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63 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1838–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berger v. Beckergreen2 sentences2011“To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury” (Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Nichols v Stamer, 49 AD3d 832, 833 [2008]). 2009“To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury” (Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000] [citation omitted]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Nichols v Stamer, 49 AD3d 832 [2008]). | 9 | 10 |
Ornstein v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.green2 sentences2023Corp. , 10 NY3d 1, 6 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Derago v Ko , 189 AD3d 1352, 1354-1355 ; Sawitsky v State of New York , 146 AD3d 914, 915 ). 2020Corp. , 10 NY3d 1, 6 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). | 7 | 8 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen2 sentences2011“To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury” (Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Nichols v Stamer, 49 AD3d 832, 833 [2008]). 2009“To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury” (Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000] [citation omitted]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Nichols v Stamer, 49 AD3d 832 [2008]). | 4 | 4 |
Taggart v. Costabilegreen2 sentences2024(See Taggart v Costabile, 131 AD3d 243, 252-253 [2d Dept 2015] ["A breach of the duty of care resulting directly in emotional harm is compensable even though no physical injury occurred when the mental injury is a direct consequence, rather than a consequential result, of the breach and when the claim possesses some guarantee of genuineness."]) Defendants maintain that "on its face, the complaint fails to show that the actions of the Board, in furthering a legitimate business purpose, could be considered a direct breach of a duty owed to plaintiff." (NYSCEF doc. no. 27 at 14.) In opposition, p 2020Corp. , 10 NY3d 1, 6 , quoting Kennedy v McKesson Co. , 58 NY2d 500, 504, 506 ; see Taggart v Costabile , 131 AD3d 243, 256 ). | 3 | 5 |
Nichols v. Stamergreen2 sentences2011“To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury” (Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Nichols v Stamer, 49 AD3d 832, 833 [2008]). 2009“To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury” (Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000] [citation omitted]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Nichols v Stamer, 49 AD3d 832 [2008]). | 3 | 5 |
Deadwyler v. North Shore University Hospital at Plainviewgreen2 sentences2022Hosp. at Plainview , 55 AD3d 780, 781 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kelly v New York City Health & Hosps. 2021Hosp. at Plainview , 55 AD3d 780, 781 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Pieter v Polin , 148 AD3d at 1194 ). | 3 | 3 |
Kennedy v. McKesson Co.green2 sentences2020Corp. , 10 NY3d 1, 6 , quoting Kennedy v McKesson Co. , 58 NY2d 500, 504, 506 ; see Taggart v Costabile , 131 AD3d 243, 256 ). 2019Corp. , 10 NY3d 1, 6 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kennedy v McKesson Co. , 58 NY2d 500, 504 ; Ball v Miller , 164 AD3d 728 , 730; Taggart v Costabile , 131 AD3d 243, 252 ). | 3 | 3 |
Pieter v. Polingreen2 sentences2025"To establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove '(1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendants breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury'" ( id. [alteration omitted], quoting Pieter v Polin , 148 AD3d 1193, 1194 ). 2024To establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove "(1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant[s] breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury" ( Pieter v Polin , 148 AD3d 1193, 1194 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hudler v Reddy , 226 AD3d 654 , 655). | 2 | 4 |
Lesniak v. Stockholm Obstetrics & Gynecological Services, P.C.green2 sentences2024Ctr. , 104 AD3d 680 , 681 [2d Dept 2013]; cf. Lesniak v Stockholm Obstetrics & Gynecological Servs., P.C. , 132 AD3d 959, 961 [2d Dept 2015]). 2024Ctr. , 104 AD3d 680 , 681 [2d Dept 2013]; cf. Lesniak v Stockholm Obstetrics & Gynecological Servs., P.C. , 132 AD3d 959, 961 [2d Dept 2015]). | 2 | 2 |
Shapiro v. Butlergreen2 sentences2021Concrete Proceeding or to seek an extension of time to answer constitutes a breach of the standard of professional care ( Shapiro v Butler , 273 AD2d 657, 658 [3d Dept 2000]). 2021Concrete Proceeding or to seek an extension of time to answer constitutes a breach of the standard of professional care ( Shapiro v Butler , 273 AD2d 657, 658 [3d Dept 2000]). | 2 | 2 |
