Sabetfard v. Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 A.D.3d 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). · Go Syfert
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Sabetfard v. Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 A.D.3d 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
18 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Meisels v. Meisels (nyed, 2021-05-13)
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meisels v. Meisels
E.D.N.Y · 2021 · confidence medium
Co., 20 A.D.3d 473, 474 (2005) (“To satisfy the statute of frauds, a memorandum evidencing a contract and subscribed by the party to be charged must designate the parties, identify and describe the subject matter, and state all of the essential terms of a complete agreement.”); Sabetfard v. Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 A.D.3d 640, 641 (N.Y. 2005) (real estate contract contained all “essential terms” because it specified the terms of payment, among other things); Behrends v. White Acre Acquisitions, LLC, 54 A.D.3d 700, 701 (2d Dep’t 2008) (contract was void for indefiniteness because it…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Greene v. Rachlin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Moreover, the email did not include the essential terms usually found in a real estate sales contract, such as the closing date, time and terms of payment, and the quality of title to be conveyed (see Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; O’Brien v West, 199 AD2d 369, 370 [1993]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saul v. Vidokle
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, in the emails exchanged by and between the parties and the defendant’s attorney, the parties expressly anticipated the execution of a formal contract (cf. Triple A Supplies, Inc. v WPA Acquisition Corp., 95 AD3d 1301 [2012]; Pescatore v Manniello, 19 AD3d 571, 572 [2005]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FERCHAW, MICHAEL F. v. TROXEL, RUTH A.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
In any event, we conclude that the contract satisfies the statute of frauds inasmuch as it identifies the parties, describes the property to be conveyed, sets forth the purchase price and the closing date, and provides the medium of payment (see Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; Birnhak v Vaccaro, 47 AD2d 915, 916 [1975]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Indeed, it has generally been held that, to satisfy the statute of frauds, a writing must identify the parties (see Matter of Licata, 76 AD3d 1076 , 1077 [2010]; Durso v Baisch, 37 AD3d 646, 647 [2007]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; Tawil v Trani, 127 AD2d 829 [1987]; Villano v G & C Homes, 46 AD2d 907 [1974]; Hagedorn v Lang, 34 App Div 117, 120 [1898] [“ ‘It is sufficient (for statute of frauds purposes) if the names of the principals are inserted in such form and manner as to indicate that it is their contract’ ” (quoting Coddington v Goddard, 82 Mass …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Indeed, it has generally been held that, to satisfy the statute of frauds, a writing must identify the parties (see Matter of Licata, 76 AD3d 1076 , 1077 [2010]; Durso v Baisch, 37 AD3d 646, 647 [2007]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; Tawil v Trani, 127 AD2d 829 [1987]; Villano v G & C Homes, 46 AD2d 907 [1974]; Hagedorn v Lang, 34 App Div 117, 120 [1898] [“ ‘It is sufficient (for statute of frauds purposes) if the names of the principals are inserted in such form and manner as to indicate that it is their contract’ ” (quoting Coddington v Goddard, 82 Mass …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Triple A Supplies, Inc. v. WPA Acquisition Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the letter satisfied the statute of frauds (see General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]) by identifying the parties to the subject real estate sales transaction, describing the property to be sold with sufficient particularity, and setting forth the terms of payment (see Omar v Rozen, 55 AD3d 705, 706 [2008]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; Century 21 Volpe Realty v Jhong Kim, 231 AD2d 667 [1996]; 160 Chambers St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Triple A Supplies, Inc. v. WPA Acquisition Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the letter satisfied the statute of frauds (see General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]) by identifying the parties to the subject real estate sales transaction, describing the property to be sold with sufficient particularity, and setting forth the terms of payment (see Omar v Rozen, 55 AD3d 705, 706 [2008]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; Century 21 Volpe Realty v Jhong Kim, 231 AD2d 667 [1996]; 160 Chambers St.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tsoulis v. Abbott Bros.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
We reject that contention inasmuch as the parties’ lease agreement embodied all of the essential elements of the option to purchase (see Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Behrends v. White Acre Acquisitions, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
The “essential terms” which should be set forth include, inter alia, the “terms of payment” (Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Estate of Piterniak
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
The writings relied upon by the petitioners to establish the alleged agreement among the parties were insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, as they left for future negotiations certain essential terms of the contemplated contract and were subject to the execution of a more formal contract of sale (see Nesbitt v Penalver, 40 AD3d 596, 597-599 [2007]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; Rahimzadeh v M.A.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nesbitt v. Penalver (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
The “essential terms” which should be set forth for the writing to be enforceable “include those terms customarily encountered in transactions of this nature” (O’Brien v West, supra at 370), such as the purchase price, the time and terms of payment, the required financing, the closing date, the quality of title to be conveyed, the risk of loss during the sale period, adjustments for taxes and utilities, etc. (see Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; Rahimzadeh v M.A.C.
discussed Cited "see" O'Hanlon v. Renwick
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
Insofar as relevant to this case, the "essential terms" of a contract for the sale of real property include the price and terms of payment, as well as the description of the property to be sold ( Nesbitt v Penalver , 40 AD3d 596, 598 ; see Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp. , 18 AD3d 640, 641 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Vista Developers Corp. v. VFP Realty LLC
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Co., 20 AD3d 473, 474 [2005] [emphasis supplied]; see Atai v Dogwood Realty of N.Y., Inc., 24 AD3d 695, 697 [2005]).” (Nesbitt v Penalver, 40 AD3d 596, 597-598 [2d Dept 2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640, 641 [2d Dept 2005].) Defendants maintain that there is no signed writing evidencing a contract for the sale of real property, and that plaintiff, therefore, can have no claim for specific performance.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Alfred Sabetfard
v.
Djavaheri Realty Corp.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 16, 2005.
18 A.D.3d 640
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published

