Jolkovsky v. Legeman, 32 A.D.3d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). · Go Syfert
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Jolkovsky v. Legeman, 32 A.D.3d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Koren v. Albert Warehouse & Son, Inc. (nyappdiv, 2017-03-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Koren v. Albert Warehouse & Son, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Corp., 122 AD3d 660, 661 [2014]; Darlind Constr, Inc. v Prism Solar Tech., Inc., 109 AD3d 783 , 783 [2013]; Hosten v Oladapo, 52 AD3d 658, 658 [2008]; Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418, 419 [2006]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucas v. Stam
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Considering the minimal delay, the absence of prejudice to the plaintiff, and the lack of willfulness on the part of COC, the delay in serving its answer was properly excused (see Darlind Constr., Inc. v Prism Solar Tech., Inc., 109 AD3d 783 , 783-784 [2013]; Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418, 419 [2006]; Bunch v Dollar Budget, Inc., 12 AD3d 391, 391 [2004]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abdul v. Hirschfield
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Auth., 51 AD3d 781 [2d Dept 2008]; White v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 41 AD3d 709 [2d Dept 2007]; Beizer v Funk, 5 AD3d 619 , 620 [2d Dept 2004].) Also, the court is mindful that “public policy favors the resolution of cases on the merits.” (Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418, 419 [2d Dept 2006]; see Cortlandt Healthcare, LLC v Gantt, 54 AD3d 799 [2d Dept 2008]; Hosten v Oladapo, 52 AD3d 658 [2d Dept 2008]; Montgomery v Cranes, Inc., 50 AD3d 981 [2d Dept 2008]; Bunch v Dollar Budget, Inc., 12 AD3d 391 [2d Dept 2004].) Applying the above standards to defendant Chu, and balancing Chu’s …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Montgomery v. Cranes, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
Moreover, public policy favors the resolution of cases on the merits (see Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418, 419 [2006]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nickell v. Pathmark Stores, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Considering the respondent’s explanation for its brief delay in appearing and answering, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the lack of prejudice to the appellant, and in light of the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the respondent’s delay in answering was properly excused (see D’Aquila v Marchena, 37 AD3d 398 [2007]; Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418, 419 [2006]; Schonfeld v Blue & White Food Prods.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Giacopelli v. Guiducci
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
However, denying the plaintiffs’ motion and granting that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was to compel acceptance of their answer was appropriate given, inter alia, the brief delay in answering, the absence of prejudice to the plaintiffs, the existence of potentially meritorious defenses, and the public policy favoring resolution of issues on the merits (see Giladi v City of New York, 34 AD3d 733 [2006]; Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418, 419 [2006]; New York & Presbyt.
discussed Cited "see" Hosten v. Oladapo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
The defendant’s “delay in appearing and answering was brief, the default was not willful, and there was no evidence that the plaintiff was prejudiced” (Bunch v Dollar Budget, Inc., 12 AD3d 391, 391 [2004]; see Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418 [2006]; Friedman v Ostreicher, 22 AD3d 798, 799 [2005]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Naomi Jolkovsky
v.
John E. Legeman, and Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corporation
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Aug 8, 2006.
32 A.D.3d 418
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the de[*419] fendant Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corporation appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rosenberg, J.), dated May 20, 2005, which granted the plaintiffs motion for leave to enter judgment against it upon its default in appearing and answering the complaint and denied its cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3102 (d) to extend its time to serve and file an answer and to compel the plaintiff to accept its late answer.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, and the “amended answer with cross claim to supplemental complaint” annexed to the cross motion papers is deemed served upon the plaintiff.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion for leave to enter judgment against the defendant Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corporation (hereinafter Chase) upon Chase’s default in appearing and answering the complaint, and in denying Chase’s cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to extend the time to serve and file an answer and to compel the plaintiff to accept its late answer. Chase’s “delay in appearing and answering was brief, the default was not willful, and there was no evidence that the plaintiff was prejudiced” (Bunch v Dollar Budget, Inc., 12 AD3d 391 [2004]; see Friedman v Ostreicher, 22 AD3d 798, 799 [2005]). Moreover, public policy favors the resolution of cases on the merits (see Bunch v Dollar Budget, Inc., supra). Florio, J.P, Santucci, Rivera and Covello, JJ., concur.