In Re Placid Oil Co., Placid Bldg. & Serv. Co., & Paul A. Hope, as Tr. of the William Herbert Hunt Trust Est., 802 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
Search
In Re Placid Oil Co., Placid Bldg. & Serv. Co., & Paul A. Hope, as Tr. of the William Herbert Hunt Trust Est., 802 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
65 citation events (36 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: McCann v. Commc'ns Design Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Conn. 1991)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 786 Weighing circumstances for judicial recusal under statute23 citing cases“to adopt a rule requiring recusal in every case in which a judge owns stock of a company in the same industry as one of the parties to the case.”3 citing courts quote it
  • Dondero v. Jernigan, No. 24-10287 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025).unpublished
    We have held that “a petition for mandamus is the appropriate legal vehicle for challenging denial of a disqualification motion.” In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 11…
  • Dondero v. Jernigan, No. 24-10287, 2024 WL 4678879 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024).unpublished
    We have held that “a petition for mandamus is the appropriate legal vehicle for challenging denial of a disqualification motion.” In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 11…
  • Creech v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho, Boise, 119 F.4th 1114 (9th Cir. 2024).published
    Circuit Justice); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 642 (2d Cir. 1995); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Holley, 862 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1986)…
  • Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Kansas, No. 5:19-cv-04007 (D. Kan. Oct. 3, 2022). 2 cites
    Conn. 1991) (citing In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786-87 (1986)). 17 In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 , 1312 (2nd Cir. 1988). 18 In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d at 786-87 (1986) (citing In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d…
  • Dondero v. Jernigan, No. 3:21-cv-00879 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2022).
    United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Cameron Int’l Corp., 393 F. App’x 133, 134-35 (5th Cir. 2010).
  • Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 783 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2011).published
    (finding no basis for recusal where judge had large investment in a bank and judge’s rulings might have dramatic impact on banking industry as a whole)
  • Waters v. Armenian Genocide Museum & Mem'l, Inc., No. 2008-1254 (D.D.C. May 9, 2011).published
    (finding no basis for recusal where judge had large investment in a bank and judge’s rulings might have dramatic impact on banking industry as a whole)
  • In re Cameron Int'l Corp., 393 F. App'x 133 (5th Cir. 2010).unpublished
    In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.1981)).
  • In Re: Deepwater Horizon, No. 10-30631 (5th Cir. July 22, 2010).unpublished
    In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981)).
  • Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.R.I. 2007).published
    Co. of Alabama, Inc. v. S. Natural Gas Co., 996 F.2d 282, 283 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (“A remote, contingent, and speculative interest is not a financial interest within the meaning of the recusal statute ... nor does it create a situ…
Show 13 more citing cases
  • Stacy Allen Draper v. Clinton D. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004).published
    Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 996 F.2d 282, 283 (11th Cir.1993) (concluding that a “ ‘remote, contingent, and speculative interest is not a financial interest within the meaning of the recusal statute ... nor does it create a situation…
  • In Re: Kpers v., No. 95-4061 (8th Cir. June 11, 1996).published
    (rejecting argument that recusal is required when judge owns stock in nonparty bank and case before him may have impact on banking industry)
  • In Re Kansas Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353 (8th Cir. 1996).published
    (rejecting argument that recusal is required when judge owns stock in nonparty bank and case before him may have impact on banking industry)
  • Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1992).published
    In making this determination, “the party seeking the writ has. the burden of proving a clear and indisputable right to it.” In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir.1986).
  • Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1992).published
    In making this determination, "the party seeking the writ has the burden of proving a clear and indisputable right to it." In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir.1986).
  • Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.M. 1989).published
    For example, in In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir.1986), plaintiff brought suit against 23 banks.
  • Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 639 (E.D. La. 2006).published
    (holding that judge’s investment in a non-party bank did not require his recusal from a case with a different bank as a party, even though that case might have affected the banking industry)
  • Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998).published
    (holding that judge’s investment in a non-party bank did not require his recusal from a casé with a different bank as a party, even though that case might have affected the banking industry)
  • Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    See In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786-87 (5th Cir.1986).
  • Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).published 2 cites
    See In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786-87 (5th Cir.1986).
  • In Re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
    See, e.g., In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir.1986) (“The first ground for disqualification urged by Petitioners is Judge Sanders’ business dealings with counsel for one of the Banks.
  • Reichert v. State Ex Rel. Mcculloch, 2012 MT 111, 278 P.3d 455.published
  • Gas Utils. Co. of Alabama, Inc., Gas Utils. of Alabama, Inc. v. S. Nat. Gas Co., Alabama Gas Corp., 996 F.2d 282 (11th Cir. 1993).published
At page 787 Determining financial interest for recusal statute7 citing casesA remote, contingent, and speculative interest is not a financial interest within the meaning of the recusal statute ... nor does it create a situation in which a judge’s impartiality-might reasonably be questioned.1 citing court put it this way
  • McCann v. Commc'ns Design Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Conn. 1991).published 2 cites
    (A remote, contingent, and speculative interest is not a financial interest within the meaning of the recusal statute ... nor does it create a situation in which a judge’s impartiality-might reasonably be questioned.)
  • X Corp. v. Media Matters for Am., No. 4:23-cv-01175 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2024).
    To support this contention, Defendants allege that (1) Tesla’s share price dropped because Musk sold Tesla shares to purchase X; (2) Tesla shares fell in response to Musk’s attack on advertisers; and (3) analysts’ predictions that further…
  • Kennedy v. Schneider Elec., No. 2:12-cv-00122 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 7, 2019).
    Id. at 1543 (citing In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1986).
  • McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 942 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Tex. 1996).published
    (recusal not required although judge owned large investment in nonparty bank and although rulings in the present case were likely to have financial impact on all banks)
  • United States v. Paul Suren Mosesian, United States of Am. v. Lawrence Clay Rocker, 972 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1994).unpublished
    Id.; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 , 1313 (2d Cir.1988) (A "remote, contingent, or speculative interest" does not reasonably bring into question a judge's impartiality) (citing In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 787 (5…
  • Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988).published
    See In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir.), reh’g. denied 805 F.2d 1030 (1986).
  • In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988).published
    See In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir.), reh'g. denied 805 F.2d 1030 (1986).
q2 “remote, contingent, and speculative”1 citing case1 citing court quotes it
  • McCann v. Commc'ns Design Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Conn. 1991).published 2 cites
    See In re Plac *1544 id Oil Co., 802 F.2d at 787 (“A remote, contingent, and speculative interest is not a financial interest within the meaning of the recusal statute ... nor does it create a situation in which a judge’s impartiality-migh…
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re PLACID OIL COMPANY, Placid Building & Service Company, and Paul A. Hope, as Trustee of the William Herbert Hunt Trust Estate, Petitioners
86-1682.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Nov 10, 1986.
Published opinion
802 F.2d 783
