green
Positive treatment
Issue: district court conducts hearingWY ↗
Issue: simple inquiryUT ↗
Quoted verbatim 1×
48.9 score
G Cite
cited 6× by 6 distinct cases, last quoted 2009 · 3 courts ·
…an ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen and a law enforcement official.
at p. 1408
⚠ not in text
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Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990
2008
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "but see"
State v. Thorn
But see United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir.1990) (characterizing trial court determination of seizure as question of fact).
cited
Cited "but see"
State v. Thorn
But see United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir. 1990) (characterizing trial court determination of seizure as question of fact).
cited
Cited "but see"
State v. Riddle
But see, United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Mary Ellen Byrne v. Board of Education, School of West Allis-West Milwaukee
But see, e.g., Miller v. AT & T Network Systems, 722 F.Supp. 633 (D.Or.1989), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1990) (asthma of installer unable to work in extreme temperatures not substantial limitation under state discrimination law); Wright v. Tisch, 45 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Robert Lambert
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
the initial investigative detention was concluded when the officer returned werking's license and registration papers. at this point, the encounter ... became an ordinary consensual encounter.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Carter v. State
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 2408 (10th Cir. 1990).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Hernandez
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
“The question of whether an encounter was consensual ‘calls for the refined judgment of the trial court.’ ” Id. at 1194 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dixon
United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990)). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Archuleta
"A person is seized only when that person has an objective reason to believe he or she is not free to end the conversation with the officer and proceed on his or her way.” Id. (citing United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Benavidez
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990). 7 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pahls v. Thomas
Co., 342 F.3d 1117 , 1138 n. 11 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “disturbing procedural irregularities, including deviations from normal company procedure, provide support for a plaintiffs assertion” that an employer acted with discriminatory intent (quoting Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1219-20 (10th Cir.2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Martinez, 983 F.2d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[T]o show pretext [in the Fourth Amendment context], the law enforcement officer must deviate from his usual practice.” (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Strieff
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
He now appeals, 1. (...continued) committing a crime’” (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990))).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Motor Vehicle Administration v. Lipella
For example, we affirmed a suspension that began when an officer approached a driver on the street, known as a “consensual encounter.” See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 , 373 n. 4, 735 A.2d 491 , 500 n. 4 (1999) (citing United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. McHugh
(2×)
An investigatory detention "is justified at its inception if `the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.'" United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2418 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1322 (2009); see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ("[T]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the offi…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Beltran-Palafox
United States v. Ferro, No. 2:07CR11DAK, 2007 WL 3125085 , at *4 (D.Utah Oct. 23, 2007) (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.1990)). 64 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Velazquez
Although [the officer] did not explicitly inform [the defendant] and her passenger that they were free to leave, [his] words of farewell suggested that any subsequent discussion was consensual.”); United States v. Wallace, 429 F.3d 969, 975 (10th Cir.2005) (initial detention transformed into a consensual encounter when trooper returned driver’s paperwork, issued a citation, and said, “That’s all I’ve got”); Anderson, 114 F.3d at 1064 (detention became consensual when trooper handed driver a warning citation and returned his papers, even though trooper did not tell driver he was fre…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
St. John v. McColley
An investigatory detention is “justified at its inception” if “the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime,” id (quoting United States *1161 v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990)), or where officers have a reasonable suspicion that a crime may be afoot.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. DeJear
A detention is justified at its inception if “the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). “[Ijnchoate suspicions and unpar-ticularized hunches” are not sufficient.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Robinson
A detention is justified at its inception if “specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). “[Ijnchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches” are not sufficient.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Martinez
Before a police officer can effectuate such a seizure, he or she "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); accord Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10 , 112 P.3d 507 ("[Ilt is settled law that 'a police officer may detain and question an individual when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in eriminal activity' ... [TThe officer's suspicion must be su…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Johnson
(2×)
