Robert Merrick v. The United States, 846 F.2d 725 (Fed. Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Robert Merrick v. The United States, 846 F.2d 725 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
110 citation events (86 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tindall v. United States, No. 21-2200 (Fed. Cl. May 31, 2026)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#5 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1 cited 1× in this case · 55 total citations of statute
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 726 Determining contract formation in IRS reward programs34 citing cases“the united states cannot be contractually bound merely by invoking the cited statute and regulation.”7 citing courts quote it
  • Tindall v. United States, No. 21-2200 (Fed. Cl. May 31, 2026).published 3 cites
    (an enforceable contract exists when the parties fix the award amount)
  • Tindall v. United States, No. 23-1139 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2023).unpublished 2 cites
    (An enforceable contract will arise . . . after the informant and the government negotiate and fix a specific amount as the reward.)
  • Abraham v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 178 (Fed. Cl. 2008).published 8 cites
    ([A] contractual claim against the Government will arise ... only after the informant and the government negotiate and fix a specific amount as the reward.)
  • McCrory v. United States, No. 24-1221 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 26, 2024).published
    The Court of Federal Claims has held that “[s]ection 7623(a) and its implementing regulations at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1 , et seq., are discretionary and not money-mandating.” Doe v. United States, 153 Fed. Cl. 629 , 636 (2021) (Roumel, J.)…
  • Doe v. United States, No. 19-720 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 30, 2021).published 3 cites
    Cir. 2009) (quoting Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.
  • Carter v. United States, No. 17-587 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 16, 2021).unpublished
    (assuming jurisdiction and determining that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief where the regulation provided that the agency “may approve such reward as [it] deems suitable” and the parties negotiated and fixed the…)
  • Meidinger v. United States, 989 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021).published
    If it is the latter, as it appears more clearly to be, he has failed to state a claim for the reasons set out in Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
  • Meidinger v. United States, No. 19-1521 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 28, 2020).published
    Cir. 1987) ("[A] court may not ... take a liberal view of ... jurisdictional requirement[ s] and set a different rule for prose litigants only."). 4 as the reward." 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.
  • Xp Vehs., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 770 (Fed. Cl. 2015).published
    Id. at 489 (citing Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988)).
  • Goldings v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 470 (Fed. Cl. 2011).published 3 cites
    The IRS reward cases relied on by defendant include decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, notably Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1308 (Fed.Cir.1999) and Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726…
Show 24 more citing cases
  • Colman v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 633 (Fed. Cl. 2011).published
    Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009).published 5 cites
    We have stated that "[t]hese authorities give the IRS broad discretion to decide whether to make an award or how much to grant." Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Dacosta v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 549 (Fed. Cl. 2008).published
    (The United States cannot be contractually bound merely by invoking [section § 7623] and [implementing regulations]____An enforceable contract will arise under these authorities only after the informant and the governme…)
  • Conner v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 86 (Fed. Cl. 2007).published
    In Merrick v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that “the United States cannot be contractually bound merely by invoking the cited statute and regulation.” Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir. 1988).
  • Gurley v. King, 183 S.W.3d 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).published
    Merrick v. United States, *42 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 34(2) (1979); Joseph M.
  • Lion Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005).published
    Cir.2002); Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citing Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 , 27 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2490 , 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977)).
  • Conway v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 572 (Fed. Cl. 2003).published
    An enforceable contract will arise under these authorities only after the informant and the government negotiate and fix a specific amount as the reward.” Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir. 1988) (citing Lagermeier v. Un…
  • Bissell v. United States, 41 F. App'x 414 (Fed. Cir. 2002).unpublished
    Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Destefano v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 291 (Fed. Cl. 2002).published 2 cites
    Moreover, “[t]he United States cannot be contractually bound merely by invoking the cited statute and regulation.” Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citing Saracena, 206 Ct.Cl. at 96 , 508 F.2d at 1336 ). 2 The ap…
  • Baker v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 483 (Fed. Cl. 2001).published 2 cites
    Generally, however, “[t]he United States cannot be contractually bound merely by invoking the cited statute and regulation.” Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Chandler v. United States, 7 F. App'x 957 (Fed. Cir. 2001).unpublished
    Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Confidential Informant v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 1 (Fed. Cl. 2000).published
    Reg. § 301.7623-1 (a) (1987) ].” Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Krug v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96 (Fed. Cl. 1998).published
    Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir. 1988).
  • Doe v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 377 (Fed. Cl. 1997).published
    Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir. 1988). “[A]bsent special negotiations between the IRS and the person seeking an award, ... there is no contractual obligation to make a definite award.” Lagermeier v. United States, 214…
  • Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng'g Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1020 (D.N.J. 1995).published
    Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 34(2) (1979); Joseph M.
  • Hannon v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 142 (Fed. Cl. 1993).published
    In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must take all “well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 , 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2943 , 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); Merri…
  • Thomas v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 749 (Ct. Cl. 1991).published
    Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Cooley v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 549 (Fed. Cl. 2007).published
    (the I.R.S. “fixed the amount of the reward [for the informant] ... by establishing [through a publication] how the IRS would calculate it)
  • APPALACHIAN Reg'l HEALTHCARE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant, 999 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).published
    See Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988); Featheringill v. United States, 217 Ct.Cl. 24, 26 , 1978 WL 5755 (1978).
  • Lea v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00044 (Fed. Cl. May 19, 2014).unpublished
    Cl. 483, 489 (2001); see also Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.
  • Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Comm'r, 137 T.C. 183 (Tax Ct. 2011).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Merrick v. United States , 846 F.2d 725 , 726 (Fed.
  • Anderson v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 199 (Fed. Cl. 2006).published
    See, e.g., Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988); see also Grav v. United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 390, 393 , 1988 WL 18981 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1305 (Fed.Cir.1989).
  • Gregory C. Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999).published
    See, e.g., Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed.Cir.1988).
  • Ferguson v. Centura Health Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Colo. 2004).published
At page 725 BISSELL, Circuit Judge. Robert Merrick appeals the judgment of the United States Claims Court, No. 654-86T (July 20, 1987), dismissing his complaint. We…1 citing caseopening of page *725 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Stack v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 634 (Ct. Cl. 1992).published
    Later, an acting district director orally “informed Merrick that [he] ... would receive a reward ... and that the reward would be calculated under 111 of IRS Publication No. 733 (July 1980).” 846 F.2d at 725.
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert MERRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
the UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee
87-1620.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Apr 27, 1988.
Published opinion
846 F.2d 725
1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5443
1988 WL 37893
Eric M. Schmitz, Armstrong, Teasdale, Kramer, Vaughan & Schlafly, St. Louis, Mo., argued for plaintiff-appellant., Regina S. Moriarty, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued for defendantappellee. With her on the brief were William S. Rose, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Allen and Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Washington, D.C.
Bissell, Archer, Mayer.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 60%
Citer courts: Federal Claims (1)
BISSELL, Circuit Judge.