Stephen F. Gordon, Edwin A. McCabe, George P. Field, McCabe & Gordon, P.C., Boston, Mass, and Ben L. Krage, Kasmir, Willingham & Krage, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants., Hugh M. Ray, Alfred H. Ebert, Andrews & Kurth, Houston, Tex., Charles R. Haworth, Andrews & Kurth, Dallas, Tex., for Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Daniel C. Stewart, Dallas, Tex., W. Ted Minisk, Jay J. Madrid, Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, Houston, Tex. and Peter Kilchenmann, Lynn Goldstein, Peter Kilchenmann, Chicago, Ill., for First Nat. Bank of Chicago., Robert M. Cohan, Lee M. Simpson, Frederick Bartlett Wulff, Cohan, Simpson, Cowlishaw, Aranza & Wulff, Dallas, Tex. and Robert L. Blank, Burton M. Freeman, New York City, for Bankers Trust Co., Freytag, Perry, LaForce, Rubinstein & Teofan, Vernon O. Teofan, Thomas B. Anderson, Jr., Dallas, Tex., Walter L. Stratton, Mitchell A. Karlan, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, New York City and Thomas W. Craddock, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Dallas, Tex., for Crocker Nat. Bank., Michael M. Baylson, John Horstmann, Duane, Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia, Pa., and Steven Gutman, New York City, and Mike Joplin, Strasburger & Price, Dallas, Tex., for European American Bank and Trust Co., Jess Hall, Jr., D. Mitchell McFarland, James W. Paulsen, Liddell, Sapp & Zivley, Houston, Tex. and Vera Bangs, Liddell, Sapp & Zivley, Dallas, Tex., for Texas Commerce Bank., W. Michael Byrd, Michael Lowenberg, Richard C. Levin, Maureen Armour, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Dallas, Tex., for First Nat. Bank of Houston., Charles Porter Storey, Storey, Armstrong, Steger & Martin, Dallas, Tex., and David A. Ranheim, Linda M. Freyer, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minn., for First Nat. Bank of St. Paul., Timothy McCormick, Jerry P. Jones, David R. McAtee, Thompson & Knight, Dallas, Tex., for Republicbank Dallas, N.A., W. Frank Carroll, Martha J. Hardwick, Stinson, Ag & Fizzell, Vincent S. Walkowiak, Fulbright & Jaworski, Dallas, Tex. and James P. Grove, Rex H. White, Jr., White & Grove, Austin, Tex. and James C. Slaughter, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Tex., Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Thomas A. Graves, James Pulis, Johnson & Swanson, Dallas, Tex., Daniel H. Williams, Phillips, Lytle, Hitehock, Blaine & Huber, Buffalo, N.Y., Paul B. Zuydhoek, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Terence M. Murphy, Patricia J. Villareal, James E. Coleman, Fletcher L. Yarborough, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Tex., Michael E. Niebruegge, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Houston, Tex., and Robert F. Finke, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., and Carla R. Voelker, Richardson, Tex., Ronald E. Cook, R.T. Nassberg, Mayer Day & Caldwell, Houston, Tex., for additional defendants., Ivan R. Irwin, Jr., A1 Conant, Jr., David M. Pruessner, Shank, Irwin & Conant, George W. Bramblett, Jr., Sharon N. Frey-tag, Haynes & Boone, Robert W. Jordan, Erin Y. Baker, Baker & Botts, Dallas, Tex. and James G. Ulmer, J. Michael Baldwin, Baker & Botts, Houston, Tex., for First Interstate Bank of Cal. and additional defendants., Edwin A. McCabe, Stephen F. Gordon, George P. Field, McCabe & Gordon, P.C., Boston, Mass., Ben L. Krage, Kasmir, Willingham & Krage, Dallas, Tex., for third party defendants., John M. Landis, William E. Brown, Barry W. Ashe, New Orleans, La., for Marine Midland Bank., Charles F. Vihon, Boston, Mass., for intervenor — Committee of Unsecured Creditors., David B. Eizenman, Moses & Singer, New York City, for Bankers Trust and additional defendants., Melvyn L. Cantor, John J. Kerr, Jr., Thomas C. Rice, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, New York City, for Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., Bracewell & Patterson, Kenneth R. Wynne, Houston, Tex., William Van Dercrealc, Robert H. MacKinnon, Mark P. Zimmett, Shearman & Sterling, New York City, for Citibank, N.A., James E. Babcock, Thomas H. Lee, James C. Kean, Dotson, Babcock & Scofield, Houston, Tex. and Henry L. Goodman, Andrew D. Gottfried, Zalkin, Rodin & Goodman, New York City, for Chemical Bank., Jim K. Choate, John P. Lilly, Dewey Hicks, Douglas Kearney, Brice & Mankoff, Dallas, Tex., for Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n and additional defendants., George W. Coombe, Jr., Winslow Christian, Frank G. Ker, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel, for Bank of America.
Reavley, Politz.
Cited by 40 opinions  |  Published
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Placid Oil Company, Placid Building and Service Company, and the William Herbert Hunt Trust Estate (whom we shall refer to collectively as Petitioners) petition this court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Barefoot Sanders to recuse himself[*786] from any further proceedings in related cases in which Petitioners are plaintiffs. We deny the writ.

