Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., 192 N.E.2d 163 (N.Y. 1963). · Go Syfert
Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., 192 N.E.2d 163 (N.Y. 1963). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

An owner's duty to provide a safe plant does not extend to hazards inherent in the work or to risks created when a worker puts a structural object to an unintended use.

A window cleaner died after a ventilating window collapsed while he was using a plank placed upon it as an improvised platform. The plaintiff alleged the defendant failed to provide a safe place to work by failing to design the building with proper window-washing features. The court held that the defendant's duty to provide a safe plant does not extend to hazards inherent in the work or to situations where a worker puts a common structural object to an unintended use. Because the window was safe for its intended purpose as a ventilator and the danger of using it as a platform was apparent, the defendant was not liable.

128 citation events (78 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1965 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1965 1995 2026
Cited for
13 N.Y.2d at 110 Employer duty to provide safe workplace with inherent work exceptions30 citing cases“does not extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work”2 citing courts quote it · 26 listed here
  • Sorto v. SCI Funeral Servs. of N.Y., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 30670(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2026).unpublished
    “hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work which the contractor is to perform”
  • Vindell v. Site 2 DSA Owner, LLC, 239 A.D.3d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2025).published
    It does not extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work which the contractor is to perform, or where the [workers] are engaged for the specific purpose of repairing the defect" ( Gasper v Ford Motor Co. , 13 NY2d 104,…
  • Macancela v. E.W. Howell Co., 2024 NY Slip Op 51263(U) (N.Y. Sup. Kings 2024).unpublished
    In any event, the City Defendants would not prevail had they made such an argument because Plaintiff Macancela's work did not involve the removal of the duct ( cf. Rendon v Callahan , 206 AD3d 945, 947 [2d Dept 2022]), and the City Defenda…
  • Sullivan v. Flynn, 2024 NY Slip Op 51151(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Warren Cty. 2024).unpublished 2 cites
    The well-established rule in New York is that there is no duty to protect or warn against defects or dangers that are part of, or inherent to, the work being performed, or to hazards that are readily observable by reasonable use of the sen…
  • Cruz v. Metro. Tr. Auth., 193 A.D.3d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2021).published
    Corp. , 10 AD3d 170, 171 [1st Dept 2004], quoting Gasper v Ford Motor Co. , 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]).
  • Leggio v. State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 3244 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2019).published
    Such a duty, however, "does not extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work" being performed ( Gasper v Ford Motor Co. , 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963], mot to amend remittitur granted 13 NY2d 893 [1963]; see Anderson v Bush…
  • Parkhurst v. Syracuse Reg'l Airport Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 6670 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2018).published
    Defendants' reliance on Gasper v Ford Motor Co. ( 13 NY2d 104, 110-111 [1963], mot to amend remittitur granted 13 NY2d 893 [1963]) is misplaced because "[t]hat case stands for the proposition that an open and obvious hazard inherent in the…
  • Arcabascio v. Bentivegna, 142 A.D.3d 1120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2016).published
    Employers have a common-law duty to provide their employees with a safe place to work (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]).
  • Barros v. Bette & Cring, LLC, 129 A.D.3d 1279 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2015).published
    Recovery is precluded where an injury is caused by a dangerous condition that is readily observable and inherent in the work (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]; Stephens v Tucker, 184 AD2d 828, 829-830 [1992]).
  • Carr v. McHugh Painting Co., 126 A.D.3d 1440 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2015).published 2 cites
    The duty does not, however, “extend to ‘hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work which the contractor is to perform’ ” (Anderson, 280 AD2d at 950 , quoting Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]; see Landahl v City…
Show 16 more citing cases
  • Jones v. Cnty. of Erie, 121 A.D.3d 1562 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2014).published 2 cites
    As the County points out, however, the dangers attendant to climbing the tree were inherent in the work itself and not created by the employee’s directive (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110-111 [1963]; see also Vega v Restani C…
  • Landahl v. City of Buffalo, 103 A.D.3d 1129 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2013).published 2 cites
    U&S’s reliance on Gasper v Ford Motor Co. ( 13 NY2d 104, 110-111 [1963], mot to amend remittitur granted 13 NY2d 893 [1963]) is misplaced.
  • Vega v. Restani Constr. Corp., 965 N.E.2d 240 (N.Y. 2012).published 2 cites
    This principle is derived from the common-law duty of an "employer . . . to provide his employees with a safe place to work" and that duty "does not extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work" being performed ( Gasper…
  • Reyes v. Arco Wentworth Mgmt. Corp., 83 A.D.3d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).published
