No citing cases on record.
v.
State of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent.
Eastern District
DIVISION TWO
Edward Walker (Appellant) appeals the motion court’s denial without an evidentiary hearing of his “Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Judgment and Sentence” filed pursuant to Rule 29.15. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
A jury convicted Appellant of murder in the second degree under § 565.021 RSMo. and armed criminal action under § 571.015 RSMo. on April 5, 2013.1 On October 4, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 30 years of imprisonment for murder second degree and 15 years of imprisonment for armed criminal action, both sentences to be served consecutively. On direct[*~331–333] criminal action violated his constitutional right protecting against double jeopardy. Moreover, Appellant’s post-conviction motion was erroneously denied because the court imposed consecutive sentences in retaliation for Appellant’s successful appeal which violates his due process and equal protection rights, he contends. Further, Appellant claims his post-conviction motion was timely filed and thus should not have been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
Standard of Review
This court’s review of a Rule 29.15 motion denial is “limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 29.15(k); see also Hopkins v. State, 519 S.W.3d 433, 435 (Mo. banc 2017). The motion court’s findings are presumptively correct. Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016). The court’s findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if a review of the entire record leaves this court with the “definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Mason v. State, 552 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).
Discussion
Appellant’s Post-Conviction Motion was Untimely
Appellant argues that because his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief was filed within 180 days of the date of his delivery to the department of corrections, his motion is timely. We disagree.
Appellant incorrectly relies on a previous version of Rule 29.15(b). The current version of the rule applicable to this matter specifies that in “all proceedings wherein sentence is pronounced on or after January 1, 2018,” a movant must file their motion “within 180 days of the date the sentenced is entered.” Rule 29.15(m); Rule 29.15(b).
[*~332–334]The time limits of Rule 29.15 are constitutional, mandatory and represent a strict guideline for filing post-conviction motions. Mitchell v. State, 386 S.W.3d 198, 200 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012); Burgin v. State, 969 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998). According to the rule, “[f]ailure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule 29.15 shall constitute a complete waiver of any right to proceed under this Rule 29.15 and a complete waiver of any claim that could be raised in a motion filed pursuant to this Rule 29.15.” Rule 29.15(b).
Here, Appellant’s post-conviction motion is untimely on its face. Following remand and pursuant to the agreement crafted by the parties, the trial court sentenced Appellant on June 4, 2019. Per the motion’s certificate of service, Appellant’s motion was filed 183 days later on December 4, 2019.4 Accordingly, Appellant waived the substantive claims asserted in his motion.
Moreover, Appellant does not allege his motion is subject to an applicable exception nor does he claim a misfiling of his motion on the part of the court. The abandonment doctrine which excuses the untimely filing of amended motions by appointed counsel is inapplicable here. See Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Mo. banc 2014). This is because the present case involves the untimely filing of an initial motion. As explained by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Price, “the abandonment doctrine was created to excuse the untimely filing of amended motions by appointed counsel under Rule 29.15(e)” and “does not apply to untimely initial motions.” Id. (emphasis in original). Because Appellant’s initial motion was untimely and not subject to any applicable exceptions, Appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the court properly dismissed his motion.5