Loretta C.W. v. Mark A.W., 77 A.D.3d 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2010). · Go Syfert
Loretta C.W. v. Mark A.W., 77 A.D.3d 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2010). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Cited for
At page 589 Unpreserved arguments regarding statutory notice periods2 citing casestions under Family Court Act § 439 (e) never began running because the Family Court mailed the order of support directly to her rather than to her counsel (see…opening of page *589 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Matter of Catherine L. v. Terence M., 208 A.D.3d 1132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2022).published
    Respondent's remaining arguments are unpreserved ( see Matter of Loretta C.W. v Mark A.W. , 77 AD3d 588, 589 [1st Dept 2010]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice.THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME…
  • Matter of Deborah K. v. Richard K., 203 A.D.3d 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2022).published
    The father's remaining objections to the Support Magistrate's amended orders are unpreserved for appellate review ( see Matter of Loretta C.W. v Mark A.W. , 77 AD3d 588, 589 [1st Dept 2010]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Loretta C.W.
v.
Mark A.W.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 28, 2010.
Published opinion
77 A.D.3d 588
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Alma Cordova, J.), entered on or about April 21, 2009, which denied petitioner wife’s objections to the Support Magistrate’s order of support, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner’s argument, that the 35-day period for filing objec[*589]tions under Family Court Act § 439 (e) never began running because the Family Court mailed the order of support directly to her rather than to her counsel (see CPLR 2103 [b]), is unpreserved since it was never raised before the Family Court. Were we to review this argument, we would find that in the objections to the order of support, petitioner’s counsel conceded that the 35-day period set forth in section 439 (e) indeed applied. Furthermore, the record shows that the court properly denied the objections since they were received by the clerk’s office approximately one week after the expiration of the applicable 35-day period (see e.g. Matter of Mazzilli v Mazzilli, 17 AD3d 680 [2005], lv denied, 5 NY3d 705 [2005]).

In view of the foregoing, we do not reach the arguments concerning the merits of petitioner’s objections to the order of support. Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Catterson, Renwick and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.