    If such equipment was provided to the worker and the worker was injured by it, the property owner will only be liable under Labor Law § 200 if it was possessed of the authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the work (see…
  • Schindler v. Ahearn, 69 A.D.3d 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    Where, as here, a plaintiff is a worker whose claim is based upon premises liability, the landowner’s duty is to provide the worker with a safe place to work (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]).
  • Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2008).published
    In Ortega v Puccia ( 57 AD3d 54 [2008]), this Court held that the “supervisory authority” standard governs defendants’ liability for work site injuries under Labor Law § 200, where the dangerous or defective equipment is provided by the pl…
  • Hansen v. Trs. of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Glen Cove, 51 A.D.3d 725 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2008).published
    Employers have a common-law duty to provide their employees with a safe place to work (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]).
  • Tighe v. Hennegan Constr. Co., 48 A.D.3d 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008).published
    Corp., 10 AD3d 170, 171 [2004], quoting Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]).
  • Monahan v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 47 A.D.3d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2008).published
    The duty of an employer to provide its employees with a safe place to work (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]; Hess v Bernheimer & Schwartz Pilsener Brewing Co., 219 NY 415, 418 [1916]; Anderson v Bush Indus., 280 AD2d 9…
  • Imtanios v. Goldman Sachs, 44 A.D.3d 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007).published
    The Civil Court erroneously relied on cases which hold that a property owner’s duty to employees working at the site does not extend to hazards which are inherent in the work the employee was hired to perform (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co.,…
  • Decker v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 13 A.D.3d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).published
    The risk inherent in the plaintiffs conduct, that a stack of boxes filled with paper products would collapse under his weight, was readily observable to a worker of the plaintiffs experience (see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 […
  • Bombero v. NAB Constr. Corp., 10 A.D.3d 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2004).published
    The Court of Appeals has held, however, that this duty does not extend to hazards which are “part of or inherent in” the very work being performed or to those hazards that may be readily observed by reasonable use of the senses in light of…
  • Soskin v. Scharff, 309 A.D.2d 1102 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2003).published
    Contrs., 247 AD2d 750, 751 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 804 [1998]), nor is it a hazard which can be said to be “part of or inherent in the very work which the contractor is to perform” (Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]; see S…
  • Chavez v. 127 Eckford Bay, LLC, 249 A.D.3d 673 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2026).published 6 cites
    Church of Glen Cove , 51 AD3d 725, 726; see Gasper v Ford Motor Co. , 13 NY2d 104, 110; Vitale v Astoria Energy II, LLC , 180 AD3d 1104, 1106).
  • Rosenblatt v. Wagman, 56 A.D.2d 1103 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).published
    Contrs., 247 AD2d 750, 751 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 804 [1998]; see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]; Stephens v Tucker, 184 AD2d at 829-830 ).
  • Musillo v. Marist Coll., 306 A.D.2d 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2003).published
    Co., 229 AD2d 837, 838 [1996], lv dismissed and denied 89 NY2d 854 [1996]; see Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104, 110 [1963]; Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll, in Town of Schenectady, 267 AD2d 651, 653 [1999]).
192 N.E.2d at 166 no responsibility rests upon an owner of real property to one hurt through a dangerous condition which he has undertaken to fix” (internal quotation omitted)1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
  • Kaczmarek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F. Supp. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).published
    (no responsibility rests upon an owner of real property to one hurt through a dangerous condition which he has undertaken to fix” (internal quotation omitted))
192 N.E.2d at 165 cited at this page1 citing case
  • Mario Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 622 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980).published 2 cites
    Wright v. Belt Associates, 14 N.Y.2d 129, 134 , 249 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418 , 198 N.E.2d 590, 591 (1964); Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N.Y.2d 104, 110-11 , 242 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208-09 , 192 N.E.2d 163, 165-66 (1963); Zucchelli v. City Constr.
Other citing cases4 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Linda Gasper, as Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Gasper
v.
Ford Motor Company, and Third-Party Frederick Seifert, Doing Business as Main Window Cleaning Company, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent
New York Court of Appeals.
Jul 10, 1963.
Published opinion
192 N.E.2d 163
1963 N.Y. LEXIS 1029
Richard E. Moot, Roy P. Ohlin and James 8. Marvin for defendant-appellant and third-party plaintiff-appellant., John B. Davison, William J. Flynn and Bose M. Frederickson for respondent., John P. Lane, Joseph M. Soviero and Harry Schechter for third-party defendant-respondent.
Desmond, Scileppi.
Cited by 82 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Scileppi, J.

