People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2d 901 (N.Y. 1996). · Go Syfert
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People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2d 901 (N.Y. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases · …the imposition of an affirmative burden of proof over defense objection and the involuntary undermining of the defendant's chosen defense strategy resulted in serious prejudice that requires reversal ✓ Topic ↗
56 citation events (49 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Roller (ohioctapp, 2016-12-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Roller
Ohio Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2d 901, 902 , 669 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The People v.Christopher E. Walker
NY · 2015 · confidence medium
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the indictment dismissed, with leave to the People, if they be so advised, to resubmit the charge of manslaughter in the first degree to a new grand jury (see People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 904 [1996]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Clark
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Rather, we only determine that where, as in this case, an instruction regarding such a defense is adamantly opposed by the defendant and his counsel, would logically conflict with the defendant’s well-considered defense choice, and possesses only tenuous applicability to the facts of the case, “the risk attendant upon [presenting inconsistent defenses] should not [be] foisted on [the defendant] against his will” (People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 904 [1996]; see People v DeGina, 72 NY2d at 777 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Brewer
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
It is well settled that a court cannot instruct a jury on an affirmative defense where the defendant objects to the instruction (see People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 902-903 [1996]; People v DeGina, 72 NY2d 768, 776-778 [1988]; People v Martin [appeal No. 1], 66 AD2d 995, 995-996 [1978]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Brewer
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
It is well settled that a court cannot instruct a jury on an affirmative defense where the defendant objects to the instruction (see People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 902-903 [1996]; People v DeGina, 72 NY2d 768, 776-778 [1988]; People v Martin [appeal No. 1], 66 AD2d 995, 995-996 [1978]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Green (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The court’s instruction placed no additional burden on defendant (compare People v DeGina, 72 NY2d at 776-777 ; People v Bradley, 88 NY2d at 903-904).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Green (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The court’s instruction placed no additional burden on defendant (compare People v DeGina, 72 NY2d at 776-777 ; People v Bradley, 88 NY2d at 903-904).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Colville
NY · 2012 · confidence medium
Similarly, the EED defense can be given to the jury only upon a defendant’s request; the People may not seek and a court may not submit this defense to the jury over a defendant’s objection (see People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 902 [1996]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. RT
N.J. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Perry, supra, 124 N.J. at 162-63 , 590 A. 2d 624 ; Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 300-01 , 486 A. 2d 833 ; see also People v. Salas, 37 Cal. 4th 967 , 38 Cal.Rptr. 3d 624 , 127 P. 3d 40, 49 (2006) (affirmative defense instruction not warranted where inconsistent with defendant's theory of case); People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y. 2d 901 , 646 N.Y.S. 2d 657 , 669 N.E. 2d 815, 816 (1996) ("[A] defendant ... has the right to chart his own defense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. R.T.
N.J. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Perry, supra, 124 N.J. at 162-63 , 590 A.2d 624 ; Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 300-01 , 486 A.2d 833 ; see also People v. Salas, 37 Cal.4th 967 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624 , 127 P.3d 40, 49 (2006) (affirmative defense instruction not warranted where inconsistent with defendant’s theory of case); People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2 901, 646 N.Y.S.2d 657 , 669 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1996) (“[A] defendant ... has the right to chart his own defense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ramkissoon
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
While a defendant is entitled to present inconsistent defenses (see People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 904 [1996]; People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 146 [1983]), counsel’s choice not to do so here was part of a reasonable and legitimate strategy.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ciborowski
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
Since the court is without the jurisdiction to, sua sponte, instruct the jury on. an affirmative defense or force a defendant to raise such a defense (see People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 902, 904 ; People v DeGina, 72 NY2d 768, 776 ), we find that County Court properly accepted defendant’s waiver of the insanity defense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Deis
NY · 2002 · confidence medium
Because defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of the second degree murder charge, we dismiss the indictment without prejudice to an application by the People for leave to resubmit the charge of criminally negligent homicide to a grand jury (People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 904 [1996]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Dunham
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
It is incumbent upon defendant to "demonstrate[] the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's allegedly deficient conduct" ( People v Duffy , 119 AD3d 1231 , 1234 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 24 NY3d 1043 [2014]; see People v McRobbie , 97 AD3d 970, 972 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 934 [2012]), and it was sensible to avoid presenting an inconsistent defense that would "create[] a risk of juror confusion and 'may well [have] taint[ed] . . . defendant's credibility in the eyes of the jury'" ( People v Bradley , 88 NY2d 901, 903 [1996]…
discussed Cited "see" People v. Fair
N.Y. App. Div. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
In any event, defendant chose to pursue the defense of duress at trial, and the sua sponte delivery of a charge on the affirmative defense of inoperability would have been “highly improper because of possible interference with defense strategy” (People v Huynh, supra, at 464 ; see also, People v Baker, 209 AD2d 293, 294 , lv denied 84 NY2d 1028 ; People v Maldonado, 175 AD2d 698 ; see generally, People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 903 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Seabra
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Under the circumstances of this particular case, counsel could have reasonably concluded that the insanity defense was stronger than the EED defense, and that raising both defenses would likely harm defendant, such as by confusing the jury ( see People v Lopez , 36 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 947 [2007]; see also People v Bradley , 88 NY2d 901, 903 [1996]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Storey
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(People v Carswell, 120 Misc 2d 274 ; see also, People v Bradley, 88 NY2d 901, 904 [1996].) In Mayo (supra), the defendant was initially brought to trial under a single-count indictment charging him with robbery in the first degree.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York
v.
James F. Bradley
New York Court of Appeals.
Jun 11, 1996.
88 N.Y.2d 901
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Connors & Vilordo, Buffalo (Terrence M. Connors and Mark R. Uba of counsel), for appellant., Kevin M. Dillon, District Attorney of Erie County, Buffalo (Donna A. Milling and John J. DeFranks of counsel), for respondent.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the indictment dismissed, without prejudice to an application by the People for leave to resubmit.

