup. 154, 160 , 703 A.2d 808 (1997).

2001In that ruling, Rosenfield v. Rogin Nassau , 2000 Ct. Sup. 4033 (Apr. 12, 2001), the court, Peck, J, made observations to the effect that Judge Wagner should not have granted Levy Droney's motion for summary judgment because the limitation period was tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine recognized by the Supreme Court in such cases as Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital , supra, 252 Conn. 202 -203, Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp ., 207 Conn. 204 , 209-10 (1988), and Cross v. Huttenlocher , 185 Conn. 390 , 400 (1981).

1994The similarity and overlap between the continuous treatment doctrine and the continuing course of conduct doctrine can be seen in Cross v. Huttenlocher, supra, 185 Conn. 390 , the only Connecticut medical malpractice case in which we determined that the statute of limitations would be tolled because of the continuing duty of a physician toward his patient.

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2011The practical effect is that “[w]hen the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed.” (Emphasis added.) Handler v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 321 , 130 A.2d 793 (1957); see also Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 161 , 464 A.2d 18 (1983); Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 241 , 429 A.2d 486 (1980).

2011The practical effect is that “[w]hen the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed.” (Emphasis added.) Handler v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 321 , 130 A.2d 793 (1957); see also Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 161 , 464 A.2d 18 (1983); Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 241 , 429 A.2d 486 (1980).

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2012He directs our attention to Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn. App. 680, 688 , 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009), where we stated that “the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense. ” See also Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 94 Conn. App. 593 , 607 n.7, 894 A.2d 335 (2006), aff'd, 284 Conn. 193 , 931 A.2d 916 (2007); Practice Book § 10-57.

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2012He directs our attention to Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn. App. 680, 688 , 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009), where we stated that “the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense. ” See also Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 94 Conn. App. 593 , 607 n.7, 894 A.2d 335 (2006), aff'd, 284 Conn. 193 , 931 A.2d 916 (2007); Practice Book § 10-57.

2014We conclude, therefore, that under the circumstances of this case, MacGrady did not have a continuing duty to disclose his prior conflict of inter- est that he continually breached by failing to disclose it.31 ‘‘The gravamen of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is that a duty continues after the original wrong is committed.’’ Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518, 525 , 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001). ‘‘[I]n the absence of a continuing special relationship, there must be a subsequent wrongful act that is related to the prior negl

2002Although “no ongoing relationship is required for the continuing course of conduct doctrine to apply”; Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518, 529 , 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001); the presence of a long-term and continuing physician-patient relationship in Cross weighed in favor of the applicability of the doctrine.

2014We conclude, therefore, that under the circumstances of this case, MacGrady did not have a continuing duty to disclose his prior conflict of inter- est that he continually breached by failing to disclose it.31 ‘‘The gravamen of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is that a duty continues after the original wrong is committed.’’ Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518, 525 , 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001). ‘‘[I]n the absence of a continuing special relationship, there must be a subsequent wrongful act that is related to the prior negl

2002Although “no ongoing relationship is required for the continuing course of conduct doctrine to apply”; Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518, 529 , 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001); the presence of a long-term and continuing physician-patient relationship in Cross weighed in favor of the applicability of the doctrine.

2014We conclude, therefore, that under the circumstances of this case, MacGrady did not have a continuing duty to disclose his prior conflict of inter- est that he continually breached by failing to disclose it.31 ‘‘The gravamen of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is that a duty continues after the original wrong is committed.’’ Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518, 525 , 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001). ‘‘[I]n the absence of a continuing special relationship, there must be a subsequent wrongful act that is related to the prior negl

2014We conclude, therefore, that under the circumstances of this case, MacGrady did not have a continuing duty to disclose his prior conflict of inter- est that he continually breached by failing to disclose it.31 ‘‘The gravamen of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is that a duty continues after the original wrong is committed.’’ Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518, 525 , 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001). ‘‘[I]n the absence of a continuing special relationship, there must be a subsequent wrongful act that is related to the prior negl

2000“In the context of applying § 52-584 to decide whether a particular action was commenced in a timely fashion, we have stated that ‘an injury occurs when a party suffers some form of actionable harm.’ Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 460 , 472 A.2d 1257 (1984); see Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 521 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989); Lambert v. Stovell, 205 Conn. 1, 6 , 529 A.2d 710 (1987); Catz v. Rubenstein, 201 Conn. 39, 43 , 513 A.2d 98 (1986); see Durrett v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 965 F. Sup. 280, 284-85 (D.

2000“In the context of applying § 52-584 to decide whether a particular action was commenced in a timely fashion, we have stated that ‘an injury occurs when a party suffers some form of actionable harm.’ Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 460 , 472 A.2d 1257 (1984); see Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 521 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989); Lambert v. Stovell, 205 Conn. 1, 6 , 529 A.2d 710 (1987); Catz v. Rubenstein, 201 Conn. 39, 43 , 513 A.2d 98 (1986); see Durrett v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 965 F. Sup. 280, 284-85 (D.