United States v. Fred Agron, 921 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
Search
United States v. Fred Agron, 921 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2009 · …taken a broad view of the definition of 'dangerous weapon' under the sentencing guidelines. at p. 26 ✓
16 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lin v. United States (nyed, 2020-05-21)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lin v. United States
E.D.N.Y · 2020 · confidence medium
The Second Circuit has “consistently ‘taken a broad view of the definition of “dangerous weapon” under the Sentencing Guidelines.’” United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Argon, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1990)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Amy Kay Gustafson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal/motion to strike dangerous nature. ¶ 16 We further note, as did the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Geier, 484 N.W.2d 167, 171-72 (Iowa 1992), “many courts ... have deemed it appropriate to characterize stun guns as dangerous or deadly weapons.” See, e.g., United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir.1990) (court takes “broad view” of “dangerous weapon,” finding stun gun constituted dangerous weapon in drug conspiracy matter); United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509, 1513 (9th Cir.1986)…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Pope
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
We have consistently “taken a broad view of the definition of ‘dangerous weapon’ under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Pope
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
We have consistently “taken a broad view of the definition of ‘dangerous weapon’ under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Young
4th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
In 5 United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1990), the defendant possessed a stun gun during a drug conspiracy and the Second Circuit found that it qualified as a dangerous weapon under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Larry Ricky Young, United States of America v. Larry Ricky Young
4th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
In United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir.1990), the defendant possessed a stun gun during a drug conspiracy and the Second Circuit found that it qualified as a dangerous weapon under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Dennis Stephen Dukovich
11th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Even more persuasive are court decisions which hold other types of instruments to be “dangerous weapons.” See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 3 F.3d 390 (11th Cir.1993) (toy gun is “dangerous weapon” within meaning of statute enhancing penalties for bank robbers); United States v. Koonce, 991 F.2d 693 (11th Cir.1993) (BB gun that looks like real firearm and is perceived by robbery victim to be such is “dangerous weapon” rather than “firearm” for sentencing enhancement purposes); United States v. Shores, 966 F.2d at 1387-88 . (although not decided under guidelines then in effec…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Kaufman
10th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir.1990) (affirming a two-level enhancement for the possession of a stun gun under USSG *1267 2D1.1(b)(1)); United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509, 1512-13 (9th Cir.1986) (holding as a matter of law, a stun gun is an inherently dangerous weapon under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1472 (£), because it may produce great bodily harm).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Rickey Lee Woodrup
4th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.1990) (stun gun); United States v. Smith, 905 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1990) (inoperable pellet gun); United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935 (6th Cir.1990) (toy gun), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3563 (U.S.1991); United States v. Gray, 895 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir.1990) (unloaded BB gun).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Barbee
2d Cir. · 2024 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that no evidentiary showing was required at sentencing with respect to the nature and effects of a stun gun where the defendant did not contest the government’s factual assertion on that issue during the sentencing).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Anibal Rodriguez
3rd Cir. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Agron, 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a stun gun is a U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) “dangerous weapon”); cf. United States v. Quiver, 805 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that a stun gun is a U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2) “dangerous weapon”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Fred AGRON, Defendant-Appellant
556, Docket 90-1404.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Dec 7, 1990.
921 F.2d 25
1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21062
1990 WL 194933
Bonnie Barnes, Middlebury, Vt. (William K. Sessions, III, Sessions, Keiner, Dumont, Barnes & Everitt, Middlebury, Vt., on the brief), for defendant-appellant., John P. Tavana, Asst. U.S. Atty., Burlington, Vt. (George J. Terwilliger, III, U.S. Atty., David V. Kirby, Chief, Crim. Div., Burlington, Vt., on the brief), for appellee.
Kaufman, Newman, Per Curiam, Winter.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Fred Agron appeals from the June 12, 1990, judgment of the District Court for the District of Vermont (Franklin S. Billings, Jr., Chief Judge) convicting him on his guilty plea of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). Agron was sentenced to 95 months' imprisonment, five years' supervised release, and a fifty dollar special assessment. On appeal, Agron challenges only his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in applying Sentencing Guideline section 2D1.1(b)(1) (1990) because there was an insufficient basis for finding that the stun gun he possessed constituted a “dangerous weapon.”

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that where “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed during commission of [the drug trafficking] offense” the base offense level should be increased by two levels. Agron admits his possession of the stun gun at the time of the offense, but argues that the gun does not meet the definition of a dangerous weapon.

First, Agron claims that the District Court did not have a sufficient evidentiary basis for determining the nature and effects of a stun gun. However, at the sentencing hearing he did not contest the Government’s assertion that the function of a stun gun is to totally incapacitate a person temporarily. Rather, he argued that section 2D1.1(b)(1) requires more than temporary incapacity. As a result, no evi-dentiary showing was required. See United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356 (11th Cir.1989) (undisputed statements in presentence report may be basis of court’s finding of facts).

Second, Agron contends that a stun gun does not meet the definition of a “dangerous weapon.” Application note 3 of section 2D1.1(b)(1) applies the definition of “dangerous weapon” found in the Commentary to section 1B1.1, and also notes that the two-level enhancement for possession of such a weapon is based on the danger of increased violence where traffickers possess weapons. “Dangerous weapon” is defined as “an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury.” Section 1B1.1, Application Note 1(d). “Serious bodily injury” is defined as “injury involving extreme physical pain or the impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention.” Section 1B1.1, Application Note l(j) (emphasis added). The District Court correctly determined that the definition in Note l(j) does not require that the impairment be permanent. Cf. id., Application Note 1(h) (defining “permanent” injury). The incapacitation caused by a stun gun constitutes sufficient “impairment,” particularly in light of the Guidelines’ rationale behind the two-level enhancement for such possession. See United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509, 1513 (9th Cir.1986) (stun gun is dangerous weapon under Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(0, 49 U.S.C.App. § 1472(0), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 1901, 95 L.Ed.2d 507 (1987).

Additionally, this Circuit has taken a broad view of the definition of “dangerous weapon” under the Sentencing Guidelines. In United States v. Laughy, 886 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir.1989), we held that an inoperable pellet gun was a dangerous weapon under Sentencing Guideline section 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), which also uses the definitions in Application note 1 of the Commentary to section 1B1.1.

[*27] The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.