United States v. Victor Peterson, 768 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Victor Peterson, 768 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1988 · …distinct conceptual groupings. at p. 66 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2011 · …it does not matter whether some jurors found that the defendant performed these acts himself, and others that he intended to help someone else who did, because either way, his liability is the same.... at p. 67 ⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1990 · …referring to situations where the same act is characterized in different ways, each of which constitutes a crime under the same count of an indictment. at p. 67 ✓
90 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Laquan Johnson (ca11, 2019-12-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#10 21 U.S.C. § 801-966 cited 1× in this case · 49 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 39 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Laquan Johnson
11th Cir. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the jury should be regarded as unanimous . . . even if some jurors believed that victor and the other jurors believed that russell was the aider or abettor.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ferguson
2d Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1985); accord, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir.2005) ("It does not matter whether some jurors found that [the defendant] performed these acts himself, and others that he intended to help someone else who did, because either way, [his] liability is the same....").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ferguson
2d Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1985); accord, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir.2005) (“It does not matter whether some jurors found that [the defendant] performed these acts himself, and others that he intended to help someone else who did, because either way, [his] liability is the same----”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ferguson
2d Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1985); accord, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir.2005) (“It does not matter whether some jurors found that [the defendant] performed these acts himself, and others that he intended to help someone else who did, because either way, [his] liability is the same....”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Green
Vt. · 2006 · confidence medium
See State v. Verge, 152 Vt. 93, 97-98 , 564 A.2d 1353, 1355-56 (1989) (finding no plain error where court gave general instruction on requirement of juror unanimity, and defendant did not request special verdict); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1985) (observing that general instruction on requirement of juror unanimity suffices to instruct jury that it must be unanimous on “specifications” it finds to form basis of guilty verdict, and concluding conviction based on verdict will stand if sufficient evidence exists with respect to each specification); accord United State…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Boone
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 60 , 112 S.Ct. 466 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991); United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir.1996) (finding “conviction as an aider and abettor was not erroneous since the jury had ample evidence on which to convict [the defendant] as a principal”); United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir.1994) (“an indictment charging aiding and abetting may be proven by demonstrating that the aider and abettor was in fact a principal”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1985) (stating that con…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gentry
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
In a similar vein, in United States v. Peterson, 768 F. 2d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 264 (1985), the court held that a jury need not unanimously agree whether a defendant's role was that of a principal or an accomplice.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Yousef
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir.1994) (charge of aiding and abetting may be proved by demonstrating that defendant was in fact a principal); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1985) (jury need not unanimously agree as to which defendant was the principal and which was the aider and abettor).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Yousef
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir.1994) (charge of aiding and abetting may be proved by demonstrating that defendant was in fact a principal); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1985) (jury need not unanimously agree as to which defendant was the principal and which was the aider and abettor).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perry v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
See also United States v. Eagle Elk, 820 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir.1987) (“even if the jury was divided on whether Eagle Elk committed the principal crime or aided and abetted in its commission, there can be no question that the illegal act was murder”); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hakeem Olayinka Alli-Balogun, Also Known as Ralph Badmus
2d Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See United States v. Shaoul, 41 F.3d 811, 818 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that, in a case where a general unanimity instruction was given but not a specific one concerning the unanimity required for the jury to find an overt act in a conspiracy, “[e]ven in circumstances where it might have been advisable as a matter of sound policy to give ‘specific’ unanimity instructions ... failure to give such instructions does not constitute plain error”) (footnote omitted); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir.) (holding that the failure to provide a specific unanimity instruction, in a …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brown (2×)
N.J. · 1994 · confidence medium
