v.
State Of Washington
LEACH, J. — Curtis Brogi appeals the denial of his conditional release to a less restrictive alternative (LRA) as a sexually violent predator (SVP). He claims that he did not receive a fair trial because the State, through its psychologist expert witness, Dr. Harry Goldberg, introduced racial bias into the proceedings. We agree that the racial prejudice Goldberg's testimony introduced denied Brogi his federal and state constitutional due process guarantees to a fair trial. We reverse.
FACTS
From 1986 to 1996, Brogi was convicted of multiple sex-related offenses. In January 2000, the State sought to have him committed as an SVP.[1] A jury found that Brogi Was an SVP, and he was committed. He has since resided at the Special Commitment Center (SCC) in the custody of the Department of No. 75529-3-1/ 3
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution protect against deprivation of a person's liberty without due process of law. The right to a fair trial is a "fundamental liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment6 and article 1, section 3.6 "IA] trial by a jury, one or more of whose members is biased or prejudiced, is not a constitutional trial.'"7 An impartial trial "commands jury indifference to race."8
Brogi claims Goldberg testified that Native American sex offenders have a higher risk of reoffending than non-Native American sex offenders. He contends that because he is Native American, Goldberg's race-based conclusion biased the jury against him and violated his substantive due process right to a trial by an impartial jury. Brogi likens his case to Buck v. Davis.° There, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Buck's trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. In the penalty phase of Buck's capital murder trial, Buck's counsel introduced expert testimony that Buck's African American race predisposed him to violent conduct.1° Buck's expert identified race as a statistical risk factor in No. 75529-3-1 /4 predicting future dangerousness and stated that being African American statistically increases an offender's future dangerousness.[11] The Court held that Buck's counsel performed deficiently when he introduced evidence that "appealed to a powerful racial stereotype."12
Here, Goldberg testified about his risk assessment of Brogi. Goldberg explained that he analyzed whether Brogi identified with any of three "protective factors," which reduce a person's risk for sexual reoffense. One of these protective factors was completion of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). Dr. Elena Lopez, a psychologist for the SCC, testified that the SCC uses a CBT treatment program.[13] Brogi testified that he stopped CBT more than once. He stated that he found it "degrading" and culturally insensitive. He felt like the treatment providers were trying to "colonize" him because they did not want him to speak his language or use a more culturally familiar form of treatment like a medicine wheel.
In anticipation of Brogi's testimony, Goldberg testified about a study looking at how well CBT worked for Native Canadian sex offenders as compared to non-Native Canadian sex offenders. When questioning Goldberg about the study, the State asked, "[D]id native Canadians perform differently in the No. 75529-3-1/ 5 No. 75529-3-1 /6 federal constitutions require. Goldberg's testimony violated Brogi's constitutional due process right to an impartial jury.
Next, we decide whether the State has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Goldberg's testimony was harmless error. It has not. The State cannot show that Goldberg's testimony did not give credence to any potential latent racial prejudice held by the jury and did not influence the jury's decision that Brogi's LRA plan did not adequately protect the community. As we noted, and like the Court's assessment of the medical expert in Buck,18 Goldberg's status as a medical expert may have heightened the value the jury gave his testimony because it assumed Goldberg had the trial court's endorsement.
"'Principles of judicial restraint dictate that if resolution of an issue effectively disposes of a case, we should resolve the case on that basis without reaching any other issues that might be presented.'"18 Thus, we decline to reach the other issues Brogi raises, including his challenges to a number of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and to the jury instructions.
Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775-77.