KOBES, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Frank Vanoy of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1 found that the armed career criminal It is undisputed that, at the time of Vanoy’s convictions, the Virginia drug schedules included some substances that the federal schedules did not. Vanoy argues that § 18.2-248 is indivisible and requires only a finding that the offense involved a substance listed on the overbroad Virginia drug schedules—instead of the substance’s identity. If this is correct, his two Virginia convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses and the armed career criminal enhancement does not apply.

We determine whether the statute of conviction is divisible by looking at the statute’s text and structure. See Ford, 888 F.3d at 930. The Iowa controlled substances statute in Ford contains the alternative elements of simulated, counterfeit, or controlled substances. Id. We noted that the statute’s structure shows that it is divisible “because different drug types and quantities carry different punishments” and the “nature and quantity of the substance at issue are therefore essential to the crime’s legal definition.” Id. We also relied on Iowa precedents confirming that the drug at issue is an element given in jury instructions. Id. at 930 n.8.

Virginia Code § 18.2-248 makes it unlawful to “possess with intent to manufacture, sell, give or distribute a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance.” Virginia defines a controlled substance as “a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through VI.” Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3401. The statute’s structure shows that different drug types and quantities have different punishments. Id. § 18.2-248. Like the Iowa statute in Ford, this Virginia statute is divisible.

Vanoy argues that Harbin v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), says otherwise. In that case, the Second Circuit held that a provision of New York’s controlled substances law was indivisible under the categorical approach. But that provision only criminalizes the sale of a controlled substance and does not have the Virginia statute’s alternative, imitation substance element. Id. at 64. Virginia courts also recognize that the New York statute does not match the elements of § 18.2-248. See Mason v. Commonwealth, 770 S.E.2d 224, 229–30 (Va. App. 2015).

Because the statute is divisible, we next ask whether Vanoy’s Virginia convictions involve the distribution of a substance listed on the federal drug schedules. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii); 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). Vanoy asserts that his Virginia convictions did not require a jury to find the drug’s identity. We disagree. When interpreting Virginia’s analogous, simple possession statute,4 Virginia courts explain that “the specific type of substance found in a defendant’s possession is an actus reus element the Commonwealth must prove.” Sierra v. Commonwealth, 722 S.E.2d 656, 660 (Va. App. 2012). The jury instructions also confirm that Virginia juries must find the identity of the drug and the relevant schedule to sustain a conviction under § 18-248-2. Instruction No. G22.300, Va. Mod. Jury Instructions-Criminal (2002). Vanoy’s certified convictions are for “possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.” As a result, his Virginia convictions are not broader than federal law and are serious drug offenses.

Finally, Vanoy’s claim that the Virginia statute has a broader mens rea requirement than federal law fails because the categorical approach does not require them to match. Shular, 140 S. Ct. at 785. It only requires that the elements of a state offense punish conduct involving a controlled substance. Id.; United States v. Boleyn, 929 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2019).

Vanoy’s sentence is affirmed.

______________________________