green
Positive treatment
Issue: complex factorsDC ↗
Issue: Maryland ruleDC ↗
Quoted verbatim 4×
62.3 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case ·
…because the alj did not explain her reasoning in arriving at a disability award of 7, we are unable to meaningfully review the decision to determine whether it is based on substantial evidence, applying proper legal principles.
⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2018–2021 ·
…the determination of disability is not an exact science,
⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2017–2018 ·
…the mere existence of substantial evidence contrary to the agency's findings does not allow this court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2012 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2012
2019
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Abebe v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.
how the alj determined that the disability award should be 7-and not, for example, 1, 10 or 30-is a complete mystery, however.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Jacqueline Dent v. DOES & Providence Hospital Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs.
(9×)
also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
recognizing that in making a legal determination of disability, the alj comes to a conclusion based on a complex of factors, taking into account physical impairment and potential for wage loss, and the application of judgment based on logic, experience and even prediction.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Katarina Straughn v. DOES / WMATA (previously released on 12/19/2017 as an MOJ)
the mere existence of substantial evidence contrary to the agency's findings does not allow this court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Straughn v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
the mere existence of substantial evidence contrary to the agency's findings does not allow this court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alston v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Services
While wage loss is not the sole determinant of a schedule award under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an ALJ’s weighing of relevant evidence includes “evidence of post-injury wages, compared with pre-injury wages . . . .” Id. at 903 (citing Jones, 41 A.3d at 1224).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
District of Columbia Public Schools v. District of Columbia Department of Employee Services
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Jones, 41 A.3d at 1223.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Solomon Abebe v. DOES / US Security Assocs.
(2×)
Jones, 41 A.3d at 1226 (―How the ALJ determined that the disability award should be 7%—and not, for example, 1%, 10% or 30%—is a complete mystery, however.‖); Bowles, 121 A.3d at 1269–70 (―How the ALJ reached this conclusion is a mystery; this court cannot discern which values were assigned to each factor that add up to 10%.‖). 7 The holding of these cases was that ALJs must explain their reasoning in arriving at disability awards.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Jacqueline Dent v. DOES/Providence Hospital Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.
(7×)
also: Cited "see"
(Carolyn) Jones, 41 A.3d at 1221.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jones v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The relevant case law includes the following reference in (Carolyn) Jones, supra, 41 A.3d at 1224 ("[I]n making a legal determination of disability, the ALJ comes to a conclusion based on a complex of factors, taking into account physical impairment and potential for wage loss, and the application of judgment based on logic, experience and even ‘prediction,’ and considering any disability determination by the ALJ, once made .... ”).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
M.C. DEAN, INC. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, & ANTHONY LAWSON, Intervenor
(5×)
For the left am, the compensation order includes two paragraphs explaining the personal, social, and occupational limitations resulting from the disability before assigning an additional “5 per cent permanent partial disability for the impact the work injury has caused impacting upon [Mr. Lawson’s] activities in these areas for a total 30 per cent permanent partial disability of the -left upper extremity.” The ALJ’s omission of the additional findings regarding the right upper extremity award prevents meaningful review of the decision. “[A] reviewing court ... must know the reasons t…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Clement v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219, 1221 (D.C.2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vernice Bowles v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
(2×)
Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219, 1221 (D.C.2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
D.C. Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc. v. District of Columbia Department of Insurance, Securities, & Banking
However, as we have recently emphasized, without sufficient findings and explanation from the agency, “we are unable to affirm ... that the [agency’s] determination flowed rationally from the factual findings, and that the [agency] in fact applied the law taking into account the entirety of the record.” Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219, 1226 (D.C.2012).
cited
Cited "see"
Rocha-Guzmán v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
See Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219 , 1221 (D.C. 2012).
cited
Cited "see"
Rocha-Guzmán v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
See Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219 , 1221 (D.C. 2012).
cited
Cited "see"
Brown-Carson v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
See Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219 , 1221 (D.C. 2012). .
discussed
Cited "see"
Tenants of 710 Jefferson Street, NW v. District of Columbia Housing Commission and Steven Loney
(2×)
See Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219 , 1225 (D.C. 2012) (“Discretion there may be, but methodized by analogy, disciplined by system . . . .
examined
Cited "see"
Reyes v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See (Carolyn) Jones, supra, 41 A.3d 1219, 1226 (reversing CRB’s order affirming ALJ’s determination where ALJ’s conclusions did not flow rationally from the facts and where the ALJ did not take into account “the entirety of the record”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re N.R. N.L.R., In re M.R. N.L.R., In re I.R. N.L.R., In re Petition of A.O.T. N.L.R.
Nos. 11-FS-1161, 11-FS-1162, 11-FS-1163, 11-FS-1164, 11-FS-1165, 11-FS-1166.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Feb 29, 2012.
Blackburne, Easterly, Oberly, Rigsby.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Citer courts: District of Columbia Court of … (3)
ORDER
PER CURIAM.In In re A.O.T., 10 A.3d 160 (D.C.2010), a division of this court issued an opinion in which it “vacated the judgment [terminating appellant’s parental rights and granting A.O.T.’s petition to adopt appellant’s children] and remand[ed] the cases for a new trial before an associate judge of the Family Court.” Id. at 167. This court’s mandate issued on March 10, 2011. Appellant moved to enforce the mandate on July 20, 2011; no opposition was filed. On August 9, 2011, the presiding judge of the Family Court denied the motion on the ground that it was moot in light of an intervening rule change by the Superior Court. This appeal followed.
Our unambiguous mandate was and continues to be binding on the Family Court. See Lenkin Co. Mgmt., Inc. v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm’n, 677 A.2d 46 (D.C.1996). In the interest of providing appellant with a new trial as expeditiously as possible and in the interest of enforcing the mandate of the court previously issued in this case, it is
ORDERED that a new trial before an associate judge of the Family Court be scheduled forthwith. An opinion will follow.