New York Consolidated Laws
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (2026)
Murder in the second degree
✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
NY-LEGnysenate.gov
Justiaon Justia
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
§ 125.25 Murder in the second degree. A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that: (a) (i) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime. (ii) It shall not be a "reasonable explanation or excuse" pursuant to subparagraph (i) of this paragraph when the defendant's conduct resulted from the discovery, knowledge or disclosure of the victim's sexual orientation, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression or sex assigned at birth; or (b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime; or 2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person; or 3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, a crime formerly defined in section 130.50 of this title, the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant: (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury; or 4. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and being eighteen years old or more the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death to another person less than eleven years old and thereby causes the death of such person; or 5. Being eighteen years old or more, while in the course of committing rape in the first, second or third degree, a crime formerly defined in section 130.50, 130.45 or 130.40 of this title, the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first, second, third or fourth degree, or incest in the first, second or third degree, against a person less than fourteen years old, he or she intentionally causes the death of such person. Murder in the second degree is a class A-I felony.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3,152
cases (364 in the last 5 years), 1970–2026 · leading case: People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2002).
People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2002). “Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of "depraved indifference" murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [2]) for the shooting death of Timothy Range.”
People v. Suarez, 844 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2005). “The Statutory Categories of Homicide With the adoption of the revised Penal Law in 1965, the Legislature codified five basic categories of homicide, which have remained essentially unchanged since that time: intentional murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), [1]…”
People v. Cahill, 809 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 2003). “But the very same mens reathe intent to killalso defines intentional murder (Penal Law § 125.25). Thus, the prosecution employs the identical mens rea both to define burglary and to elevate defendant's intentional murder to murder in the first degree.”
People v. Mills, 804 N.E.2d 392 (N.Y. 2003). “Defendant Arthur Mills was indicted in March 2000 for murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [2] [depraved indifference murder]) in connection with his role in the 1978 drowning death of 12-year-old Raymond Umber.”
Angel Sellan v. Robert Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2001). “d Degree (so-called “depraved mind” murder), Manslaughter in the Fir£t Degree (a lesser included offense of second degree intentional murder, which requires intent to cause serious physical injury resulting in death), two counts of Assault in the First Degree, Reckless…”
People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y. 2003). “A grand jury indicted defendant and codefendant on two counts of second degree murder, charging both intentional murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and depraved indifference murder (Penal Law § 125.”
People v. Baker, 926 N.E.2d 240 (N.Y. 2010). “A grand jury indicted defendant for depraved indifference murder of a child (Penal Law § 125.25 [4]), manslaughter in the first and second degrees (Penal Law § 125.”
People v. Heslop, 48 A.D.3d 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). “Defendant was charged with depraved indifference murder (see Penal Law § 125.25 [4]), stemming from the death of his four-month-old son.”
People v. Miller, 845 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 2006). “27 (1) (a) (vii) (intentional felony murder) and two counts of second degree murder under Penal Law § 125.25 (1) and (3) (intentional murder and felony murder, respectively), as well as first degree burglary, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and criminal…”
David Sweet v. Floyd Bennett, Superintendent of Elmira Corr. Inst., 353 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003). “Sweet’s petition was based, among other things, on a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object when: (1) the trial court’s instructions to the jury charged Sweet with second degree murder, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 [4], and…”
People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053 (N.Y. 2004). “The Weight of the Evidence of First Degree Felony Murder Defendant claims that his conviction for first degree felony murder based on either the shooter or the commander theory was against the weight of the evidence because the evidence proved, at most, that he was an ordinary…”
The People v. Matthew A. Davis, 66 N.E.3d 1076 (N.Y. 2016). “169 Defendant was indicted for two counts of murder in the second degree (felony murder) (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), and one count each of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.”
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1): 53 cases
Hoffler v. Bezio, 831 F. Supp. 2d 570 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
Patsy Kelly Jarrett v. Frank R. Headley, Superintendent of Bedford Hills Corr. Facility, 802 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986).
Paul Cox v. David H. Miller, Superintendent, E. Corr. Facility, 296 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002).
People v. Brown, 2020 NY Slip Op 1632 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
Eugene Anderson v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent of Attica Corr. Facility, 751 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1984).
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2): 19 cases
Rustici v. Philips, 497 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D.N.Y 2007).
Gutierrez v. Smith, 702 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2012).
David Policano v. Victor T. Herbert, 453 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006).
Mannix v. Phillips, 619 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2010).
People v. Illis, 2020 NY Slip Op 3535 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(3): 22 cases
Eugene Anderson v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent of Attica Corr. Facility, 751 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1984).
Domingo Casillas v. Charles Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Corr. Facility, Stormville, New York, 769 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1985).
Cappiello v. Hoke, 698 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D.N.Y 1988).
Alexander v. Keane, 991 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Klosin v. Conway, 501 F. Supp. 2d 429 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(4): 4 cases
Rustici v. Philips, 497 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D.N.Y 2007).
Congelosi v. Miller, 611 F. Supp. 2d 274 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
People v. Smith, 2024 NY Slip Op 00280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024).
People v. Smith, 2024 NY Slip Op 00280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024).
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(8): 1 case
Nathan Sams v. Hans Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Corr. Facility, 18 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1994).
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(l)(a): 1 case
Fagan v. Kuhlman, 267 F. Supp. 2d 388 (E.D.N.Y 2003).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.