Plaintiff’s intestate, Donald Gasper, was employed as a master window cleaner by Frederick Seifert (doing business as Main Window Cleaning Company). Seifert’s company was engaged by defendant Ford to wash the windows of its stamping plant at Hamburg, New York. On June 2, 1953 Gasper, in the course of his employment of cleaning a window on an enclosed bridge or elevated walkway at defendant’s plant, had placed a plank across the glass face of a horizontally opened ventilating window. The window collapsed under the decedent’s weight, and he fell to the ground some 34 feet below, sustaining fatal injuries.

On the day of the accident, the decedent, Gasper, and two fellow workers, after selecting their own tools and equipment for the job, proceeded to the Ford plant in Hamburg, and commenced washing the windows of the elevated bridge. The bridge connected the employees’ parking lot with the second floor of the factory, and passed over the fence enclosing the parking lot, a small sloping bank, a two-lane private access road used for delivery of material, and a 48-foot level apron between the access road and the factory.

By the custom and practice of the trade, the choice of equipment and manner of performing the work was left entirely to the discretion of the master window cleaners. They were in complete charge of the manner and method of prosecuting the work. No Ford employees were present at the time of the accident except two plant guards positioned at the ends of the bridge. Neither the Ford maintenance man, who had occasionally observed the work on prior occasions, nor any other Ford employees had ever given any instructions on the manner or method of washing the windows, but the superintendent of maintenance had given the window washers orders not to hold up production in any way. No Ford equipment, tools or devices were employed in the work.

The decedent ivas working inside the bridge and, after washing the inside face of the windows, he opened one of the horizontally[*109] pivoted ventilating windows by pushing the bottom out and up. The top slid down in the window frame and the bottom swung out clear of the inside passage. In the open position the window itself was horizontal with the outside glass panes facing upwards. It was held in this position by friction only; pressure on the inside top edge would keep it open, pressure on the outside or bottom edge or pulling on the handle affixed to the bottom edge would close the window.

The open window left a 14-inch space above it through which the decedent placed a short plank on the upturned face of the glass window panes. According to coworkers employing the same method, this enabled Gasper to ‘ ‘ wiggle around out ’ ’ through the open space and sit upon the plank which served as an improvised platform. He was then entirely outside the building except for his legs from the knee down. Just before decedent’s fall to the ground, he was seen to be “ going backwards ’ ’ and ‘1 downward or outward ’ ’. After the accident, the window hung from one channel with a broken or bent arm on the other side.

There was testimony at the trial that other employees, with the knowledge of both the independent contractor and the defendant, had employed this method of washing these windows on previous occasions, and, prior to the accident, none of the windows had failed when used to support a plank as a window washing platform. The reasons given by the other window washers for selecting this method of performing the work are concerned with what they considered to be the ‘ ‘ simplest ’ ’ or “ safest” way. They did not believe that a hook ladder was appropriate for this type of building. There were no ladders affixed to the building with which to reach the roof, no spigots on the roof to fill the pails, no catwalk upon which a cleaner could stand in order to wash the windows nor a trolley rail from which a boatswain’s chair, if rigged, could be moved along the face of the windows. Extension ladders were not selected, it was stated, because there was traffic on the two-lane access road which passed under part of the bridge.

Thus, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there was no way, other than that used by decedent, by which the windows could have been cleaned.

[*110] There was testimony that the window was not designed or intended to support a plank as a window washing platform or to sustain the weight of a man. It should he noted that no defect in the manufacture or use of this ventilating window as a ventilating window was proven or claimed; it was a matter of common engineering knowledge, however, that it was not designed to so hold the weight of a man.

Section 202 of the Labor Law, which requires the owner of a building, for the protection of window washers, to install and maintain anchors on all windows or to provide other safe and approved means for cleaning windows, is expressly inapplicable to the building in question. Ford’s liability, therefore, was predicated on its failure to provide decedent with a safe place to work, in that Ford constructed and occupied a building lacking proper design features for window washing.