See United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1996) ("A traffic stop may become a consensual encounter if the officer returns the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an overbearing show of authority."); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 (10th Cir.1990) (same); State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, ¶ 22 , 73 P.3d 623, 630 (App.2003) (traffic stop became consensual encounter after officer issued warning to driver for speeding). ¶ 18 We have found no case law governing when the seizure of passengers in a vehicle, incident o…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Thompson
In citing factors that might communicate the continuation of a seizure, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has frequently cited the Mendenhall factors, including “ ‘the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.’ [Citations omitted.]” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Cardenas-Alatorre, 485 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2007) (“ ‘[A] coercive show of authority, such as the prese…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Arciga-Bustamante
We have held that: [A]fter the point at which the driver has his or her other documentation back, the touchstone of our analysis is simply whether — adapting the language of Bostick to the circumstances of a traffic stop — the driver (United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404 1408 (10th Cir.1990)): has an objective reason to believe that he was not free to end his conversation with the law enforcement officer and proceed on his way.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Swift v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 , 100 S.Ct. at 1876-77 ; Werking, 915 F.2d at 1408; Black, 675 F.2d at 133 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gabaldon
We have consistently rejected this argument, and have specifically held that without other indicia of coercion, “the fact that [the person posing the questions] was a uniformed police officer ... is insufficient to prove [the defendant] was ‘seized’ *319 within the meaning of the fourth amendment.” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)); see also Elliott, 107 F.3d at 814 ; United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir.1991).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Worwood
Id. (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Brown
Continued detention of defendant must be based upon “specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts [that give] rise to reasonable suspicion.” Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 878 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lopez-Guzman
In considering this evidence, “we are mindful that at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence together with the inferences, deductions and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are to be determined by the trial judge.” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Brandon
United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990)(the return of the driver’s documents will not end a detention if the driver “has an objective reason to believe that he was not free to end his conversation with the law enforcement official and proceed on his way”); United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir.1993)(“ ‘once the officer has returned the driver’s license and registration in a routine traffic stop, questioning about drugs and weapons or a request for voluntary consent to search may be �…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Markland
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
However, it is settled law that “a police officer may detain and question an individual when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation omitted). 1 In order to justify such a detention, the officer’s suspicion must be supported by “specific and articulable facts and rational inferences,” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990), and cannot be merely an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ �…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Chism
Cf. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.1995) (determining, in the context of alcohol consumption, that a police officer’s request for age identification is more than a simple inquiry into identity and constitutes a seizure). ¶ 12 An officer may initiate a so-called level two stop “when ‘specific and ar-ticulable facts and rational inferences ... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.’ ” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,¶ 35 , 63 P.3d 650 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (alteration in original)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Molina
However, an officer is not required to inform a suspect that he does not have to respond to his questioning or that he is free to leave, see Patten, 183 F,3d at 1194, and it is immaterial that officers are in uniform when asking a suspect if he will consent to additional questioning, see United States v. Taverna, 348 F.3d 873, 879 (10th Cir.2003), citing United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith
See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134-35 (8th Cir.1998) (traffic stop complete once officer returned driver’s license and rental agreement, issued warning, and told defendant he was free to go); United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775, 778-79 (8th Cir.1996) (traffic stop ended when officer returned driver’s license and registration, and issued a warning); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990) (traffic stop over once officer returned license and registration to driver); see also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 , 117 S.Ct. at 886 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 48 (“an officer makin…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Trujillo
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The Tenth Circuit has held that an officer may approach a citizen and ask questions based solely on a hunch, United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.1995) (citation omitted), and those questions can include an inquiry into the presence of weapons, United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 958 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990)); see also United States v. Gerby, 41 Fed.Appx. 312 (10th Cir.2002) (finding the officer’s question regarding the defendant’s possession of guns or drugs was consensual because the officer’s question w…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Castro-Holguin