Accordingly, the accepted view is that to return a criminal conviction, a jury need not be unanimous on the theory of criminal-conduct responsibility if the alternative theories apply to commission of the same criminal act and each of them supports conviction of the same offense: In a criminal charge involving one incident and two people, the jury is regarded as being unanimous if, without specifically identifying who was the principal and who was the accomplice, they all agree that one of the two actors performed all of the elements of the offense charged as a principal and that both actors k…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jack Shaoul
2d Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nafez Anthony Karam, Also Known as Tony Karam, United States of America v. George Antoun Haro, United States of America v. Antoine Youssef El Hani, Also Known as Tony El Hani
8th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 926-29 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 77 , 126 L.Ed.2d 45 (1993); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 876-78 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 , 111 S.Ct. 2235 , 114 L.Ed.2d 477 (1991); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Karam
8th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 926-29 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 77 , 126 L.Ed.2d 45 (1993); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 876-78 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 , 111 S.Ct. 2235 , 114 L.Ed.2d 477 (1991); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Armando Correa-Ventura (2×)
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Downing v. United States, 493 U.S. 1025 , 110 S.Ct. 732 , 107 L.Ed.2d 751 (1990); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985). 47 The Supreme Court has recently criticized the Gipson rationale when it interpreted the unanimity requirement in the context of the Arizona first-degree murder statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Tucker
Conn. · 1993 · confidence medium
Gipson’s requirement that a jury verdict be unanimous applies only if the acts on which unanimity is required fall into “ ‘distinct conceptual groupings.’ ” United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1985). 35 “The Gipson logic requires the jury to agree on the factual theory or ‘concept’ underlying criminal liability but does not require it to split hairs over nomenclature.” Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 139 , 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) U.S. v. Correa-Ventura
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Downing v. United States, 493 U.S. 1025 (1990); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lamar Harris, A/K/A Cheese, United States of America v. Gary Wyche, A/K/A Gary Gunter, Drago, United States of America v. Donald Johnson, A/K/A Danny, United States of America v. Michael Palmer, A/K/A Knot, Tony, James, United States of America v. Richard A. Smith, A/K/A Rich, Mo, Richmo
D.C. Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See id. at 2497 11 See United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1110-13 (6th Cir.1988) (following Gipson), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1025 , 110 S.Ct. 732 , 107 L.Ed.2d 751 (1990); accord United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460-62 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985); see also United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 874-76 (D.C.Cir.1990), vacated in pertinent part on other grounds, 920 F.2d 940, 950-51 (D.C.Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2235 , 114 L.Ed.2d 477 (1991) 12 See Moorm…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harris
D.C. Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1110-13 (6th Cir.1988) (following Gipson), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1025 , 110 S.Ct. 732 , 107 L.Ed.2d 751 (1990); accord United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460-62 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985); see also United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 874-76 (D.C.Cir.1990), vacated in pertinent part on other grounds, 920 F.2d 940, 950-51 (D.C.Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2235 , 114 L.Ed.2d 477 (1991). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Ramos
Mass. App. Ct. · 1991 · confidence medium
See also United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324-325 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 458-459 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-68 (2d Cir. 1985); People v. Forbes, 175 Cal. App. 3d 807, 816 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Diggs
Conn. · 1991 · confidence medium
“A general instruction on unanimity is sufficient to insure that ... a unanimous verdict is reached; [United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S. Ct. 257 , 88 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jennings
Conn. · 1990 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 789 (1987)]; see also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 835-37 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S. Ct. 257 , 88 L.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Oliver L. North (6×)
D.C. Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Id. (citing United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bailey
Conn. · 1988 · confidence medium
Moreover, a number of courts have acknowledged the need to avoid unwarranted multiplication of specific unanimity instructions by requiring such a charge only in “cases where the complexity of the evidence or other factors create a genuine danger of jury confusion.” United States v. Schiff, supra, 114-15 ; see also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 835-37 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S. Ct. 257 , 88 L.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joe S. Duncan and Michael M. Downing (6×)
6th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460-62 (3d Cir.1987) (three alternative transactions charged in same count as occasions of "embezzling, stealing, abstracting or converting to own use" union funds: unauthorized use of credit card, excessively expensive hotel room, portion of hotel stay for personal reasons); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.) (two discrete instances of drug possession charged in same count: three glassine envelopes found on defendant's brother and glassine envelope stored in nearby wall), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Probst v. State (2×)
