v.
Derrick Johnson
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 17-1788
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Derrick Christopher Johnson
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport
Submitted: April 9, 2018
Filed: August 24, 2018
[Unpublished]
Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Derrick Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. The district court1 sentenced him to 300 received as a criminal history Category IV with a 37 offense level which is a range of 292 to 365 months.[2]
First, Johnson challenges the district court’s career offender determination. However, when “the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not relied upon the invalid factor or factors,” the “misapplication of the guidelines is harmless.” United States v. LaRoche, 700 F.3d 363, 365 (8th Cir. 2012). Here, the district court determined that with or without the career offender determination, Johnson’s sentence would be the same. We conclude, therefore, any possible error in the application of the career offender guideline to Johnson was harmless.
Second, Johnson argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of his sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). As discussed above, the district court carefully reviewed, on the record, Johnson’s personal history and characteristics and the nature and circumstances of the May 2016 offense. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting “[w]e do not require a district court to provide a mechanical recitation of the § 3553(a) factors,” but the record must make clear “the district court actually considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining the sentence” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2009))); United States v. Morais, 670 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting the district court has “substantial discretion” in weighing the statutory sentencing factors). Based on the record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Johnson.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. ______________________________