However, the determination of whether an encounter was consensual “ ‘calls for the refined judgment of the trial court.’ ” Patten, 183 F.3d at 1194 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir. 1990)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Manjarrez
In reviewing the district court’s findings, “we are mindful that at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence together with the inferences, deductions and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are to be determined by the trial judge.” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.1990).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Taverna
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Green
(2×)
Ferris, 355 Md. at 373 n. 4, 735 A.2d at 500 n. 4 (citing United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Seldon v. State
Ferris, 355 Md. at 373 , 735 A.2d 491 (citing United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Damato v. State
(2×)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Paul
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 958 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881 , 112 S.Ct. 230 , 116 L.Ed.2d 187 (1991)); see United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir.1997) (providing that traffic detention ended when officer returned driver’s documentation and driver’s subsequent encounter with officer was consensual, even though officer did not inform defendant she was free to leave, where officer’s questioning was not accompanied by a coercive show of authority); Turner, 928 F.2d at 959 (providing t…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Mogen
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
See Kiliott, 107 F.3d at 814 (concluding that although officer must return a driver's documentation before detention can end, return of driver's documentation is not always sufficient to demonstrate that encounter has become consensual); Werking, 915 F.2d at 1408 (concluding that return of driver's documents will not end detention if driver "has an objective reason to believe that he was not free to end his conversation with the law enforcement official and proceed on his way."). 116 In reviewing the trial court's decision in this case, we "consider the facts in a light most favorable to the t…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Allen v. State
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.1990)." Madrid, 910 P.2d at 1344 (quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo.1994)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Roslyn Morgan
See United States v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 1997) (trooper did not seize defendant by asking whether she had drugs or other contraband in vehicle); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 653 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (same); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States of America v. Rosalind Sarah Morgan Fredine Walker Elijah M. Jones
(2×)
See United States v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir.1997) (trooper did not seize defendant by asking whether she had drugs or other contraband in vehicle); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 653 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc) (same); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir.1990) (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Trott v. State
As this Court has previously observed, “ ‘[b]ecause an individual is free to leave during such an encounter, he [or she] is not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Reynolds, 130 Md.App. at 322 , 746 A.2d 422 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Cervantes-Arredondo
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Once an officer has returned the driver's license and registration, questioning about drugs and weapons, or a request for voluntary consent to search, may become "an ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen and a law enforcement official." United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Parra-Bojorquez
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (permissible for agents to examine a passenger’s ticket and driver’s license); United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994) (“This Circuit follows the bright-line rale that an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver’s documents have been returned to him.”); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir.1990) (affirming a district court finding of no duress when an officer returned driver’s license and registration before ask…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Tennessee v. Roger D. Mccrary
See also, e.g., United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775, 778-779 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408-1409 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Poulack, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. McCrary
See also, e.g., United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775, 778-779 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408-1409 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Poulack, 82 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1030 (D.Neb.1999); United States v. D'Armond, 80 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1164-1165 (D.Kan.1999); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 , 735 A.2d 491, 499-506 (1999); Commonwealth v. Hoak, 700 A.2d 1263, 1266-1271 (Pa.Super.Ct.1996).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert Seaman DRABECK, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
v.
Robert Seaman DRABECK, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
89-30237.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 11, 1990.
Goodwin, Browning, Wallace, Hug, Tang, Schroeder, Fletcher, Farris, Pregerson, Alarcon, Poole, Nelson, Canby, Norris, Reinhardt, Beezer, Hall, Wiggins, Brunetti, Kozinski, Noonan, Thompson, O'Scannlain, Leavy, Trott, Fernandez, Rymer.
Published
ORDER
Before GOODWIN, Chief Judge, and BROWNING, WALLACE, HUG, TANG, SCHROEDER, FLETCHER, FARRIS, PREGERSON, ALARCON, POOLE, NELSON, CANBY, NORRIS, REINHARDT, BEEZER, HALL, WIGGINS, BRUNETTI, KOZINSKI, NOONAN, THOMPSON, O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, TROTT, FERNANDEZ and RYMER, Circuit Judges.Upon the vote of a majority of nonre-cused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by the en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3.
The mandate is recalled.