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13 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. Peelgreen2 sentences1989However, this simple analysis cannot be employed here because *556 both plaintiff and defendant obtained some monetary relief against the other. [7] Our review of the relevant case law convinces us that under the provision at issue, there can be only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and defendant are awarded money damages on claims arising from the same transaction. [8] See Lawrence v. Peel, 45 Or. 1989However, this simple analysis cannot be employed here be cause both plaintiff and defendant obtained some monetary relief against the other. 7 Our review of the relevant case law convinces us that under the provision at issue, there can be only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and defendant are awarded money damages on claims arising from the same transaction. 8 See Lawrence v. Peel, 45 Or.App. 233 , 607 P.2d 1386, 1392 (1980); Marquam Inv. | 2 | 2 |
Marquam Investment Corp. v. Myersgreen2 sentences1989Corp. v. Myers, 35 Or.App. 23 , 581 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1978). 1989Corp. v. Myers, 35 Or.App. 23 , 581 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Saundersgreen2 sentences2017See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 35 , 992 P.2d 951 (explaining that “[rjuling that a prospective juror is qualified to sit simply because he says he will be fair ignores the commonsense psychological and legal reality of the situation”). ¶45 And while it seems unlikely that responses such as these would not prompt further questioning from the judge and counsel, if not challenges for cause, the reconstructed record does not disclose any follow-up other than the judge’s simple inquiry whether each juror could be fair and impartial, ¶46 But even if a more complete record may have mitigated th 2017See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 35 , 992 P.2d 951 (explaining that “[rjuling that a prospective juror is qualified to sit simply because he says he will be fair ignores the commonsense psychological and legal reality of the situation”). ¶45 And while it seems unlikely that responses such as these would not prompt further questioning from the judge and counsel, if not challenges for cause, the reconstructed record does not disclose any follow-up other than the judge’s simple inquiry whether each juror could be fair and impartial, ¶46 But even if a more complete record may have mitigated th | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Utah Labor Commissiongreen2 sentences2015This is why a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review. 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44 , 308 P.3d 382 (footnote omitted); accord Murray, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 39, 308 P.3d 461 (a search and seizure determination "is not 'fact-like' because the ultimate determination will often rest on the 'general reasonableness' of the facts"). 19 Ms. Sawyer's interpretation of these cases is incorrect, Baby B.'s reasoning did not depend on a simple rule that all determinations of reasonableness are law-like. 2015This is why a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review. 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44 , 308 P.3d 382 (footnote omitted); accord Murray, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 39, 308 P.3d 461 (a search and seizure determination "is not 'fact-like' because the ultimate determination will often rest on the 'general reasonableness' of the facts"). 19 Ms. Sawyer's interpretation of these cases is incorrect, Baby B.'s reasoning did not depend on a simple rule that all determinations of reasonableness are law-like. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Petersgreen1 sentence2007"Where the defendant has touched a body part specified in the statute, the court inquires into the surrounding factual background only as it may be relevant to other elements of and defenses to the crime." State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (discussing also that the "inquiry into all the facts surrounding the event in question [in an indecent liberties analysis] contrasts with the simple inquiry suggested by a proscription against touching a specified body part"). ' 19 Recently, in State v. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356 , 144 P.3d 226 , this court was called upon to interpret the | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2005The reasonableness of a level two stop is “evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14 , 78 P.3d 590 ; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 2005The reasonableness of a level two stop is “evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14 , 78 P.3d 590 ; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Seaman Drabeck, Jr.green1 sentence2005Cf. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.1995) (determining, in the context of alcohol consumption, that a police officer’s request for age identification is more than a simple inquiry into identity and constitutes a seizure). ¶ 12 An officer may initiate a so-called level two stop “when ‘specific and ar-ticulable facts and rational inferences ... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.’ ” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,¶ 35 , 63 P.3d 650 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (alteration in original)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Crippsgreen1 sentence2005Cf. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.1995) (determining, in the context of alcohol consumption, that a police officer’s request for age identification is more than a simple inquiry into identity and constitutes a seizure). ¶ 12 An officer may initiate a so-called level two stop “when ‘specific and ar-ticulable facts and rational inferences ... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.’ ” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,¶ 35 , 63 P.3d 650 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (alteration in original)). | 1 | 1 |
