JUSTICE JENKINS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “‘“‘The exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding custody of a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been abused; however, where the trial court’s ruling does not reflect a discretionary decision but is based upon an erroneous application of the law and is clearly wrong, the ruling will be reversed on appeal.’ Syl. pt. ^[2], Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 158 W. Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in David M. v. Margaret M., 182 W. Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 912 (1989).” Syl. Pt. ^[1], In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W. Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 (2008)[, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011)].’ Syl. Pt. ^[2], In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011).” Syllabus point 2, In re Guardianship of A.C., 240 W. Va. 23, 807 S.E.2d 271 (2017).

2. “A family or circuit court’s authority to appoint a suitable person as a guardian for a minor, including a minor above the age of fourteen, is derived from West Virginia Code § 44-10-3 (2010), which grants courts discretion in determining when the appointment of a guardian for a minor is appropriate[.]” Syllabus point 5, in part, In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011). i

3. “A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child and, unless the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.” Syllabus, Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960).

4. “While courts always look to the best interests of the child in controversies concerning his or her custody, such custody should not be denied to a parent merely because some other person might possibly furnish the child a better home or better care.” Syllabus point 3, Hammack v. Wise, 158 W. Va. 343, 211 S.E.2d 118 (1975).

5. “Although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal . . . in all family law matters . . . must be the health and welfare of the children.” Syllabus point 3, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). ii Jenkins, Justice:

The petitioner, Terrence E. ^[1] (“Father”), appeals from the August 21, 2018 order entered by the Circuit Court of Cabell County. The circuit court’s order denied Father’s request to terminate 2 the guardianship of the respondents, Christopher R. and Julie R. (“the Guardians”), maternal grandparents and current guardians of Father’s child, K.E. In its ruling, the court determined that Father had not demonstrated a “material change of circumstances” as required by West Virginia Code section 44-10-3(j) (LexisNexis 2014) to support a termination of the current guardianship. On appeal to this Court, Father argues that he has satisfied the statutory criteria for the termination of his child’s guardianship and that, as the child’s biological father, he has a superior right to her custody as compared to the Guardians. Upon a review of the parties’ arguments and briefs, the appendix record and its supplement, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude the circuit court erred by requiring Father to demonstrate a “material change of circumstances” in order to terminate the existing guardianship. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s ruling and remand this case to the circuit court to determine whether the current guardianship should continue or whether the child’s custody should be returned to one or both of her parents.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2017, Kathryn R. (“Mother”) and Father were charged with child abuse and neglect of K.E. The petition primarily alleged that Mother, as a result of her substance abuse and addiction, had abused and/or neglected K.E. and that Father had failed to protect K.E. from Mother’s substance abuse. Later, Father also was charged with failure to provide support because he was delinquent in his child support payments. Eventually, the circuit court found that both parents had corrected the conditions constituting abuse and/or neglect and returned custody of K.E. to Mother and Father. The court also entered a parenting order that gave primary custody of K.E. to Mother and visitation to Father, including two overnight weekend visitations per month.

The following month, November 2017, Mother was arrested; charged with a violation of the conditions of her release and possession with the intent to deliver heroin; and incarcerated. As a result of Mother’s incarceration, Guardians, who are Mother’s parents, filed a petition to be appointed guardians of the child. Father claims that he was not notified of Mother’s arrest or of the guardianship petition until after the petition had been granted on an emergency basis and a temporary guardianship hearing had been scheduled. With counsel, Father appeared at the temporary guardianship hearing, objected to the Guardians’ appointment as the child’s guardian, and requested custody. Mother consented to the guardianship, and the circuit court entered a temporary order appointing the maternal grandparents as Guardians of K.E.

During a subsequent hearing in January 2018, Father, by counsel, again objected to the guardianship and requested custody of his child. Ultimately, Father agreed that, because the child was doing well in school and it would be disruptive to change her school during the middle of the school year, continuation of the guardianship through the end of the school year would be in the child’s best interest. It was suggested, however, that the guardianship arrangement could be reexamined at the end of the school year. The circuit court entered an order on February 20, 2018, finding it to be in the child’s best interests to grant the maternal grandparents’ (Guardians’) petition to be named as her guardians and to continue Father’s visitation pursuant to the parenting order entered at the end of the abuse and neglect proceedings. Father did not appeal from this order.

