Maryland rule in District of Columbia

2017Applying the Maryland factors, in Getson the Maryland Court of Appeals provided as an example of the proper consideration of disability a workplace injury suffered by a freight checker and a pianist that results in amputation of both thumbs — a schedule award under both the Maryland and District of Columbia workers’ compensation acts — that would yield significantly different disability ratings depending on the ability to return to “pre-accident duties ... [notwithstanding the similarity of the injuries. ...” Getson, 694 A.2d at 968 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Applying the Maryland factors, in Getson the Maryland Court of Appeals provided as an example of the proper consideration of disability a workplace injury suffered by a freight checker and a pianist that results in amputation of both thumbs — a schedule award under both the Maryland and District of Columbia workers’ compensation acts — that would yield significantly different disability ratings depending on the ability to return to “pre-accident duties ... [notwithstanding the similarity of the injuries. ...” Getson, 694 A.2d at 968 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Dean, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 146 A.3d 67, 77 (D.C. 2016) (citing Smith, 548 A.2d at 100 , and Upchurch, 783 A.2d at 627 ).

2017Dean, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 146 A.3d 67, 77 (D.C. 2016) (citing Smith, 548 A.2d at 100 , and Upchurch, 783 A.2d at 627 ), Using evidence of actual wages in applying the statutory factors to determine a claimant’s disability percentage for a schedule award furthers the legislative objective of compensating claimants for the economic harm of loss of wage-earning capacity.

1993The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 668-669 , 522 A.2d 812, 816 (1987), citing inter alia Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, hinted that it might adopt a rule similar to the Maryland rule, but it did not do so in Burger & Burger and, to our knowledge, has not yet done so. .Accord, Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, supra note 9, 202 Conn, at 668, 522 A.2d at 816 ("Demonstrating that the outcome of a trial has been affected by an erroneous disqualification of counsel rather than by the other 'myriad variables present in civil litigation’ concede

1993The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 668-669 , 522 A.2d 812, 816 (1987), citing inter alia Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, hinted that it might adopt a rule similar to the Maryland rule, but it did not do so in Burger & Burger and, to our knowledge, has not yet done so. .Accord, Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, supra note 9, 202 Conn, at 668, 522 A.2d at 816 ("Demonstrating that the outcome of a trial has been affected by an erroneous disqualification of counsel rather than by the other 'myriad variables present in civil litigation’ concede

1993The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 668-669 , 522 A.2d 812, 816 (1987), citing inter alia Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, hinted that it might adopt a rule similar to the Maryland rule, but it did not do so in Burter & Burger and, to our knowledge, has not yet done so. [10] Accord, Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, supra note 9, 202 Conn. at 668 , 522 A.2d at 816 ("Demonstrating that the outcome of a trial has been affected by an erroneous disqualification of counsel rather than by the other `myriad variables present in civil litigation' co

1993The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 668-669 , 522 A.2d 812, 816 (1987), citing inter alia Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, hinted that it might adopt a rule similar to the Maryland rule, but it did not do so in Burter & Burger and, to our knowledge, has not yet done so. [10] Accord, Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, supra note 9, 202 Conn. at 668 , 522 A.2d at 816 ("Demonstrating that the outcome of a trial has been affected by an erroneous disqualification of counsel rather than by the other `myriad variables present in civil litigation' co

1978See id. at 407 , 78 S.Ct. 875 ; United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 , 65 S.Ct. 249 , 89 L.Ed. 236 (1944). 6 In applying these considerations to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that fundamental fairness does not dictate a Maryland hearing (conducted by Maryland authorities under Maryland law).

1978See id. at 407 , 78 S.Ct. 875 ; United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 , 65 S.Ct. 249 , 89 L.Ed. 236 (1944). 6 In applying these considerations to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that fundamental fairness does not dictate a Maryland hearing (conducted by Maryland authorities under Maryland law).

2005See, e.g., In re Regent, 741 A.2d 40, 41 (D.C.1999) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for making material misrepresentation's on application for admission to Hawaii bar); In re Webster, 661 A.2d. 144, 150 (D.C.1995) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for “manipulating] the flow of information between the District of Columbia, Florida, and Palau in order to practice law”); In re Gilbert, 538 A.2d 742, 746 (D.C.1988) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for intentional non-disclosure *643 of material information during the process for admission to the Maryland bar); see also Carver v. Clephane, 78 U.S.App

1989In Gilbert, supra, respondent was disbarred in the District of Columbia for failing to disclose on a Maryland bar application that he had been involved in a former lawsuit denying his claim for life insurance under his wife’s policy, on grounds that he intentionally caused her death in order to obtain the proceeds from the policy.

1997The Court cited In re Rosen, 570 A.2d 728 (D.C.1989), in which it ordered a nine-month suspension on a finding of reckless misrepresentation on an application for admission to the Maryland bar.

1995See In re Rosen, supra, 570 A.2d at 729 . 14 .Ten years before applying for membership in the Maryland bar, Gilbert had been a plaintiff in a civil suit against an insurance company in which he attempted to recover proceeds from his deceased wife’s life insurance policies.

2022Conduct 3.1, the analogue to Maryland’s rule); In re Yelverton, 105 A.3d 413, 428-29 (D.C. 2014) (issuing a 30-day suspension with a fitness requirement for reinstatement for violating D.C.