Del. · 1988 · confidence medium
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shivers v. United States
D.C. · 1987 · confidence medium
See United States v. Mangieri, 224 U.S.App.D.C. 295, 304 , 694 F.2d 1270, 1279 (1982); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985); Commonwealth v. Lemar, 22 Mass.App. 170 , 492 N.E.2d 105 (1986) and cases cited.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The United States v. James Beros, Titus McCue A/K/A Tim McCune Appeal of James M. Beros (2×) also: Cited "see"
3rd Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Murad Nersesian
2d Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
We now examine each prong of § 371 not only for sufficiency of evidence but also to see if they state cognizable conspiracy offenses, assuming without deciding that it is necessary for us to do so, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 , 51 S.Ct. 532, 535 , 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985); United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 898-99 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324-25 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 , 96 S.Ct. 1663 , 48 L.Ed.2d 175…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Irwin A. Schiff
2d Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Unanimous Jury It is true, as Schiff argues, that a jury must reach a unanimous verdict as to the factual basis for a conviction, United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 456-59 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324-25 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 , 96 S.Ct. 1663 , 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976), at least insofar as that basis can be broken down into “distinct conceptual groupings” of facts, Peterson, 768 F.2d at 67 ; Gipson, 553 F.2d at 458 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Lemar
Mass. App. Ct. · 1986 · confidence medium
Cir. 1982); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 923 (1985).
cited Cited "see" United States v. John Pforzheimer
2d Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Roger Eagle Elk
8th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985) (Friendly, J.) (interpreting Gipson, supra, in 18 U.S.C. § 2 (a) drug possession case, as requiring that the jury verdict be unanimous with regard to the act of possession, not as to whether defendant was principal or aider or abettor); cf. Gipson, 553 F.2d at 458-59 (instructing jury to convict defendant upon finding he received, concealed, stored, bartered, sold or disposed of stolen property deprived defendant of unanimous verdict because the first three acts are conc…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Roberta Dupre, Beverly Stambaugh
2d Cir. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 66-68 (2d Cir.1985) (Friendly, J.) (affirming despite trial judge’s failure to charge jury that it must be unanimous about which particular bag of drugs served as basis for conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute it); United States v. Natelli 527 F.2d 311, 324-25 (2d Cir.1975) (affirming despite trial judge’s refusal to charge jury that it must be unanimous about what particular false statement served as the basis for conviction for securities fraud); see also United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 898-99 (2d Cir.1980) (…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Barry Trupin, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee (2×)
2d Cir. · 1997 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir.1977) (describing § 2313 as referring to six acts in two distinct conceptual groupings — -receiving, concealing and storing on the one hand— bartering, selling and disposing on the other — which could permit the jury to find the actus reus element unanimously despite difference in belief as to which intra group act the defendants committed, but reversing conviction where trial judge gave instruction that permitted jury to find actus reus element unanimously despite difference in belief that inter group acts occurred), cited …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Baker v. State (2×)
Alaska Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64 (2nd Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 257 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 ; Lampkins v. Gagnon, 539 F.Supp. 359 (E.D.Wis.1982), aff'd 710 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 , 104 S.Ct. 729 , 79 L.Ed.2d 189 (1984); State v. Moriarty, 87 Or.App. 465 , 742 P.2d 704 (1987); State v. Mclnelly, 146 Ariz. 161 , 704 P.2d 291, 293 (App.1985); State v. Wheeler, 109 Idaho 795 , 711 P.2d 741 (App.1985); State v. Wixon, 30 Wash.App. 63 , 631 P.2d 1033 (1981); People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 11 , 612 P.2d 1106, 1109 (1980); Bowen v. State, 606 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Brown
Tenn. Crim. App. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.1985) (defendant’s conviction on one count of heroin possession justified by both heroin found in courtyard wall and heroin found on the defendant’s brother).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Willie Horton
4th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1985) (principal and aiding and abetting instructions proper because “[t]he jury would still have been unanimous in finding that the acts proved to have been committed by [defendant] were sufficient to make him guilty as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (a).”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Victor PETERSON, Defendant-Appellant
1287, Docket 85-1055.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jul 22, 1985.
768 F.2d 64
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20880
Donald E. Nawi, New Rochelle, N.Y., for defendant-appellant., Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Atty., S.D. N.Y., New York City (David E. Brodsky, Stuart E. Abrams, Asst. U.S. Attys.), New York City, for appellee.
Friendly, Oakes, Winter.
Cited by 62 opinions  |  Published
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge:

