Charles J. Oltarzewski, Jr. v. Marcia Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
Charles J. Oltarzewski, Jr. v. Marcia Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

Verbal harassment or abuse generally does not constitute a constitutional deprivation under section 1983.

An inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a correctional supervisor retaliated against him by increasing his custody status, denied him access to a law library, and used vulgar language. The prisoner provided affidavits from other inmates to dispute the supervisor's claim that she never used abusive language, but failed to provide specific facts to contradict the supervisor's assertions regarding library access and retaliation. Because the prisoner failed to establish genuine issues of material fact regarding his access to the courts, and because verbal harassment or abuse generally does not constitute a constitutional deprivation under § 1983, the court granted summary judgment for the supervisor.

479 citation events (368 in the last 25 years) across 43 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Cited for
At page 139 Denying summary judgment for alleged vulgar language343 citing cases[v]erbal harassment or abuse . . . [alone] is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 198320 citing courts put it this way · 207 listed here · 2 cautionary
  • Rubley, No. 1:25-cv-01456 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2025). Cited "but see"
    (holding that verbal harassment and abuse are not recoverable under § 1983)
  • Chaffin 834697 v. Naeyaert, No. 2:24-cv-00195 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2024). Cited "but see"
    (holding that verbal harassment and abuse are not recoverable under § 1983)
  • Ruiz, No. 3:26-cv-03624 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2026).
    (Verbal 27 harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 28 U.S.C. § 1983 .)
  • Guzman, No. 3:25-cv-02007 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2026).
    (Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional 4 deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .)
  • Thompson, No. 3:25-cv-01224 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2025).
    (‘Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional 5 deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .’)
  • Shallowhorn v. Hopper, No. 3:25-cv-00222 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2025).
    (Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not 16 sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .)
  • Lopez v. Hernandez, No. 3:23-cv-01237 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2023).
    ([V]ulgar language” 22 and “[v]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation 23 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .)
  • Kriege v. HCCC Hawaii Cmty. Corr. Ctr., No. 1:19-cv-00434 (D. Haw. Oct. 15, 2021).
    (verbal harassment or abuse … is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .)
  • Fernandez v. Borough of Roseland, No. 2:20-cv-00103, 2021 WL 3930718 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2021).
    (Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .)
  • McCarty v. Egnor, No. 2:21-cv-00473 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2021).
    (‘[v]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not 10 sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983’)
Show 197 more citing cases
At page 138 Reviewing summary judgment standard and evidence29 citing cases“although prison officials may not obstruct a prisoner's access to the courts by unreasonably blocking his access to a law library, prison officials may place reasonable limitations on library access in the interest of the secure and orderly operation of the institution.”4 citing courts quote it · 28 listed here
Show 18 more citing cases
At page 137 Counselor's threats not actionable under section 19834 citing casesallegations that correctional counselor told plaintiff he would transfer him to a higher custody status unit if he tried to go to the law library, and he would be sorry if he filed a class action suit, were not actionable under § 19831 citing court put it this way
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles J. OLTARZEWSKI, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Marcia RUGGIERO, Defendant-Appellee
86-2605.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 14, 1987.
Published opinion
830 F.2d 136
1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 13782
Charles J. Oltarzewski, Jr., pro per., Thomas Prose, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellee.
Boochever, Holland, Poole.
Cited by 404 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 79%
Citer courts: D. Arizona (1)
HOLLAND, District Judge:

Oltarzewski, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ruggiero, the correctional programs supervisor at the Southern Arizona Corrections Release Center (SACRC).

Oltarzewski brought the underlying action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Ruggiero retaliated against his plan for a class action suit by transferring him to a higher custody status. Oltarzewski further alleged that Ruggiero used excessively vulgar language, that Ruggiero had correctional officers fabricate charges against him, and that Ruggiero demonstrated great bias in her acts towards him. Oltarzewski also claimed that Ruggiero violated prison policy and deprived him of access to the courts and access to a law library.