2016See Bowles, supra, 121 A.3d at 1269–70 (remanding where disability award could not be derived from summation of the possible evidence: ―No combination of 7%, 8%, and 5% add[s] 25 up to just 10%‖); Jones, supra, 41 A.3d at 1226 (remanding for additional findings where the basis for a 7% disability award ―and not, for example, 1%, 10% or 30% — is a complete mystery‖).

2016See Bowles, supra, 121 A.3d at 1269–70 (remanding where disability award could not be derived from summation of the possible evidence: ―No combination of 7%, 8%, and 5% add[s] 25 up to just 10%‖); Jones, supra, 41 A.3d at 1226 (remanding for additional findings where the basis for a 7% disability award ―and not, for example, 1%, 10% or 30% — is a complete mystery‖).

2016See Bowles, supra, 121 A.3d at 1269–70 (remanding where disability award could not be derived from summation of the possible evidence: ―No combination of 7%, 8%, and 5% add[s] 25 up to just 10%‖); Jones, supra, 41 A.3d at 1226 (remanding for additional findings where the basis for a 7% disability award ―and not, for example, 1%, 10% or 30% — is a complete mystery‖).

2016See Bowles, supra, 121 A.3d at 1269–70 (remanding where disability award could not be derived from summation of the possible evidence: ―No combination of 7%, 8%, and 5% add[s] 25 up to just 10%‖); Jones, supra, 41 A.3d at 1226 (remanding for additional findings where the basis for a 7% disability award ―and not, for example, 1%, 10% or 30% — is a complete mystery‖).

2007Cf. In re Pennington, 921 A.2d 135, 140-41 (D.C.2007) (noting the "important difference” between Maryland’s standard regarding “how mitigating or extenuating circumstances will be considered” in cases of intentional dishonesty of any type, and this jurisdiction's standard). 18 .

2007Board Report at 12 (quoting from In re Stanback, 681 A.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.1996)).

2007Id. (citing Kersey, 520 A.2d at 327 n. 16); see also Temple, 596 A.2d at 590 (explaining that “there must be a close nexus between the misconduct and the mitigating factor proffered, whether alcoholism, drug addiction or mental illness,” and holding that this test was met even though Temple “was able to manage an appearance of normalcy in his law practice”). 16 *424 We conclude that Maryland’s Vander-linde standard is substantially different (not merely “somewhat different”) from our Kersey standard. 17 The Maryland standard sets a substantially higher bar and will require an unmitigated sanct

2007Id. (citing Kersey, 520 A.2d at 327 n. 16); see also Temple, 596 A.2d at 590 (explaining that “there must be a close nexus between the misconduct and the mitigating factor proffered, whether alcoholism, drug addiction or mental illness,” and holding that this test was met even though Temple “was able to manage an appearance of normalcy in his law practice”). 16 *424 We conclude that Maryland’s Vander-linde standard is substantially different (not merely “somewhat different”) from our Kersey standard. 17 The Maryland standard sets a substantially higher bar and will require an unmitigated sanct

2005See, e.g., In re Regent, 741 A.2d 40, 41 (D.C.1999) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for making material misrepresentation's on application for admission to Hawaii bar); In re Webster, 661 A.2d. 144, 150 (D.C.1995) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for “manipulating] the flow of information between the District of Columbia, Florida, and Palau in order to practice law”); In re Gilbert, 538 A.2d 742, 746 (D.C.1988) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for intentional non-disclosure *643 of material information during the process for admission to the Maryland bar); see also Carver v. Clephane, 78 U.S.App

2005See, e.g., In re Regent, 741 A.2d 40, 41 (D.C.1999) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for making material misrepresentation's on application for admission to Hawaii bar); In re Webster, 661 A.2d. 144, 150 (D.C.1995) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for “manipulating] the flow of information between the District of Columbia, Florida, and Palau in order to practice law”); In re Gilbert, 538 A.2d 742, 746 (D.C.1988) (imposing reciprocal disbarment for intentional non-disclosure *643 of material information during the process for admission to the Maryland bar); see also Carver v. Clephane, 78 U.S.App

2005In re Berger, 737 A.2d 1033, 1039 n. 10 (D.C.1999) (quoting In re Powell, 646 A.2d 340, 342 (D.C.1994)). 7 .Although Mr. Hines could have sought readmission to the Maryland bar as of May 16, 2002, he did not. 8 .

2005D.C. 91, 92, 137 F.2d 685, 686 (1943) (“appellant’s lack of candor in his repeated applications for admission to the bar is reason enough for his exclusion”).

2004Furthermore, even if we were so inclined, we are *611 not free to adopt the Maryland rule that the crime "may be prosecuted only in a jurisdiction where the essential or key element takes place [a forced sexual act in this case],” id. at 1283, since such a ruling would disregard another panel's decision.

2004Furthermore, even if we were so inclined, we are *611 not free to adopt the Maryland rule that the crime "may be prosecuted only in a jurisdiction where the essential or key element takes place [a forced sexual act in this case],” id. at 1283, since such a ruling would disregard another panel's decision.

2004See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971). 7 .

2004See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971). 7 .

2003Other cases, too, ruling a forum inconvenient are similarly distinguishable. 12 The present case, rather, as to private factors, is akin to Smith v. Alder Branch Realty, 684 A.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C.1996), where we affirmed denial of an inconvenient forum motion primarily because of the defendants’ substantial business in the District of Columbia.