Shiffman v. Shiffman, 57 A.D.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). · Go Syfert
Shiffman v. Shiffman, 57 A.D.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tuckman v. Tuckman (nysupct, 1982-02-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tuckman v. Tuckman
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1982 · confidence medium
(Shiftman v Shiftman, 57 AD2d 519, 520; Gleeson v Gleeson, 69 AD2d 964 , mot for lv to app dsmd 47 NY2d 709 .) The question presently before the court is whether the equitable distribution amendments to the Domestic Relations Law should warrant a departure from the holdings in Shiftman (supra) and Gleeson (supra).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gleeson v. Gleeson
N.Y. App. Div. · 1979 · confidence medium
"Alimony will not become an issue * * * unless and until the support terms of the separation agreement are set aside.” (Shiffman v Shiffman, supra, p 520; cf. Moat v Moat, 27 AD2d 895 .) Since neither alimony nor support were an issue here, section 250 of the Domestic Relations Law did not apply.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Moss v. Moss
N.Y. App. Div. · 1978 · signal: see also · confidence low
The remedy is "a speedy trial, where the true facts concerning the finances and standard of living of the parties can more accurately be ascertained.” (Macken v Macken, 63 AD2d 874 ; see, also, Brokaw v Brokaw, 57 AD2d 519 .) Concur—Kupferman, J.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Felix Shiffman
v.
Mira Shiffman
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 14, 1977.
57 A.D.2d 519
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered December 1, 1976, denying plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs and without disbursements, and motion granted. Plaintiff brought an action for conversion divorce based upon the parties’ 1972 separation agreement. The defendant counterclaimed to rescind the separation agreement on the ground that she was coerced into signing it at a time[*520] when she was heavily dependent upon drugs. Thereafter, the defendant served the plaintiff with a notice to examine him with regard to his income and assets. The plaintiff promptly moved for a protective order to vacate that notice as premature, but the lower court denied that motion for plaintiff’s failure to advance a valid reason in support thereof. Section 250 of the Domestic Relations Law provides, to the extent here relevant, that: "In all matrimonial actions and proceedings commenced on or after September first, nineteen hundred seventy-five in supreme court in which alimony or support is in issue and all support proceedings in family court, there shall be compulsory disclosure by both parties of their respective financial states. No showing of special circumstances shall be required before such disclosure is ordered.” While the plaintiff has clearly brought a matrimonial action for divorce (CPLR 105, subd.[o]), alimony will not become an issue in this proceeding unless and until the support terms of the separation agreement are set aside (Moat v Moat, 27 AD2d 895). If the support terms are set aside, the defendant may then move for such disclosure as is advisable. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Silverman, Capozzoli, Lane and Markewich, JJ.