This case arose out of one of the New York City Police Department’s “buy operations” — numerous purchases in a targeted area of small amounts of drugs, supposedly for personal use, by undercover agents, followed by arrests and federal prosecution of the sellers. The sweep here was “Operation Pressure Point”; the target area was the area around Eighth Avenue and 115th Street in Harlem. The undercover police officer posing as a buyer was Willie Grim-ball; Victor Peterson and his brother Russell were alleged to be the sellers.

Victor and Russell Peterson were charged with violating the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966, in a three-count indictment returned by a grand jury in the Southern District of New York. Count One charged the defendants with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count Two charged them with distributing and possessing with intent to distribute one bag containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 845a and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count Three charged them with possessing with intent to distribute a quantity of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Russell Peterson pleaded guilty in satisfaction of the indictment to Counts Two and Three, and was sentenced to concurrent one-year terms of imprisonment to be followed by a three-year special parole term. Victor Peterson pleaded not guilty and was tried before Judge Lowe and a jury. Count One was dismissed at the close of the Government’s case with its consent. Victor was convicted on the two remaining counts and was sentenced to concurrent three-year terms of imprisonment to be followed by a three-year special parole term. This appeal followed.

Appellate counsel for Victor Peterson concedes that, from the evidence presented, the jury could have found the facts to be as follows:

The sale took place in the late afternoon of October 24, 1984. Grimball approached a group of people standing near a school on 115th Street and asked if any “D”, (i.e., heroin) was out. Victor Peterson said yes and led Grimball into the school courtyard where Grimball said he wanted a “joint” ($40 worth of heroin). Peterson had no joints, but offered Grim-ball two “halves” (a half is $20 worth of heroin), obtained a glassine envelope from a hole in a nearby wall, and called to his brother Russell to give Victor one of Russell’s halves. Grimball, however, saw that Russell had a whole joint in his hand and asked for that instead of two halves. Victor agreed, Russell gave Grimball a glassine envelope stamped “Red Apple”, and Grimball gave Victor Peterson $40 and left. A few minutes later Grimball’s backup team arrested both Victor and Russell Peterson, seized from Russell three glassine envelopes, a “Red Apple” rubber stamp, and the $40 which Grimball had paid for the joint, and found in a wall in the school court[*66] yard a tin foil packet containing one glassine envelope partially filled with heroin.

Brief for Appellant at 3-4.

Despite appellant’s contrary assertions, this evidence was ample to justify a reasonable juror’s concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Victor Peterson distributed or possessed with intent to distribute the “joint” of heroin sold to Grimball, as charged in Count Two. Peterson orchestrated the entire transaction from negotiating the sale of two “halves” of heroin with Officer Grimball to approving the sale of the “joint” being held by Russell and receiving the $40 payment from this sale. Cf. United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66, 70 (2 Cir.1985). The evidence was also ample to convince a reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt that Victor Peterson possessed, either directly or constructively, with intent to distribute the glassine envelope in the school wall and/or the three glassine envelopes found upon Russell, as charged in Count Three. With respect to the heroin in the school wall, Peterson removed the envelope containing this heroin from the wall and offered to sell it to Officer Grimball; as noted in the Government’s brief, “[a] clearer example of possession with intent to distribute is difficult to imagine.” Cf. United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 450 (2 Cir.1977) (distinguishing between simple possession and possession with intent to distribute). [1] With respect to the glassine envelopes found on Russell, there was undoubtedly sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant had the sort of “working relationship or ... sufficient association with those having physical custody of the drugs so as to enable him to assure their production ... as a matter of course,” United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26, 30 (2 Cir.1962) (en banc), which supports finding constructive possession. See United States v. Baratta, 397 F.2d 215, 224 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939, 89 S.Ct. 293, 21 L.Ed.2d 276 (1968). We do not find appellant’s criticism of a portion of the charge telling the jury “if you should find that this defendant committed any acts which amount to a crime, then the consequences flowing from such acts are his; they are not yours; they are not mine,” as violating Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), or his criticism of the charge on the eyewitness’ identification, to be worthy of discussion. This leaves only the claims that under the court’s instructions some jurors might have convicted on Count Two on the basis that Victor made the sale aided and abetted by Russell while others might have convicted on the basis that Russell made the sale aided and abetted by Victor, and that some jurors might have convicted on Count Three solely because they believed that Victor was in possession of the glassine envelope in the school wall while others might have convicted solely because they believed that Victor was in constructive possession of the glassine envelopes found on Russell.

