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12 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Abbot v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2024NYCHA does not deny knowledge of the inspection of the apartment and receipt of the DOH abatement order, which provided it with actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the tenants' claims within 90 days or a reasonable time after the claim arose ( see Abbot v City of New York , 271 AD2d 364, 364 [1st Dept 2000]). 2024NYCHA does not deny knowledge of the inspection of the apartment and receipt of the DOH abatement order, which provided it with actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the tenants' claims within 90 days or a reasonable time after the claim arose ( see Abbot v City of New York , 271 AD2d 364, 364 [1st Dept 2000]). | 1 | 1 |
Gelish v. Dix Hills Water Districtgreen1 sentence2009In addition, the original notice of claim, which was served only six days beyond the statutory period, was sufficiently particular to apprise the City of the plaintiffs claim of assault within a reasonable time after the claim accrued (see Matter of Gelish v Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 AD3d 841, 842 [2009]; Bussey v City of New York, 50 AD3d 938, 939 [2008]; Matter of Fritsch v Westchester County Dept. of Transp., 170 AD2d 602 [1991]). | 1 | 1 |
Bussey v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2009In addition, the original notice of claim, which was served only six days beyond the statutory period, was sufficiently particular to apprise the City of the plaintiffs claim of assault within a reasonable time after the claim accrued (see Matter of Gelish v Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 AD3d 841, 842 [2009]; Bussey v City of New York, 50 AD3d 938, 939 [2008]; Matter of Fritsch v Westchester County Dept. of Transp., 170 AD2d 602 [1991]). | 1 | 1 |
Lanphere v. County of Washingtongreen1 sentence2005It is well established that the decision to permit the late filing of a notice of claim is discretionary and involves a consideration of several factors, including whether the municipal defendant acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time after the claim accrued, whether a reasonable excuse was proffered for the delay in filing the claim and whether granting the application would result in prejudice to the municipality (see Matter of Tara V. v County of Otsego, 12 AD3d 984, 985 [2004]; Matter of Crocco v Town of New Scotland, 307 AD2d 516, | 1 | 1 |
Crocco v. Town of New Scotlandgreen1 sentence2005It is well established that the decision to permit the late filing of a notice of claim is discretionary and involves a consideration of several factors, including whether the municipal defendant acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time after the claim accrued, whether a reasonable excuse was proffered for the delay in filing the claim and whether granting the application would result in prejudice to the municipality (see Matter of Tara V. v County of Otsego, 12 AD3d 984, 985 [2004]; Matter of Crocco v Town of New Scotland, 307 AD2d 516, | 1 | 1 |
Tara V. v. County of Otsegogreen1 sentence2005It is well established that the decision to permit the late filing of a notice of claim is discretionary and involves a consideration of several factors, including whether the municipal defendant acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time after the claim accrued, whether a reasonable excuse was proffered for the delay in filing the claim and whether granting the application would result in prejudice to the municipality (see Matter of Tara V. v County of Otsego, 12 AD3d 984, 985 [2004]; Matter of Crocco v Town of New Scotland, 307 AD2d 516, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Regan v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2025Auth. , 162 AD3d 884; Matter of Regan v City of New York , 131 AD3d 1064). 2025Auth. , 162 AD3d 884 ; Matter of Regan v City of New York , 131 AD3d 1064 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Matter of Bhargava v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2017Additionally, DASNY’s receipt of information regarding the accident approximately 37 days after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed did not, under the circumstances, provide it with actual knowledge of the essential facts within a reasonable time after the claim arose (see Matter of Bhargava v City of New York, 130 AD3d 819 [2015]; Matter of Murray v Village of Malverne, 118 AD3d 798 [2014]; Matter of Sanchez v City of New York, 116 AD3d 703 [2014]; Matter of Katsiouras v City of New York, 106 AD3d 916 [2013]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Katsiouras v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2017Additionally, DASNY’s receipt of information regarding the accident approximately 37 days after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed did not, under the circumstances, provide it with actual knowledge of the essential facts within a reasonable time after the claim arose (see Matter of Bhargava v City of New York, 130 AD3d 819 [2015]; Matter of Murray v Village of Malverne, 118 AD3d 798 [2014]; Matter of Sanchez v City of New York, 116 AD3d 703 [2014]; Matter of Katsiouras v City of New York, 106 AD3d 916 [2013]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sanchez v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2017Additionally, DASNY’s receipt of information regarding the accident approximately 37 days after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed did not, under the circumstances, provide it with actual knowledge of the essential facts within a reasonable time after the claim arose (see Matter of Bhargava v City of New York, 130 AD3d 819 [2015]; Matter of Murray v Village of Malverne, 118 AD3d 798 [2014]; Matter of Sanchez v City of New York, 116 AD3d 703 [2014]; Matter of Katsiouras v City of New York, 106 AD3d 916 [2013]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Murray v. Village of Malverne
