v.
Tyron Young
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 17-2885
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Tyron Young
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
Submitted: March 16, 2018
Filed: April 26, 2018
[Unpublished]
Before WOLLMAN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Tyron Young pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and was sentenced to 115 months’ imprisonment. He appeals his sentence, challenging the district court’s1 admission crime lab report, and the stipulated testimony of a forensic examiner and a detective who investigated the shooting the morning it took place.
Young first argues that the district court erred by admitting the hearsay statements of the CI and by relying upon those statements to find that Young committed the offense of conviction in connection with assault with intent to commit murder. Based on that finding, the district court applied a cross reference to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, the section that applies to assault with intent to commit murder, resulting in a higher offense level than he would have had without the cross reference. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) (cross reference to § 2X1.1); U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(c)(1) (cross reference to offense section that expressly covers the attempt). Because Young objected to the admission of the statements, we review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sheridan, 859 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review).
The Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3). The district court is permitted to consider relevant information, even if it would be inadmissible at trial, “provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). Young argues that the CI’s statements were unreliable because the CI had a motive to accuse Young (and shift blame from himself), he failed to respond to a subpoena, he previously had committed bond and probation violations and had been convicted of a crime of dishonesty, he had absconded from supervision for the year following the shooting, and he was a possible contributor of genetic information found on the firearm.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the CI’s hearsay statements. The CI had proven himself reliable in the past, having worked with Detective Straubel for three years. When the CI met with Straubel on the same day of the shooting, he gave a detailed account of what occurred during the early morning hours of May 11. He described the firearm and identified Young’s possible motive. During a police interview, Young’s girlfriend corroborated the CI’s account of the events leading up to and following the shooting. She also identified the Taurus 9 mm firearm as belonging to Young. Forensic evidence confirmed that Young’s firearm was the source of the bullets and spent casings that were found at the crime scene. Young’s DNA was found on the firearm. Young pleaded guilty to possessing the firearm, and Young himself told officers that he believed that Belton had shot him, corroborating the CI’s statements and indicating Young’s motive for shooting Belton’s home. In light of the evidence presented, the district court fairly determined that the CI’s statements were probably accurate and properly applied the cross reference. We also conclude that the admission of the CI’s statements did not violate Young’s constitutional rights. See United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 402 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that “the Guidelines’ standard for the consideration of hearsay testimony at sentencing meets the appropriate constitutional test and fulfills the Confrontation Clause’s basic purpose of promoting the integrity of the factfinding process”).
Young’s argument that the district court erroneously classified his prior Missouri conviction for attempted second-degree robbery as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is foreclosed. See United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (holding that Missouri second-degree robbery is categorically a “violent felony” under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)); United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2017) (viewing “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) as interchangeable with “crime of violence” under the Guidelines).2
The sentence is affirmed.
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