Baumann v. Hanover Community Bankgreen2 sentences2017Corp., 10 NY3d 1, 6 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kennedy v McKesson Co., 58 NY2d 500, 504 [1983]; Taggart v Costabile, 131 AD3d 243, 255-256 [2015]; Baumann v Hanover Community Bank, 100 AD3d 814, 816 [2012]). 2015Corp., 10 NY3d 1, 6 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Baumann v Hanover Community Bank, 100 AD3d at 816 ). | 2 | 2 |
Elliot v. Long Island Home, Ltd.green2 sentences2008Home, Ltd., 12 AD3d 481, 482 [2004]). 2008Home, Ltd., 12 AD3d 481, 482 [2004]; Hanley v St. | 2 | 2 |
Kilgore v. Rochdale Village, Inc.green2 sentences2017Hosp. at Plainview, 55 AD3d 780, 781 [2008], quoting Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000]; see Brown v Shah, 109 AD3d 948 , 949 [2013]; Dockery v Sprecher, 68 AD3d 1043, 1045 [2009]; Harper v Findling, 38 AD3d 601, 602 [2007]; Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d 516, 517 [1998]). “ ‘Expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from accepted standards of medical care and to establish proximate cause’ ” (Novick v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 136 AD3d 999, 1000 [2016], quoting Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d at 517 ; see Sushchenko v Dyker Emergency Physicians Serv., P.C., 86 AD3d 638, 639 [2011] 2017Hosp. at Plainview, 55 AD3d 780, 781 [2008], quoting Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000]; see Brown v Shah, 109 AD3d 948 , 949 [2013]; Dockery v Sprecher, 68 AD3d 1043, 1045 [2009]; Harper v Findling, 38 AD3d 601, 602 [2007]; Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d 516, 517 [1998]). “ ‘Expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from accepted standards of medical care and to establish proximate cause’ ” (Novick v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 136 AD3d 999, 1000 [2016], quoting Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d at 517 ; see Sushchenko v Dyker Emergency Physicians Serv., P.C., 86 AD3d 638, 639 [2011] | 1 | 4 |
Jones Lang Wootton USA v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRaegreen2 sentences2005Generally, “[settlement of an action will not preclude an award of damages for legal malpractice where the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that the settlement was caused by the malpractice and resulting damages” (Fusco v Fauci, 299 AD2d 263 , 263 [1st Dept 2002] [citation omitted] [malpractice claim dismissed where settlement exceeded stipulated value of claim to client]; Jones, Lang Wootton USA v LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 [1st Dept 1998] [posttrial settlement “when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, does not present an intervening cause so as t 1999It was only required to plead, with sufficient detail, that, but for the attorneys’ alleged malpractice, plaintiff would have avoided some “actual ascertainable damage” (Franklin v Winard, 199 AD2d 220, 221 ), and settlement, when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, as alleged herein, does not constitute an intervening cause barring a claim for legal malpractice (Jones Lang Wootton v LeBoeuf Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 ; Whitman & Ransom v Revson, 220 AD2d 321 ). | 1 | 3 |
Brown v. Hitesh Shah M.D.green2 sentences2024To establish proximate causation in a medical malpractice case, a plaintiff must present sufficient medical evidence from which "a reasonable person might conclude that it was more probable than not that the defendant's departure was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury" ( Brown v Shah , 109 AD3d 948 , 949 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Speciale v Achari , 29 AD3d 674, 674 ). 2017Hosp. at Plainview, 55 AD3d 780, 781 [2008], quoting Berger v Becker, 272 AD2d 565, 565 [2000]; see Brown v Shah, 109 AD3d 948 , 949 [2013]; Dockery v Sprecher, 68 AD3d 1043, 1045 [2009]; Harper v Findling, 38 AD3d 601, 602 [2007]; Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d 516, 517 [1998]). “ ‘Expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from accepted standards of medical care and to establish proximate cause’ ” (Novick v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 136 AD3d 999, 1000 [2016], quoting Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d at 517 ; see Sushchenko v Dyker Emergency Physicians Serv., P.C., 86 AD3d 638, 639 [2011] | 1 | 2 |