United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324-25 (2 Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1663, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976), strongly implies, if it does not actually hold, that the jury must be unanimous as to each “specification” in a count of an indictment, on which it finds the defendant guilty; in that case, one count of the indictment charged the defendants with making two false representations in a proxy statement, to wit, an earnings statement and a footnote. A clear holding that the jury must be unanimous with respect to at least one act sufficiently proved was made and explicated in United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 456-59 (5 Cir.1977) (Wisdom, J.). The court there, however, added the qualification that this principle applies only insofar as the acts on which unanimity is required fall into “distinct conceptual group[*67] ings.” As we read Judge Wisdom’s opinion, the “distinct conceptual grouping” qualification to the unanimity requirement refers to situations where the same act is characterized in different ways, each of which constitutes a crime under the same count of an indictment. [2] If we are correct, the two instances of possession offered in support of Count Three (the glassine envelope found in the school wall and the three glassine envelopes found on Russell) would constitute “distinct conceptual groupings” despite their close coincidence in time and similarity in nature. To the extent that Natelli requires unanimity as to the particular acts described in a single count of an indictment, it too certainly applies to these two acts of possession. On the other hand, although we need not decide the point for reasons subsequently discussed, it would appear to us that, under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), which provides that “[whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal,” the jury should be regarded as unanimous under either Natelli or Gipson even if some jurors believed that Victor and the other jurors believed that Russell was the aider or abettor. The jury would still have been unanimous in finding that the acts proved to have been committed by Victor were sufficient to make him guilty as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Cf. United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 20-21 (2 Cir.1979) (upholding refusal to require jury first to identify principals and then to identify aiders and abettors), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082, 100 S.Ct. 1037, 62 L.Ed.2d 767 (1980), and cases cited therein.

However, while Natelli may have established the need for unanimity with respect to each “specification” in each count of an indictment, Natelli also held that “a general instruction on the requirement of unanimity suffices to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous on whatever specifications they find to be the predicate of the guilty verdict” and that a conviction based on such a verdict will stand if there was sufficient evidence with respect to each specification. 527 F.2d at 325. [3][*68] We subsequently followed Natelli in this respect in United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 898-99 (2 Cir.1980), and found a general unanimity charge sufficient where a single-count indictment charged conspiracy to import and to distribute cocaine and marijuana. See also United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 146 (2 Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1427, 71 L.Ed.2d 648 (1982), which distinguished Gipson on the basis that the judge in that case had affirmatively told the jury that they need not all agree on which one of several specified acts the defendants had committed. Any possibility of success by Peterson thus must hinge on the fact that Judge Lowe departed from the usual “general instruction on unanimity,” approved in Natelli, which simply instructs the jury that its verdict must be unanimous, [4] by elaborating as follows:

[y]ou will, or you must arrive at a verdict that all 12 jurors agree upon. In other words, you cannot have on count [three], 10 jurors agreeing on something and count [two], 2 jurors, making a total of 12. Your verdict must be the result of 12 jurors agreeing on count [two], and 12 jurors agreeing on count [three].