In an action, inter alia, for specific performance of an agreement to purchase real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feinman, J.), dated April 19, 2004, which granted the defendant’s motion, among other things, to dismiss the complaint, directed the Nassau County Clerk to cancel the notice of pendency filed against the property designated on the North Hempstead tax map as Block 376, Section 2, Lots 9, 10, and 12, located in Great Neck and denied his cross motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof granting the motion and directing the Nassau County Clerk to cancel the notice of pendency filed against the property designated on the North Hempstead tax map as Block 376, Section 2, Lots 9, 10, and 12, located in Great Neck and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the Nassau County Clerk is directed to reinstate the notice of pendency.

Eursuant to a written agreement executed by the parties on July 25, 2002 (hereinafter the agreement), the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant certain real property designated on the North Hempstead tax map as Block 376, Section 2, Lots 9, 10, and 12, located in Great Neck. The agreement required[*641] the plaintiff to pay a deposit upon signing, and an additional deposit within seven days on signing a “more detailed & supplemental contract.” The supplemental contract was intended to address several collateral matters that were not addressed in the agreement. The defendant’s attorney delivered to the plaintiff a proposed supplemental contract which did not address all of the collateral matters. When the plaintiff discovered a zoning restriction on the property, his attorney sent a letter to the defendant’s attorney requesting a credit or a reduced purchase price. The letter also addressed the absence of the collateral matters from the proposed supplemental contract. The defendant’s attorney responded with a letter in which he advised that the price reduction was not acceptable to the defendant, and demanded that the plaintiff make the additional contract deposit by September 3, 2002. The defendant allegedly refused to meet with the plaintiff to discuss the collateral matters.

By letter dated September 19, 2002, the plaintiffs attorney requested that the defendant’s attorney return his call to schedule a closing date. By letter dated September 25, 2002, the plaintiffs attorney again requested that a closing be scheduled. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, for specific performance of the agreement. The defendant moved, among other things, to dismiss the complaint and the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion on the ground that the agreement violated the statute of frauds (see General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]).

“To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, a writing must identify the parties, describe the subject matter, state all the essential terms of an agreement, and be signed by the party to be charged” (Urgo v Patel, 297 AD2d 376, 377 [2002]). “That the parties anticipated the execution of a more formal contract would not impair the effectiveness of the writing if it, in fact, embodies all of the essential terms of the agreement” (160 Chambers St. Realty Corp. v Register of New York, 226 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]).

The agreement identified the parties, described the subject property, stated the time and terms of payment, established the closing date, and was subscribed by the parties to be charged. Accordingly, the agreement satisfied the statute of frauds (see General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]; Rahimzadeh v M.A.C. Assoc., 304 AD2d 636 [2003]; 160 Chambers St. Realty Corp. v Register of New York, supra; Healy v Gumienny, 142 AD2d 629 [1988]; cf., Sabetfard v Smith, 306 AD2d 265 [2003]). The matters that were to be included in the supplemental contract were[*642] not material terms, and the fact that they remained unresolved did not vitiate the parties’ meeting of the minds as expressed in the executed agreement.

However, the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied because the defendant raised triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff repudiated the agreement or failed to comply with all of his obligations thereunder (see G.G.F. Props, v Yu Mi Hong, 284 AD2d 427 [2001]; Stewart v Sternberg, 137 AD2d 592 [1988]). Florio, J.P., Adams, Luciano and Skelos, JJ., concur.