green
Positive treatment
Issue: concrete standardNY ↗
Issue: breach standardNY ↗
Issue: Industrial Code violationNY ↗
Issue: plaintiff must prove violationNY ↗
15.2 score
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lema v. Iris Erenstein Props., L.L.C.
Accordingly, in order to support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable given the circumstances of the accident, and sets forth a specific standard of conduct rather than a mere reiteration of common-law principals ( see id. at 502; Ares v State , 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; see also Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lema v. Iris Erenstein Props., L.L.C.
Accordingly, in order to support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable given the circumstances of the accident, and sets forth a specific standard of conduct rather than a mere reiteration of common-law principals ( see id. at 502; Ares v State , 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; see also Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Prunty v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.
To prevail on a claim under Labor Law §241(6), plaintiff must demonstrate that his injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision (See Ares v State, 80 NY2d 959, 960 (1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Moore v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc.
To prevail on a claim under Labor Law §241 (6), plaintiff must demonstrate that his injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision (See Ares v State, 80 NY2d 959, 960 (1992)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Reyes v. Arco Wentworth Management Corp.
Co., 81 NY2d at 502 ; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 [1995]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gonnerman v. Huddleston
The protection afforded workers by Labor Law § 241 (6) is not limited to construction involving buildings, but extends to workers involved in, among other things, road construction projects (see Mosher v State of New York, 80 NY2d 286, 289 [1992]; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gray v. City of New York
Thus, a plaintiff supports a Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action by demonstrating that his or her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code rule applicable to the circumstances of the accident and setting forth a concrete standard of conduct rather than a mere reiteration of common-law principles (id.; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 [1995]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Huether v. New York Times Building, LLC
Accordingly, in order to support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of a New York State Industrial Code provision that is applicable given the circumstances of the accident, and sets forth a concrete standard of conduct rather than a mere reiteration of common-law principles (id. at 502; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; see also Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 [1995]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (b) (1) (i), which pertains to “falling hazards” and “hazardous openings” pro…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ortega v. Puccia
Co., 81 NY2d at 502 ; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 [1995]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rivera v. Santos
Co., 81 NY2d 494, 502 [1993]; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972 [1995]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rivera v. Rite Lite Ltd.
Accordingly, in order to support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable given the circumstances of the accident, and sets forth a concrete standard of conduct rather than a mere reiteration of common-law principles (Ross at 502 ; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; see also Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 [1995]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shaheen v. Hueber-Breuer Construction Co.
Moreover, we conclude that Hueber-Breuer and RMI failed to establish as a matter of law that the violation of that provision, which requires the installation of toeboards on scaffolds, was not a proximate cause of decedent’s injuries (cf. Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; Enderlin v Hebert Indus.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lawyer v. Rotterdam Ventures, Inc.
It should be noted that the First and Fourth Departments disagree with this Department with respect to the requirement that a plaintiff must prove a violation of the specific standards set forth in the implementing regulations (see, Leon v Peppe Realty Corp., 190 AD2d 400, 409 [1st Dept]; Nagel v Metzger, 103 AD2d 1, 7-8 [4th Dept]; cf, Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [failure to establish that violation of a safety regulation promulgated pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6) was the proximate cause of the accident required dismissal]).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Palacios v. Ford Found.
Auth., 213 AD3d 506 , 507–08 [1st Dept 2023]; see also Ares v State, 80 NY2d 959, 959 [1992]).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Duffina v. County of Essex
I recognize that, notwithstanding the seemingly contrary language of the statute, Labor Law § 241 (6) has been judicially extended to encompass highway repaving projects (see Mosher v State of New York, 80 NY2d 286, 288-289 [1992]; see also Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; Torres v Springcreek Assoc., 295 AD2d 976, 977 [2002]), and I acknowledge both that plaintiff has alleged the violation of a specific provision of the Industrial Code and that the record before us contains conflicting proof as to the cause of the asserted brake failure.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Duffina v. County of Essex
I recognize that, notwithstanding the seemingly contrary language of the statute, Labor Law § 241 (6) has been judicially extended to encompass highway repaving projects (see Mosher v State of New York, 80 NY2d 286, 288-289 [1992]; see also Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959, 960 [1992]; Torres v Springcreek Assoc., 295 AD2d 976, 977 [2002]), and I acknowledge both that plaintiff has alleged the violation of a specific provision of the Industrial Code and that the record before us contains conflicting proof as to the cause of the asserted brake failure.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Cooper-Fry v. Kolket
Considering that plaintiff had the burden of proof on the issue of serious injury and the jury was entitled to reject the expert opinion as to permanency (see, PJI3d 1:90 [1997]; 1A NY PJI3d 117 [1997]; see also, Ares v State of New York, 176 AD2d 203 , affd 80 NY2d 959 ; Linton v Nieves, 175 AD2d 550, 551 ; Mechanick v Conradi, 139 AD2d 857, 859 ), the question should have gone to the jury (see, Barker v Bice, 87 AD2d 908 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Tamara R
v.
Pete F.
v.
Pete F.
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 22, 1992.
605 N.E.2d 870
1992 N.Y. LEXIS 3790
Cited by 45 opinions | Published
Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals sua sponte, upon the ground that the two-Justice dissent at the Appellate Division is not on a question of law (CPLR 5601 [a]).