Although it might be argued that the jury could have drawn from this instruction the negative inference that all twelve jurors need not agree on the basis for a finding of guilt under a single count, such an argument would be strained. In any event, trial counsel for defendant raised no objection to this portion of the charge and did not request a specific unanimity instruction as to either Count Two or Count Three; defendant thereby forfeited any claim of error in the charge, F.R.Crim.P. 30, unless the error, if there was one, was so plain that “the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (quoted in United States v. London, 753 F.2d 202, 205 (2 Cir.1985)); F.R.Crim.P. 52(b). A case of this sort, where, in endeavoring to protect the defendant against non-unanimous verdicts on the two counts, the judge might inadvertently have used language which on a tortured reading could be considered to suggest that unanimity was not required with respect to the acts supporting a guilty verdict on one count, is precisely the kind of situation to which F.R.Crim.P. 30 is addressed. If the alleged error had been called to the judge’s attention, she would surely have corrected it.

Affirmed.

1

. Appellant suggests that the quantity of heroin found in the glassine envelope concealed in the wall, 3.8 grams, "did not rise to the level needed” to establish possession with intent to distribute. However, “where there is other evidence of ... intent to distribute, possession of as small a quantity as 4 or 5 grams is sufficient to establish an intent to distribute....” United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1264 (9 Cir.1979). Here, Victor Peterson's actions were plainly sufficient for the jury to find the necessary intent to distribute.

2

. Thus, the defendants in Gipson were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2313, which subjects to criminal liability anyone who knowingly "receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes” of any stolen vehicle moving in or which constitutes interstate commerce. Judge Wisdom explained:

These six acts fall into two distinct conceptual groupings; the first consisting of receiving, concealing, and storing, and the second comprised of bartering, selling, and disposing. Within each grouping, the acts are sufficiently analogous to permit a jury finding of the actus reus element of the offense to be deemed “unanimous” despite differences among the jurors as to which of the intragroup acts the defendant committed. This is so for two reasons. First, the acts within each grouping are not conceptually distinct. The single act of keeping a vehicle in a certain place may constitute both concealing and storing; or the single act of marketing a vehicle may simultaneously constitute bartering, selling, and disposing. Second, distinguishing among the acts within each grouping presents characterization problems. One juror may view a defendant’s actions in housing a stolen vehicle as receiving, while another juror may conclude that the same actions constitute concealing or storing. Similar definitional problems would likely confront a jury faced with the task of choosing among the terms bartering, selling, and disposing for the proper label for a defendant’s actions.
On the other hand, the two conceptual groupings are sufficiently different so that a jury finding of the actus reus element of the offense would not be "unanimous” if some of the jurors thought the defendant committed only an act in the first conceptual grouping while others believed he committed an act only in the second. Differentiating the course of conduct prohibited by the first grouping from that proscribed by the second presents neither the conceptualization nor the characterization problems posed by distinguishing the acts within each grouping. The individual jurors and the collective jury could be expected to perceive and understand that the conduct prohibited by the first grouping, that relating to the housing of stolen vehicles, is distinct and different from the conduct forbidden by the second grouping, that dealing with the marketing of stolen vehicles.

553 F.2d at 458.

3

. On the count of the Natelli indictment containing two specifications, defense counsel, unlike trial counsel in this case, requested an instruction that the jury “must be unanimous on which, if either, of the two specifications had been proven ... beyond a reasonable doubt.”[*68] 527 F.2d at 324. Judge Gurfein, writing for this court, recognized that the requested instruction was proper and stated that it would be "sound practice" to give it "[w]hen there is more than one specification as a predicate for guilt, each dependent on particular evidence which is unrelated to the other,” but held, relying on United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 250 (2 Cir.1951) (Swan, J.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907, 72 S.Ct. 580, 96 L.Ed. 1325 (1952), that it was not reversible error to refuse to give it when a general charge on unanimity had been given.

4

. In Natelli, after explaining to the jury that it must reach a separate verdict as to each of the defendants, Judge Tyler instructed that "[y]our verdict either way with respect to the defendants must be unanimous under our system.” The unanimity instruction recommended by Devitt and Blackmar is equally straightforward: "The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous." 1 Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 18.01 (3d ed. 1977). See abo Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction No. 9 at 16 (1982) (“The decisions you reach in the jury room, whether guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous. You must all agree.”).