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town of North Hempsteadgreen2 sentences2005Generally, “[settlement of an action will not preclude an award of damages for legal malpractice where the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that the settlement was caused by the malpractice and resulting damages” (Fusco v Fauci, 299 AD2d 263 , 263 [1st Dept 2002] [citation omitted] [malpractice claim dismissed where settlement exceeded stipulated value of claim to client]; Jones, Lang Wootton USA v LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 [1st Dept 1998] [posttrial settlement “when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, does not present an intervening cause so as t 1998Settlement, when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, does not present an intervening cause so as to bar a malpractice action (Kerson Co. v Shayne, Dachs, Weiss, Kolbrenner, Levy, 59 AD2d 551, 552-553 [Suozzi, J., concurring], affd 45 NY2d 730 for reasons stated in concurring mem; Whitman & Ransom v Revson, 220 AD2d 321 ; Bernstein v Oppenheim & Co., 160 AD2d 428 ). | 1 | 2 |
| Navarro v. Ortizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Speciale v. Acharigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coffey v. Mansourigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Derago v. Kogreen | 1 | 1 |
| E.B. v. Liberation Publications, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Webster v. Ragonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dockery v. Sprechergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sheinmel v. Comar Restaurants, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Novick v. South Nassau Communities Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harper v. Findlinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barila v. Comprehensive Pain Caregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quezada v. O'Reilly-Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dragotta v. Southampton Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Singleton v. Citnalta Construction Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rodriguez v. Fredericksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gross v. Friedmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gross v. Friedmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Koehler v. Schwartz
green
2 sentences2009“Expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from accepted standards of medical care and to establish proximate cause” (Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d 516 , 517 [1998] [citations omitted], citing Koehler v Schwartz, 48 NY2d 807 [1979]). 2008“Expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from accepted standards of medical care and to establish proximate cause” (Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d 516 , 517 [1998], citing Koehler v Schwartz, 48 NY2d 807 [1979]). | 3 | 2007–2009 |
Gibson v. D'Amico
green
2 sentences2000To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury (see, Gibson v D’Amico, 97 AD2d 905 ; see also, Gross v Friedman, 138 AD2d 571 , affd 73 NY2d 721 ; Kelly v Lieber, 261 AD2d 441 ). 1990It is now firmly established that "in most medical malpractice actions, a plaintiff must prove through expert medical opinion (1) the standard of care in the locality where treatment occurred, (2) that defendant breached that standard of care and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury” (Gibson v D’Amico, 97 AD2d 905 , lv denied 61 NY2d 603 ). | 3 | 1985–2000 |
People v. Sparrow
green
2 sentences1999It was only required to plead, with sufficient detail, that, but for the attorneys’ alleged malpractice, plaintiff would have avoided some “actual ascertainable damage” (Franklin v Winard, 199 AD2d 220, 221 ), and settlement, when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, as alleged herein, does not constitute an intervening cause barring a claim for legal malpractice (Jones Lang Wootton v LeBoeuf Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 ; Whitman & Ransom v Revson, 220 AD2d 321 ). 1999It was only required to plead, with sufficient detail, that, but for the attorneys’ alleged malpractice, plaintiff would have avoided some “actual ascertainable damage” (Franklin v Winard, 199 AD2d 220, 221 ), and settlement, when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, as alleged herein, does not constitute an intervening cause barring a claim for legal malpractice (Jones Lang Wootton v LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 ; Whitman & Ransom v Revson, 220 AD2d 321 ). | 3 | 1998–1999 |
Xiao Yan Chen v. Maimonides Medical Center
neutral
2 sentences2024Ctr. , 104 AD3d 680 , 681 [2d Dept 2013]; cf. Lesniak v Stockholm Obstetrics & Gynecological Servs., P.C. , 132 AD3d 959, 961 [2d Dept 2015]). 2024Ctr. , 104 AD3d 680 , 681 [2d Dept 2013]; cf. Lesniak v Stockholm Obstetrics & Gynecological Servs., P.C. , 132 AD3d 959, 961 [2d Dept 2015]). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