In this prosecution for second degree murder, the trial court erred in submitting the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance over objection by the defense. As we held in People v DeGina (72 NY2d 768, 776), "a defendant * * * has the right to chart his own defense.” That right is infringed when an affirmative defense is submitted over defense objection and the defendant is thereby prejudiced (id., at 776-777).

[*903] Here, defendant asserted the defense of not responsible by reason of a mental disease or defect (see, Penal Law former § 30.05 [now Penal Law § 40.15, an affirmative defense]). The specific defense theory was that defendant suffered from a progressive mental illness which had worsened in the months preceding the shooting. Defendant took the position that by the time of the shooting his condition had deteriorated to the point where his paranoid thought processes prevented him from appreciating the moral and legal import of his actions. This position was plainly incompatible with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which on these facts would have necessarily involved a temporary loss of control by a person who was otherwise capable of appreciating the nature and consequences of his actions.

At the close of the proof, the prosecutor asked the court to submit first degree manslaughter, as intentional homicide while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Over defense objection the court responded by advising the jury that it should find defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree rather than second degree murder if it found that he was legally sane and intentionally caused the death of another, but that he did so while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, and that this affirmative defense must be established by a preponderance of the evidence (see, Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]). The jury found defendant guilty of first degree manslaughter and a divided Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (211 AD2d 388). A dissenting Justice of that Court granted leave to appeal to this Court.

In People v DeGina (72 NY2d 768, supra), a narcotics-sale prosecution, the defendant was prejudiced in part because the affirmative defense that the court introduced — the entrapment defense — was inconsistent with the defense’s position — that the defendant had not, in fact, sold any drugs. As the Court noted in DeGina, the interposition of inconsistent defenses is "a hazardous tactic” because it creates a risk of juror confusion and "may well taint a defendant’s credibility in the eyes of the jury” (id., at 777). Such a strategic risk is not one that the court may foist on an unwilling defendant (id.). Moreover, when the defensive theory that the court interjects constitutes an affirmative defense there is an increased danger of prejudice because of the resulting shift in the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense and the attendant risk that the jury will believe that the defendant has assumed a burden beyond the defense.

[*904] Although defendant was entitled to present inconsistent defenses (see, People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 146; People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526, 529), the risk attendant upon such a choice should not have been foisted on him against his will (see, People v DeGina, supra). The imposition of an affirmative burden of proof over defense objection and the involuntary undermining of the defendant’s chosen defense strategy resulted in serious prejudice that requires reversal in this case.

Because defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter, the dismissal is without prejudice to an application by the People to resubmit that crime to a new Grand Jury (People v Mayo, 48 NY2d 245).

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur in memorandum.

Order reversed, etc.