At common law an employer had a duty to provide his employees with a safe place to work (Hess v. Bernheimer & Schwartz Brewing Co., 219 N. Y. 415, 418). Section 200 of the Labor Law codified and extended this duty by placing upon the owner of a building a similar obligation concerning defects in the plant for the purpose for which the plant is used (Hess v. Bernheimer & Schwartz Brewing Co., supra; Borshowsky v. Altman & Co., 280 App. Div. 599, affd. 306 N. Y. 798). The duty, however, is subject to recognized exceptions. It does not extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work which the contractor is to perform (Mullin v. Genesee County Elec. Light, Power d Gas Co., 202 N. Y. 275), or where the workmen are engaged for the specific purpose of repairing the defect (Kowalsky v. Conreco Co., 264 N. Y. 125). Nor does any duty rest upon an owner “ to secure the safety of his servant against a condition, or even defects, risks or dangers that may be readily observed by the reasonable use of the senses, having in view the age, intelligence and experience of the servant” (McLean v. Studebaker Bros. Co., 221 N. Y. 475, 478; Dougherty v. Pratt Inst., 244 N. Y. 111). His duty is to furnish a safe “plant” (Borshowsky v. Altman d Go., supra), but this duty does not make the owner responsible for the sufficiency of the contractor’s own plant, tools and methods (Zucchelli v. City Constr. Co., 4 N Y 2d 52, 56; Hess v. Bernheimer d Schwartz [*111] Brewing Co., 219 N. Y. 415, supra), nor is it breached when the contractor’s employee puts a common structural object to an unintended use (Italiano v. Jeffrey Garden Apts. Section II, 3 A D 2d 677, affd. 3 N Y 2d 977). “ A plant is defective when any part of it is not in a proper condition for the purpose for which it was intended and it is also defective when it is so incomplete that the use of the plant is dangerous by reason of the failure to furnish reasonably necessary parts for the purpose for which it is used.” (Wiley v. Solvay Process Co., 215 N. Y. 584, 591.)

Defendant’s bridge was used to connect its factory with the employees’ parking lot. There is no doubt that it was safe for that purpose. So, too, the ventilating windows were safe qua ventilating windows. The accident did not occur because of a defect in the defendant’s “plant”, which in all respects was adapted and appropriate to its intended use, but because of the method employed by decedent in the performance of his work, e.g., putting a common structural device to an unintended purpose. And it seems to us that the danger in using the window in such manner was readily apparent (cf. Dougherty v. Pratt Inst., 244 N. Y. Ill, supra). Defendant’s knowledge that the windows had been cleaned previously by the same method does not fasten liability upon it (Borshowsky v. Altman & Co., 280 App. Div. 599, affd. 306 N. Y. 798, supra). Ford had no duty to supervise the method by which decedent cleaned the windows or to supply him with the equipment necessary to perform the work (Borshowsky v. Altman & Co., supra); in fact, by custom in the trade, the choice of equipment and method was left entirely to the master window cleaner, the decedent.

Accordingly, the judgment in plaintiff’s favor should be reversed, without costs, and the complaint dismissed.

[For motion to amend remittitur, see 13 N Y 2d 893.]

Dissent

Chief Judge Desmond

(dissenting). I vote to affirm.

Ford had, it is conceded, an affirmative duty to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work. The jury was justified by the evidence in this record in finding that a seat on the ventilating window was the only place from which this work could be done. The sole question, therefore, is: did Ford “ furnish” this locus as the place to do this work? The jury’s answer “ Yes ” was well based on the proof that responsible employees of Ford[*112] had furnished no other place or way to do the work and knew that the windows were being tvashed in this manner. Borshowsky v. Altman & Co. (306 N. Y. 798) is not in point except as an authority for plaintiff, since the dismissal of Borshowsky’s complaint was based on proof not only that plaintiff had been told to keep off the glass marquee but that there were other safe ways to do the cleaning and that defendant Altman never knew that the marquee was being used for the purpose.

Judges Dye, Fuld and Van Voorhis concur with Judge Scileppi; Judge Foster concurs in result; Chief Judge Desmond dissents in an opinion in which Judge Burke concurs.

Judgment reversed, etc.

[For motion to amend remittitur, see 13 N Y 2d 893.]