In April 2018, Father filed a petition to modify 3 the Guardians’ guardianship. Pursuant to West Virginia Code section 44-10-3(j),

[f]or a petition to revoke or terminate a guardianship filed by a parent, the burden of proof is on the moving party to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a material change of circumstances and that a revocation or termination is in the child’s best interest. To support his petition, Father stated:[*~758–760] A change in circumstances has occurred because [Father] has systematically shown this Court that he is a fit parent and can provide the proper care and stability for the minor child.

At the filing of this Petition, the biological mother is incarcerated and unable to provide adequate care for the minor child.

[Father] has no criminal history.[4] Therefore, it is in the best interests of the minor child to be under the care, custody, and control of the biological father.

Furthermore, [Father] recently switched to day shift at his place of employment to accommodate the minor child’s school schedule and to ensure he will be available when she is getting out of school.

(Footnote added). The Guardians objected to Father’s motion, and the circuit court held hearings on the matter.

By order entered August 21, 2018, the circuit court denied Father’s motion to terminate the Guardians’ guardianship and continued the child’s placement in their care. The circuit court ruled as follows:

The Court FINDS that there has not been a substantial change of circumstances warranting any modification of the current guardianship[,] and the Petition for Modification shall be dismissed. The Court further FINDS it is in the best interests of the minor child for the guardianship to remain.

In summary, the circuit court ordered that “[t]he minor child shall remain in her current guardianship,” but also ordered that K.E. “shall continue to have visitation [with Father] as in the prior order.” From this order, Father appeals to this Court.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the guardianship appointing the child’s maternal grandparents as her Guardians should continue or whether Father is entitled to the custody of his child. Our review of the circuit court’s ruling continuing the guardianship order is governed by the following standards of review. First, when reviewing decisions rendered by a circuit court, we are guided by our holding in Syllabus point 4 of Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W. Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996): “This Court reviews the circuit court’s final order and ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” See also Syl. pt. ^[1], McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 197 W. Va. 415, 475 S.E.2d 507 (1996) (“When this Court reviews challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, a two-prong deferential standard of review is applied. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard.”).

With specific respect to a circuit court’s order concerning a minor child’s custody, we previously have held that

“‘“[t]he exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding custody of a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been abused; however, where the trial court’s ruling does not reflect a discretionary decision but is based upon an erroneous application of the law and is clearly wrong, the ruling will be reversed on appeal.” Syl. pt. ^[2], Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 158 W. Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in David M. v. Margaret M., 182 W. Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 912 (1989).’ Syl. Pt. ^[1], In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W. Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 (2008)[, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011)].” Syl. Pt. ^[2], In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011).

Syl. pt. ^[2], In re Guardianship of A.C., 240 W. Va. 23, 807 S.E.2d 271 (2017). See also Syl. pt. ^[4], Hammack v. Wise, 158 W. Va. 343, 211 S.E.2d 118 (1975) (“Although the exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding custody of a child will not ordinarily be disturbed, when it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused, the decision awarding custody will be reversed.”).

Finally, because guardianship matters are governed by statutory law in this State, we further accord a plenary review to the circuit court’s interpretation and application of the relevant statute. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl pt. ^[1], Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). See also Syl. pt. ^[1], Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of W. Va., 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995) (“Interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review.”). With these standards in mind, we proceed to consider the parties’ arguments.

III.

DISCUSSION

In his appeal to this Court, Father contends that the Guardians’ role as guardians of his minor child should be terminated and that he, as K.E.’s biological father, should be awarded her custody. The Guardians counter that Father has not demonstrated a “material change of circumstances” as required by West Virginia Code section 44-10- 3(j) to terminate or revoke their guardianship. To determine which custodial arrangement serves the child’s best interests, we must examine both the guardianship statute and the circuit court’s order applying the guardianship statute to the facts of this case.