FACTS

Oltarzewski was transferred to the SACRC on April 9,1986, pending his scheduled release from prison on June 24, 1986. According to Oltarzewski, shortly after his arrival he was told by his correctional counselor that Ruggiero would transfer Oltarzewski to a higher custody status unit if Oltarzewski tried to go to the law library. Oltarzewski claims that Ruggiero later told him that if he had any plans on filing a class action against the SACRC that he would be sorry he did. He further claims that Ruggiero, upon discovering that Oltarzewski was in the process of preparing a class action against the SACRC and Ruggiero, encouraged members of her staff to target him with bogus disciplinary charges in an effort to move him to a higher custody unit and prevent him from filing any legal action against her or the SACRC. Finally, Oltarzewski asserts that his request for a pass to go to the law library was denied, and that he was told the only way for him to have the proper amount of time in the law library or access to the courts would be to agree to go to a higher custody status.

According to Ruggiero, Oltarzewski was not denied the right to go to a law library, nor was he denied the right to file lawsuits during his stay at the SACRC. Ruggiero stated in her affidavit that she never threatened Oltarzewski and that Oltarzewski was not threatened at any time with high custody to suppress his wish to go to[*138] a law library. Ruggiero also stated that Oltarzewski advised members of the SACRC staff that he had no pending legal work and no need to go to the law library. She further stated that Oltarzewski was advised that if he did desire to go to the law library he would have to be escorted because of his inmate status.

According to Ruggiero’s affidavit, Oltarzewski continually aggravated the staff by threatening them with lawsuits if they did not comply with his demands. Ruggiero’s affidavit sets forth three violations of institutional rules committed by Oltarzewski during his stay at the SACRC. Oltarzewski was found guilty of all three violations. As a result of his discipline violations, Oltarzewski was subsequently moved from the SACRC and placed in medium custody status.

Oltarzewski has not controverted by affidavit any of the facts set forth in Ruggiero’s affidavit. However, Ruggiero made an additional statement in her affidavit that while Oltarzewski was at the SACRC she at no time used abusive language. Oltarzewski responded with three affidavits from SACRC inmates who claimed that Ruggiero used vulgar language when speaking to them.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c).

The district court’s decision is reviewed de novo to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law in ruling on the motion. Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir.1986).

The reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir.1985).

The district court’s grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if, viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R.F.D. Publications, Inc. v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 749 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th Cir.1984).

Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d at 787.

DISCUSSION

Prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts which includes adequate access to a law library. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Although prison officials may not obstruct a prisoner’s access to the courts by unreasonably blocking his access to a law library, prison officials may place reasonable limitations on library access in the interest of the secure and orderly operation of the institution. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-48, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877-79, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

In the present case, Oltarzewski has not contradicted the facts set forth in Ruggiero’s affidavit by specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Ruggiero stated in her affidavit that Oltarzewski was not denied the right to file a lawsuit nor was he denied the use of a law library or threatened or harassed in any way. 01-tarzewski’s affidavits merely challenge Ruggiero’s unrelated assertion that she did not use vulgar language while Oltarzewski was at the SACRC. Oltarzewski now attempts to argue that he can prove that Ruggiero’s entire affidavit was perjured if he is allowed to present a long list of witnesses at trial. This allegation, however, is insufficient to prevent a summary judgment under Rule 56.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits[*139] or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

Since Oltarzewski failed to set forth specific facts to support his allegations, the district court was correct in concluding that there were no unreasonable restraints placed upon Oltarzewski’s right to access to the courts.

The district court was also correct in denying Oltarzewski’s claim alleging that Ruggiero violated his civil rights by using vulgar language. As stated by the court in Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825 (10th Cir.1979), “[vjerbal harassment or abuse ... is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 827. Accord, Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir.1985); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 998, 104 S.Ct. 499, 78 L.Ed.2d 691 (1983). See also Ellingburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir.1975) (holding that damages for defamation, allegedly incurred when defendant called plaintiff by an obscene name, are not recoverable under § 1983). In short, the alleged vulgarity does not establish a genuine issue as to any material fact.

Oltarzewski’s remaining allegation that he was denied the right to a trial by jury is without merit. Since Oltarzewski’s affidavits in response to Ruggiero’s motion for summary judgment failed to contravene the material facts established by Ruggiero in her affidavit, there was no issue as to any material fact to be considered by a fact-finder — a jury.

CONCLUSION

The district court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.