Robert Merrick appeals the judgment of the United States Claims Court, No. 654-86T (July 20, 1987), dismissing his complaint. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

In June 1982, Merrick provided the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with information otherwise unknown to the agency regarding an illegal tax shelter. This information indicated the identities of approximately 1,600 persons who had invested in this shelter. As a result, the IRS recovered over $10 million.

In February 1984, the Acting District Director for the Los Angeles, California area office informed Merrick that Merrick would receive a reward for providing the information, and that the reward would be calculated under ¶ 1 of IRS Publication No. 733 (July 1980). Under that paragraph,[*726] Merrick would obtain for each investor 10% of the first $75,000 recovered, 5% of the next $25,000 recovered, and 1% of the any additional recovery with the total reward for each investor not to exceed $50,000.

The IRS paid Merrick a reward of approximately $31,000. However, because the IRS determined that the identified investors were “related,” the IRS notified Merrick that his total reward could not exceed $50,000. Merrick made a demand on the IRS for an additional reward, which the IRS rejected. Merrick thereafter filed suit in the Claims Court. In a bench ruling on June 16, 1987, the Claims Court dismissed Merrick’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Merrick v. United States, No. 654-86T (Cl.Ct. June 16, 1987). Merrick subsequently appealed.

ISSUE

Whether Merrick’s complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a monetary claim against the United States.

DECISION

In 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (1982), Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury “to pay such sums ... as he may deem necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws....” The implementing regulations state that a “district director may approve such reward as he deems suitable....” 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1(a) (1987). These authorities give the IRS broad discretion to decide whether to make an award or how much to grant. Saracena v. United States, 508 F.2d 1333, 1336, 206 Ct.Cl. 90 (1975).

The United States cannot be contractually bound merely by invoking the cited statute and regulation. Id. An enforceable contract will arise under these authorities only after the informant and the government negotiate and fix a specific amount as the reward. Lagermeier v. United States, 566 F.2d 1188, 214 Ct.Cl. 758, 760 (1977); Gordon v. United States, 36 F.Supp. 639, 640, 92 Ct.Cl. 499 (1941); Briggs v. United States, 15 Ct.Cl. 48, 50, 54 (1879).

In this case, Merrick’s complaint alleges that an Acting District Director fixed the amount of the reward in February 1984 by establishing how the IRS would calculate it. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must assume the facts alleged in the complaint are true. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 2492 n. 2, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The facts alleged in Merrick’s complaint are sufficient to state that the IRS fixed the amount of the reward. Therefore, these facts are sufficient to state a contract claim against the United States.

The government maintains that no contract could have arisen in this case. It asserts that because Merrick supplied information before the District Director made his alleged promise, Merrick’s conduct was merely past consideration that could not support an enforceable agreement. Nonetheless, our precedents establish that the subject statute and regulation amount to an indefinite reward offer that an informant may respond to by his conduct. See Lagermeier, 214 Ct.Cl. at 760, 566 F.2d 1188 (quoting Gordon, 36 F.Supp. at 640). Because, however, the obstacle of indefiniteness may be removed by the subsequent conduct of the parties, an enforceable contract arises when the parties fix the reward amount. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34 comment c (1981); 1 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 49 (3d ed. 1957). They have done so here. The issue of past consideration, therefore, never arises and is no bar to our holding in this case.

Merrick further contends that after the IRS exercised its discretion in deciding to pay Merrick a reward, Publication 733 sufficiently defines the reward’s amount to enable him to bring a contract claim on that basis. See Lagermeier, 214 Ct.Cl. at 760-61, 566 F.2d 1188. We need not, and do not, reach that question.

[*727] COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Claims Court, and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.