Guardianship of a child in West Virginia is governed by statute:

A family or circuit court’s authority to appoint a suitable person as a guardian for a minor, including a minor above the age of fourteen, is derived from West Virginia Code § 44-10-3 (2010), which grants courts discretion in determining when the appointment of a guardian for a minor is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. ^[5], in part, In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850. Specifically, West Virginia Code section 44-10-3(f) provides that

[t]he court may appoint a guardian for a minor if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment is in the minor’s best interest and:[*~760–762] (1) The parents consent;

(2) The parents’ rights have been previously terminated;

(3) The parents are unwilling or unable to exercise their parental rights;

(4) The parents have abandoned their rights by a material failure to exercise them for a period of more than six months; or

(5) There are extraordinary circumstances that would, in all reasonable likelihood, result in serious detriment to the child if the petition is denied.

If the factors enumerated in subsection (f) are not present, or have not been considered, the resulting guardianship is temporary in nature:

Whether or not one or more of the conditions of subsection (f) have been established, the court may appoint a temporary guardian for a minor upon a showing that an immediate need exists or that a period of transition into the custody of a parent is needed so long as the appointment is in the best interest of the minor. The temporary guardian has the authority of a guardian appointed pursuant to subsection (f) but the duration of the temporary guardianship may not exceed six months. A temporary guardianship may be extended beyond six months upon further order of the court finding continued need in the best interest of the minor.

W. Va. Code § 44-10-3(g). Finally, pursuant to subsection (h), [a]ny suitable person may be appointed as the minor’s guardian. A parent shall receive priority subject only to the provisions of subsections (d)[5] and (f) above. However, in every case the competency and fitness of the proposed guardian must be established and a determination made that the appointment is in the best interest of the child.

W. Va. Code § 44-10-3(h) (footnote added).

Considering the language of a prior version of the guardianship statute, we held that, “[p]ursuant to the plain language of W. Va. Code § 44- 10-3(a) (2006) (Supp. 2007), the circuit court or family court of the county in which a minor resides may appoint a suitable person to serve as the minor’s guardian. In appointing a guardian, the court shall give priority to the minor’s mother or father. ‘However, in every case, the competency and fitness of the proposed guardian and the welfare and best interests of the minor shall be given precedence by the court when appointing the guardian.’ W. Va. Code § 44-10-3(a).” Syl. Pt. 6, In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W. Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 (2008)[, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011)]. Syl. pt. ^[3], In re Guardianship of A.C., 240 W. Va. 23, 807 S.E.2d 271. See also Syl. pt. ^[3], in part, Mathews v. Wade, 2 W. Va. 464 (1868) (“By the Code of Virginia, 1860, a lawfully appointed guardian has the custody of his ward and the care and management of his estate, but the father of the minor, if living, and in case of his death, the mother, while she remains unmarried, shall, if fit for the trust, be entitled to the custody of the person of the minor, and the care of his education.”). Having examined the statutory language applicable to the issues raised in this case, we likewise find that the wording of the current version of West Virginia Code section 44-10-3 also is clear and plainly expresses the Legislature’s intent to favor a child’s parent, if he/she is fit, to serve as his/her child’s guardian provided such custodial placement comports with the child’s best interests. See W. Va. Code § 44-10- 3(h).

Because the instant appeal seeks to terminate the Guardians’ guardianship of K.E., it is necessary to consider the basis upon which the circuit court initially granted the guardianship to determine whether Father has demonstrated a “material change of circumstances” sufficient to terminate it. In its February 20, 2018 order granting the guardianship, the circuit court made the following findings of fact:

1. An ex parte order was entered on November 14, 2017[,] granting temporary guardianship to the [Guardians] and a temporary order further granted temporary guardianship following a hearing held on November 27, 2017[,] pending further investigation.

2. The child was in the primary legal custody of the respondent mother . . . until her arrest. The respondent mother is currently incarcerated and does not have a current release date.

3. The Department has not substantiated any abuse or neglect by either parent to the minor child. The [Department] recommends that the guardianship be granted.

4. The guardian ad litem has conducted an investigation and recommends that the guardianship be granted and that [it] is in the best interests of the child.

5. There are no other filings before the Court.

6. It is in the best interests of the minor child to grant the petition [for] guardianship filed by [the Guardians].

7. It is in the best interests of the minor child to continue the respondent father’s visitation as decreed in the final parenting order.

