Vega v. James, 67 A.D.3d 1317 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). · Go Syfert
Vega v. James, 67 A.D.3d 1317 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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12 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Matter of Perkins v. Albany Port Dist. Commn. (nyappdiv, 2020-12-24)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Perkins v. Albany Port Dist. Commn.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Thus, the City was "unaware of any facts to suggest that [it was] responsible" for the condition that caused petitioner's fall ( Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth. , 67 AD3d 1317, 1318 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Matter of Curiel v Town of Thurman , 289 AD2d 737, 738 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 611 [2002]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Kim v. Dormitory Authority of the State of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
The nonexhaustive list of pertinent factors include “whether [respondent] obtained actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter, whether [petitioner] offered a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing a claim and whether that delay would substantially prejudice [respondent], with no one factor being dispositive” (Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318 [2009]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Reinemann v Village of Altamont, 112 AD3d 1264, 1265 [2013]; Matter of Crocco v Town of New Scotland…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abad v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Section 50-e (5) of the General Municipal Law confers a court with broad discretion whether to grant leave to serve late notice (see Diallo v City of New York, 224 AD2d 339 , 340 [1st Dept 1996]), and on appeal the court’s determination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion (Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318 [3d Dept 2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abad v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Section 50-e (5) of the General Municipal Law confers a court with broad discretion whether to grant leave to serve late notice (see Diallo v City of New York, 224 AD2d 339 , 340 [1st Dept 1996]), and on appeal the court’s determination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion (Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318 [3d Dept 2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reinemann v. Village of Altamont
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Under these circumstances, petitioners failed to demonstrate that respondents “had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” (Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318-1319 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Folmar v Lewiston-Porter Cent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reinemann v. Village of Altamont
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Under these circumstances, petitioners failed to demonstrate that respondents “had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” (Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318-1319 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Folmar v Lewiston-Porter Cent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conger v. Ogdensburg City School District
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we cannot say that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s application (see Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318-1319 [2009]; Matter of Smith v Otselic Val.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franco v. Town of Cairo (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Servs., 79 AD3d 1405, 1405 [2010]; Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318-1319 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Folmar v. Lewiston-Porter Central School District
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
The record supports respondent’s contention that it was not aware of those allegations until claimant made the instant application, and thus was unaware of any facts to suggest that it was responsible for claimant’s injuries despite its knowledge that the accident occurred (see Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318-1319 [2009]; Le Mieux, 1 AD3d at 996).
discussed Cited "see" Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. County of Madison
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 538-539 [2006]), and this Court has repeatedly held that, absent a clear abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion, the “determination of an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim will not be disturbed” (Matter of Isereau v Brushton-Moira School Dist., 6 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2004]; see Kirtley v Albany County Airport Auth., 67 AD3d 1317, 1318 [2009]; Matter of Dewey v Town of Colonie, 54 AD3d at 1143 ; Matter of Hinton v New Paltz Cent.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Jose Vega
v.
Randy James, as Superintendent of Camp Georgetown Correctional Facility
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Nov 25, 2009.
67 A.D.3d 1317
Published

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Garry, J.), entered December 2, 2008 in Madison County, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent Department of Correctional Services calculating petitioner’s prison sentence.

In September 2004, petitioner was sentenced as a second felony offender to a prison term of 4 to 8 years upon his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. The sentence and commitment order failed to specify the manner in which this sentence was to run relative to petitioner’s prior undischarged prison terms. Respondent Department of Correctional Services treated petitioner’s 2004 sentence as running consecutively to his prior undischarged terms. Petitioner commenced a habeas corpus proceeding to challenge that computation and the legality of his continued incarceration. Supreme Court converted the matter to this CPLR article 78 proceeding and annulled the sentencing calculation, prompting this appeal by respondents.

Where a statute compels the imposition of a consecutive sentence, the sentencing court is deemed to have imposed the consecutive sentence required by law—regardless of whether it issues a specific directive to that effect (see People ex rel. Gill v Greene, 12 NY3d 1, 4 [2009], cert denied sub nom. Gill v Rock, 558 US —, 130 S Ct 86 [2009]). As there is no dispute that petitioner was sentenced as a second felony offender and, therefore, was subject to the consecutive sentencing provisions of Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a), we discern no error in the computation of his sentence (see People ex rel. Taylor v Brown, 62 AD3d 1063, 1064 [2009]). Accordingly, Supreme Court’s judgment is reversed and the petition is dismissed.

Cardona, EJ., Peters, Lahtinen, Kane and Stein, JJ:, concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.