NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BARBARA COLLINGS, No. 20-35040

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:19-cv-05024-EFS v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 5, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: BOGGS,*** TASHIMA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Barbara Collings appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. benefits under the Social Security Act. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

We review the district court’s decision de novo and reverse only if the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) “decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). The substantial-evidence standard is deferential. See id. at 1111 (“[W]hen the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). However, “[w]e review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).

clear and convincing reasons.” See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678–79, 682 (9th Cir. 2017).

Here, the ALJ offered only a generic statement that Collings’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” In doing so, the ALJ erred because that boilerplate statement was not a sufficiently “clear and convincing” reason to discount Collings’s testimony. See id. at 678–79, 682; Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that an ALJ “must specify what testimony is not credible and identify the evidence that undermines the claimant’s complaints”). The Commissioner now offers several reasons to discount Collings’s testimony, including Collings’s purported failure to follow through with certain recommended treatments and Collings’s apparent improvement with medication. But because the ALJ did not rely on these reasons for discounting Collings’s symptom testimony, we cannot affirm the ALJ’s decision on these grounds. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010.

physician’s specialty, supportability of the opinion, and consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole. Id. Generally, a treating physician’s medical opinion is entitled to greater weight than a non-treating physician’s medical opinion. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

In this case, the ALJ’s decision provided sufficient “specific and legitimate” reasons for discounting Dr. Smith’s opinion that Collings could not perform any type of work, which conflicted with Dr. Thompson’s opinion that Collings could perform light work. The ALJ pointed out that Dr. Smith’s opinion was brief and conclusory; the check-box form Dr. Smith filled out does not explain Dr. Smith’s opinion beyond a diagnosis of “chronic back pain.” See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that an ALJ “may permissibly reject check-off reports that do not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions”) (quoting Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111). In addition, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Smith’s opinion was inconsistent with the medical record. This conclusion is supported by record evidence, including treatment notes indicating that Collings had only a mildly impaired gait and moderate decrease in her range of motion but was “doing well” after surgery, and by Dr. Thompson’s opinion that Collings could sit and walk up to four hours in an eight-hour workday. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957[*~731–734] (9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”). Therefore, the ALJ offered sufficient “specific and legitimate reasons” for discounting Dr. Smith’s brief opinion. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012.

Contrary to Collings’s contention, there is no case law requiring the ALJ to specifically discuss each of the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) when assigning weight to a medical opinion—the regulation simply states that the ALJ must “consider” these factors. From the discussion within the ALJ’s decision, it appears that the ALJ did consider several of the relevant factors—including the treating relationship, supportability of the opinion by the record evidence, and consistency of the opinion with the record—in assigning Dr. Smith’s opinion little weight. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Smith’s opinion.

evidence he relied on and responded to questions from Collings’s counsel about his conclusions. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in affording great weight to Dr. Thompson’s opinion, since Dr. Thompson explained the basis for this opinion at length.^[1] See id.