green
1 sentence2017Additionally, DASNY’s receipt of information regarding the accident approximately 37 days after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed did not, under the circumstances, provide it with actual knowledge of the essential facts within a reasonable time after the claim arose (see Matter of Bhargava v City of New York, 130 AD3d 819 [2015]; Matter of Murray v Village of Malverne, 118 AD3d 798 [2014]; Matter of Sanchez v City of New York, 116 AD3d 703 [2014]; Matter of Katsiouras v City of New York, 106 AD3d 916 [2013]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Holmes
neutral
1 sentence2015The subsequent interview came within a reasonable time after the warnings had last been given (see People v Holmes 82 AD3d 441 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 895 [2011]), and, for the reasons previously stated, the questioning cannot be viewed as having followed a request for counsel. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fritsch v. Westchester County Department of Transportation
neutral
1 sentence2009In addition, the original notice of claim, which was served only six days beyond the statutory period, was sufficiently particular to apprise the City of the plaintiffs claim of assault within a reasonable time after the claim accrued (see Matter of Gelish v Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 AD3d 841, 842 [2009]; Bussey v City of New York, 50 AD3d 938, 939 [2008]; Matter of Fritsch v Westchester County Dept. of Transp., 170 AD2d 602 [1991]). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Vasquez
neutral
1 sentence2004(People v Vasquez, 183 AD2d 864 [2d Dept 1992]; see, People v Parker, NYLJ, June 3, 1991, at 29, col 6 [Sup Ct, Bronx County].) Intervals of up to 12 hours — much longer than was involved here — have been held to have been reasonable. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. . Molineux
green
1 sentence2000The admission into evidence of certain photographs was proper as they were relevant to the defendant’s motive for the commission of the crime (see, People v Correal, 160 AD2d 85, 92 , citing People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Correal
green
1 sentence2000The admission into evidence of certain photographs was proper as they were relevant to the defendant’s motive for the commission of the crime (see, People v Correal, 160 AD2d 85, 92 , citing People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Stanton
neutral
1 sentence2000Where, as here, the interrogation is continuous, a statement made by a defendant during interrogation will not be suppressed for failure to repeat the Miranda warnings if the statement is made within a reasonable time after such warnings have been given (see, People v Thomas, 233 AD2d 347 ; People v Baker, 208 AD2d 758 ; People v Stanton, 162 AD2d 987 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Baker
green
1 sentence2000Where, as here, the interrogation is continuous, a statement made by a defendant during interrogation will not be suppressed for failure to repeat the Miranda warnings if the statement is made within a reasonable time after such warnings have been given (see, People v Thomas, 233 AD2d 347 ; People v Baker, 208 AD2d 758 ; People v Stanton, 162 AD2d 987 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2000Where, as here, the interrogation is continuous, a statement made by a defendant during interrogation will not be suppressed for failure to repeat the Miranda warnings if the statement is made within a reasonable time after such warnings have been given (see, People v Thomas, 233 AD2d 347 ; People v Baker, 208 AD2d 758 ; People v Stanton, 162 AD2d 987 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Altavilla v. Patchogue Medford School District
green
1 sentence1997The petitioner Paulette Graham failed to offer a legally acceptable excuse for waiting over four months after the expiration of the 90-day period before seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim, failed to demonstrate that the respondent Wyandanch Union Free School District (hereinafter the school district) acquired actual knowledge of the facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time after the claim arose, and failed to prove that the extensive unexplained delay, extending into the following school year, did not prejudice the school district’s ability to defend against the claims ma | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Baldeo v. City of New York
neutral
1 sentence1995Auth., 180 AD2d 551 ; Baldeo v City of New York, 127 AD2d 809 ), the plaintiff nevertheless failed to demonstrate that the SCA had acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the claim arose (see, e.g., Matter of Tricomi v New York City Hous. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Shelden v. New York City Housing Authority
green
1 sentence1995Auth., 180 AD2d 551 ; Baldeo v City of New York, 127 AD2d 809 ), the plaintiff nevertheless failed to demonstrate that the SCA had acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the claim arose (see, e.g., Matter of Tricomi v New York City Hous. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Tricomi v. New York City Housing Authority
neutral
1 sentence1995Auth., 191 AD2d 447 ; Matter of D'Andrea v City of Glen Cove Pub. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Environmental Compliance, Inc. v. William Floyd Union Free School District of Mastic-Moriches-Shirley
neutral
1 sentence1992The decision to grant an application is discretionary (see, e.g, Environmental Compliance v Floyd Union Free School Dist., 158 AD2d 663 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People ex rel. Knowles v. Smith
green
1 sentence1981Knowles v Smith, 54 NY2d 259 .) Concur: Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.