possible meritorious defense in New York

1997Although the failure to serve a timely reply was apparently caused by law office failure, considering the existence of a possible meritorious defense to the counterclaims, the lack of willfulness on the part of the plaintiffs, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving claims on the merits, we agree, as a matter of discretion, that the plaintiffs’ delay in serving a reply was properly excused (see, Polizzotto v Ultra Express Coach 220 AD2d 568 ; Robles v Grace Episcopal Church, 192 AD2d 515 ; see also, Matter of Ajamian, 225 AD2d 992 ; Berman v Szpilzinger, 172 AD2d 304 ; Sunrise Assoc

1996In view of the relatively short period of delay involved, the absence of any claim of prejudice to the plaintiffs, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the absence of any willfulness on the defendant’s part, and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the defendant’s motion to vacate its default was properly granted (see, Pollizotto v Ultra Express Coach, 220 AD2d 568 ; Robles v Grace Episcopal Church, 192 AD2d 515 ).

1997Although the failure to serve a timely reply was apparently caused by law office failure, considering the existence of a possible meritorious defense to the counterclaims, the lack of willfulness on the part of the plaintiffs, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving claims on the merits, we agree, as a matter of discretion, that the plaintiffs’ delay in serving a reply was properly excused (see, Polizzotto v Ultra Express Coach 220 AD2d 568 ; Robles v Grace Episcopal Church, 192 AD2d 515 ; see also, Matter of Ajamian, 225 AD2d 992 ; Berman v Szpilzinger, 172 AD2d 304 ; Sunrise Assoc

1996In view of the relatively short period of delay involved, the absence of any claim of prejudice to the plaintiffs, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the absence of any willfulness on the defendant’s part, and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the defendant’s motion to vacate its default was properly granted (see, Pollizotto v Ultra Express Coach, 220 AD2d 568 ; Robles v Grace Episcopal Church, 192 AD2d 515 ).

2008Mgt, Inc., 22 AD3d 826 [2005]; Kaiser v Delaney, 255 AD2d 362 [1998]; Robles v Grace Episcopal Church, 192 AD2d 515 [1993]).

2003In view of the absence of any prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the lack of willfulness on the part of the defendant, and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, we agree with the Supreme Court that, as a matter of discretion, the defendant’s delay in answering was properly excused (see Drake v Drake, supra; Calcagno v Magistrelli, 284 AD2d 289 [2001]; Kaiser v Delaney, 255 AD2d 362 [1998]; Van Man Adhesives Corp. v City of New York, 236 AD2d 465 [1997]).

1994Co., 188 AD2d 575 ; Gisondi & Co. v Evans Dev.

1993Co., 188 AD2d 575 ; I.J.

1988In view of the relatively short period of the delay, the absence of any claim of prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the absence of any willfulness on the appellants’ part and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the Supreme Court should have denied the cross motion and granted the appellants leave to file late answers (see, McNeill v LaSala, 115 AD2d 459 ).

1988In view of the relatively short period of the delay, the absence of any claim of prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the absence of any willfulness on the appellants’ part and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the Supreme Court should have denied the cross motion and granted the appellants leave to file late answers (see, McNeill v Lasala, 115 AD2d 459 ).

2024Pursuant to CPLR 2005, this Court may “exercise[] its discretion in the interests of justice to excuse delay or default resulting from law office failure.” In exercising this discretion, a court will consider “the procedural history of [the] case. . . the lack of prejudice, and a possible meritorious defense” (Maze v Di Bartolo, 97 AD2d 815, 815 , 468 NYS2d 688 [2nd Dept 1983]). 157655/2022 BENFIELD PARTNERS, INC. vs.

2024Pursuant to CPLR 2005, this Court may “exercise[] its discretion in the interests of justice to excuse delay or default resulting from law office failure.” In exercising this discretion, a court will consider “the procedural history of [the] case. . . the lack of prejudice, and a possible meritorious defense” (Maze v Di Bartolo, 97 AD2d 815, 815 , 468 NYS2d 688 [2nd Dept 1983]). 157655/2022 BENFIELD PARTNERS, INC. vs.

2019Upon a review of the record, we find that the District Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion, since defendant established an excusable default and a possible meritorious defense to the action ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Abrash v Lavendar , 119 AD2d 785 [1986]).

2019In these circumstances, and in view of the strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits, defendant's default should be excused ( see Hoskie Co., Inc. v Wu , 112 AD3d 497 [2013]).

2008Mgt, Inc., 22 AD3d 826 [2005]; Kaiser v Delaney, 255 AD2d 362 [1998]; Robles v Grace Episcopal Church, 192 AD2d 515 [1993]).

2008In view of the very short delay, the absence of any prejudice to the plaintiffs, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the lack of willfulness on the part of Tyree, and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, Tyree’s motion was properly granted (see Jolkovsky v Legeman, 32 AD3d 418 [2006]; Rottenberg v Preferred Prop.

2006Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in, in effect, granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to vacate so much of the compliance conference order as set a deadline for completing depositions (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Berry v Aquila Realty Co., 6 AD3d 563 [2004]; Burns v Casale, 276 AD2d 734, 735 [2000]).

2005Under the circumstances, including, inter aha, the reasonable excuse offered by the defendants for their delay in answering, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the lack of any evidence of willfulness, the absence of prejudice to the plaintiffs, and public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion, among other things, to vacate their default (see CFLR 5015 [a] [1]; Bunch v Dollar Budget, Inc., 12 AD3d 391 [2004]; Orwell Bldg.

2003In view of the absence of any prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the lack of willfulness on the part of the defendant, and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, we agree with the Supreme Court that, as a matter of discretion, the defendant’s delay in answering was properly excused (see Drake v Drake, supra; Calcagno v Magistrelli, 284 AD2d 289 [2001]; Kaiser v Delaney, 255 AD2d 362 [1998]; Van Man Adhesives Corp. v City of New York, 236 AD2d 465 [1997]).