KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Cynthia Rollo-Carlson brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the government, alleging that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provided negligent psychiatric care that resulted in her son’s death. The district court1 dismissed her complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

never presented the VA with her authority to act as a trustee, as required by FTCA, and that such presentment is a jurisdictional prerequisite. The district court agreed and dismissed Rollo-Carlson’s complaint. Rollo-Carlson appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and applying de novo review, we affirm. See ABF Freight Sys. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review).

II.

The FTCA is a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity. Molzof ex rel. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992). It permits persons injured by federal employees to sue the United States for tort claims in federal district court. Id. The “extent of the United States’ liability under the FTCA is generally determined by reference to state law.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674.

Before bringing an FTCA claim in federal court, a party must administratively exhaust their remedies under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). As part of this administrative process, the party “shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.” Id. The presentment requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an FTCA action in federal court. Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 808 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

The FTCA does not specify what information must be included in a properly “presented” claim. Id. at 798. Instead, 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) provides the following clarification for the presentment requirement:

[A] claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal representative, [1] an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, [2] accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or death alleged to have occurred by reason of the[*~769–771] incident, and [3] the title or legal capacity of the person signing, and is accompanied by evidence of his authority to present a claim on behalf of the claimant as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian, or other representative.

28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (emphasis added).

Both parties agree that in this case Minnesota law governs whether a person has authority to present a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674; see also Mader 654 F.3d at 808; Goodman v. United States, 2 F.3d 291, 292 (8th Cir. 1993) (“In this FTCA case, we are, of course, bound to apply the law of the state in which the acts complained of occurred.”). The parties also agree that Minnesota’s wrongful-death statute requires a court-appointed trustee to bring a wrongful-death action. Minn. Stat. § 573.02; see also Regie de l’assurance Auto. du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85, 89–90 (Minn. 1987).

Rollo-Carlson concedes she was not the appointed trustee under Minnesota law and was only Jeremiah’s next-of-kin at the time she filed a claim with the VA. Nevertheless, she argues that she satisfied the presentment requirement.^[2] First, she argues that under Minnesota law, there is a difference between a “claim” and an “action.” And because the wrongful-death statute requires that a wrongful-death action—not claim—be filed by an appointed trustee, her status as next-of-kin at the time she filed the VA Claim satisfied Minnesota law. But we are unaware of any legal authority stating that Minnesota law contemplates a distinction between a “claim” and an “action” for purposes of wrongful death cases, and Rollo-Carlson provides none. Indeed, Minnesota courts use “claim” and “action” interchangeably when discussing[*~770–772] the wrongful-death statute. See e.g., Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 1999); Jensen, 399 N.W.2d at 89–90.

Second, Rollo-Carlson contends the VA had actual notice of her authority to bring a claim because it granted her a burial allowance; acknowledged her claim for insurance; responded to her requests for medical records; provided information regarding the circumstance surrounding Jeremiah’s death; received a death certificate listing Jeremiah as single and never married; and replied to her request for Jeremiah’s file. As a result, she argues, the VA knew she had the authority to act on behalf of Jeremiah. But Rollo-Carlson’s status as next-of-kin is not synonymous with her status as appointed trustee under Minnesota law.^[3] To the extent she argues that she is excused from her obligation to show she was the appointed trustee because the VA had evidence indicating she had authority to act on Jeremiah’s behalf in another capacity and in other contexts, the presentment requirement contains no such exception, and Rollo-Carlson provides no legal support for one. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a).

Third, she alleges that the government is precluded from arguing she failed to satisfy the presentment requirement because it did not raise the issue during the VA’s review. We disagree. Preclusion does not apply where, as here, a party must administratively exhaust her claim before filing suit in court. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110–11 (1991).

For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly dismissed Rollo-Carlson’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

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