Petitioners filed two related suits in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas against twenty-three banks (Banks) that have made loans to Petitioners. The complaints seek damages, declaratory relief, and reformation or rescission of credit agreements based on a number of alleged wrongful acts of the Banks, including unlawful and inequitable conduct, breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, and antitrust violations. The cases were assigned to Judge Sanders, who has in the short time since the cases were filed made several preliminary rulings. [1] Petitioners assert that Judge Sanders should be ordered to recuse himself from further proceedings because of business dealings he has had with counsel for one of the Banks and because of an alleged financial interest he has in the litigation. Judge Sanders denied Petitioners’ motions in this regard and Petitioners now seek a writ of mandamus.

This circuit has recognized that the question of recusal is reviewable on a petition for a writ of mandamus. See In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 927 (5th Cir.1984). However, the writ will not lie in the absence of exceptional circumstances, id., and the party seeking the writ has the burden of proving a clear and indisputable right to it. United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.1981). The issue of recusal requires a sensitive weighing of the circumstances in each case and is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge. City of Houston, 745 F.2d at 927.

The first ground for disqualification urged by Petitioners is Judge Sanders’ business dealings with counsel for one of the Banks. Since the time Petitioners filed their briefs with this court, however, the counsel in question has withdrawn from the case. Thus, any necessity for recusal on this ground — an issue on which we make no comment — has now been removed. Cf. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 581 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir.1978). Moreover, in light of the virtually nonexistent role played by the counsel in question in rulings made prior to the withdrawal, [2] we reject Petitioners’ argument that an “appearance of partiality,” cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982), has been established which survives counsel’s withdrawal. [3]

Petitioners also argue that recusal is required because Judge Sanders holds a large investment in a Texas bank that may be affected by rulings in this case. Petitioners assert that any rulings adverse to the Banks will have a dramatic impact on the entire banking industry and thus on Judge Sanders’ investment as well. Petitioners argue that this gives Judge Sanders a financial interest in the litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1982). We find no basis here for requiring recusal. We are unwilling to adopt a rule requiring recusal in every case in which a judge owns stock of a company in the same industry as one of the parties to the case, and Petitioners, by showing only an indirect and specu[*787] lative interest, have failed to sufficiently distinguish this case from that situation. A remote, contingent, and speculative interest is not a financial interest within the meaning of the recusal statute, cf. City of Houston, 745 F.2d at 931, nor does it create a situation in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

The writ of mandamus is DENIED.

1

. These rulings are discussed in an opinion dealing with an earlier appeal in this case. See Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir.1986).

2

. In an uncontroverted affidavit, the counsel in question states that he and his firm acted as local counsel for one of the out-of-state defendants. He was one of approximately one hundred lawyers acting for the Banks and he attended, as an observer, only one hearing before Judge Sanders. The bank he represented held only one-half of one percent of the total indebtedness owed to the Banks.

3

. Judge Sanders’ business dealings with the counsel in question arise out of his position on the board of directors of a small corporation, a position also held by the counsel. Petitioners appear to argue, in addition to their contention that the business dealings require recusal, that Judge Sanders' position as director of the corporation, standing alone, requires recusal because it is in apparent violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It is undisputed, however, that the corporation is not a party and holds no interest whatsoever in this litigation. Thus, Judge Sanders' directorship, standing alone, does not raise any appearance of partiality or constitute a financial interest and is not grounds for recusal.