NA KERSON CO., INC. v. Shayne
green
2 sentences2005Generally, “[settlement of an action will not preclude an award of damages for legal malpractice where the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that the settlement was caused by the malpractice and resulting damages” (Fusco v Fauci, 299 AD2d 263 , 263 [1st Dept 2002] [citation omitted] [malpractice claim dismissed where settlement exceeded stipulated value of claim to client]; Jones, Lang Wootton USA v LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 [1st Dept 1998] [posttrial settlement “when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, does not present an intervening cause so as t 1998Settlement, when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, does not present an intervening cause so as to bar a malpractice action (Kerson Co. v Shayne, Dachs, Weiss, Kolbrenner, Levy, 59 AD2d 551, 552-553 [Suozzi, J., concurring], affd 45 NY2d 730 for reasons stated in concurring mem; Whitman & Ransom v Revson, 220 AD2d 321 ; Bernstein v Oppenheim & Co., 160 AD2d 428 ). | 2 | 1998–2005 |
Leon's Collision Shop, Inc. v. Adduci
green
2 sentences1999Further, defendants’ conclusory assertion that Home will never be able to prove damages does not provide a sufficient basis for dismissal at this stage of the proceedings (see, e.g., VDR Realty Corp. v Mintz, 167 AD2d 986 ). 1999Further, defendants’ conclusory assertion that Home will never be able to prove damages does not provide a sufficient basis for dismissal at this stage of the proceedings (see, e.g., VDR Realty Corp. v Mintz, 167 AD2d 986 ). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Franklin v. Winard
green
2 sentences1999It was only required to plead, with sufficient detail, that, but for the attorneys’ alleged malpractice, plaintiff would have avoided some “actual ascertainable damage” (Franklin v Winard, 199 AD2d 220, 221 ), and settlement, when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, as alleged herein, does not constitute an intervening cause barring a claim for legal malpractice (Jones Lang Wootton v LeBoeuf Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 ; Whitman & Ransom v Revson, 220 AD2d 321 ). 1999It was only required to plead, with sufficient detail, that, but for the attorneys’ alleged malpractice, plaintiff would have avoided some “actual ascertainable damage” (Franklin v Winard, 199 AD2d 220, 221 ), and settlement, when compelled by an attorney’s breach of the standard of care, as alleged herein, does not constitute an intervening cause barring a claim for legal malpractice (Jones Lang Wootton v LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 243 AD2d 168, 175 ; Whitman & Ransom v Revson, 220 AD2d 321 ). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital
neutral
2 sentences1985Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831).” In Taormina v Goodman ( 63 AD2d 1018 ), the testimony of a medical doctor was offered as an expert against a defendant chiropractor. 1983Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831). | 2 | 1983–1985 |
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831).” In Taormina v Goodman ( 63 AD2d 1018 ), the testimony of a medical doctor was offered as an expert against a defendant chiropractor. 1983Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831). | 2 | 1983–1985 |
McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital
green
2 sentences1985In Gibson v D’Amico ( 97 AD2d 905 [3d Dept 1983]), the court held at page 905: "It has long been the recognized rule of law that in order to establish a prima facie case of liability in most medical malpractice actions, a plaintiff must prove through expert medical opinion (1) the standard of care in the locality where treatment occurred, (2) that defendant breached that standard of care and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury (see, e.g., McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 NY2d 20, 24 ; Meiselman v Crown Hgts. 1983It has long been the recognized rule of law that in order to establish a prima facie case of liability in most medical malpractice actions, a plaintiff must prove through expert medical opinion (1) the standard of care in the locality where treatment occurred, (2) that defendant breached that standard of care and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury (see, e.g., McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 NY2d 20, 24 ; Meiselman v Crown Hgts. | 2 | 1983–1985 |
Morwin v. Albany Hospital
neutral
2 sentences1985Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831).” In Taormina v Goodman ( 63 AD2d 1018 ), the testimony of a medical doctor was offered as an expert against a defendant chiropractor. 1983Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831). | 2 | 1983–1985 |
McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital
neutral
2 sentences1985Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831).” In Taormina v Goodman ( 63 AD2d 1018 ), the testimony of a medical doctor was offered as an expert against a defendant chiropractor. 1983Hosp., 285 NY 389 ; McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 26 AD2d 519 , affd 18 NY2d 970 ; Morwin v Albany Hosp., 7 AD2d 582 ; 2C Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts [3d ed], Physicians and Surgeons, § 13.02, pp 830-831). | 2 | 1983–1985 |
Ayers v. Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen
green
2 sentences1907Plaintiff cites the decision of the Court of Appeals, in the case of Ayres v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 188 N. Y. 280 , in support of his contention that the defendant had no right, by an amendment to its by-laws, to impair the vested rights of the assured; and the court, in that case, does hold that, when a power to amend by-laws is reserved in general terms, the parties „do not mean that the contract is subject to change in any essential part at the election of the one in whose favor the reservation is made. 1907Plaintiff cites the decision of the Court of Appeals, in the case of Ayres v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 188 N. Y. 280 , in support of his contention that the defendant had no right, by an amendment to its by-laws, to impair the vested rights of the assured; and the court, in that case, does hold that, when a power to amend by-laws is reserved in general terms, the parties „do not mean that the contract is subject to change in any essential part at the election of the one in whose favor the reservation is made. | 2 | 1907–1907 |
Bidwell v. . the North Western Insurance Company
neutral
2 sentences1867Co., 24 N. Y. 302 : “ If such facts are to be held a breach of such a clause, they are a breach co instanti of the making of the contract, and are so known to be by the company as well as the insured; and to allow the company to take the premium, without taking the risk, would be to encourage a fraud: It would, as a legal principle, be equivalent to holding that a warranty of the soundness of a horse is a warranty that he has four legs, when one has been cut off.” See also Tallman v. Atlantic Fire & M. 1867Company ( 24 N. Y. 302 ): “ If such facts are to be held a breach of such a clause, they are a breach eo instanti of the making of the contract, and are so known to be by the company as well as the insured; and to allow the company to take the premium, without taking the risk, would be to encourage a fraud. | 2 | 1867–1867 |
| Tsitrin v. New York Community Hospital green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Sawitsky v. State of New York green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Hecht v. Kaplan green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Perry v. Valley Cottage Animal Hospital green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Iocovello v. Weingrad & Weingrad green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Venezia v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Rau v. Bagels N Brunch, Inc. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Forschner v. Jucca Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Sanatass v. Consolidated Investing Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Sandmann v. Shapiro green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Kaf-Kaf, Inc. v. Rodless Decorations, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Bess green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contracting Co. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Lasek v. Nachtigall green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Kelly v. Lieber neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Republic Western Insurance v. RCR Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Tamara B. v. Pete F. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Spitaleri green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Schmidt v. Bishop green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Toth v. Community Hospital green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Todd Equipment Leasing Co. v. Pierce Trading Corp. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Akins v. Glens Falls City School District green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Davidoff v. Metropolitan Baseball Club, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Saks & Co. v. Continental Ins. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Biltmore Knitwear Corp. v. Chalfin neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.