IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
══════════ No. 19-0959 ══════════
IN THE INTEREST OF G.X.H., JR. AND B.X.H., CHILDREN
══════════════════════════════════════════════════ ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS ══════════════════════════════════════════════════
JUSTICE GUZMAN, joined by JUSTICE BUSBY, concurring.
The unique bond between parent and child is a blessing that is cherished by parents and essential to the child’s long-term well-being and development. The parent-child relationship is so important and so precious that the highest constitutional protection is afforded to the family decision-making process. Indeed, the right of parents to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of their children has been recognized as fundamental, foundational, and formative. [1] The ties that bind parent to child can be severed, strained, or broken but they are nonetheless[*~289–295] dismissal through a timely filed motion and, failing that, any complaint about noncompliance with the dismissal deadline was waived. [6] As presently enacted, however, the statute makes dismissal automatic, and divests the trial court of jurisdiction, if the court fails to make the findings required to extend the dismissal deadline. [7] This stricter standard illustrates the importance the Legislature has placed on satisfaction of the extension criteria and findings to that effect.
The legislative history to the enacting amendment further bolsters the significance the Legislature placed on affirmative findings as a predicate to extending the deadline. The bill analysis for the enrolled legislation states the statutory changes were intended to “improve[] accountability throughout the Child Protective System (CPS) system[.]” 8 Section 263.401 holds the Department accountable by requiring the trial court to determine whether “extraordinary circumstances” warrant the Department’s continued conservatorship of a child after the automatic dismissal date. This provision helps ensure that stability is achieved for both parent and child as expeditiously as possible and that neither is separated from the other longer than reasonably necessary to resolve the charges leading to the child’s placement in the Department’s custody.
Our precedent also supports the solemnity of a trial court’s duty to determine whether the Department’s continued custody of a child is both necessary and in the child’s best interest. Our opinion in In re Department of Family & Protective Services holds that a trial court’s order purporting to extend the automatic dismissal date without the requisite Section 263.401(b) findings[*~295–301] is insufficient to extend the dismissal deadline. 9 Although In re Department was interpreting the prior version of Section 263.401, the Court’s reaffirmation of this decision today demonstrates its continued application with respect to the current version of the statute.
Despite the vital importance of the statutorily mandated findings, the Legislature chose not to require the trial court to reduce those findings to writing, as is the Legislature’s prerogative for whatever policy reasons it finds compelling. Perhaps today’s ruling is not the outcome the Legislature envisioned, but as the Court’s statutory construction analysis illustrates, the outcome is within statutory bounds. With these additional thoughts, I join the Court’s opinion.
____________________________________ Eva M. Guzman Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: April 30, 2021
9 273 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex. 2009).