costs defense in New York

1895Dubois v. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673 ; Oceanic Co. v. Compania , 134 id. 461 .

1895Dubois v. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673 ; Oceanic Co. v. Compania , 134 id. 461 .

2022While Hicks funded its share of the settlement using proceeds from its own insurance carrier, the procurement of insurance by Hicks to pay the costs of its defense and liability "does not diminish the separate and distinct obligation of [SDS], its contractual indemnitor" ( DiPerna , 200 AD2d at 271 ).

2022Further, the indemnification clause does not condition Hicks's right to indemnification on a finding of fault by SDS, or a third person ( see id. at 270 ; Santos v BRE/Swiss, LLC , 9 AD3d 303, 304 [1st Dept 2004]).

2011Accordingly, that branch of the cross motion remains pending and undecided (see Fragosa v Haider, 17 AD3d 526, 527 [2005]; Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536 [1979]).

2010That doctrine “requires that once an issue is judicially determined, it is deemed to be conclusive as to courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction” (Metropolitan Package Store Assn. v Koch, 89 AD2d 317, 321 [1982], appeal dismissed 58 NY2d 1112 [1983], appeal dismissed 464 US 802 [1983], reh denied 464 US 1003 [1983]; see Emergency Enclosures, Inc. v National Fire Adj.

2010That doctrine “requires that once an issue is judicially determined, it is deemed to be conclusive as to courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction” (Metropolitan Package Store Assn. v Koch, 89 AD2d 317, 321 [1982], appeal dismissed 58 NY2d 1112 [1983], appeal dismissed 464 US 802 [1983], reh denied 464 US 1003 [1983]; see Emergency Enclosures, Inc. v National Fire Adj.

2010(KTA), “in the main action up to the $100,000 deductible/ [self-insured retention (SIR)] set forth in the Continental [insurance] policy.” Liberty further contends that the court erred in granting that part of Continental’s cross motion seeking a declaration that Liberty and Continental “should share the costs of defense of KTA in the main action on an equal . . . basis following the exhaustion of that $100,000 deduetible/SIR.” At the outset, we agree with Liberty that the doctrine of law of the case does not apply based on the prior judgment that, inter alia, granted KTA’s prior motion for pa

2010(KTA), “in the main action up to the $100,000 deductible/ [self-insured retention (SIR)] set forth in the Continental [insurance] policy.” Liberty further contends that the court erred in granting that part of Continental’s cross motion seeking a declaration that Liberty and Continental “should share the costs of defense of KTA in the main action on an equal . . . basis following the exhaustion of that $100,000 deduetible/SIR.” At the outset, we agree with Liberty that the doctrine of law of the case does not apply based on the prior judgment that, inter alia, granted KTA’s prior motion for pa

2008When parties enter into a preliminary agreement, anticipating that a more formal contract will be executed later, the contract is enforceable if it embodies all the essential terms of the agreement (see Pescatore v Manniello, 19 AD3d 571 [2005]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640 [2005]).

2008When parties enter into a preliminary agreement, anticipating that a more formal contract will be executed later, the contract is enforceable if it embodies all the essential terms of the agreement (see Pescatore v Manniello, 19 AD3d 571 [2005]; Sabetfard v Djavaheri Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 640 [2005]).

2000Co. v Salvatore, 102 AD2d 342, 346 ).

2000On the other hand, the amount of any eventual liability determination against the landlord, and the costs of the defense, are not recoverable damages, inasmuch as both would be covered by the insurance procured by the landlord (see, e.g., Wallen v Polo Grounds Bar & Grill, supra; Wilson v Haagen Dazs Co., 201 AD2d 361 , supra; Noah v 270 Lafayette Assocs., 233 AD2d 108 , supra).

2000On the other hand, the amount of any eventual liability determination against the landlord, and the costs of the defense, are not recoverable damages, inasmuch as both would be covered by the insurance procured by the landlord (see, e.g., Wallen v Polo Grounds Bar & Grill, supra; Wilson v Haagen Dazs Co., 201 AD2d 361 , supra; Noah v 270 Lafayette Assocs., 233 AD2d 108 , supra).

2000On the other hand, the amount of any eventual liability determination against the landlord, and the costs of the defense, are not recoverable damages, inasmuch as both would be covered by the insurance procured by the landlord (see, e.g., Wallen v Polo Grounds Bar & Grill, supra; Wilson v Haagen Dazs Co., 201 AD2d 361 , supra; Noah v 270 Lafayette Assocs., 233 AD2d 108 , supra).

1999In light of our determination in the companion appeal (see, Davidson v Hilton Hotels Corp., 266 AD2d 335 [decidedherewith]), Hilton’s contention that it is entitled to be indemnified by DiMarino and the third-party defendants for any liability to the plaintiffs is academic.

1995Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 201 ).

1995They could not escape that limitation by simply denominating the action a plenary action for indemnification of the costs of the defense, which is entitled to a longer Statute of Limitations (see, Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 ; New York City Health & Hosps.

1993Corp., 350 F Supp 873 .) How the costs of defense are to be allocated is treated differently in different jurisdictions.

1992Co., 707 F Supp 1368 ).

1984Co. ( 313 F Supp 502 [EDNY]) it was held that the insured may recover the costs of its defense from the primary carrier.

1984A determination as to whether the alleged act upon which a suit is based actually occurred within the scope of the official’s duties should be an objective one based on the actual facts of the case (see 1982 Opns St Comp 82-243; 1980 Opns St Comp 80-688). 11 The county’s reliance on Corning v Village of Laurel Hollow ( 48 NY2d 348 ) for support of the proposition that reimbursement of officials for the costs of their defense is unconstitutional is misguided.

1977This type of expense, we believe, is precisely that contemplated by the Legislature in the additional allowance percentage of the Condemnation Law, as section 16 thereof has been interpreted (see, e.g., Matter of Dodge v Tierney, 40 AD2d 936 ; City of Binghamton v Chenango Enterprises, 48 Misc 2d 430, 434 ).

1977This type of expense, we believe, is precisely that contemplated by the Legislature in the additional allowance percentage of the Condemnation Law, as section 16 thereof has been interpreted (see, e.g., Matter of Dodge v Tierney, 40 AD2d 936 ; City of Binghamton v Chenango Enterprises, 48 Misc 2d 430, 434 ).

1976Second, article I (§ 7, subd [a]) of the Constitution of New York State mandates that "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” In Matter of the City of New York (Town of Hempstead) ( 125 App Div 219, 222 ) Justice Woodward wrote as follows: "The Constitution (Art. 1, § 6) requires that private property shall not be taken for public purposes except upon the payment of 'just compensation’, and a man who is forced into court, where he owes no obligation to the party moving against him, cannot be said to have received 'just compensation’ for his property if h