The court additionally ordered that “[t]he [Guardians] are granted custody and guardianship of the minor child, K[.] E[.]” and “[t]he Respondent father shall exercise visitation as outlined in the prior final parenting order.”

However, noticeably absent from the circuit court’s order establishing the guardianship is any reference to the guardianship statute, i.e., West Virginia Code section 44-10-3; any findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the requisite statutory factors set forth in subsection (f) warranted the guardianship; or any explanation as to why Father did not receive priority or was determined to be unfit as required by subsection (h). Other than observing that Mother has been, and remains, incarcerated, the circuit court also did not identify what “immediate need” exists to require the appointment of the Guardians or explain that “a period of transition into the custody of a parent is needed” as set forth in West Virginia Code section 44-10-3(g).

Inc., 194 W. Va. 97, 106 n.5, 459 S.E.2d 374, 383 n.5 (1995) (“[I]t is clear that where a circuit court’s written order conflicts with its oral statement, the written order controls. Therefore, ‘we are left to decide this case within the parameters of the circuit court’s order.’” (quoting State v. White, 188 W. Va. 534, 536 n.2, 425 S.E.2d 210, 212 n.2 (1992))). See also Murrell B. v. Clarence R., ___ W. Va. ___, ___ n.43, 836 S.E.2d 9, 20 n.43 (2019) (noting that “the order of adoption is prime, and the circuit court’s oral statements, uttered before entry of the 2014 Order of Adoption, cannot add to or subtract from the final effect of that order” and that “[i]f there is a conflict between the circuit court’s oral statements during the June 2014 hearing and the 2014 Adoption Order, the Adoption Order controls”).

Pursuant to West Virginia Code section 44-10-3(g), “the duration of the temporary guardianship may not exceed six months,” although “[a] temporary guardianship may be extended beyond six months upon further order of the court finding continued need in the best interest of the minor.” Id. (emphasis added). As a temporary guardianship, then, the Guardians’ appointment to serve as K.E.’s guardian does not, as stated in subsection (g), continue for an indefinite period of time; rather, a temporary guardianship is limited to six months, subject to subsequent extension by the circuit court. Under these circumstances, when Father filed his motion to terminate the Guardianship in April 2018, he was not required to satisfy the high threshold of a “material change of circumstances” required by subsection (j). Rather, Father was required to show only that the justification for a temporary guardianship no longer exists by demonstrating either that no “immediate need exists” or no “period of transition into the custody of a parent is needed” to support the continuation of the temporary guardianship. See W. Va. Code § 44- 10-3(g).

require the continuation of the subject guardianship as well as to consider whether Father, who has superior rights to the custody of his child over the Guardians, is fit to have custody, and, if he is, whether such placement serves the child’s best interests. See W. Va. Code §§ 44-10-3(g), (j).

that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions. Syl. pt. ^[1], In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973).

This custodial preference accorded to a child’s fit parent prevails even if another person might provide a better home for the child and is defeated only if the child’s best interests dictate a different custodial placement is more suitable for the child. Therefore, “[w]hile courts always look to the best interests of the child in controversies concerning his or her custody, such custody should not be denied to a parent merely because some other person might possibly furnish the child a better home or better care.” Syl. pt. ^[3], Hammack v. Wise, 158 W. Va. 343, 211 S.E.2d 118. Again, though, the ultimate factor for determining to whom a child’s custody should be awarded is the best interests of the child subject to the guardianship proceedings. “Although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal . . . in all family law matters . . . must be the health and welfare of the children.” Syl. pt. ^[3], in part, In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). See also Syl. pt. 7, Matter of Brian D., 194 W. Va. 623, 461 S.E.2d 129 (1995) (“Cases involving children must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults’ rights, but also with a regard for the rights of the child(ren).”); Syl. pt. ^[4], Green v. Campbell, 35 W. Va. 698, 14 S.E. 212 (1891) (“But the court is in no case bound to deliver the child into the custody of any claimant, but may leave it in such custody as the welfare of the child at the time appears to require.”). Accordingly, on remand, the circuit court is directed to consider not only the guardianship statute that governs these proceedings, but also whether Father is fit to have custody of his child as well as the custodial arrangement dictated by K.E.’s best interests.