Resolution Trust Corporation v. Stonegreen1 sentence2001The court explained that "we approvel T[of] the practice of asking the jury to clarify its meaning when the [trial] court is faced with an ambiguous verdict." Id. " '[Plermitting questioning of jurors ... promotes the value of judicial economy; otherwise, in the event of an ambiguity the court would be left with no other *675 remedies than to order a new trial, even though a simple inquiry could clear up questions about how to read the damages verdict" Id. (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548 (10th Cir.1998)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Contegreen2 sentences1989See also People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704 , 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984), where the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected the strict per se test sometimes attributed to Bram v. United States, and adopted “the simple rule that a confession caused by a promise of leniency is involuntary and inadmissible.” (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, the trial court did not address defendant’s contention that even though an adequate Miranda warning had been given to him, his subsequent confession was the result of coercive threats and promises made by the interrogating officers. 1989See also People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704 , 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984), where the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected the strict per se test sometimes attributed to Bram v. United States, and adopted “the simple rule that a confession caused by a promise of leniency is involuntary and inadmissible.” (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, the trial court did not address defendant’s contention that even though an adequate Miranda warning had been given to him, his subsequent confession was the result of coercive threats and promises made by the interrogating officers. | 1 | 1 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences1987Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 527 , 91 S.Ct. at 2068 (White, J., dissenting). 1987Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 527 , 91 S.Ct. at 2068 (White, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Manzanares v. Byington
green
2 sentences2015This is why a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review. 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44 , 308 P.3d 382 (footnote omitted); accord Murray, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 39, 308 P.3d 461 (a search and seizure determination "is not 'fact-like' because the ultimate determination will often rest on the 'general reasonableness' of the facts"). 19 Ms. Sawyer's interpretation of these cases is incorrect, Baby B.'s reasoning did not depend on a simple rule that all determinations of reasonableness are law-like. 2015This is why a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review. 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44 , 308 P.3d 382 (footnote omitted); accord Murray, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 39, 308 P.3d 461 (a search and seizure determination "is not 'fact-like' because the ultimate determination will often rest on the 'general reasonableness' of the facts"). 19 Ms. Sawyer's interpretation of these cases is incorrect, Baby B.'s reasoning did not depend on a simple rule that all determinations of reasonableness are law-like. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Verde
green
2 sentences2026R. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 3 ¶26 “The difficulty in applying this simple rule, however, springs from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts often will yield dual inferences—and thus betray both a permissible purpose and an improper one.” State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 U 2026R. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 3 ¶26 “The difficulty in applying this simple rule, however, springs from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts often will yield dual inferences—and thus betray both a permissible purpose and an improper one.” State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 U | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Green
green
1 sentence2026R. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 3 ¶26 “The difficulty in applying this simple rule, however, springs from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts often will yield dual inferences—and thus betray both a permissible purpose and an improper one.” State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 U | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Thornton
green
2 sentences2026R. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 3 ¶26 “The difficulty in applying this simple rule, however, springs from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts often will yield dual inferences—and thus betray both a permissible purpose and an improper one.” State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 U 2026R. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 3 ¶26 “The difficulty in applying this simple rule, however, springs from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts often will yield dual inferences—and thus betray both a permissible purpose and an improper one.” State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 U | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Jacobs
green
