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12 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1939–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Custodi v. Town of Amherstgreen1 sentence2017School Dist., 14 NY3d at 395 ; accord Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d at 89 ). | 1 | 1 |
In re Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-agreen1 sentence2007Co. v Combustion Eng’g, 264 AD2d 319, 321-322 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
Hamptons Hospital & Medical Center, Inc. v. Mooregreen1 sentence1984Center v Moore, 52 NY2d 88, 93, n 1 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re GAULT
green
2 sentences1980While the doctrine of parens patriae does not permit any unfairness in judicial procedure towards juveniles (Matter of Gault, 387 U. S. 1 , supra) * * * the vitality of that doctrine continues in that the State has the power to perform the parental role of insuring the child’s * * * training [to which we add protection and support], when the parent is unable to control [her] sufficiently to perform it. 1971While the doctrine of parens patriae does not permit any unfairness in judicial procedure towards juveniles (Matter of Gault, 387 U. S. 1 , supra), in this court’s opinion the vitality of that doctrine continues in that the State has the power to perform the parental role of insuring the child’s education and training, when the parent is unable to control him sufficiently to perform it. | 2 | 1971–1980 |
Trupia v. Lake George Central School District
green
1 sentence2017School Dist., 14 NY3d at 395 ; accord Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d at 89 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing
green
1 sentence1996As we have already quoted, the core principle of the Establishment Clause is that religious observance must be "a matter of voluntary choice" ( id. , at 640), and that the State may not " force nor influence a person to go to * * * church against his will or force him to profess a belief" ( Everson v Board of Educ. , supra , 330 US, at 15-16 ). *695 Even those scholars who urge a shift to a more flexible, accommodating approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence than the present Supreme Court decisions would dictate, recognize the need for retaining the vitality of that principle. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Leon's Collision Shop, Inc. v. Adduci
green
1 sentence1993(VDR Realty Corp. v Mintz, 167 AD2d 986 [4th Dept 1990]; Skinner v Stone, Raskin & Israel, 724 F2d 264 [2d Cir 1983]; 76 NY Jur 2d, Malpractice, § 39.) Here plaintiff sues essentially for the difference in the value of his claim as having been diminished by defendants’ negligence; that is, the value of the claim had it been properly prepared and tried in the Court of Claims less any payments received in the Supreme Court action. (1 Hallen and Smith, op. cit., § 16.19.) Had any of the exonerated defendants in the underlying action pleaded an affirmative defense that the present defendants could | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Kossover v. Trattler
green
1 sentence1992Malpractice is both a defense to an action to recover for professional services and a predicate for a counterclaim, and if used for either purpose it destroys the vitality of the claim for services (Kossover v Trattler, 104 Mise 2d 424, 428, affd 82 AD2d 610 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Shiffman v. Shiffman
green
1 sentence1983We all agree that the Equitable Distribution Law (Domestic Relations Law, § 236, part B), applicable to matrimonial actions commenced after July 19, 1980, saps the vitality of the rule barring financial disclosure in a matrimonial action unless and until the support provisions of an existing separation agreement are set aside (see Shiffman v Shiffman, 57 AD2d 519 ; Gleeson v Gleeson, 69 AD2d 964 , mot for lv to app dsmd 47 NY2d 709 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gleeson v. Gleeson
neutral
1 sentence1983We all agree that the Equitable Distribution Law (Domestic Relations Law, § 236, part B), applicable to matrimonial actions commenced after July 19, 1980, saps the vitality of the rule barring financial disclosure in a matrimonial action unless and until the support provisions of an existing separation agreement are set aside (see Shiffman v Shiffman, 57 AD2d 519 ; Gleeson v Gleeson, 69 AD2d 964 , mot for lv to app dsmd 47 NY2d 709 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rottkamp v. Young
green
1 sentence1982Corp. (supra) which restated the vitality of the immunity doctrine set forth in Rottkamp (supra) were decided after the amendment to CPLR 2512, and gave no expression to the claimed abrogation of immunity now contended by the plaintiffs. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
In re Mario
neutral
1 sentence1980If children were permitted the same freedom of choice as adults, they might well be unequipped when they attain adulthood to exercise any freedom of choice” (Matter of Mario, 65 Misc 2d 708, 717 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Miles
green
1 sentence1976We note that the vitality of the doctrine was expressly recognized in People v Miles ( 23 NY2d 527 ) decided by our court more than 15 months after the Penal Law revision became effective. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Collister v. . Fassitt
green
1 sentence1939It is to be recalled that no will has a brother (Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 286 ), and that there is a dominant rule that “ each will is to be construed by itself and depends for its meaning largely upon its own context and subject matter.” (See Matter of Spitz-miller, 96 Misc. 381, 384 .) There is no doubt of the vitality of the principle, or that the courts have held that a clause referring to the death of a beneficiary contemplates the latter’s death in the lifetime of the testator. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
In re the Estate of Evans
green
1 sentence1939(Matter of Evans, supra, and numerous cases there cited.) In the last-mentioned case Surrogate Foley stated, however (at p. 763), that “ It is true that this general rule that the death referred to in the will is death in the lifetime of the testator, yields to facts or circumstances or language in the will indicating a different intention.” He called attention, also (p. 763), to the fact that “ words of present gift in reference to a remainder are strong evidence of an intention that the remainder is to vest on the death of the testator.” In clause “ Fourth ” (supra) no such words are found. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
In re the Estate of Spitzmiller
neutral
1 sentence1939It is to be recalled that no will has a brother (Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 286 ), and that there is a dominant rule that “ each will is to be construed by itself and depends for its meaning largely upon its own context and subject matter.” (See Matter of Spitz-miller, 96 Misc. 381, 384 .) There is no doubt of the vitality of the principle, or that the courts have held that a clause referring to the death of a beneficiary contemplates the latter’s death in the lifetime of the testator. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.