City of Los Angeles v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 263 (1965). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite City of Los Angeles v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 263 (1965).
California Supreme CourtPublished opinionNo. L. A. Nos. 28022, 28023Aug 27, 1965

City of Los Angeles v. Indus. Accident Comm'n

Quick Summary

An employer paying workers' compensation death benefits may be entitled to a credit against future compensation or a reduction of pension payments, so a commutation order foreclosing that credit is unreasonable.

A former city fireman died from job-related injuries, and his widow received workers' compensation death benefits while also receiving city pension payments. The Industrial Accident Commission ordered commutation of the weekly compensation award to a lump sum, reasoning that the employee should receive both full compensation and pension payments. The question presented is whether the commission may order commutation that forecloses the city's ability to reduce future pension payments. The court holds that the commission's premise was erroneous because the city is entitled to a partial credit, so the commutation order was unreasonable. The court annulled the order and remanded to the commission without deciding whether res judicata or collateral estoppel applies.

61 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Statutes this case interprets
#3 Cal. Labor Code § 5100 cited 1× in this case · 5 cases cite this section Read the statute Leading cases
Cited for
At page 264Determining credit for pension payments against compensation award5 citing cases“the city, therefore, may be entitled to a credit on future compensation liability or may be entitled to reduce future pensions. ...”1 citing court quotes it
  • Hulse v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 63 Cal. App. 3d 221 (Ct. App. 1976).published
    Appeals Bd. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 570, 573 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 812 ].) Its discretion may not be exercised arbitrarily, however (ibid.), and its arbitrary denial of a petition for commutation is subject to judicial annulment, as “unreasonable.”…
  • Jenkins v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 48 Cal. App. 3d 570 (Ct. App. 1975).published
    Com. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 263, 264, fn. 1 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 404 P.2d 814 ]. 2 The fund itself has conceded in its answer and at oral argument that the payment of medical bills may constitute a sufficient reason for commutation of future por…
  • Smith v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 276 Cal. App. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 1969).published
    (Morse) 63 Cal.2d 263, 264 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 404 P.2d 814 ].) It is the excess of such death and dependency payments over and above those required by the Workmen’s Compensation Act which constitutes “salary” payable to the dependents an…
  • City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 269 Cal. App. 2d 382 (Ct. App. 1969).published 4 cites
    Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 412, 422-423 [ 339 P.2d 225 ].) Moreover, "If ... there is any conflict between charter provisions and the compensation provisions of the Labor Code, the latter must prevail." (Healy v. Ind…
  • City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 267 Cal. App. 2d 771 (Ct. App. 1968).published
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
City of Los Angeles
v.
Industrial Accident Commission, Lucille C. Morse
L. A. Nos. 28022, 28023.
California Supreme Court.
Aug 27, 1965.
Published opinion
Tobriner.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
TOBRINER, J.

In this case, a corollary to City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Fraide) (1965) ante, p. 242 [46 Cal.Rptr. 97, 404 P.2d 801] (hereinafter called Fraide), the City of Los Angeles seeks annulment of an Industrial Accident Commission order that commuted to a lump sum a workmen’s compensation award of weekly payments to respondents Lucille Morse and her two children.

[*264] As we explain below, in view of our determination in Frcvide, we believe that we must remand this ease to the commission for reconsideration.

Mrs. Morse, the widow of a former city fireman who died as a result of injuries incurred in his employment as a fireman in January 1961, applied to the commission for death benefits pursuant to the workmen’s compensation provisions of the Labor Code. Awarding the full amount of such benefits, the commission refused to allow the city any credit for the widow’s pension payments which would be owing under the city charter. The District Court of Appeal denied the city’s petition for a writ of review; this court denied a petition for hearing.

The city proceeded to pay the weekly compensation award to Mrs. Morse, but attempted to reduce her pension payments. In an effort to realize the maximum possible benefits Mrs. Morse applied to the commission for commutation of the compensation award to a lump sum payment equal to the present value of the awarded weekly payments. She contended that once the full amount of the workmen’s compensation award had been paid, the city could not then reduce the pension payments. The commission granted the commutation ; the city now seeks annulment of the order.

The order of commutation does not purport to, nor could it, directly adjudicate the city’s liability under the pension plan. The commission did, however, look to the practical effect of commutation on the pension liability. The commission’s order essentially rests on the theory that the employee should receive both full compensation and pension payments.

We have held in Fraide that this theory is erroneous: that the city is entitled to a partial credit against workmen's compensation. The city, therefore, may be entitled to a credit on future compensation liability or may be entitled to reduce future pensions which it may pay to Mrs. Morse. In the instant case, however, the District Court of Appeal denied a petition for a writ of review to consider the credit issue and this court denied a petition for hearing. Questions of res judicata or collateral estoppel may therefore be involved.[1] [*265] Counsel, of course, have not had the opportunity to present their respective positions on these issues; we do not believe that we should pass upon them at this time.

In view of this disposition of the case, the city’s other contentions relating to alleged errors in procedure by the commission need not be discussed.

The Industrial Accident Commission’s order is annulled, and the cause is remanded to the commission.

Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and Schauer, J.,* concurred.

1

The city has argued that the commission acted beyond its powers in ordering commutation. We cannot accept this proposition. The commutation in the instant case would apparently subserve Mrs. Morse’s “best interest.’’ (See Lab. Code, §5100, subd. (a).) The crucial question appears to be whether the order of commutation, in the circumstances of this case, is “unreasonable.” (Lab. Code, § 5952, subd. (c).) If the city is lawfully entitled to reduce its workmen’s compensation[*265] liability to Mrs. Morse we see no reason why it may not, as an alternative, reduce its pension liability. In either ease, of course, the reduction may not exceed an amount determined by the method of computation outlined in Fraide. Thus, if the city is entitled to reduce its workmen’s compensation liability to Mrs. Morse, the commutation order, which attempts to foreclose reduction of future pension payments, is unreasonable. On the other hand, if the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel apply in the instant case, the city will not be permitted to reduce its pension liability to Mrs. Morse. Thus the commutation award would be reasonable. As we have indicated above, we do not pass on the crucial question of the applicability of the principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.