2 sentences2007"Where the defendant has touched a body part specified in the statute, the court inquires into the surrounding factual background only as it may be relevant to other elements of and defenses to the crime." State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (discussing also that the "inquiry into all the facts surrounding the event in question [in an indecent liberties analysis] contrasts with the simple inquiry suggested by a proscription against touching a specified body part"). ' 19 Recently, in State v. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356 , 144 P.3d 226 , this court was called upon to interpret the 2007"Where the defendant has touched a body part specified in the statute, the court inquires into the surrounding factual background only as it may be relevant to other elements of and defenses to the crime." State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (discussing also that the "inquiry into all the facts surrounding the event in question [in an indecent liberties analysis] contrasts with the simple inquiry suggested by a proscription against touching a specified body part"). ' 19 Recently, in State v. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356 , 144 P.3d 226 , this court was called upon to interpret the | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Warren
green
2 sentences2005The reasonableness of a level two stop is “evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14 , 78 P.3d 590 ; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 2005The reasonableness of a level two stop is “evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14 , 78 P.3d 590 ; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Hansen
green
2 sentences2005Cf. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.1995) (determining, in the context of alcohol consumption, that a police officer’s request for age identification is more than a simple inquiry into identity and constitutes a seizure). ¶ 12 An officer may initiate a so-called level two stop “when ‘specific and ar-ticulable facts and rational inferences ... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.’ ” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,¶ 35 , 63 P.3d 650 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (alteration in original)). 2005Cf. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.1995) (determining, in the context of alcohol consumption, that a police officer’s request for age identification is more than a simple inquiry into identity and constitutes a seizure). ¶ 12 An officer may initiate a so-called level two stop “when ‘specific and ar-ticulable facts and rational inferences ... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.’ ” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,¶ 35 , 63 P.3d 650 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (alteration in original)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Trayner v. Cushing
green
1 sentence2002In support, the court of appeals cited two of our cases, Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93 , 1 P.2d 950 (1931), and Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
1 sentence2002This simple analysis cannot always be employed, however. 1 24 The court of appeals, when presented with a similar agreement awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party, noted that "under the provision at issue, there can be only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and defendant are awarded money damages on claims arising from the same transaction." Id. at 556 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Checketts v. Collings
green
2 sentences2002In support, the court of appeals cited two of our cases, Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93 , 1 P.2d 950 (1931), and Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). 2002In support, the court of appeals cited two of our cases, Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93 , 1 P.2d 950 (1931), and Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co.
green
2 sentences2001The court explained that "we approvel T[of] the practice of asking the jury to clarify its meaning when the [trial] court is faced with an ambiguous verdict." Id. " '[Plermitting questioning of jurors ... promotes the value of judicial economy; otherwise, in the event of an ambiguity the court would be left with no other *675 remedies than to order a new trial, even though a simple inquiry could clear up questions about how to read the damages verdict" Id. (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548 (10th Cir.1998)). 2001The court explained that "we approvel T[of] the practice of asking the jury to clarify its meaning when the [trial] court is faced with an ambiguous verdict." Id. " '[Plermitting questioning of jurors ... promotes the value of judicial economy; otherwise, in the event of an ambiguity the court would be left with no other *675 remedies than to order a new trial, even though a simple inquiry could clear up questions about how to read the damages verdict" Id. (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548 (10th Cir.1998)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Karen Romano v. U-Haul International, U-Haul Company of Maine, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Further, we conclude that the trial court's actions "did not take the decision-making role away from the jury," id., but gave the jury the opportunity "to render a proper verdict." Id. *676 T40 Finally, we agree with the rationale set forth in both Romano and Unit Drilling that permitting the trial court to question the jury regarding an ambiguous verdict promotes judicial economy and alleviates the need for a new trial when a simple inquiry may cure the ambiguity. 2001Further, we conclude that the trial court's actions "did not take the decision-making role away from the jury," id., but gave the jury the opportunity "to render a proper verdict." Id. *676 T40 Finally, we agree with the rationale set forth in both Romano and Unit Drilling that permitting the trial court to question the jury regarding an ambiguous verdict promotes judicial economy and alleviates the need for a new trial when a simple inquiry may cure the ambiguity. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bunnell v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF UTAH
green
2 sentences1991The hearsay testimony also should not have been admitted under the simple test of “fairness” given in Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333 . 1991Under the “fairness” test, the evidence may only be admitted if it has “some probative weight and reliability.” Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.